China extends terrestrial rivalries into orbit with new space race - The Nikkei Asian Review, 23 August 2019

On this Friday, I published a short essay on the emerging Asian space race in The Nikkei Asian Review. I believe that the emerging space dynamics especially in Asia will spur new competition as well as cooperation. For example, India and Japan unite over Beijing's moon landings and anti-satellite weapons and find new avenues to collaborate including in joint lunar missions in the future.

On September 7, India will attempt to land an unmanned mission on the moon. If it is successful, it will join China as the second Asian power that has landed on the lunar surface -- its efforts driven by China's achievements.

While such peaceful rivalry can spur countries to greater feats, unfortunately competition between Asian nations is now having more hostile effects: earlier in the year, India tested an antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, in space, trying to match a capability that China had demonstrated earlier.

These are two facets of the space race in Asia and it now looks like both will be determined by terrestrial power tussles more than anything else.

For the full essay, click here.



Asian powers have made significant advances in developing their capacities in outer space in the past couple of decades. China landed a rover on the far side of the moon earlier this year, an impressive feat that no other country has achieved, three years after landing on the near side.

While China has not officially commented on plans for a manned mission to the moon yet, many believe that will be the next step. In fact, Beijing has disclosed that its future lunar missions will set the foundation for a potential research base there.

Further, China's plans to construct and operate its own space station in low-earth orbit sometime around 2022 are impressive, but also add to space competition. By the time China's space station is established, it will probably be the only one operating. The current International Space Station is likely to wind up by 2024.

Similarly, India became the first Asian country to send an orbiter around Mars, called the Mangalyaan. ISRO, India's space agency, has an ambitious agenda, including a mission to study the sun in 2019-20, a second mission to Mars around 2022-23 and a Venus mission around 2023. Like China, India also plans manned space missions.

Japan, the other Asian power, has focused more on commercially viable projects but it has impressive achievements including a lunar orbiter mission in 2007 as well as the Hayabusa mission, the first time that a spacecraft landed on an asteroid and brought back samples.

While these achievements are commendable, there is a darker side; tense international relations in Asia are being felt in outer space.

In 2007, when China tested its ASAT weapon, it was the first such test since the 1980s. China's decision to demonstrate that capability meant that every power which had a reasonable level of dependence on outer space, not just military but also civilian, through such uses as GPS and telecommunication satellites, was now suddenly vulnerable.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. immediately followed with its own ASAT test the next year, and India began its own program. Now it appears that Japan may be on its way to developing an ASAT capability.

ASATs are only the visible element of this competition. There is also a less well known race to develop other capabilities that can damage the outer-space assets of potential adversaries. These include everything from cyber attacks to electronic warfare and spectrum interference, deliberate attempts to jam or otherwise impede radio signals.

The problem is of course a global one. But it is also specifically Asian because most of the key players are the rising powers in this region. Growing national wealth and technological capabilities have made these countries more dependent on space -- and hence more vulnerable.

The difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of international rules or norms. Existing treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 have proved to be outdated and inadequate to meet these challenges. The problem is well recognized and there have been recent international efforts to address it, though these have gone nowhere.

The consequence is that deterrence appears to be the only real safeguard to protecting national assets in space. Simply put, the absence of strong rules and norms means countries must implicitly threaten retaliation by developing their aggressive capabilities.

This competition is spurring cooperation of a sort, however. China's enormous capacity means that no other Asian power can counter it alone. Just as this is encouraging new terrestrial alignments between India, Japan, Australia and others, it is also leading to cooperation in outer space by a number of countries, all whom have common concerns about China's capabilities and behavior in space.

Thus India and Japan, despite having highly nationalistic space programs, are cooperating more. In 2017, the two countries formally recognized the importance of deeper cooperation, and the space agencies of the two countries plan to conduct a joint lunar mission. More significantly, the two countries have just started a space security dialogue.

The first space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union petered out without too much damage. With only two players in the game and a far simpler outer-space environment, management of that competition was relatively easy.

Asia may not be so lucky unless wiser counsel prevails. Asian powers have made significant advances and accomplished much they can be proud of, but unless they can either manage their terrestrial power politics or at least isolate outer space from those politics, it is likely that all of Asia could suffer.

India’s ASAT test: Further steps - ORF March 28, 2019

SO, India finally conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test on March 27, 2019. And there I was in Geneva for the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) Meeting on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). The timing was interesting and strange in many ways. But amidst all the GGE work, I managed to write a few OpEds on the ASAT test, the strategic implications of it and what needs to be done now that it has a demonstrated ASAT capability.

For the ORF, I wrote a piece examining the next steps following the ASAT test. India’s ASAT test is not surprising although the timing of the test is. India started developing its ASAT capabilities in the last decade after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in 2007. It goes without saying that other countries could follow suit and build ASATs. But China made the first move with regard to ASATs and it took India a dozen years to decide whether it wanted to demonstrate this capability or not.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced yesterday that India has conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test, hitting a live satellite at an altitude of 300 kms. This makes India only the fourth country after the US, Russia and China to demonstrate such a capability. The only other country that is thought to have this capability is Israel, although it has not demonstrated it as yet.

India’s ASAT test could raise some questions given that it is likely to be perceived as a path to weaponisation but Modi argued that this was a “defensive” move meant to secure India’s own assets. He said, “Our aim is to maintain peace over war mongering. The space programme’s aim is peace, India’s economic and technological progress.” Highlighting the salience of space to India, Modi asserted, “Today, we are using space and satellites for all sorts of purposes, including agriculture, defence, disaster management, communication, entertainment, weather, navigation, education, medical uses, and other things. In such a situation, the security of these satellites is extremely important.”

In fact, the former DRDO chief Dr. VK Saraswat has claimed several times that India is developing the necessary technologies in order to destroy an enemy satellite. In fact, the successful testing of India’s anti-ballistic missile on March 6, 2011 was seen as taking a step closer to India’s development of an ASAT capability.

For the full article, click here.



Many will question the need for India to develop and test such capabilities when it is mired in a number of developmental challenges but the fact is that India is not located in a benign neighbourhood and cannot afford to ignore the new realities within the region and globally within the space domain. Therefore, even though India’s space programme is largely civilian oriented, it has acquired a slightly greater focus on national security concerns. While India still wants to ensure that outer space remains free of weapons and continues as a domain of peace and stability, it is of course not up to New Delhi alone to ensure that. India cannot avoid the increasing militarization of outer space and ignoring this reality will only hurt India’s security interests. Moreover, these developments are taking place at a time when there is a larger power transition within Asia and beyond. India’s difficulties with an aggressive China have also been pushing India down this path.

India has come a long way as far as the ASATs are concerned. From fierce opposition to the US and Soviet ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s, India has come to appreciate the strategic utility of these capabilities and demonstrations. While India’s approach to non-proliferation issues and the global regimes has been changing since the early 2000s, a clearer articulation on space began to appear after the Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. The Chinese test was a wake-up call for Indian policymakers who called for breaking down some of the bureaucratic and inter-departmental barriers within the Indian government to better address this threat. Then DRDO Chief Dr. M Natarajan suggested that there must be greater integration between institutions such as Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Similar statements were echoed by former ISRO chiefs like Dr. K Kasturirangan, who said that India has spent huge amount of resources to develop and place assets in space and therefore there is responsibility “to protect them from adversaries.”

India did not have knee-jerk reaction to China’s tests but given the worsening security competition, New Delhi had little choice but to make this decision in the interest of ensuring deterrence. But all sides will lose in such an unbridled competition because all are dependent on space.

Now that India has crossed the rubicon and has a demonstrated ASAT capability, New Delhi must make earnest efforts to help develop rules of the road that will bring about certain restraint in outer space activities. Under the current international political climate, it is unrealistic to assume that the major spacefaring powers will develop a consensus for a global treaty but India must not lose opportunities in making those efforts. At the very least, India must coordinate with all the key players in producing some consensus language about those global governance arrangements that can be taken up in multiple foras including the Conference on Disarmament, UN First Committee, and UN Disarmament Commission.

India Changing Tack on Space Policy, my essay for AsiaGlobal Online Journal

Here's an essay of mine on the changing strategic dynamics in Asia including the outer space domain and how India is responding to that, published by the AsiaGlobal Online Journal.

India is scheduled to launch the lunar rover Chandrayaan-2 in 2018, an emblematic sign of the country's will to step up its space policy. Its efforts in this arena include a revival of international partnerships and a change in its position on space militarization. In the absence of an adequate global governance regime, such activity extends geopolitical tensions to outer space.

India has one of the oldest space programs in the world — in operation for more than five decades — and is considered an established spacefaring power. Today, the country is gradually reorienting its space program towards national security. This new approach is driving India to forge partnerships with countries such as Japan, and revise and strengthen old links with partners like the US and France. India’s changing tack towards a more security-driven space program is spurred by new geopolitical realities. But could this changed stance on space policy also spark further geopolitical competition?

For the full essay, click here.



Before we delve into the substance of India’s new space program, two points need to be made. First, India’s space program remains overwhelmingly focused on civilian initiatives, and the new and developing attention on the security utilities of the program will not fundamentally change its civilian orientation. The development of new capabilities that help address India’s national security concerns is an addition to, and not a replacement of, existing capabilities.

Second, India’s interest in developing these technologies is somewhat reactive, driven by the development of such capacities in other countries: China, for example. There is little to suggest that India’s expansion of the scope of its space program is being driven by purely domestic political interests or technological imperatives.

Japan and France, New Strategic Partners

The larger geopolitical developments in the region constitute a critical factor. The India-Japan strategic partnership, which has been steadily growing over the past decade, is a testament to the new geopolitical realities in the region. It is worth recalling that for decades, these countries had rather cool relations. Not anymore. China’s rise affects both, and they have reacted together. Space is one of the many arenas where this new strategic cooperation can be seen.

Naoki Okumura, president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), stated, “India and Japan will lead the space sector in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe further elevated India-Japan space cooperation in September 2017, when the two leaders underlined the importance of their bilateral collaboration “in the field of Earth observation, satellite-based navigation, space sciences, and lunar exploration.” Emphasizing the significance of the countries’ joint lunar mission in November 2017, Naoki Okumura, president of the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), stated, “India and Japan will lead the space sector in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Just a few weeks ago, India entered into similar engagements with France. French President Emmanuel Macron’s recent visit to India saw surprisingly strong statements of deeper strategic cooperation between the two countries. So dramatic is this intensification of the relationship that some noted commentators have even suggested that France could be as important an ally for India as Russia has been.

India and France will be collaborating on a range of issues in defense and security. Their agreements on space and maritime security in the Indian Ocean, in particular, stand out in terms of the actionable agenda that New Delhi and Paris are working on. As is the case in collaboration between India and Japan, India and France are driven by shared global and regional security concerns, including maritime security, freedom of navigation and overflight, and respect for international law, among other issues. The two sides are planning on employing space assets to develop effective maritime domain awareness (MDA), given their increasing concern about maritime security in the Indo-Pacific.

As with France, India’s relationship with the US is also undergoing a strategic deepening, with the two countries sharing political and strategic goals in the Indo-Pacific region.

On the Road to Space Militarization?

This new focus on using space for security purposes has not come easily for India. India has traditionally been opposed to using space for security-related functions. In fact, from early on, India played an active role in pushing to keep outer space beyond interstate conflicts. In one of the first articulations on the issue at the United Nations, Indian representative Krishna Rao argued in 1964 that outer space was a new field, so “there were no vested interests to prevent the international community from embarking on a regime of cooperation rather than of conflict.” As he saw it, space fortunately did not have any regimes in place, so the questions were “not those of modifying an existing regime but of fashioning a new pattern of international behavior.” This had consistently been the Indian position: that space should only be used for peaceful, cooperative purposes.

In accordance with this position, India was stridently opposed to the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. In 1985, Muchkund Dubey, India’s ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, criticized the SDI and “called for negotiations to prevent an arms race in outer space.” This policy stance continued even after the end of the Cold War.

This had consistently been the Indian position: that space should only be used for peaceful, cooperative purposes.

But over the last decade, there have been signs of change in India’s space policy orientation, especially its position on space militarization. For example, India supported the Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, though this did not result immediately in any specific changes in Indian space military capabilities or even programs. This can be traced, partially, to larger political objectives.

A Response to China’s Geopolitical Positions

Real change in India’s space policy orientation came after January 2007, when China conducted its first anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test. This was compounded by changing geopolitical alignments and the shifting military balance in Asia. All of this is now driving new races, including in outer space. Though the primary competition is between the US, Russia, and China, there is a second rung of competition involving, among others, India because of China’s growing capabilities and the ambiguity of its policies, as well as the aggressiveness of some of its postures.

India has come to acknowledge that space may not remain a purely civilian domain.

China’s ASAT test in January 2007 is particularly important in this regard. China may have been responding to the capabilities already developed by the US and Russia during the Cold War, but its ASAT test was an eye-opener for New Delhi with regard to the kind of threats India must be ready to confront right in its backyard. Since then, India has nuanced its position on space militarization.

India has come to acknowledge that space may not remain a purely civilian domain. The implication of this is that if India does not improve its own capabilities, it may be left lagging behind in a critical area. Thus, India has set up an “Integrated Space Cell” within its Ministry of Defence, and has been discussing other administrative reforms.

There is, of course, little doubt that others, including Pakistan and China, will respond to the growing sophistication of India’s capabilities. There is little that India can do about this; what is clear is that the growing geopolitical tensions in Asia are going to reach outer space.

Seeking Nuclear Legitimacy, my article on India's nuclear security policy...

Here's my short essay on India's nuclear security policy, particularly in the backdrop of India's NSG membership talks... I make two points here: one, even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. two, for many of the NSG members, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

The annual meeting of the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was recently concluded in Buenos Aires, where India's membership issue was discussed with no clear answer. Several countries, including the US, UK, France have remained supportive of India's membership although countries such as China, among a few others, have remained opposed to the Indian membership issue. It is in the interests of India to be part of the NSG if it has to be able to shape the new non-proliferation architecture and exercise a greater say in how the global rules are played. For the international community as well, it is beneficial to have India inside the tent than outside.

Nuclear security has become an important concern for the global community. The threat of nuclear terrorism, including the so-called 'dirty bomb', has continued to increase over the last decade. The need for strengthening the current international mechanisms and establishing new rules if necessary is growing. Recognising the importance of the problem, the global community has held three 'nuclear security summits' which focused just on this problem. India has a lot to contribute to this effort, but we are being stymied by misperception about our own efforts in the nuclear security arena.

For India too, this is an important issue. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister participated in the first two nuclear security summits indicates the importance of this issue to India. New Delhi worries that one of the various terrorists groups in the region, especially those in Pakistan, might acquire some type of nuclear capacity.

While acquisition of nuclear materials and capabilities is not easy given the tight security around facilities and installations, the potential for such should not be ruled out. Accordingly, India has instituted strong measures around nuclear safety and security, which is at par with some of the other major nuclear powers. Analysts have been critical of India's policies and practices, but the reality is that India put in place both its institutional and legal architecture way back in the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously, there have been structural changes as well as amendments brought to these instruments in recognition of new threats and risks. In the backdrop of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks, the potential to carry out commando style attack or a sabotage by Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba is very real and India has to gear up its response mechanisms in a focused manner. Therefore, while terrorism is not a new phenomenon to India given its geographical proximity to global terrorism, it has to plan its response and contingency measures well. The ability to respond quickly and effectively, bringing together all the different agencies involved, will be a major challenge. While various agencies do periodic scenario building and exercises to test their response capabilities, mock drills involving all agencies are done very rarely.

International cooperation is particularly important given the nature of new challenges facing India in this regard. Even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. To a great extent, the consensus has been that we need not be so open in the area of nuclear safety and security. This may have served India's interests to a limited extent so far.

However, as India's interests grow and it makes efforts to integrate with the international nuclear community, its ability to shape the new non-proliferation architecture will depend to a large extent how open it is about its policies and postures. No one is arguing for total transparency wherein our security may be put to risk, but a more pro-active engagement and outlining of our broad approach might do India some good. Having said that, it should also be acknowledged that there has been some effort recently to outline India's nuclear security approach and what different measures India has taken to secure its nuclear facilities and installations. For instance, a report authored by the Ministry of External Affairs lays out in detail the structures and practices that India has adopted in the area of nuclear security.

Despite India having an elaborate system in place, the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) Nuclear Security Index 2014 has clubbed India along with countries that have extremely poor track record in nuclear security. How seriously should this be taken up? Should an attempt by a think tank to quantify this issue be accorded any importance? This question pops up in the backdrop of India trying to garner support for membership into major technology export control regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It should be important that other countries know what we do, in terms of our internal practices but also what we do in the international realm, particularly with bodies such the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

There is little that one could do if groups such as the NTI come with a pre-judged position on India's nuclear security policies and practices. To counter such perceptions, not only must India put in place a lot of institutions and practices but also advertise to the world what it is doing. This is important when we are seeking membership of various nuclear clubs and because we need others' cooperation on a number of nuclear-related issues. Having said that, for many, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

India can consider a few steps that might strengthen its image on this issue among the larger nuclear community. One, India's nuclear doctrine could be elucidated further and updated as a means of bringing about more clarity. This may be something that the Modi government could contemplate upon. Such measures could also be used as important tools of international messaging. Two, India could issue detailed position papers and statement at important forums like the Nuclear Security Summit and such other platforms. Three, India should communicate to the international community by using different platforms to share its perspectives and concerns. For instance, participation in international conferences, which are many a time effectively Track 1.5 platforms, are a way to garner greater support while pro-actively shaping the global discourse. India on many occasions does not appreciate the significance of such platforms and whether intended or not, it has lost out on several opportunities to effect impact. India must take corrective steps in this regard sooner than later. India's establishment of the GCNEP has gone a long way to strengthen its credibility in the area of nuclear security. India could consider additional steps, including possibly establishing a CTBT Monitoring Station, which would be seen as a positive contribution to monitoring non-proliferation challenges in the region and beyond. All this could go a long way in correcting international misperception of India in the nuclear non-proliferation and security arena.

GSLV success: A major technology boost

Here's an analysis of India's successful GSLV launch conducted on January 05, 2014. This puts India in an exclusive club of five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China. Given the complex nature of this technology - the use of rocket propellants at extremely low temperatures, as the ISRO Chairman Dr. Radhakrishnan remarked, "only a few in the world have mastered it."

For the full article, click here.



With the launch of GSLV-D5, India’s indigenously developed cryogenic engine upper stage technology has been proven for the first time, a major feat of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The proven technology demonstrates India’s ability to launch heavier payloads into geostationary orbit. Cryogenic technology is significant due to the thrust gained through burning every kg of propellant that is far higher in a cryogenic engine, which gives the thrust to carry heavier satellites into orbit. In the flight of GSLV-D5, the ISRO also launched a communication satellite GSAT-14 into the Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). The test was a make or break situation for the ISRO after two successive failures in 2010 and a mission cancelled in 2013.

India had undertaken so far seven GSLV launches, including three failures and one mission cancelled hours before the launch. Previous failures included problems such as fuel tank leakage, the mission centre losing control of the rocket with it deviating from predicted flight path, among others. Therefore, the January 5 successful launch is a matter of technology demonstration and a major boost for the Indian space community.

India’s cryogenic journey has been a long one, going back to the 1980s. In December 1982, a Cryogenic Study Team was established that studied all aspects of the technology and questions such as whether India should develop or buy the technology from outside were examined. In 1983, the team submitted a report that recommended developing the engine capable of generating about 10 tonnes of thrust indigenously as against procuring it off the shelf. In addition to the exorbitant cost to buying from elsewhere, export control mechanisms such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that denies transfer of such technologies were also contextualising factors in India’s decision. However, in 1991 after a great deal of indecision, Government of India entered into a deal with the Soviet Union for procuring two cryogenic flight stages and the technology to make them in India. The sale of such technology was seen as a violation of the MTCR commitments made by the Soviet Union and thus the deal was scrapped.

In addition to the prestige factor of being part of an exclusive club of countries that have the proven cryogenic engine technology, the GSLV-D5 launch is important from a commercial and strategic perspective. The growing satellite launch market has a huge commercial angle. So far, this market is dominated by the French and the Chinese to an extent. Given the growing number of countries entering the space domain for a variety of missions from socio-economic and development to military functions, the number of satellite launches is likely to go up significantly in the coming years. India should not lose out opportunities in this ever-growing lucrative foreign satellite launch market.

From a strategic perspective, the successful launch of the GSLV means it is self-reliant in the area of satellite launching, including heavier satellites. This also means that India will not have to depend on foreign agencies to carry their heavier payloads. Without a successfully tested indigenous cryogenic engine GSLV, many of India’s future missions would have been affected by delays. India already has a series of satellites including include GSAT-6A and 7A, two remote sensing satellites, GISATs and the GSAT series including GSAT-9 ready for launch in the near future. Chandrayaan-2 and India’s interplanetary and manned moon missions will also have a huge boost. While India has not faced any serious issue of reliability as far as foreign launchers are concerned, being self-sufficient in this area is significant in addition to having more cost-effective, cheaper options at home.

So far India has used its tried and tested Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) although these do have a weight limitation of just over one tonne. A PSLV can carry 1600 kg satellites in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). On the other hand, a GSLV offers India the ability to launch satellites weighing 3.5-5 tonnes.


1. N. Gopal Raj, "The Long Road to Cryogenic Technology," OpEd, The Hindu, April 21, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-long-road-to-cryogenic-technology/article397441.ece

India's GSLV Launch: A Major Milestone for ISRO...

India's GSLV launch in January 2014 has been watched with a lot of interest as well as apprehension given what happened in 2010 and 2013. However, it is clear that s successful launch of GSLV will place India in the same league as a handful of countries as far as the technological sophistication is concerned. Currently, there are five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China - that have demonstrated the cryogenic engine upper stage technology in order to launch heavier satellites in geostationary orbit. India will become the sixth nation to design and develop this sophisticated and complex technology.

For the full article, click here.



After two successive failures of its Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV) launches in 2006 and 2010 and an aborted mission in 2013, India's endeavour to launch another GSLV on January 5 is being watched with both hope and apprehension. Though the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has done several trial tests for the launch of GSLV-D5, there is apprehension because of what happened in 2010 and 2013.

A successful launch of GSLV will place India in the same league as a handful of countries as far as the technological sophistication is concerned. Currently, there are five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China - that have demonstrated the cryogenic engine upper stage technology in order to launch heavier satellites in geostationary orbit. India will become the sixth nation to design and develop this sophisticated and complex technology. The GSLV-D5 rocket will carry on board the 2-tonne GSAT-14 satellite capable of delivering communication services in the area of tele-medicine and tele-education. On December 28, 2013, the Mission Readiness Review (MRR) team and the Launch Authorisation Board (LAB) cleared the GSLV-D5/GSAT 14 launch for January 5 and thereafter the rocket was shifted to the launch pad.

The three-stage rocket, with solid, liquid and cryogenic stages, is "a very complex system compared with solid or earth-storable liquid propellant stages due to its use of propellants at extremely low temperatures and the associated thermal and structural problems", according to the ISRO. Cryogenic technology is significant because the thrust gained through burning every kg of propellant is far higher in a cryogenic engine, which gives the thrust to carry heavier payloads into orbit.

Starting in April 2001, India has so far carried out seven GSLV launches, including three failures and one aborted launch. Past failures have included problems such as deviation from the predicted flight paths soon after the lift-off. The attempt in 2013 had to be called off hours before the lift-off as they detected a leak in the fuel tank of the liquid second-stage in pre-launch pressurisation phase of the vehicle.

This time around, ISRO Chairman Dr. S Radhakrishnan and the engineers appear confident of having rectified many of the problems faced in the previous missions. There have been several committees set up to study in detail the cause of failures and accordingly remedial measures have been taken. For instance, they have used an entirely new fuel tank. Apparently, the earlier leaked-prone fuel tank was an old stock, procured four years ago and also the aluminium alloy, Afnor 7020 that was used in the making of the tank tends to develop cracks over a period of time. The booster turbo pump, that ran into problem twice previously, had used different materials that contracted differently at low temperatures, which has been rectified now by using a single material. Similarly, the issues of contamination with the propellant acquisition device procured from Russia have been addressed and this time around, the device is manufactured in India. There has been refurbishing of the casing of the rocket as well.

Tomorrow's attempt will be significant both from the commercial and strategic perspectives. In addition to the large number of domestic satellites ready to be launched using the heavier launch vehicle, a successful launch will also mean India's ability to cash in on the large lucrative foreign satellite launch market.

Given the ever-increasing reliance on space assets for a variety of missions from socio-economic and development to military functions, the number of satellite launches will spike significantly in the coming years. China has already captured a sizeable chunk of this market even though India offers much more cost-effective launches, which in fact have been its strength.

India's tried and tested Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) have a weight limitation of just over one tonne. A PSLV is capable of carrying 1600 kg satellites in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). A GSLV on the other hand will offer India ability to launch satellites weighing 3.5-5 tonnes.

A successful launch with the indigenous cryogenic engine will go a long way in making India self-sufficient in the area of satellite launching. Large tonnage carrying capability is important in the domestic context since it will no longer have to depend on foreign rockets to carry their large satellites. Chandrayaan-2 is a case in point. Other satellite launches planned include GSAT-6A and 7A, two remote sensing satellites, GISATs and the GSAT series including GSAT-9. Relying on foreign carriers has had reliability issues in addition to the cost factor as these have proven to be more expensive options.

Military Diplomacy: Time for India to Go Proactive, my article published in The Diplomatist...

Here's an article of mine, wherein I make case for India to effectively use military diplomacy in its conduct of diplomacy, published in the year-end special edition on Indian Diplomacy (December 2013).

Today military diplomacy is construed as one of the essential tools in the pursuit of a nation’s foreign policy. This would mean utilisation of all defence activities and platforms including exchange of international military personnel, visits of ships and aircrafts, engagement of the civil, military bureaucracies and defence ministers, military training and exercises, regional and global defence meetings and forums. India, however, has been shy of using military diplomacy as an active tool in its diplomacy. What is not clear is whether this has been a deliberate attempt on India’s part or more a result of bureaucratic and political inertia. However, India has to become proactive in using military diplomacy in furthering its own national interests.

What Is Military Diplomacy?
Diplomacy is broadly described as the art and practice of pursuing a nation’s foreign relations, and military diplomacy is defined as the conduct of foreign policy by the men in uniform or even the civilian defence departments. As mentioned earlier, this involves military exchanges and accordingly these are categorised under heads such as defence exchanges to include joint training with the militaries of foreign countries.

While this broader definition has come to be used by a considerable number of countries, China, which has used military diplomacy in an effective manner, defines it from a narrower perspective, to say “foreign affairs work performed by defence institutions and armed forces.” (Matsuda Yasuhiro, “An Essay on China’s Military Diplomacy: Examination of Intentions in Foreign Strategy,” NIDS Security Repors, No. 7, December 2006, p. 3.) Yasuhiro, one of the prominent scholars on the subject, quotes Chinese authors who have differentiated military diplomacy from political or regular diplomacy by stating that military diplomacy is “all diplomatic activities relating to national security and military diplomatic activities.” (Yasuhiro quotes Yang Songhe, Junshi waijiao gailun (Survey of Military Diplomacy), Junshi yiwen chubanshe, Beijing, 1999.)

It may be true that military diplomacy does not differ in significant terms from the regular diplomacy in its content given that visits, meetings, exchanges, negotiations, participating in international conferences, treaty signings and exchanges of diplomatic documents are important aspects of military diplomacy. The difference lies in the fact that these would be conducted primarily by men in uniform or otherwise civilians in the defence ministries and that the content would have a large role for the military. However, these functions will form an important part of the larger foreign and security policy goals and ideals dictated by the political leadership. Broadly, military diplomacy has the following objectives: training of one’s own military for any emergency situation, strengthening of ties with other countries, sales of weapons and military technologies, and more importantly establishment of a sphere of influence as also learn a lot about foreign militaries, their way of working, their equipments through direct interaction with such organizations. The exercises are also big opportunities for signalling and messaging about a nation’s security interests and challenges to the foreign countries. If one were to look at the now routine SCO-China military exercises, which started way back in 2007, China announced that it intends to fight the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Despite Russia’s wariness and apprehensions of a rising China, it has been an active participant in these exercises. The exercises were also part of the Chinese efforts to limit the US influence in these countries, as much as an effort to strengthen bilateral and multilateral dealings with these countries. These exercises have also provided an opportunity to understand other militaries’ organizational ethos, culture, philosophies, strengths and weaknesses and most importantly get a sense of the other military’s modernisation processes. Forums like Shangri-La Dialogue are also becoming important conduits for conducting military diplomacy.

The major aspects of military diplomacy include military and strategic level undertakings including defence consultations and strategic dialogues, arms transfers, regional activities, including state to state military protocols, opening of military bases, participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, professional military education exchanges, including Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues besides cooperation in non-traditional security areas, like sending armed forces to counter-terrorism exercises, UN Peacekeeping operations, disaster management operations. Military diplomacy also includes: exchange of military attaches, visits by military delegations, military study abroad, participation in international arms control and disarmament programmes, arms import and export, and military assistance to friendly countries.

Military Diplomacy – India
India has been lagging behind in using military diplomacy as an effective tool in its diplomacy. But this has been changing in the last few years. India has recognised the crucial importance of military diplomacy to strengthen this beyond the narrow traditional level of bilateral joint exchanges to include multilateral exercises in our neighbourhood and beyond and also to engage in arms sales. Traditionally, this aspect of arms sales has been left to our neighbours such as Pakistan and China, who have been active in promoting this aspect of diplomacy and thus gaining greater influence beyond their immediate neighbourhood.

India’s participation in the quadrilateral exercises with the US, Japan, Australia was one of the major demonstrations of India taking big steps in this regard. In addition, India has enhanced its defence ties with some of the Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore, who have been prompting an increased role and presence of India in Southeast Asia over the years. Signing of a defence cooperation pact with Singapore in 2004, for instance, drastically changed the fabric of New Delhi’s defence ties in the region. The manner in which the Indian Navy was able to quickly respond, first on its own, sending 35 ships, and later joined by the US, Japan, Australia in ensuring rapid response and relief, post-Tsunami 2004 was a spectacular display of the soft power aspects of India’s military capabilities. As part of its military diplomacy in Southeast Asia, India (as also Japan) has also been active in stepping up the maritime capabilities of key countries, particularly in meeting the challenges of piracy, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). These have included regular regional and bilateral dialogues on the safety of SLOCs, coordinated patrols, port calls by ships, training of naval officers in Indian military institutions, and intelligence sharing particularly on maritime affairs. India has also been pursuing several trilateral partnerships in this regard including the US, Japan, India framework.

As regards India’s joint military exercises, India has been fairly active. For example, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with navies of several friendly countries, including with the French Navy (the Varuna Exercise(s)), the British Navy (the Konkan Exercise(s)), the Russian Navy (the Indra Exercise(s)), the MALABAR series with the US Navy, SIMBEX with the Singapore Navy, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and the Chinese PLA Navy among others. Taking India’s Look East Policy forward, India has intensified its engagement with the ASEAN nations. In December 2012, the India-ASEAN relations were raised to the level of a strategic partnership, in recognition of the security and strategic interests that are gaining a greater say. Similarly, Indian ships have also made regular port calls in Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Oman, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, South Africa, Kenya, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. Initiatives involving the IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) have been on since 2008 – the first joint naval exercise, IBSAMAR I was held in 2008; a second one in 2010. The IBSA series of exercises has been of a sophisticated nature involving live-fire drills, radio compatibility and Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) exercises as well as anti-aircraft and anti-terrorist drills. Additional measures to strengthen military-to-military cooperation are being explored, especially given the issue of piracy on both the eastern and western coast of Africa. These challenges have also prompted this group to take up issues of ocean governance and freedom of navigation. Unlike the BRICS, the IBSA has far greater potential for military cooperation given that these countries do not share any history of conflict with each other.

In dealing with some of its neighbours, for instance, India has been much more pragmatic than idealistic. India has also been moving closer to Vietnam, with an eye on the rising China factor for both the countries. New Delhi has paid closer attention to Hanoi’s needs, particularly in enhancing its air and maritime capabilities. It has offered huge aid and assistance on both these fronts. In addition, India has also considering the idea of forging closer military ties with Myanmar given the growing Chinese reach in that country. While India along with China had come in for criticism for its proposed arms sales to Myanmar, India-Myanmar military-to-military relations have been warming up. All the three Indian service chiefs had visited Myanmar in the past one year – a sign of the closer bilateral ties and a sign of India gaining greater comfort in pursuing military diplomacy. Despite the apparent close ties with Beijing, Myanmar’s Navy Chief Vice Admiral Thura Thet Swe was in India for closer military cooperation with India. This visit secured higher number of slots for the Myanmarese military officers in Indian military installations, in addition to higher number of air force officers, especially helicopter pilots, to be trained in India. The Indian Shipyard will also be constructing at least four Offshore Patrol Vehicles (OPV) for use by the Myanmarese Navy. In the recent years, Myanmar had procured 105 mm artillery guns, mortars, armoured personnel carriers (APVs) and rifles from India.

Compared to even a decade back, India has made taken major strides in pushing military diplomacy to a new level. Even as that is the case, it has to do more in order to gain influence and leverage, both closer to home and far. India has not only increased the nature and intensity of its military interactions with others but has also strengthened its reach by increasing the number of military officers posted abroad as Defence Attaches and military advisers. Through woken up late to the idea, India is beginning to get a firmer grip on effectively running military diplomacy.

Arms Sales Should be A Big Part of Military Diplomacy
While there have been several important considerations including technological, economic and commercial, India has shied away from pursuing arms sales as an important aspect of its military diplomacy. However, a more critical consideration should have been the strategic considerations, which is to prevent China or Pakistan from gaining particular advantage in spheres of Indian influence and concern.

Accordingly, India should have considered sale of arms and such other items including the Brahmos cruise missile and the INSAS small arms systems to a number of countries who have been on a look-out. Regarding Brahmos, since it was jointly developed with Russia, there have been issues to work out with Moscow before India could make deals. However, these are problems that can be ironed out if India acknowledges the need to do so. For instance, Brahmos has been looked at with keen interest in South Africa, South Korea and Vietnam. Commercial considerations coupled with strategic interests in all of these three countries should be significant drivers pushing India in this direction. Similarly, several smaller western African countries have shown interest in India’s INSAS small arms systems.

India could consider other weapon systems for export purposes such as the Dhruv – the Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH). Dhruv, being a multi-role new generation helicopter, produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., is believed to have a variety of capabilities, including heliborne assault, logistic support, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance and training, besides its utility as air observation post. Dhruv has appeared in a few international air shows including the 2007 Paris Air Show and potential buyers have been identified as well. HAL entered into deal with Chile to sell six; two to Bolivia, among others. India’s ship-building capabilities are considered fine. Until now, India has been building destroyers though it is also building its own aircraft carrier. India builds whole range of smaller boats, ships, frigates, missile boats, patrol boats, and OPVs. Southeast Asia will provide itself as potential buyers given the nature of challenges faced by the countries in this region.

Among non-lethal weapons, India could possibly sell trucks, other military vehicles and radars. India is already selling trucks to the Malaysian Army; other military vehicles to some African countries and air defence radars – Indra - have been supplied to Sri Lanka. While the effectiveness of the Indra radars has been debated, they nevertheless serve some limited purpose.

Conclusion
Military diplomacy, conducted as part of India’s overall diplomacy, will act as a significant catalyst in strengthening its ties with friendly countries. Successive joint military exercises with a range of nations would further deepen the content and form of bilateral ties. India needs to pursue military diplomacy much more aggressively in order to create a strategic space for itself in India’s own neighbourhood, before losing out to Beijing and Islamabad that have been cashing on India’s lethargic approach in this arena. Keeping in mind larger strategic interests and not just commercial ones, India needs to step up arms transfer relations with important countries.

However, if India has to succeed in this arena, it has to create a strategic industry with significant private sector participation. Private sector participation that could boost India’s own defence sector will also be in a position to drive a profit-driven business if India’s arms export policy is revamped. India has to craft an innovative policy that will minimise delay and red tapism that have been a curse with our state-owned enterprises.

Revamping India’s arms export policy would also involve keeping up to date with the global export control lists such as that of the Waasenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines, which could also go to strengthen India’s own candidature in to these groupings.

Geopolitics of India's Mars mission, my OpEd in The Wall Street Journal....

It has been more than six months since I updated my blog. I thought I will get serious with my blog at least from the beginning of a new year but it has been more hectic than before. There have been couple of different projects that I have been part of as well as coordinating, which have been exciting and challenging but they clearly took a lot of my time as they involved a lot of travelling, meeting and interactions with experts, key stakeholders. Now that I am done with most of the travel for these projects, I hope I will have more time at hand at my blog back on track.

November 2013 was big for India. India's Mars mission undertaken on November 05 was a matter of pride, in terms of technology demonstration. But the Mars mission, called Mangalyaan, was also a reflection of the growing competition in the space domain, especially in Asia. Also to be the first Asian country to conduct such a complex mission must have been an important factor in India's calculation. The fact that India managed to do this mission in a cost-effective manner at around $ 75 million, a fraction of the cost incurred by other spacefaring powers, added to the pride factor.

Here is an OpEd that I wrote in November, one for the Wall Street Journal.

In the Asian Wall Street Journal OpEd, I argue that India did not enter the space domain with big dream projects but the key objective was to bring about change in the socio-economic and development domains through greater utilisation of science in particular, and space utilisation in particular. However, as things have progressed over the decades, there have been challenges, new compulsions which have necessitated India to focus on showcasing of its abilities every now and then.

Full article is given below.




India’s space program did not begin with big ambitions. Vikram Sarabhai, one of the original leaders of the Indian space program in the early 1960s, said that India did “not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight.”

Even if we take Mr. Sarabhai at his word, India’s maiden mission to Mars, set for lift off today, shows that things have changed.

Firstly, it provides an indication of a growing space race between India and China. Fielding its Mars mission before China has reached the Red Planet is clearly a big factor in Delhi’s calculations. China attempted a Mars orbiter mission in 2011, piggybacking it on a Russian Mars spacecraft, but that failed to leave Earth’s orbit.

Setting off to Mars is a demonstration of India’s technological capabilities and an attempt to join the US, Russia and the European Union in successful interplanetary exploration before China.

The mission is not without its critics, including some former officials of Indian Space Research Organisation, India’s space agency, who argue that it is a waste of money, especially in a country where so many live in poverty. It is unlikely that critics will get much of a hearing.

India claims that its missions are much cheaper than similar ones elsewhere, with this attempt costing $73 million, about a tenth as much as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spends on comparable programs.

The bread or gun argument is real for India, but the country doesn’t live in a benign neighborhood and the security imperative also requires it to focus on those capabilities which can prepare it for the challenge presented by its location.

India’s security compulsions are becoming a more compelling driver for its space program. Countries around the world have so far used space for so-called passive military applications such as communications and reconnaissance but there is a growing trend towards ‘weaponizing’ outer space.

The U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike program, which includes using long-range missiles and hypersonic vehicles that will transit through space, has created the impression that it plans to weaponize space. This could provoke reactions from Russia and China and set off a broader arms race in space.

China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 served as a wake-up call to India about the challenges that exist in its neighborhood. The test sparked a new debate, both within the Indian security establishment and the larger Indian strategic community about the country’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and put pressure to develop its own anti-satellite system. While India is yet to demonstrate such capability, the scientific establishment has made it amply clear that they have the technological blocks ready should there be a political decision to do so.

One indicator of Indian concerns about the nature of the space race, is the likely establishment of an Indian aerospace command. Many of the key global powers such as the U.S. and Russia have such commands, India does not. While the Indian government has been debating the issue for close to a decade, there are indications that it is moving forward with the proposal. In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. The cell has functioned well in coordinating between the military, the Department of Space and ISRO.

India also launched the first dedicated military satellite this August for its navy, reflecting a gradual shift in the country’s approach to security. The maritime communications satellite is a necessary tool for the marine force as the competition for the Indian Ocean, particularly with China, gradually gathers pace.

From the outset of its space program, demonstrating technological pride and capability has always been an important consideration for India. No less so today. But the Mars mission is as much about demonstrating India’s capabilities as a force in space, as it is about scientific skill.

MARSMERISING, on India's Mars Mission in The Gulf Today....

Here's a story on India's Mars mission published last week in The Gulf Today... with my comments as well.

ndia launched its first rocket to Mars on Tuesday, aiming to reach the red planet at a much lower cost than successful missions by other nations, positioning the emerging Asian giant as a budget player in the latest global space race. The Mars Orbiter Mission’s red and white striped rocket blasted off from the southeastern coast, streaking across the sky in a blazing trail, and is scheduled to orbit Mars by next September.

Probes to Mars have a high failure rate and a success would be a boost for Indian national pride, especially after a similar mission by China failed to leave Earth’s orbit in 2011. Only the United States, Europe, and Russia have sent probes that have orbited or landed on the planet.

“The ISRO team will fulfil the expectations that the nation has in them,” said K. Radhakrishnan, head of the state-run Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), after the spacecraft was successfully placed into orbit around Earth. “The journey has only begun. The challenging phase is coming.”

India’s space programme began 50 years ago and developed rapidly after Western powers imposed sanctions in response to a nuclear weapons test in 1974, spurring its scientists to build advanced rocket technology. Five years ago, its Chandrayaan satellite found evidence of water on the moon.

India’s relative prowess in space contrasts with mixed results in the aerospace industry. State-run Hindustan Aeronautics has been developing a light combat aircraft since the early 1980s with no success so far.

Reaching a new horizon

“The point is we don’t have the sound technological base for a car, forget about a fighter jet,” said Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.

The mission plans to study the Martian surface and mineral composition as well as search the atmosphere for methane, the chemical strongly tied to life on Earth. Recent measurements by Nasa’s rover, Curiosity, show only trace amounts of it on Mars.

India’s space programme has drawn criticism in a country that is dogged by poverty and power shortages, and is now experiencing its sharpest economic slowdown in a decade. India has long argued that technology developed in its space programme has practical applications to everyday life.

“For a country like India, it’s not a luxury, it’s a necessity,” said Susmita Mohanty, co-founder and chief executive of Earth2Orbit, India’s first private space start-up. She argued that satellites have applications from television broadcasting to weather forecasting for disaster management.

The mission is considerably cheaper than some of India’s more lavish spending schemes, including a $340 million plan to build the world’s largest statue in the state of Gujarat.

Analysts say India could capture more of the $304 billion global space market with its low-cost technology. The probe’s 4.5 billion rupee ($73 million) price tag is a fraction of the cost of Nasa’s MAVEN mission due to launch this month.

ISRO designed the craft to go around Earth six or seven times to build up the momentum needed to slingshot it to Mars, a measure that will help it save fuel, said Mayank N. Vahia, a scientist in the department of astronomy and astrophysics at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.

It costs India about 1,000 rupees ($16.20) to put a gram weight into space, less than a tenth of Nasa’s cost, he said.

India’s space programme still has challenges, including the need to import components and the lack of a deep space monitoring system which means it will rely on the United States to watch the satellite once it nears Mars.

There’s much at stake in the global space business, where revenues for the satellite industry in 2012 was $189.5 billion, according to the US Satellite Industry Association.

Space is the limit

“Given ISRO’s broad portfolio of space capabilities, India could, if it does things right, get at least a quarter of (the space industry) market if not more in the coming decade or two,” said Earth2Orbit’s Mohanty.

India’s relations with its giant neighbour China are marked as much by competition as cooperation, and analysts say New Delhi has stepped up its space programme because of concerns about China’s civilian and military space technology.

“The reality is that there is competition in Asia. There’s the angle of the potential space race,” said Rajagopalan.

Although India’s programme is largely for peaceful purposes, it has increasingly realised the need to grow its deterrence capability after China’s 2007 anti-satellite missile test.

“That was a wake-up call for India,” said Rajagopalan. “Until then we were taking it easy.”

China’s space programme is far ahead of India’s, with bigger rockets, more launches and equally cost-effective missions.

Officials dismissed the suggestion that India raced to prepare Tuesday’s launch to trump China’s failed attempt at Mars.

“We’re not in a race with anybody,” said ISRO spokesman Deviprasad Karnik, noting that the voyage can happen only every 26 months, when the spacecraft can travel the shortest distance between Earth and Mars. “The mission to Mars has to be organised whenever there is an opportunity available.”

Mangalyaan Mission Plays Vital Role in New Delhi’s Development Plans, my OpEd on India's Mars mission published in yesterday's Global Times

Here's my OpEd on India's Mars mission published by Global Times (China) yesterday.

My core argument is that India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

India’s Race to Mars Goes Way Beyond Science, my essay in Asian Wall Street Journal on India's Mars mission....

Here's a short essay of mine on India's Mars mission on November 05, published in Asian Wall Street Journal.

India’s space program did not begin with big ambitions. Vikram Sarabhai, one of the original leaders of the Indian space program in the early 1960s, said that India did “not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight.”

Even if we take Mr. Sarabhai at his word, India’s maiden mission to Mars, set for lift off today, shows that things have changed.

For the full essay, click here.

Firstly, it provides an indication of a growing space race between India and China. Fielding its Mars mission before China has reached the Red Planet is clearly a big factor in Delhi’s calculations. China attempted a Mars orbiter mission in 2011, piggybacking it on a Russian Mars spacecraft, but that failed to leave Earth’s orbit.

Setting off to Mars is a demonstration of India’s technological capabilities and an attempt to join the US, Russia and the European Union in successful interplanetary exploration before China.

The mission is not without its critics, including some former officials of Indian Space Research Organisation, India’s space agency, who argue that it is a waste of money, especially in a country where so many live in poverty. It is unlikely that critics will get much of a hearing.

India claims that its missions are much cheaper than similar ones elsewhere, with this attempt costing $73 million, about a tenth as much as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spends on comparable programs.

The bread or gun argument is real for India, but the country doesn’t live in a benign neighborhood and the security imperative also requires it to focus on those capabilities which can prepare it for the challenge presented by its location.

India’s security compulsions are becoming a more compelling driver for its space program. Countries around the world have so far used space for so-called passive military applications such as communications and reconnaissance but there is a growing trend towards ‘weaponizing’ outer space.

The U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike program, which includes using long-range missiles and hypersonic vehicles that will transit through space, has created the impression that it plans to weaponize space. This could provoke reactions from Russia and China and set off a broader arms race in space.

China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 served as a wake-up call to India about the challenges that exist in its neighborhood. The test sparked a new debate, both within the Indian security establishment and the larger Indian strategic community about the country’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and put pressure to develop its own anti-satellite system. While India is yet to demonstrate such capability, the scientific establishment has made it amply clear that they have the technological blocks ready should there be a political decision to do so.

One indicator of Indian concerns about the nature of the space race, is the likely establishment of an Indian aerospace command. Many of the key global powers such as the U.S. and Russia have such commands, India does not. While the Indian government has been debating the issue for close to a decade, there are indications that it is moving forward with the proposal. In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. The cell has functioned well in coordinating between the military, the Department of Space and ISRO.

India also launched the first dedicated military satellite this August for its navy, reflecting a gradual shift in the country’s approach to security. The maritime communications satellite is a necessary tool for the marine force as the competition for the Indian Ocean, particularly with China, gradually gathers pace.

From the outset of its space program, demonstrating technological pride and capability has always been an important consideration for India. No less so today. But the Mars mission is as much about demonstrating India’s capabilities as a force in space, as it is about scientific skill.

Synergies in Space: The Case for an Indian Aerospace Command

Here's an Issue Brief of mine, articulating the need for an Indian aerospace command published by ORF.

Introduction

The Indian Armed Forces have been mulling over the establishment of an aerospace command for close to a decade now. Over those years, international circumstances and geopolitics relating to outer space have changed, making it imperative for India to make decisions now. Though outer space is part of the global commons, it is increasingly getting
appropriated and fenced as powerful States are seen seeking to monopolise space.

The growing advanced military space capabilities of some nations, which include the development
of their anti-satellite missile capabilities, are also a worrying trend. With much of outer space having
been utilised by a small number of great powers and the increasing presence of non-state players in
the recent years, even a nominal increase in terms of space activity by some developing countries is
leading to issues related to overcrowding and access. In order to protect its interests, India must
institutionalise its own strengths in the form of an Aerospace Command.

For the full paper, click here.

While all the three services are becoming increasingly reliant on outer space assets, the Indian Air
Force (IAF) has taken the lead, at least going by open sources. Back in 2003, Indian Air Force Chief
Air Marshal S Krishnaswamy had already articulated the need for an aerospace command: “Any
country on the fringe of space technology like India has to work towards such a command as
advanced countries are already moving towards laser weapon platforms in space and killer satellites.”

Some years after that, in 2006, the IAF established a Directorate of Aerospace in
Thiruvananthapuram in South India, which can be referred to as the initial avatar of the Indian
aerospace command. What was visualised was a separate command with communications,
navigation and surveillance as major functionalities. The directorate was headed by an Air
Commodore-rank officer who reported to the Vice Chief's office through the Directorate of
Concepts and Doctrines at Air Headquarters. The government, however, refused to take decisive
action over the additional expenditure involved. It also feared that India might be accused of
militarising outer space.

India has come a long way since then. The government clearly recognises the need to have a triservice space command, particularly given the changing regional and global dynamics of security.

In June 2008, Defence Minister A. K. Antony announced the setting up of an Integrated Space Cell
under the aegis of the HQ Integrated Defence Staff. Outlining the background to the project, the
minister said: “Although we want to utilize space for peaceful purposes and remain committed to our
policy of non-weaponisation of space, offensive counter space systems like anti-satellite weaponry,
new classes of heavy-lift and small boosters and an improved array of Military Space Systems have
emerged in our neighbourhood.” Antony articulated the need for the cell which will operate as an
integrating window between the military, the Department of Space, and the Indian Space Research
Organisation (ISRO).

The debate surrounding the creation of an aerospace command began to gather greater momentum
in the aftermath of the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007. Two weeks after the test, then
Indian Air Force Chief Air Marshal S. P. Tyagi publicly raised the issue, stating thus: “As the reach of
the Indian Air Force is expanding it has become extremely important that we exploit space and for it
you need space assets. We are an aerospace power having trans-oceanic reach. We have started
training a core group of people for the 'aerospace command'.”

Former Indian President and eminent scientist, Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, in March 2007 outlined the
force multiplier aspects of outer space assets. He said: “I visualize the Indian Air Force of the year
2025 to be based on our Scientific and Technological Competence in the development of
communication satellites, high precision resource mapping satellites, missile systems, unmanned
super-sonic aerial vehicles and electronics and communication systems. This capability will enable
the Air Force to succeed in the electronically controlled warfare in the midst of space encounters,
deep-sea encounters, and ballistic missiles encounters.” He emphasised the greater relevance of air
and space power in future warfare. The idea behind an aerospace command is to integrate all the
different capabilities and functions that exist today, particularly the military aspects of outer space.

Logic of an Aerospace Command

The logic behind the creation of a joint aerospace command in the case of India is abundantly clear.
First, as India's requirements for space increase, it becomes more important for the country to have a
single agency that will coordinate such different activities. Second, the presence of a single entity will
also allow India to better promote its national interests in outer space as this becomes increasingly
crowded and contested. India's security interests are now more than merely maintaining territorial
integrity; today those interests go beyond its borders. Accordingly, India's armed forces have to be
far more agile and dynamic with an ability to constantly understand, appreciate and respond to
emerging situations. The need to be ever vigilant to the rapidly changing security environment in
Asia cannot be underestimated.

Even as India has maintained the rhetoric of peaceful uses of outer space, the military utilities of
outer space are growing. At present, out of the country's 25 satellites, six are dual-use or military
ones, with utilities across passive military applications including surveillance, communications, and
navigation.

However, with the changing nature of warfare, it has become necessary to leverage space capabilities
for full-fledged military operations as witnessed in the US operations in the two Iraq wars and
Afghanistan. India cannot remain on the sidelines, as many other countries including potential
adversaries move ahead, utilising space for military purposes. China, for example, has learnt a great
deal from the US experience and accordingly streamlined its capabilities under the PLA. We can also
learn from the experiences of other powers that have made such attempts before.

Aerospace Commands in Other Countries

Many other powers have gone about establishing space commands given the increasing military
nature of utilities of the space domain. The United States Space Command (USSPACECOM) is one
of the earliest space commands, established in 1985 as a Unified Combatant Command of the US
Department of Defense.

The Command was established acknowledging the greater utility of space assets in military
operations and therefore the need to institutionalise it under one head. Military utility for passive
applications such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and navigation, has been widely
prevalent and the potential for space assets for utility in active military operations is rising. The
USSPACECOM was established with a view to coordinate and strengthen several different space
utilities, including launching of satellites and other high-value payloads, enhanced communications,
intelligence, missile warning, and navigation.

Even though a Russian Space Command, as part of the Russian Aerospace Defence Forces, was
born only in December 2011, Moscow had set up the Russian Space Forces way back in 1992. The
new command, as in the case of the US, is tasked with important space utilities in functions such as
missile warning, space surveillance, and control of military satellites.

France, too, has a similar institution called the Joint Space Command, established in 2010. It has roles
and functions that are similar to those of its counterparts, including tracking and directing space
utilities in six key programmes: earth observation; signals intelligence; space situational awareness;
missile warning; military satellite telecommunications; and space-based navigation. The idea of the
Command was also to establish a single window for contact with international partners on all the key
programme areas.

One of the justifications for France's space command was that while the country had a fairly wellestablished military space programme, particularly satellite communications and optical surveillance
capability, there was a lack of a clear chain of command to get these space assets to be used for
tactical operations. Thus like the other two, coordination was the primary problem that France faced,
and it is an issue that India faces, too.

Looking at the experience of these three powers, a joint space command has been of great utility in
giving a sharper focus, particularly to military space activities, in coordinating with international
partners in identifying the challenges and finding solutions, and lastly in seeking better financial
allocations and human resources. In most cases, it is the air force that has taken the lead despite the
fact that it is a tri-service command with utilities across army, navy and air force.

India's own space command should have a similar outlook, with the IAF shepherding the command
and also similar functionalities: stepping up watch on India's immediate and extended
neighbourhood regions and developing better situational awareness across land, maritime and air
domains, easing integration of outer space assets across the three services while restricting the
destructive abilities of hostile forces that might target India's outer space assets, and bringing about
better integration among India's multiple space-related stakeholders including the ISRO, the
Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry
of External Affairs, and the Department of Space.

At a functional level, India's aerospace command could also be responsible for India's evolving
missile defence programme, providing missile launch warnings, managing a range of high-end
satellites with military utilities, among others. While ISRO has been so far managing India's satellites,
having a military command responsible for military satellites as well as the dual-use satellites with
military implications will free up the ISRO and enable it to focus on more scientific and
developmental missions.

India already has much of the hardware needed to effect these capabilities; bringing it all under a
single military command will be significant. India's all-weather and day and night satellites, with
synthetic aperture radars such as the RISAT-1, RISAT-2 and the maritime communication satellite
such as the GSAT-7, already implement many of these military functions.

It is important to ensure that while the Air Force may take a lead in shaping the command and its
activities, the burden and assets for the joint command be shared among all the services equally. The
burden should not be placed on the Air Force alone, making the command potentially a non-starter.
Moreover, the command should not be seen as a supporting, auxiliary unit but a full-fledged
command with utilities across the spectrum.

Conclusion

While India has the software in terms of its technological capabilities, it lacks the institutional
architecture in the form of an aerospace command. Given the centrality of space assets across
domains–socio-economic and development, weather monitoring, intelligence, surveillance, and
navigation–India has to coordinate the functions of these different compartments for greater clarity
and better allocation of resources, both human and financial. In addition to greater efficiency, an
Aerospace Command is also needed because of the manner in which other powers are using outer
space and its potentially dangerous consequences for India.