US' National Military Strategy 2011

I should have got this post earlier ... better late than never. The US released its National Military Strategy (NMS) on February 08, 2011. The document, released by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, an update in seven years, has a lot of focus on Asia. This is no surprise given that this century is acknowledged as the Asian century. Asia is also at the centre for a variety of reasons -- economic growth, terrorism, proliferation of dangerous technologies or resource crunch or climate change woes.

Looking at Asia, detailed assessments and strategies are provided particularly for the war against terror in Afghanistan, the ongoing war in Iraq and China.



Asia has clearly overtaken Europe as the US priority area. The NMS states, "The Nation’s strategic priorities and interests will increasingly emanate from the Asia-Pacific region. The region's share of global wealth is growing, enabling increased military capabilities. This is causing the region’s security architecture to change rapidly, creating new challenges and opportunities for our national security and leadership. Though still underpinned by the US bilateral alliance system, Asia's security architecture is becoming a more complex mix of formal and informal multilateral relationships and expanded bilateral security ties among states."

The challenges faced in the domain of global commons -- air, sea, cyberspace -- is another area that has been paid sufficient attention in the NMS. It states, "Assured access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons – shared areas of sea, air, and space – and globally connected domains such as cyberspace are being increasingly challenged by both state and non-state actors. States are developing anti-access and area-denial capabilities and strategies to constrain US and international freedom of action. These states are rapidly acquiring technologies, such as missiles and autonomous and remotely-piloted platforms that challenge our ability to project power from the global commons and increase our operational risk. Meanwhile, enabling and war-fighting domains of space and cyberspace are simultaneously more critical for our operations, yet more vulnerable to malicious actions. The space environment is becoming more congested, contested, and competitive. Some states are conducting or condoning cyber intrusions that foreshadow the growing threat in this globally connected domain." At the other end of it, "Non-state actors such as criminal organizations, traffickers, and terrorist groups find a nexus of interests in exploiting the commons."

As for the war against terror in Afghanistan, the NMS states, "The Nation’s strategic objective in this campaign is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaida and its affiliates in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return to either country. Success requires the Joint Force to closely work with NATO, our coalition partners, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. We will continue to erode Taliban influence, work with the Afghan government to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation of former insurgents, continue to strengthen the capacity of Afghan security forces, and enable Pakistan to ultimately defeat al Qaida and its extremist allies." The document also notes that "The threat of violent extremism is not limited to South Central Asia. Groups such as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Shabaab, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, and others emanate from Somalia, Yemen, and elsewhere around the globe. Terrorists’ abilities to remotely plan and coordinate attacks is growing, sometimes facilitated by global illicit trafficking routes, extending their operational reach while rendering targeting of their sanctuaries more difficult."

The NMS also notes while military strategy can be decisive, there has to be long-term viable strategies wherein "Military power complements economic development, governance, and rule of law – the true bedrocks of counterterrorism efforts. In the long run, violent ideologies are ultimately discredited and defeated when a secure population chooses to reject extremism and violence in favor of more peaceful pursuits."

On China, the NMS states the US objectives thus: "Our Nation seeks a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship with China that welcomes it to take on a responsible leadership role. To support this, the Joint Force seeks a deeper military-to-military relationship with China to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation. We will promote common interests through China’s cooperation in countering piracy and proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the Korean peninsula." Having said that, there are issues of concern such as the military modernisation and some of the evolving strategies which are not conducive for a stable Asia. The NMS details to say, "We will continue to monitor carefully China’s military developments and the implications those developments have on the military balance in the Taiwan Strait. We remain concerned about the extent and strategic intent of China’s military modernization, and its assertiveness in space, cyberspace, in the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. To safeguard U.S. and partner nation interests, we will be prepared to demonstrate the will and commit the resources needed to oppose any nation’s actions that jeopardize access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, or that threaten the security of our allies."

India-US Strategic Dialogue: Challenges Ahead

Here's the link to an article of mine on Indo-US Strategic Dialogue published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS).

Though India and the US have rebooted their relations with their first ever strategic dialogue, a few key issues will decide the fate of the new strategic partners. These include the geopolitics of AfPak and the war on terror, dealing with China, hi-tech trade and export controls.



Do India and the US have a common vision vis-a-vis the AfPak issue and the war on terror issues? The US has restated a stable Afghanistan remains as vital to its national security interest although it has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism. This can be achieved in two ways – through reconstruction and development of Afghanistan’s society, economy and polity; and second, by putting together some sort of a coalition of forces, including the so-called moderate Taliban. It appears President Obama is keen on following the second option. This explains the added importance of Pakistan in the US’ AfPak calculus. On the other hand, India’s interests go much beyond resources, Taliban or terrorism to ensuring a stable, democratic and strengthened Afghanistan in its neighbourhood that will contribute to regional peace and stability. It is unclear if these differing objectives can be strategically adjusted.

Second, the two countries have a problem on China too. Dealing with a rising China will in fact be a test case for US-India relations as well as the US-Japan alliance. With the US deeply entrenched in Iraq and Afghanistan, China has managed to carve out a crucial strategic space for itself in the region, developing significant leverage. North Korea and Myanmar are cases in point. Chinese military modernization and the opaqueness of its policies and intentions have created suspicions in several countries in the region. There are a number of complications between India and China. India-China relationship cannot be and should not be seen in a purely bilateral framework. It is necessary to contextualize India-China relations in the broader Asian state security context. It is India’s rising profile in Asia and beyond – India’s rising profile in South East Asia, its strengthened relationship with Japan, Vietnam, US – that has been at the crux of the issue in the recent years. The Sino-Indian border issue is only a manifestation of these other problems. And Washington may be forced to take sides in case of a conflict in the future.

The state of US-China relations will have a major bearing on India’s relations with both of these powers as well as on Asian stability. India will be uncomfortable with cosy ties between Washington and Beijing, although a tense relationship is also not going to be easy for India to manage. A G-2 scenario will be nightmarish for India given their potential to ‘manage’ South Asia jointly. Beijing also was not comfortable with a Bush Administration that was cosying up to India as major pillar in the emerging Asian balance.

Finally, how India and the US will approach the hi-tech trade and export controls is a major issue. In fact, as analysts have pointed out, hi-tech trade between India and the US will be a ‘litmus’ test of the still uncertain India-US partnership. India’s engagement with US in the field of hi-tech trade and defence should be monitored through military-to-military relations, defence trade, and defence industrial collaboration. While military to military relations have been going quite strong, there is also improvement in the defence trade arena. There are again issues that need to be sorted out before it can improve significantly. Problems in this area have included India’s refusal to sign up to agreements that the US wanted including the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMoA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA). Washington finds it hard to trade with New Delhi on high-end technology items or transferring advanced avionics, communications equipment and satellite navigational aids on board some platforms that India wants (for instance the P-8I Poseidon multimission maritime aircraft or the C-130J Super Hercules transport aircraft). Not being party to CISMoA or BECA could also potentially affect India’s plans to purchase Boeing C-17 Globemaster III strategic transport aircraft or the 145 BAE Systems M777 ultra light-weight howitzers or Apache AH-64 attack helicopter. Washington is also keen that India signs the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) and the Access and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA). As far as LSA is concerned, India feels that making available facilities for maintenance, servicing, communications, refueling and medical care will drag India into regional conflicts unnecessarily making India’s position much more complicated. India having been used to the Soviet/Russian style of defence trade, finds it difficult to agree to such strict terms and conditions from the US side. India took a big step last year in signing the End User Monitoring Agreement (EUMA) which was being dragged on for several years. Lastly, operationalisation of the India-US civil nuclear deal will also say a great deal about the commitment of the new dialogue partners to their relations.

True, strategic dialogue is all about thinking big and strategic issues and not to focus on deliverables or tactical issues, but problems on several tactical fronts can blow the air out of the strategic balloon. India and the US need to be cautious to see that that does not happen.

Indo-US Relations in the Second Manmohan Singh Administration

This essay on Indo-US relations in the second Manmohan Singh Administration first appeared on the IPCS website.

With a decisive mandate for the Congress (I)-led UPA government, the general assumption is that there will be continuity in India’s relations especially with the United States. With the Congress (I) not having to depend on the Left parties for support anymore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be able to pursue the strategic partnership with the US with greater ease. The Left parties would have exercised a stronger say particularly in matters pertaining to US, China and Nepal, and have been overly critical about US-India defence agreement of 2005, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the strengthened defence and military ties with the US. The end-user monitoring agreements on American defence items supplied to India too would have come under the Left scanner. The defeat of the Left parties has particularly elated the NRI community who believe that the new government will not only take the economic relations to a higher level but also significantly strengthen the strategic ties between the two countries.



With the Congress (I) and Manmohan Singh at the helm of affairs, there could be easy passage of further economic reforms and of FDI into India. Opening up of sectors including telecom, retail, media and insurance can now be speeded up and fiscal reform measures will also be on the table that can get the country out of the economic downturn faster.

In fact, Manmohan Singh’s decision to call the Left a bluff and conclude the Indo-US nuclear deal proved his mettle and strong leadership qualities. Although the nuclear deal will enable it to meet about 3 percent of India’s energy needs, more significantly, the deal, as the Prime Minister saw it, got India out of the nuclear apartheid of more than three decades and put India on the global map as an important and responsible player.

While continuity is foreseen, there might be a few issues that one has to factor in India’s relations with the US. These concern nuclear issues, regional security issues including Kashmir and Pakistan, China, Iran and WTO and climate change issues.

The Democrats including Obama have been staunch opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Now that the deal has been completed, their opposition cannot mean very much. However, there could possibly be some difficulties at the next stage of negotiations on operationalizing the deal. It should also be borne in mind that the Obama Administration will remain committed to non-proliferation goals, including Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) that will be pushed with greater vigour. The Obama Administration is also likely to strengthen its efforts to bring in countries like India, Pakistan and Israel into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, though it is unclear if this is just a declaratory posture ahead of the next year’s NPT Review Conference or something more serious. India not being a member of the NPT remains a major issue for the Democrats. Obama’s renewed interest in getting CTBT ratified by the US Senate and thereafter by other countries, including India and Pakistan could become a sore point in bilateral relations. On the other hand, India’s opposition to the CTBT has weakened somewhat, if one goes by the speech that Shyam Saran gave at the Brookings Institution recently.

Obama’s AfPak strategy linking Kashmir to the security of Afghanistan is not a very palatable one for India. This is exactly what Pakistan has always sought and it could possibly be a sticking point in India-US relations. Second, there is a clear gap between the US and India on their objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban / al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. For India, it is a much more complex issue of ensuring that Afghanistan does not fall back into the hands of Taliban and become a fertile ground for terrorism and instability in the region. India also disagrees with the US on dealing with Taliban by making a differentiation between good and bad Taliban. Besides, a deal with the Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results when the effective command and control are with the ISI in Pakistan. Lastly, the US will be making the same mistakes as it did at the peak of the Cold War when it funded a large number of tribal groups. It must be kept in mind that over a period of time, these groups outsmart their masters and get out of control.

Finally, the nature of US-China relations will also affect Indo-US relations. A softer approach towards China is not something favourably looked upon by India as it happened, for example, during the Clinton administration, where they wanted to jointly manage South Asia. On the other hand, India does not want to see them become hostile to each other and get into a conflict situation, where India may be forced to take sides. Both of these situations could prove dangerous for India. Similarly, improved Indo-US relations will likely have a negative effect on Sino-India ties. In the same way, improved US-China relations will raise concerns in New Delhi and could affect both US-India as well as Sino-India relations.

A critique of Obama's AfPak strategy

President Barack Obama has called his new AfPak initiative, which he unveiled on March 27, 2009, a stronger, smarter, and comprehensive strategy that aims to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The White Paper brought out three major objectives: removal of al Qaeda’s sanctuary; helping to create an effective democratic government in Pakistan and a self-reliant Afghanistan. The US fear remains that al Qaeda is still actively planning attacks on the US homeland from its safe haven in Pakistan. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen recently noted that it is the Afghan-Pakistan border region that is the ‘site of planning for the next attack’ on the United States. The White House claims that its strategy is well-thought out and well-resourced, although there is no estimate available as to how much it would cost the US or its other allies.



Despite pronouncements that al Qaeda/ Taliban is not the problem of the US alone, but an international problem, it appears that the US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. This could be seen as a long-term objective and in the meantime, the US has to look at a series of short-term issues which can ensure that long-term gain. Is the US really interested in installing a civilian government or undertake nation-building activities in Pakistan or Afghanistan.
The US has emphasised that its relationship with Pakistan is “grounded in support for Pakistan’s democratic institutions and the Pakistan people.” Is that valid for the US that there is a democratic government in Pakistan. The US has dealt with Pakistan military dictators for a long time in the past and has found it convenient to deal with the military leadership than the civilian government who is not control of the army and the ISI. Second, what is the guarantee that the civilian leadership in Pakistan will ensure their goal of eliminating terrorism or that they will not be party sponsoring or supporting terrorism? Benazir Bhutto is a case in point.
Under the new strategy, the US plans to deploy an additional 17,000 troops and another 4,000 that would be essentially for training purposes. These forces are meant to fight Taliban in the south and the east, as also improve the capacity of Afghan forces to go after the terrorists. Military aid for Pakistan would go into training as well as for buying helicopters, night vision equipments and other weapon system needed to fight insurgency in the tribal areas. There is also a provision for non-military aid of $ 1.5bn each year for the next five years to undertake civilian activities. Unless monitored in an effective manner, such funding will find its way into anything and everything other than civilian/ development programmes.
The US spending is supposed to be judged against a set of benchmarks. These benchmarks could be improvements in Afghanistan, better cooperation from Pakistan, and reduced violence in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In this regard, there is funding for a strong Inspector General at the State Department and USAID, who will oversee the spending to ensure accountable spending and avoid wasteful expenditure.
While this is all well and good, there is unease about the new policy. A recent RAND study found that only 7% of terrorist organisations end their activities because they are militarily defeated; the majority will end terror when they become part of a political process. While Obama was correct in saying that terrorism cannot be defeated militarily, the question is how the US or Afghanistan or Pakistan can ensure that these forces are brought into a political process.
Reconciliation with former enemies, the so-called non-violent Taliban, is a possibility that the US is looking at. The Hague Conference brought out clearly that the US will offer an “honourable” form of reconciliation to those Taliban fighters who renounce violence in Afghanistan as part of a revamped strategy to tackle the deepening insurgency. This makes a distinction between those who joined Taliban out of desperation and those who joined out of conviction. The White Paper made a note of exploiting differences among the insurgents “to divide Taliban’s true believers from less committed fighters.” Dennis Blair, now Director of National Intelligence, has indicated something similar. He said that roughly 2/3rd of Taliban are primarily concerned with regional issues and hence can be defeated or co-opted by the Karzai government. This can boost its ability to provide security and services beyond Kabul. But the remaining 1/3rd of the group is under the leadership of Mullah Omar and will be a tough case, because they want power in Afghanistan.
Splitting the Taliban is seen as a tactic in the overall US strategy of defeating Taliban. One way of doing this is to exploit “fractures” or fissures within the Taliban. The US, by working with other Afghans, hopes to assimilate Taliban foot soldiers into the political system. Obama in his interview to NYT suggested that he might do something similar to what was had done in Iraq – peace agreements with Sunni militias in Iraq. However, the situation is much more complex in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Splitting the Taliban is not easy. Not only is doing deals with Taliban more complex but could prove destabilising for Afghanistan. Firstly, as some analysts have brought out, unlike in Iraq, there is a sovereign government in Afghanistan and if at all any deal is done, it should be done by the Karzai government and not the US. This could otherwise prove to be what India did in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. Second, given that Taliban controls the entire southern belt of Afghanistan, it appears to be on the winning side and no Taliban will be willing to enter into a deal with Karzai or the US at this time. And in the case of Afghanistan, it has been known that tribal groups shift their allegiance depending which side is winning. Third, a deal with Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results as long as effective command & control comes from Pakistan. In the last few years, when Pakistan has done peace agreements with Taliban, it has been after failure on the part of Pakistan army. Thus, the Taliban has always gained greater control. There is no reason why the results should be different this time. Lastly, the US risks making the same mistake as it did during the 1980s, pumping money to militia groups which, over a period of time, become dangerous and out of control.
Instead of doing deals with these militia groups and Taliban, it might be prudent for the US to strike a deal with Iran, replacing US reliance on Pakistan. The US would be able to use the Iranian port of Chabahar and the Indian-built Zaranj-Delaram highway, which links up to the ring road to Kandahar and Kabul.
Lack of good intelligence is seen as another serious issue. In this regard, Dennis Blair stated that lack of solid intelligence and understanding of Afghanistan at the level of intelligence agencies is be a serious flaw. This intelligence imbalance would hamper Obama Administration’s efforts, especially as it shifts from one theatre to another.
The other issue is whether the Obama administration, given the economic difficulties, will be able to sustain the extended commitments and for how long.
Lastly, should the US be engaged in such activities and is there ground support for the US to engage in such activities? In fact, it has been the presence of US and other foreign troops that has created strong resentment and the resultant growth of radical militia groups in Pakistan.
The new strategy emphasises more on training and thereby increasing the size as well as strengthening of the Afghan Security Forces – the Afghan Army and Police. Every American unit will be partnered with an Afghan unit; this will accelerate as well as strengthen the process of creating a more effective Afghan force (Army of 134,000 and Police of 82,000) by 2011. This is being complimented with civilian activities in fighting corruption, narcotics trade that give way to criminality and funding of insurgency. Besides interdiction, for which Iran has agreed to cooperate, the US has to think of other programmes like crop substitution and alternative livelihood programmes.
While Obama recognises that the US alone will not be able to achieve all these objectives, it is important that the US engages Iran, Russia, China, Japan and India in this regard. Iran has come on board partially, extending help in tackling the huge opium trade in the region, while emphasising its opposition to US and other foreign troops there. Russian position has been that there is a need to combine anti-terror measures with socio-economic measures to rebuild Afghanistan. Russia has expressed its willingness to participate in this effort.
How different is Obama strategy from the strategy followed over the last eight years? Increasing the civilian component and nation-building activity is a new element. Even with such addition, is it significantly different? Despite being a strong critic of Bush’s policies, Obama’s AfPak strategy appears to be a repeat of what President Bush had done in Iraq.
However, be it old or new, what is of concern is the US’ short-sighted policies, be it vis a vis terrorism or WMD proliferation. The US sidelines some of these important goals for minor, but quicker gains vis a vis certain other national security objectives. The way WMD proliferation was sacrificed for the sake of Pakistan’s support against the Soviets in the 1980s is a classic case. This short-sightedness is visible even now - in not going after other terror groups like LeT, JeM, which will in the future be critical threats to US security. Until and unless the US is attacked, they do not see the danger some terrorist groups pose. These approaches have a significant impact on other important bilateral relationships.
One case in point is Indo-US counter-terrorism cooperation. What constitutes terrorism for India has not been considered terrorism by the US. India has been the victim of cross-border terrorism from Pakistan in Kashmir and elsewhere in the north-east, whereas the US looks at Pakistan as a necessary link to prosecute the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda. The US has adopted very short-term approach in dealing with these issues and it will be a folly if India follows the US line. The US needs to formulate long-term strategies which ensure that American policies do not create the conditions that directly or indirectly encourage terrorism. Overlooking terrorism in some parts of the world because it inconveniences other American interests, or pursuing the war on terrorism in an insensitive manner can create problems in the long run.
Matters have become further complicated due to the Indo-Pakistan issues and Pakistan’s continued reliance on cross-border terrorism as state policy. Pakistan had also believed that it can support Kashmiri insurgents against India but that they would not turn against other countries or even Pakistan. Today, Pakistan is faced with this monster and the government appears to be not in full control of the situation. Additionally, Pakistan always made a distinction between terrorism directed against India and terrorism against the US and other western nations. Pakistan was prudent enough to make sure that several of the terrorist groups under its control did not act against US interests, but the terrorist groups grew under the leadership of Al Qaeda and did not appreciate the need to take orders from Pakistan anymore. The September 11 terrorist attacks in the US was one such case. Hence, be it for India or the US, there has to be a clear recognition that Pakistan remains the culprit. And accordingly, India and the US have to take appropriate actions.
Lastly, while there is acknowledgment that Pakistan is the root cause, the calls for constructive diplomacy between India and Pakistan suggests that the Obama administration is still of the view that Kashmir issue is key and resolution of the Kashmir problem will let Pakistan cooperate with the US on war on terror. That explains the Obama Administration’s keenness to mediate and seek a solution to the Kashmir problem. Obama’s comments during interviews to Time magazine in October and December 2008 and the reported consideration (earlier) of former President Bill Clinton as a special envoy on Kashmir had created major stir in the Indian political and policy circles. Obama in his interview said, “We should probably try to facilitate a better understanding between Pakistan and India and try to resolve the Kashmir crisis so that they (Pakistan) can stay focused not on India, but on the situation with those militants.” Some analysts in India have tended to believe that a Kashmir-specific pro-active policy need not necessarily be bad, given Obama’s pro-India statements.
The issue, however, is complicated as Obama believes that solving Kashmir as a pre-requisite for ensuring Pakistan’s support in the war on terror against Taliban and al Qaeda. Linking Afghanistan to the resolution of Kashmir dispute, as brought out in Obama’s interview to Time magazine, is problematic. Such an inclination of linking Afghanistan’s security with terrorism in Kashmir could prove dangerous and India needs to maintain a close watch. The US must retain its attention on the real problem – Pakistan, instead of getting diverted into Kashmir.