India’s New Defense Budget: Another Year, Another Disappointment? - The Diplomat, 6 February 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at India's defence spending for 2020-21 and it is another year of disappointment, as far as military modernisation of the Indian armed forces are concerned. The new numbers highlight New Delhi’s continued challenge of investing in its much-needed military modernization.

Indian Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman presented the new budget for the country last week. From the perspective of defense modernization, the budget has yet again proved to be disappointing, with significant implications for India as well as other key partners and competitors.

For the full essay, click here.



Sitharaman announced an allocation of 4.71 trillion rupees (about $66.9 billion) for the Ministry of Defense (MoD), 15.49 percent of the total central government expenditure. Of this, almost $45.8 billion goes to meet the expenses of the army, navy, and air force as well as the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The rest of the allocation goes to meet defense pensions (about $19.0 billion) and MoD (Civil) (about $2.1 billion). The revised estimate for the previous year, 2019-20, was $65 billion.

The allocations for the various services are once again not very different from previous years: the army has received the biggest chunk of the allocation of 56 percent, the air force at 23 percent, and the navy has the smallest share at 15 percent. Over the last few years, India’s defense budget allocation has drawn unfavorable comparison to the budgets in the period prior to the 1962 war with China.

This year’s defense budget without the defense pensions amounts to a mere 1.5 percent of the GDP, which is noticeably low considering the state of the military. This figure is made worse by the fact that pensions accounted for only about 5 percent of the defense budget in 1960-61 but have skyrocketed to over 40 percent now, which in essence means that much less of the budget is going toward modernization of military equipment.

As I have written previously in The Diplomat (in 2018 and 2019) the current defense budget allocation comes against the backdrop of the 2018 Parliamentary Committee Report, which brought out severe deficiencies in the Indian military. Indian Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt. Gen. Sarath Chand in 2018 lamented the budget allocation, saying that it “has dashed our hopes.” He argued that as India looks at potentially fighting a two-front war scenario, the Indian military’s deficiencies are that much worse. He said then that unless the government makes necessary funds available for emergency procurement, the army, for instance, did not have war reserves to fight a high-intensity war beyond 10 days. In addition to the two fronts in the east and west, the Indian Army is also bogged down in internal security operations in the northeast and in Jammu and Kashmir.

Two years later, the situation has not improved much. Despite the Modi government’s national security rhetoric, it has failed when it comes to military modernization.

The capital expenditure that is available for the army is slightly less than $5 billion, for the navy it is less than $4 billion, and for the air force slightly more than $6 billion. These in effect cripple the Indian military’s efforts to modernize their weapon platforms. The Indian Army has been making efforts to procure a number of different platforms, including the M777 ultra-light howitzers and the K-9 Vajra self-propelled gun. Buying the indigenously produced 155 mm towed howitzers has also been an issue.

The Indian navy’s deficiencies are again well known. The fact that the number of operational submarines stands at 13 should be a reminder and warning to India of the state of the navy, especially at a time when the Chinese navy is probing the Indian Ocean. Indian efforts at developing the French Scorpene submarines has run into massive delays. The second of the six Scorpene submarine, INS Khanderi, was inducted into service only in September 2019. With the naval capability build-up being a time consuming and capital-intensive exercise, inadequate attention to and slow development of India’s naval capabilities can negatively affect India in any confrontation, including with Pakistan.

The Indian Air Force has its own woes, be it strengthening of the number of squadron or strengthening air defenses. Even though the Indian Air Force has a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons, it is currently at a low of just about 31 squadrons. Out of the 31 squadrons, close to half of them belong to the vintage category such as the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, and Jaguars. The effort to get the French-built Rafale fighter has been caught in all sorts of problems, and the first four of 36 on order will only arrive this May.

There are no easy solutions to India’s budget problem. But the Indian government needs to consider radical solutions, including curtailing the size of the Indian army, and fast. The alternative is to have a very large but poorly-equipped force that will not be able to meet the challenges it is facing.

The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership - East Asia Forum, 1 February 2020

In February, I wrote a short essay on India-Australia strategic partnership for the East Asia Forum. The essay, "The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership", looked at the pulls and pressures of this partnership and what lies ahead.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has grown quite rapidly over the last few years. This is impressive considering how indifferent New Delhi and Canberra were towards each other a decade ago. The change in the tone and direction of the relationship over the past decade is driven by shared concerns about China’s rise and its strategic implications for the Asia Pacific order.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the number of high-level political visits and military exchanges, such as the 2+2 Dialogue, there still remains scepticism about the relationship. Many believe that the shared concerns of both countries have not yet translated into a shared policy approach. Frederic Grare raised this point in 2014, but six years later India and Australia remain unable to forge a coherent strategy or a common policy approach to China.

There has traditionally been some wariness among Australian security analysts about the India–Australia relationship, and vice-versa. But as the threat from China grows, New Delhi and Canberra should find more innovative ways to work together to shape a stable Asian strategic order. The two already work together in larger strategic formulations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad).

A new wrinkle in the relationship is the Modi government’s identity politics. Many argue that India’s recent internal developments go against the grain of its strategic partnerships — based on shared liberal democratic values.

Whether mutual concerns about China are serious enough to offset worries about the unhelpful direction of India’s internal politics and nurture the budding India–Australia strategic partnership remains to be seen.

Australian officials are very positive about the direction of relations. At the fourth Raisina Dialogue in January 2019, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne noted that as ‘competition intensifies, Australia and India have shared interests in ensuring the peaceful development of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo‑Pacific region — a region in which the rights of all states are respected, large and small’.

The signing of a Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia in 2014 by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and then-prime minister Tony Abbott still provides the much-needed impetus for greater security engagement between the two countries.

The two countries are currently finalising a mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. These are expected to increase military interoperability and help ‘elevate’ the strategic partnership.

There remain areas that need greater clarity. One of the problems with the India–Australia relationship is that both countries have a different set of concerns about China. Australian concerns have to do with China’s increased activities in the Pacific, while India is concerned about China’s greater presence and influence in the Indian Ocean. India has also been uncertain about Australia’s reliance since Canberra backed out of the Quad in 2007, though this uncertainty is slowly disappearing. It is equally likely that Canberra has a certain lack of confidence given that New Delhi seems ambiguous about whether to balance or hedge. These differences might partly have to do with strategic histories. Australia has long been an American ally, while India remains uncomfortable about alliances.

This need not be an impediment to the strategic relationship if the two countries are able to forge their partnership based on some key principles, norms and ideals. Both countries should champion the rule of law, a rules-based order, respect for human rights and norms of responsible behaviour.

The joint naval exercise AUSINDEX (which began in 2015) reflects the convergence of Indian and Australian approaches to maritime and regional security. The two countries conducted the third edition of AUSINDEX in April 2019. The exercise was reported to have been the biggest in terms of the scale of participation from both navies.

The second issue with the relationship is the deficit of military capabilities, especially on the Indian side. While the two militaries have been able to showcase their prowess during exercises, their ability to come to each other’s aid during conflict remains in question. The joint logistics services agreement would go a long way in addressing this issue as it would provide joint access to each other’s military facilities.

Third, there is a need for greater agreement among the Quad member states about burden-sharing. A discussion about the operational aspects of their cooperation would create greater synergy between their forces when dealing with common problems.

From an Australian perspective, the fourth and final irritant in the relationship is India’s reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar trilateral naval exercise alongside the other three Quad nations — India, Japan and the United States. Indian media reports indicate that India might be open to involving Australia at the next Malabar naval exercises scheduled to take place later in the summer.

Indian reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar exercise has not produced significant negativity towards India, especially given the progress in bilateral relations more broadly. But if India thinks Australia is a legitimate security partner, it must expand the trilateral to include Australia as well. The fact that Australia is included in other bilateral and multinational military exercises should not be an excuse.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has seen impressive advancements in the last few years, but its potential and promise are yet to be fully realised. It will require dedicated attention and political leadership from both capitals to become more than a work in progress going forward.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.

Sri Lanka’s Role in Sino-Indian Competition in South Asia - The Diplomat, 28 January 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I examined the role of Sri Lanka in the Sino-Indian competition in South Asia. The country continues to be a prime area of competition for both Asian powers in the South Asia region.

How China and India will manage their bilateral relations, even as their competition intensifies, remains a major question, with implications for their ties as well as the wider region. At the Raisina Dialogue earlier this month, India’s external affairs minister, Dr. S Jaishankar, said that finding accommodation with China “is a must; it is not a choice… We have to get along with each other.” Jaishankar recognized, as he put it, that “it is work-in-progress and it will continue to be work-in-progress because both powers are very dynamic.”

Nowhere is this arguably more difficult than in the South Asian region, which has been so far dominated by India. China has tried hard to woo various neighbors of India including Sri Lanka, Mauritius, and Myanmar. These all are countries which have had closer ties with India but because of the proximity, have also felt dominated by New Delhi. Nevertheless, India has also tried hard to make sure that these countries did not fully fall under China’s sway.

For the full post, click here.



Sri Lanka is a prime area of competition. And we have seen this playing out over the past few weeks, particularly as senior officials from both countries made their way to Sri Lanka to woo the newly-elected government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

China’s growing role in Sri Lanka has been widely documented, particularly its significant investment in Sri Lankan infrastructure. But these have also been controversial even within Sri Lanka because some of the terms of China’s loans with which these infrastructure projects have been built has been quite unfavorable. Indeed, the Hambantota port has now become a prime example of the perils of what has come to be termed as China’s debt-trap diplomacy.

More broadly, China’s presence in Sri Lanka and the terms of its investments became a controversial issue in the last elections in Sri Lanka. Gotabaya campaigned that he would renegotiate the deal that allowed China to lease Hambantota for 99 years, a controversial deal that was made by the Sirisena Government, but one which had raised a lot of objections within the country. Despite such promises, once he was elected, Rajapaksa appears to have gone back in challenging China’s hold on Hambantota. Instead, he called upon other important players including India, Singapore, Japan, Australia, and ASEAN countries to invest in Sri Lanka.

How the new government balances India and China is clearly of importance to both New Delhi and Beijing. As if to illustrate that, China’s foreign minister Wang Yi visited Colombo last week. While it appears to have been more of a goodwill visit, Beijing will no doubt also continue to be concerned about Rajapaksa’s rhetoric during the election campaign. Seen from that perspective, Wang Yi probably wanted to ensure that there would be no damage to China’s political and financial investments under the new government.

If that is so, he has reasons to be satisfied. According to the Chinese foreign ministry statement, “China will continue to firmly support Sri Lanka in safeguarding its sovereignty and national dignity.” But at the same time, the statement also noted that “China-Sri Lanka cooperation has never targeted at any third party and also it should not be affected by any third party.” It doesn’t take much to guess which third party that China is referring to here.

Not to be outdone, India’s National Security Advisor Ajit Doval made a beeline for Colombo just a few days after Wang Yi left. The previously unannounced visit appears to have been cordial, with the two sides discussing strengthening bilateral cooperation on national security, intelligence sharing and regional cooperation. India and Sri Lanka have had several high-level exchanges even since Rajapaksa’s election in November 2019. His first foreign visit was to India in November. His brother and now Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa is to visit New Delhi in early February.

Both China and India are clearly attempting to ensure that they do not lose out to the other when it comes to currying favor with the new regime in Colombo. At the same time, is unlikely that Colombo will pick one side or the other because it makes more sense for it to get China and India continue to woo it with gifts and attention, which will stop if Sri Lanka makes a choice. Thus, even as India and China compete, Sri Lanka has every incentive to keep both parties in play so as to benefit from both.

China and India too certainly recognize the dynamic at play. But they will also recognize that they have little choice but to keep up the game given the broader geopolitical dynamics at play. Neither side can win unless they abandon the field, which of course neither side will do.

What Does Xi’s Myanmar Visit Mean for India’s China Anxieties? - The Diplomat, 22 January 2020

In my third column for The Diplomat, I wrote a piece on Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Myanmar and its implications for India. The trip produced a mixed outlook for New Delhi’s perceptions of Beijing’s inroads in the wider Indo-Pacific.

Last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a two-day visit to Myanmar, the first for Xi in his current capacity and his first overseas visit of 2020. Viewed from the perspective of growing Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean, Xi’s trip spotlighted Beijing’s continued efforts to make geopolitical gains in line with its broader regional interests, which will be of concern to India.

While there may have been some surprise about Xi’s choice of Myanmar for his trip, it is in fact in line with China’s continued interest in making inroads with respect to the Indian Ocean. With the Myanmar visit, Xi has effectively completed his key neighborhood trips, having traveled through the Maldives and Sri Lanka in 2014, Pakistan in 2015, Bangladesh in 2016, and Nepal in 2019.

For the full essay, click here.



From India’s perspective, New Delhi can be none too pleased with China’s constant forays into the wider Indian Ocean region. But at least for now, India appears to be letting Myanmar’s natural caution limit China’s influence.

The significance of Xi’s trip ought not to be understated. It has been nearly two decades since a Chinese leader has traveled to Myanmar. While consolidating political and strategic ties are important for China, like in Nepal, there has been skepticism in Myanmar about partnering with China on the Belt and Road projects. But at the same time, given the difficult times that Myanmar is faced with internationally, clearly Myanmar is looking for support from China, which comes at a price.

Consolidation and implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor was an important item in Xi’s Myanmar agenda and China has been quite successful on that front as the joint statement clearly outlined. China has other security interests as well, seeing Myanmar as a potential gateway to the Indian Ocean.

From New Delhi’s perspective, both are problematic. India has taken a strong position against Belt and Road and it worries about the strategic implications of any Chinese bases in the Bay of Bengal under guise of infrastructural projects.

India’s worries are only likely to grow. During Xi’s visit, China and Myanmar have signed a total of 33 agreements, memoranda of understanding (MoU), protocols, and exchanges of letters on areas including major infrastructure projects, railways, industrial and power projects, trade and investment. Giving a big boost to China’s efforts at seeking greater presence in the Indian Ocean, the two countries signed a concession agreement and shareholders’ agreement for the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) deep seaport project.

The Kyaukpyu deep seaport is particularly critical for China as it would provide it with an alternative to Straits of Malacca, which is currently their lifeline for energy transportation as well as a trade corridor. Making progress on the Kyaukpyu port is important also because it is linked to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and therefore the China-Myanmar agreement on the port is touted as a big success for the BRI.

Yun Sun, a China specialist, was earlier quoted as saying that “It’s all part and parcel of Beijing’s projection of soft power, with the intention of winning the hearts and minds of the whole of Myanmar, without whom their strategic Belt and Road Initiative southwestwards will stall.”

The two countries have also agreed on MoUs to undertake a feasibility study on the Myanmar-China Power Interconnection Project in addition to conducting feasibility studies for the Yangon River Estuary West Bank Protection, Mandalay-Bagan Railway Line, and Watalone Tunnel projects. Clearly, the Myanmar government has tried to accommodate some of the Chinese demands, but much like in Nepal, Myanmar’s response has also been to stall the process by agreeing to feasibility studies rather than undertaking these projects right away.

In an opinion survey conducted by the Myanmar local newspaper, The Irrawady, analysts were skeptical about these projects, saying there are no significant benefits for Myanmar. On many of the projects, the analysts pointed out that “China views our country as a transit country. It has plans to export its products via Myanmar to the Indian Ocean. So, let’s see if Myanmar has any strategic thinking beyond that.” They are not overly optimistic: “According to our [ISP Myanmar’s] study, Myanmar barely ever thinks strategically. Usually, Myanmar makes decisions ad hoc, only aiming to solve immediate problems.”

K Yhome, a close watcher of Myanmar, notes certain similarities in China’s timing for some of these trips. He wrote in a recent essay that these visits seem to take place when leaders of small countries are under enormous international scrutiny and pressure on issues such as treatment of religious and ethnic minorities and human rights violations.

That pattern seems to hold on this trip too. Last month, Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi defended the Myanmar government’s action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on the issue of violence against the Rohingya minority. The ICJ is expected to deliver its verdict on possible emergency measures on January 23. Given the difficult situation that Myanmar is in, Xi picked the right time to extract its pound of flesh from Myanmar in return for China’s support.

China has also been attempting to play the role of an “honest broker” between Myanmar and Bangladesh in repatriating the refugees. The joint statement issued during the visit stated that “The Chinese side supports the efforts of Myanmar to address the humanitarian situation and to promote peace, stability and development for all communities in Rakhine State.” For Beijing’s support on the Rohingya issue, Naypyidaw has reconsidered some of the earlier tough positions it had taken on stalled projects.

New Delhi can only hope that Myanmar may not want to tilt too much to one side, and there are indications of some discomfort in the country about China. For instance, many commentators have criticized the title of Xi’s recent article in local newspapers in Myanmar, which used the phrase “pauk-phaw.” It means fraternal or “siblings from the same mother,” but Myanmar analysts don’t seem to like the characterization. In an opinion piece in The Irrawady, Kyaw Zwa Moe, a local analyst commented that “The countries are close geopolitically, but distant in many ways.”

Also, there are certain projects that were not given any play during the visit although they were big on China’s agenda. For instance, the stalled $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project was not mentioned during the meetings in Myanmar, possibly sensing the opposition in Myanmar, from northern Kachin state to the deep south. There were reportedly about 40 civil society groups calling for a permanent cancellation of the project.

Therefore, for all the gains China it is making, which may worry India, Beijing will have to be careful in Myanmar. Despite the unfavorable international situation for Myanmar, Naypyidaw does not want to give into all of China’s demands yet, and if Beijing pushes too hard, it may only accelerate Myanmar’s quest for more diversification where New Delhi may gain. Though China keeps reiterating that it conducts its diplomacy with mutual respect and reciprocity as the guiding principle, smaller countries in Asia have found China’s projects have significant downsides. India, lacking China’s economic muscle or infrastructure-building capacity, can only hope that Myanmar’s caution will limit China’s influence.

China-Pakistan Naval Drills: More Than Just Symbolism - The Diplomat, 10 January 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog posts but here is a short essay I wrote for The Diplomat from earlier in the month, where I focused on the impact of the China-Pakistan naval drills. Beyond symbolism, the substance behind the latest iteration of exercises between the two countries also deserves emphasis.

Earlier in the week, the navies of China and Pakistan began their sixth bilateral naval exercise, titled Sea Guardians-2020, in the northern Arabian Sea. Such military exercises are expected to strengthen security cooperation between the two countries, who are already “iron brothers.” According to Chinese media reports, the naval drills are aimed at exploring new methods of conducting China-Pakistan joint naval drills while stepping up the capabilities to jointly addresses issues such as maritime terrorism and crime.

For the full post, click here.



The exercise is also sensitive because it is taking place on India’s west coast, a critical security area from New Delhi’s perspective. Clearly, the exercise will be very important for China because it increases the PLA Navy’s familiarity and understanding of the operational conditions in this part of the Arabian Sea. Moreover, gaining greater access to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan is also likely an attractive incentive for China. If it works, it can be an alternate route for China in the event of a naval blockade by an adversary that closes the Malacca Straits choke point.

In addition, India will also have concerns because India’s Arabian Sea coast hosts several major Indian ports including Kandla, Okha, Mumbai, Nhava Sheva (Navi Mumbai), Mormugão, New Mangalore, and Kochi. For China, the Arabian Sea is also important in the context of its air and naval facility, Jiwani, close to the Gwadar Port and the Iranian Chahabar Port that is jointly developed by India and Iran.

China appears enthusiastic about undertaking these naval exercises on a regular basis. In a story about these exercises in the Chinese newspaper Global Times, Zhang Junshe, a senior research fellow at the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute, argues that “serializing the drills and making them a routine will further enhance China and Pakistan’s friendship and cooperation.” Similarly, Zhou Hanwen, an executive director of the exercise, stated that “the training involving submarine will boost the two navies’ combat capabilities and show a high level of strategic mutual trust.” Commenting on the exercise, China’s ambassador to Pakistan Ambassador Yao Jing said that the exercise “fully reflects the good wishes of the Chinese and Pakistani navies in jointly building a community of shared maritime destiny, and demonstrates the confidence and capability to jointly guard marine peace and security.”

The exercise that began at the Pakistan Navy Dockyard in Karachi will go on for nine days from January 6 to 14. The opening ceremony had Vice Admiral Dong Jun, general director of the Chinese side and deputy commander of PLA Southern Theater Command, and Vice Admiral Asif Khaliq, general director of the Pakistani side and commander of the Pakistani Naval Fleet deliver speeches emphasizing the importance of their joint collaboration. China has continued to reiterate that the naval drills have nothing to do with the prevailing situation in the Middle East and that it is not aimed at any third country. The PLA reportedly stated that the joint exercise will involve two sessions – “joint training in Karachi and live-fire drills in northern parts of the Arabian Sea－and will include workshops, tactical simulation, joint patrol, air and missile defense, law enforcement inspection and anti-submarine operation.”

For the exercise, the PLA Navy has deployed five major ships, including the guided-missile destroyer Yinchuan, the guided-missile frigate Yuncheng, the comprehensive supply ship Weishanhu, and the submarine rescue ship Liugongdao, whereas Pakistan is represented by two Zulfiquar-class F22P/F21 frigates, two fast attack craft, one fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft, two ship-borne helicopters and more than 60 special operations soldiers.

It has also been reported that the two navies will engage in a number of training exercises including joint patrol, air-defense, joint anti-submarine, maritime live-firing, and joint marine training. The Pakistan Navy reportedly said that the overall aim of the exercise is to enhance the two navies’ technical and tactical capabilities, exchange of professional experiences against maritime threats, evolve a synergistic approach between the two sides and preserve regional maritime security. The Chinese navy’s new website navy.81.cn provides a detailed summary of the exercise, including the naval platforms that have been deployed. It is also noteworthy that the joint naval exercise is in addition the “warrior” series of exercises between the two armies and the “eagle” series exercises between the two air forces.

China and Pakistan have had a decades-long strategic partnership, and they have conducted many military exercises. But it does appear as if these exercises are now getting more complex and are designed for more than simply symbolic demonstration of China-Pakistan friendship. These bilateral exercises need to be seen also in the context of the recent China-Pakistan-Iran-Russia naval exercise, all of which is likely to worry India as well others such as the United States.

India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020 - The Diplomat, 4 January 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020, I looked at India's foreign policy challenges for 2020. Sadly, many of them have been the government's own making. Hence, I argue that while the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi has paid significant attention to India’s foreign relations. Though there could be some quibbles about how much he managed to achieve, there is little doubt that his focus at least led to greater energy and push in India’s foreign policy, even if Modi’s foreign policy has not witnessed any significant shifts.

But since his re-election last summer, India’s foreign policy challenges have been growing. And while the reasons for this may be varied, some of it is because of the BJP government’s own mistakes.

For the full essay, click here.



In his first term, Modi was able to undertake significant strategic outreach to the United States, Japan, and Australia. The revival of the Quad is a great indicator of the pragmatism in India’s diplomacy today. Despite some setbacks in between, India also managed to consolidate its position in two important Indian Ocean countries – Sri Lanka and Maldives. Modi can also be credited with a more effective outreach to Southeast Asia, with its Act East Policy.

But there are also growing difficulties. Managing China, India’s most serious challenge, has seen some success but it remains a major and continuing problem. India’s more active role in the Quad in its second avatar is a positive sign. Despite the occasional wavering in India’s Indo-Pacific policy, elevating the Quad to foreign ministerial level deliberations shows the willingness of all the four Quad members to acknowledge the reality of the China problem and the need for the four to work toward strategic coordination.

But there are serious problems with India’s hard capacity to manage the China problem. General V.P. Malik, the former chief of Indian Army Staff, said during the Kargil war that “we will fight with what we have,” but such an approach while facing a much a larger and strong force in China will be dangerous for India. For all the loud rhetoric on national security, the Modi government’s defense budget allocation has been abysmal. Year after year, it has driven down the defense budget, which now has the lowest allocation since the period before the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Even within this allocation, much of it is spent on salaries and pension, leaving very little for capital expenditure, thus leaving procurement issues unresolved. All three Indian services have significant gaps and this is going to test India’s ability to defend successfully against China. The Indian focus appears to be on diplomacy to deal with China, but depending on one toll alone could be dangerous.

Another major challenge is the neighborhood, and the problems here are compounded due to India’s internal developments. Today, India’s neighborhood policy is facing serious challenges, in part because of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Together, they have had a particularly negative impact on India’s relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. With the CAA targeting three Islamic neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – India’s neighborhood diplomacy suddenly faces new problems.

Relations with Bangladesh had improved significantly under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the CAA and the NRC have put the Bangladeshi government in a difficult position. Relations with Afghanistan, another friendly neighbor, are affected also. Moreover, the CAA is seen both as specifically targeting Muslims and as equating Indian citizenship with Hinduism, raising eyebrows across the world. Even India’s partners are questioning its credentials as a multicultural, pluralist society. India did enjoy certain soft power benefit as the world’s largest democracy, with diverse cultures and religions co-existing in a stable political system, but that image has been tarnished by the recent developments.

Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and even External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar can ignore the global concerns by saying these are internal matters of India. But the reality is that India’s moral standing has taken a hit and it will need significant efforts on the part of the Modi government to demonstrate that India is still a multicultural and secular democracy.

Modi did make a smart choice in getting Jaishankar to head the foreign ministry. Jaishankar, a former foreign secretary, is well-respected around the world, and is known to have been an important reason for many of Modi’s foreign policy successes in his first term. But it is unclear if an experienced technocrat like Jaishankar can weather the storms created by poor domestic political decisions. Jaishankar was successful to a large extent in assuaging the fears around the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, after Article 370 was revoked in early July. His extensive engagements in the United States, speaking in nearly a dozen think tanks, as well as other media interviews, helped stem the damage.

But India’s outreach has been poor after the CAA. Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because the delegation included Ms. Pramila Jayapal, for instance, has angered Democrats in the United States to the point where Jayapal now has another 10 legislators co-sponsoring her resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir at the earliest. It is not clear that India still enjoys the kind of bipartisan support in the U.S. as it did in the last 15 years.

This comes on top of Modi’s statement, “Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar,” which has not gone down well with Democrats. It would have been better for Modi to not poke his head into the internal politics of another country. The U.S. relationship is absolutely critical in managing the China issue and it will be a challenge to get it back to even keel, especially if a Democrat wins the White House in November.

It is unclear how the India-Japan relationship has been affected. The annual summit, originally slated to take place in Guwahati in December 2019, was postponed because of CAA-related protests. This has been an annual feature for more than a decade and it is possibly the first time that the summit meeting has been skipped.

India’s democracy and stability plays at least a supporting role in India’s partnerships, and even uncertainty can hurt these relations. While India has faced many external difficulties in the past, they have rarely been the result of domestic politics. Handling these new challenges could be much more difficult than the Indian government assumes.