PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India - ORF Occasional Paper, February 2020

Pulkit Mohan and I published our co-authored Occasional Paper, PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India, in February 2020. This is a paper that I have wanted to do for a very long time and am glad it is done, finally.

Since President Xi Jinping’s ascendency to power in 2012, China has had a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to increase its influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in March 2018, Xi highlighted China’s shift towards “rejuvenation” as a world power. Xi also attached great importance to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and under his watch, the military has undergone changes in its doctrine and force modernisation.

Indeed, Xi has partly bolstered China’s rise in the region through these military reforms, beginning in 2015. Since then, there have been major changes in the operational structure of the PLA, with the modernisation and optimisation of the military to “achieve enhanced jointness and efficiency.” China’s inclination towards building an improved operational force is driven by its need to safeguard its national interests amidst the changing dynamics of power.

According to the US Department of Defense’s 2018 China Power report, China’s military has introduced reforms to the operations of the PLA with the “most comprehensive restructuring of forces in its history.” The PLA’s ultimate focus is to improve its ability to conduct joint operations in an effective manner. Its most recent defence White Paper 2019 highlighted maintaining combat readiness, in particular, empahasising the need “to improve the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.” According to the White Paper, the PLA, since 2012, have conducted extensive mission-oriented training including 80 joint exercises at and above brigade/division level.

This White Paper is a significant departure from its predecessor, published in 2015. In that document, China maintained that its intentions in force modernisation was defensive and in the interest of safeguarding national security and development interests. The 2019 White Paper emphasises the impact of competition in the military sphere with the US and how China’s growing military is being developed and modernised to face such challenge. China, according to the document, will pursue national defence goals which include safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security as well as maritime interests.

Even as China’s primary objective is to compete with the US, however, the strategic consequences of a more modern PLA will be felt in India as well as in its neighbourhood. China argues that seeking hegemony or expansion in its areas of influence are not part of its strategy; yet, the reality has been different. Maintaining its position in the power hierarchy in the region, and beyond, remains at the core of China’s goals with regard to both military modernisation and its foreign policy strategy. This has been evident in the last several years in its various policy statements. At the 6th Xiangshan forum in October 2015, for instance, vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin detailed some of what he called the “injustice” to China in its relations with other countries. While this is nothing new, the problem comes from the deep contradictions between China’s rhetoric and the reality. For instance, Liu called on the big powers to not seek spheres of influence, and of the small and medium countries to not take sides between big powers. The flaw in this formulation is that China looks at the world through a divided prism that categorises countries into big, small and medium, highlighting China’s hierarchical approach in international politics and the differentiated response that Beijing assumes these countries to play. Clearly, India needs to be mindful of such Chinese inclinations and work with like-minded partners in shaping an inclusive agenda in the Asian strategic space.

This paper examines a particular aspect of the PLA reforms as they pertain to training and jointness in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Sino-Indian border areas. The paper starts with an examination of the Chinese military reforms as it applies to these areas, in terms of the military restructuring and the new commands responsible for them. The paper then chronicles the increasing number of military exercises being undertaken by China in these areas. The paper also examines the Sino-Indian border landscape and weighs China’s state-of-the-art infrastructure against India’s own. The paper concludes with the strategic consequences and tactical implications of these for India.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long paper but I conclude with a few thoughts on what these imply for India.

Implications of PLA’s Joint Exercises

PLA’s impressive achievements with regard to troop mobilisation, joint training, and integration on the Sino-Indian border as well as in the TAR should be of concern to India. Given the unresolved border and territorial issues between India and China, the PLA’s military buildup and the overall capability mix could produce outcomes possibly in China’s favour, at least in the initial stages of a conflict. China has made significant advances for such an outcome through a number of reforms including through overhauling combat units to undertake joint, integrated and “informationised” operations. China could be engaged in these for a number of reasons. One, Xi’s attempts could be to reassure the domestic audience on the combat preparedness of its military. Chinese security analysts believe that demonstrating combat readiness to adversaries can deter an actual conflict.

Irrespective of the logic, PLA is attempting to address a serious lacuna with its military. Its lack of operational experience for the last several decades has been considered a serious deficiency of the PLA, and the intensive trainings and frequent joint military exercises are meant precisely to address this. PLA exercises held over the last few years have been focused on joint and integrated military operations to bring about a synergistic approach under informationised conditions. The establishment of logistic centres and oil depots in TAR and Sino-Indian border areas along with the improved road, air and rail networks have enhanced their ability for rapid mobilisation. This has also strengthened their capacity to sustain forces in the border areas for reasonably longer periods of time. Exercises testing their mobilisation and coordination capabilities have been undertaken through many joint exercises in the TAR.

Second, the improved physical border infrastructure that has aided the mobilisation of forces for training and joint exercises have also demonstrated the effectiveness of their command and control networks. Today, the PLA is in a position to undertake quick troop deployment to the Sino-Indian border areas. Previously, such mobilisation exercise would stretch over six months and could be undertaken only during the summer. The PLA has been engaged in military exercises to test the effectiveness of the Rapid Reaction Forces in mobilising them to the border areas in any weather or season. The quick mobilisation capabilities tested during these military exercises essentially validate the effectiveness from both operational and mobilisation perspectives.

Third, the PLA has also used these military exercises to assess the effectiveness of jointness and integration. Moving away from Military Regions to Theatre Commands is a big shift aiding the process of military integration. Nevertheless, operational jointness and integration may still be an issue. A joint and integrated planning is again not an easy task. There is no clarity on this issue until they engage in an actual operation – there have been no open reports assessing the success of the training and exercises but certainly they are making the efforts, which is worth closer examination.

Four, the overall military balance is tilted in favour of China. The former Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, for instance, had noted the big increase in the number of Chinese aircrafts in the TAR. He mentioned in particular the deployment of Sukhoi-27 and J-10 aircraft for year-round operations, giving the PLAAF possibly a major tactical boost. This is a new trend as against the earlier practice of deploying these aircrafts during summer months alone. The overall mix of multi-role fighter and strike aircraft of the PLAAF can address any possible attrition during a conflict.

Five, improved border infrastructure has assisted the PLA in making a realistic appraisal of the state of their infrastructure. The multiple exercises done along the border areas and in the TAR can help identify the weaknesses and problems that need to be addressed on a realistic basis.

For its part, India’s lack of physical border infrastructure has impeded progress on multiple fronts, including its ability to undertake military mobilisation to engage in joint military exercises in the border areas. The critical role of strengthened physical infrastructure cannot be emphasised enough in this regard. India’s ability to bring about more effective jointness and integration will also depend on a better border management system, possibly under a single command structure that will focus on infrastructure and the capability mix for the border forces, and monitor the frequency of exercises.

Conclusion

Since the ascent of Xi Jinping to China’s presidency, strong emphasis has been given to the Chinese military’s competitiveness as well as that of the world’s other major militaries. This emphasis has translated to greater prominence for jointness and integration among the different arms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially the PLA Army and the PLA Air Force. These joint exercises and efforts at bringing about better integration have been on full display on the Sino-Indian border areas and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This brings about serious security implications for India.

The problem becomes more acute with the massive military imbalance in the border areas, both in terms of infrastructure and equipment, in favour of China. India’s poor infrastructure has also impacted on the military’s ability to mobilise forces, undertake exercises to test out the vulnerabilities and gaps, and the overall jointness in terms of operations and strategic approach. The central government must undertake two important measures in this regard. One, the government has to find a way of incentivising private sector participation in infrastructure development in the border. In the harshest of terrains, private sector ventures have succeeded in setting up, for example, hydroelectric plants. However, the private sector will not enter an area unless there is a profit calculation to its benefit. Given the strategic nature of these infrastructure projects, the central government has to find a way of encouraging the private sector to take them on.

There should be a new institutional authority established under the PMO that will track the progress of these projects on a periodic basis. While the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has undertaken a review of these projects, these were merely recommendations that have not necessarily been followed up by the political leadership to address the inadequacies, especially the problem of multiplicity of agencies involved in the development of border infrastructure including road and rail networks and bridges. The need for a single authority for periodic monitoring and completion of these projects cannot be overemphasized. The government should constitute a parliamentary committee on strategic infrastructure which could monitor and update the status of the projects.

Given China’s apparent seriousness in its single-service and joint military operations in the Tibetan region, India should urgently step up its own capabilities on multiple fronts.

PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India - video link to our fellows seminar discussions, 17 April 2020

Here's the video link to our fellows seminar discussions on PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India. The discussions were based on an Occasional Paper that Pulkit Mohan, my colleague and I published a few months ago on the same issue. You can find the video here and the Occasional Paper here.

Why China’s Growing Military Might in Tibet Should Worry India - The Diplomat, 3 March 2020

Earlier in the week, I had a short essay for The Diplomat looking at the implications of China's growing military might in Tibet. I have tried to locate the importance of the PLA military exercise in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in January but the essay is also a shorter version of an Occasional Paper I co-authored with Pulkit Mohan, my colleague, for the ORF in February 2020. In this essay, I argue that the rising tempo of Chinese deployments in Tibet should be of concern to New Delhi.

Last month, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in a major military exercise in the Tibet region. The engagement showcased some of the latest weapons in the Chinese military inventory and also spotlighted its deployments in the region more generally.

According to reports, the exercise last month in Tibet witnessed the deployment of several key aspects of Chinese military capabilities, including the Type 15 light battle tank and the new 155 mm vehicle-mounted howitzer. A Chinese military analyst speaking to the Global Times said that both “had powerful engines, allowing them to maneuver efficiently in Tibet’s terrain.” The same Global Times report also stated that the PLA Tibet Military Command had deployed helicopters, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles across the region, from Lhasa, which has an elevation of around 3,700 meters, to border defense frontlines at an altitude higher than 4,000 meters.

For the full essay, click here.



These developments were by no means surprising. Indeed, the PLA has been beefing up its overall combat proficiency in the last few years by engaging in training and joint exercises, especially in high-altitude regions, with implications for how China’s military operates and how other actors in the Indo-Pacific region respond in kind.

With respect to Tibet in particular, the PLA has been doing a number of exercises in Tibet, and the frequency seems to be increasing. Close to a decade ago, in 2011, the PLA conducted two joint exercises at the group army level in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with the goal of practicing employing a division-size force in a truly integrated manner, involving armor, artillery, and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There were also reportedly network-centric operations in a high-intensity electromagnetic environment practiced during this exercise. A J-11 regiment was sighted engaging in night-combat training in Tibet in August 2015.

Beyond individual exercises and more broadly, these developments demonstrate the growing air infrastructure in the TAR, including civilian airports, many of which are used by the PLAAF. These exercises have continued to grow bigger and more sophisticated. Even amidst the Doklam crisis in 2017, the PLA was engaged in a joint military exercise on the Tibetan plateau to test agility and combat proficiency in tasks such as assaults on enemy positions.

China’s engagements are part of an effort to step up their combat proficiencies in Tibet. More specifically, they address a significant lacuna of the PLA – lack of recent operational experience. These exercises have also focused on bringing about true jointness and integration in military operations. In addition to these exercises, there are other indicators of increased PLA activity in the TAR. For example, from 2013 onwards, PLAAF aircraft and helicopters have been sighted doing increased patrolling. Since 2013, troops coming to sectors opposite the Ladakh sector have been instructed to only travel by air and not by road, though the implications of this is unclear. Since April 2015, there have been increasing PLAAF activities, with J-11 and Su-27 aircraft of the PLAAF engaged in periodic exercises in the TAR.

From an Indian perspective in particular, China’s military efforts in the TAR are of grave concern. Even though this was the first major exercise of the PLA in 2020, there has been a significant increase in PLA engagements in terms of military training and exercises in the TAR over the last decade. The fact that Beijing has established all-weather physical border infrastructure in these areas has enhanced its ability to project military power in the region.

Additionally, the PLA is also known to have set up many military camps close to the border areas with periodic deployment of forces in these camps. This would imply that the PLA remains relatively acclimatized to the high-altitude conditions prevalent in the region, whereas on the Indian side, most forces responsible for the Sino-Indian border areas are in the plains of Assam.

This is a challenge in itself, but the bigger worry for New Delhi should be the growing number of Chinese military exercises in the TAR. The PLA has been engaged in many single-service and joint military exercises to validate several operational concepts.

The increase in the frequency and complexity of the PLA exercises in the TAR could also be an indicator of things to come. The fact that the Chinese state-run media are publicizing these exercises in Tibet is possibly an effort to send a signal to India and a demonstration of the overall better combat proficiency of the PLA. New Delhi cannot afford to ignore them.

Clearly, the tempo of China’s military activities in the TAR is growing, and it is likely to lead to even greater efforts on the Indian side. Though the Doklam confrontation ended peacefully, the preparations being undertaken by both sides suggest that the next one may have a different outcome.

Chinese Defence White Paper: An Initial Assessment

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the just released Chinese Defence White Paper.

China's defence White Paper, titled China's National Defense in 2010, the seventh in the series, was published on March 31, 2011. Does the White Paper bring out anything new? The answer may be a "No" given that it has continued reiterating the same positions on all of these issues. Because of criticism of lack of transparency on security issues, China has decided to come out with these white papers but unfortunately it sheds no new light on the PLA, its objectives or the military modernization. While it remains an important CBM measure, the suspicions about the long term intentions of Beijing can be hardly wished away with the publication of these white papers. The White Paper is essentially what the Chinese want the world to believe what they are doing. Therefore, if China is serious about reducing the regional suspicion about its rise, it has to do something more meaningful.



Underlying the fact that the momentum for economic globalization and multi-polar world are irreversible, the White Paper identifies a few challenges as it outlines its security environment. The "intermittent tension" on the Korean Peninsula and the unraveling security scenario in Afghanistan are seen as major concerns, and the White Paper argues that the Asia-Pacific security has become "more intricate and volatile." Occasional disputes and flare-ups over undemarcated territorial issues and maritime rights have been mentioned as issues contributing to the volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific though thereis no mention of the recent incidents at sea, fuelled by Chinese naval actions.2 The presence of external powers in China's extended neighbourhood - the US and its strengthened regional partnerships -is an issue for Beijing. However, China claims that it is still in "the period of important strategic opportunities for its development," and therefore the idea of cooperating with major traditional powers and new emerging powers, along with good neighbourly relationship, is seen as something Beijing must continue with for mutual benefits. While acknowledging relations with the United States as significant and as a stabilizing tool, Beijing does not mince its words in criticizing Washington for its alliance-kind of relationship, particularly the military sales to the region.

Describing its national defense policy as purely defensive, the White Paper sets out four critical tasks for its armed forces: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. It further details its strategy as adhering to "the principles of independence and self-defense by the whole nation" and is essentially for maintaining the territorial integrity of its land border, territorial sea and air defenses. China has also begun to emphasize on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), again a theme that began with the last defense White Paper. Beijing argues that there is an increased role for its armed forces on a range of missions, from disaster management missions to riot control to search and rescue operations given the penetrating nature of non-traditional security threats faced by Asia today.

On the modernization of national defense capabilities, the White Paper argues that the PLA is modernizing its forces and equipment "with mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, while making extensive use of its achievements in information technology, and stepping up the composite and integrated development of mechanization and informationization." Talking of PLA modernization, it emphasizes shifting from a "manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive model." The document mentions the formation of new types of combat forces,without divulging much detail. There is also the modernization of the artillery forces - with the introduction of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles- for undertaking important military maneuvers - "to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities." In addition, the PLA Army aviation wing has made significant changes to its role and function - moving away from being a support arm to being a main-battle assault force. Air power has been given a lot of emphasis evident from the upgradation undertaken in its armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, thereby making marked differences in its ability to move and support infantry forces, force projection as well as extending support role in various missions.

There has been marked progress on the naval front as well. Introduction of new submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels in support of China's offshore defense strategy or "Far Sea Defense Strategy" as stated by Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in April last year.3 Accordingly, PLA Navy plans construction of new support bases in order to strengthen the shore-based support system while complementing the deployment of forces and development of weaponry and equipment. This suggests the future intentions of the Navy to project power beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

However, the most significant pronouncement has been regarding the role of the PLA Air Force - to meet "the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations." The Air Force is projected to have important roles in the coming years that emphasizes "air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection," while improving its "leadership and command system for an informationized, networked base support system."Similarly, it has been training on various scenarios involving extensive electromagnetic environment, recognizing the importance of these in future warfare scenarios. Similarly, there has been major push for modernizing its Second Artillery Force with an objective of sharpening their capabilities for "rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations."

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need to accelerate the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment for undertaking the above-mentioned missions and goals. Accordingly, it has strengthened "the retrofitting and management of existing equipment, and promoting the composite development of mechanized and informationized weaponry and equipment."

Additionally, the White Paper discusses defence expenditure and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation involves a range of issues from joint military exercises and training to strengthening cooperation as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Confidence building measures are also discussed for maintaining social stability and non-proliferation and arms control issues.