2020 - A challenging year yet a satisfying year, professionally

2020 has remained a challenging year for the world around and I was no exception.  Personally, it was a trying year with a lot of dislocations.  Nevertheless, it has been a satisfying year, professionally speaking.  

In March 2020, I was offered to join the Perth USAsia Centre as part of their inaugural Indo-Pacific Fellow programme for a period of nine months.  While I represented India, there were colleagues, one each from Australia, Japan, Indonesia and Vietnam.  It was a very fulfilling experience.  As part of the fellowship, I did a number of essays and webinars: Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement?; Uneasy Contradictions Continue in India's Strategic Engagements; Countering ChineseAssertiveness: India’sChanging Posture in the Indian Ocean; and a forthcoming one, looking at how India-Australia relations will continue to get stronger in the face of an aggressive China.  

I got a peer reviewed journal article, "India's Emerging Space Assets and Nuclear-Weapons Capabilities" published in The Non-proliferation Review in March 2020.  In this article, I argue that over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.  

In May 2020, the Office of Principal Scientific Adviser to the Government of India and the Department of Science and Technology invited me to be part of the process of formulating India's new Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy (STIP 2020).  As part of the STIP 2020 policy drafting exercise, 21 thematic groups (TGs) were constituted and I was asked to be a member and Co-Chair of the TG-Strategic Technologies.  It was such an honour and privilege for me to part of this exercise, discussing and coming up with recommendations on India's strategic technologies.  The report should be out within a few months, I guess.  

In October 202, I was invited to be part of the Editorial Board of Asian Security.  It is one of the top ranking journals on various aspects of national and international security in Asia.  I am honoured and delighted to be joining the journal in this capacity.  

In November 2020, I was part of the Bloomberg-Intelligence Squared US debate, "That's Debatable - Is A U.S.-China Space Race Good for Humanity?".  The debate was aired on November 7, 2020 and it is available at: https://www.intelligencesquaredus.org/debates/us-china-space-race-good-humanity.  American theoretical physicist, Prof. Michio Kaku and I argued against the motion, and Prof. Avi Loeb and Bidhushi Bhattacharya argued for the motion, and so well-moderated by John Donvan.  This was so much fun and we won the debate.  

I thought I will highlight some of my professional activities here but I have updated my blog with most of these developments on a reasonably regular basis.  

Chinese Misbehavior Increases Support for Taiwan - The Diplomat, 24 October 2020

In my October column for The Diplomat, I looked at how China's misbehaviour has increased support for Taiwan.  I argue that Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan and on other countries is generating greater sympathy and support for Taiwan.  

As China’s relations with many countries in the region and outside deteriorate, sympathy for Taiwan and its plight is growing. While there is little to indicate that any country is considering dramatic shifts to their Taiwan policy, China’s aggressive behavior is generating growing concerns about a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. There is also increasing public sympathy for Taiwan in many countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia and India, because most have now experienced some form of coercion from China. This provides a fertile ground should there be considerations of any shifts in policy toward Taiwan in any of these countries. Equally, China’s sensitivity about Taiwan provides a ready handle for others to retaliate for unfriendly Chinese behavior. 

For the full post, click here.  

Some of these growing concerns are a result of Chinese behavior toward Taiwan itself. Repeated military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan and efforts to pressure Taiwan militarily have been growing. According to Taiwan’s defense minister, the PLA has engaged in 49 military aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 2020, the highest number since 1990. The minister, who made a statement in the parliament, said that the Chinese military “conducted 1,710 aircraft sorties and 1,029 military vessel sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) this year.” The minister added that, countering these moves, Taiwan’s military undertook around “3,000 military aircraft sorties to intercept and monitor the Chinese aircraft and vessels.” There is even some concern that China might be doing this as a tactic to force Taiwan to waste its resources.  

In response to these Chinese moves, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. In August this year, the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar traveled to Taiwan. This was “the highest-level visit by an American Cabinet official since the break in formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979.” The discussions during the visit focused on COVID-19, the impact on global health, and Taiwan as a possible supplier of medical equipment and technology to deal with the pandemic. In September, another high-level U.S. visit took place with Keith Krach, under secretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment. Krach was also accompanied by a U.S. delegation that included Robert A. Destro, assistant secretary of the department of democracy, human rights, and labor. 

More recently, the U.S. has also agreed to a major arms package for Taiwan worth almost $2 billion. The total package may increase to as much as $5 billion. The military package includes sensors, missiles, and artillery, all designed to boost Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself from China. China has threatened unspecified retaliation against the United States for such arms transfers, but it is unlikely that the United States will stop making them. 

Support for Taiwan is growing at the popular levels in countries like India. This was in no small measure the result of Chinese heavy-handedness, such as its recent “instruction” to Indian journalists that they should observe the “One China” principle. This was triggered by reports and advertisements in the Indian media regarding Taiwan’s National Day. Far from winning any compliance, the Indian media dismissed and laughed off Chinese efforts. The Indian government was less than amused. The spokesperson of India’s foreign ministry rejected the Chinese statement saying, “there is free media in India, that reports on issues that they see fit.” The growing sympathy in India toward Taiwan, including at official levels, is most clearly the result of the Sino-Indian confrontation at the border this summer. There was even reportedly considerations in the Indian government of starting free trade talks with Taiwan, though this appears to have been shelved for the time being. The contrast between India’s attempts to curtail its China trade while seeking greater trade with Taiwan is stark. As in the Indian case, sympathy toward Taiwan has also grown in Southeast Asia as a result of crude Chinese pressures. The so-called “Milk Tea Alliance” is one reflection of this phenomena. 

The increasing salience of the Taiwan issue is reflected in the growing debate in the United States about the appropriate level of commitment to Taiwan. There is also some concern in Australia about the potential impact of U.S. involvement in Taiwan on Australia. There are, equally, concerns about whether Taiwan itself is doing enough to defend itself. 

Much of the new attention and support that Taiwan is getting is clearly the consequence of both the Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its unrelenting pressures on other countries, even those far from China. China recently engaged in a spat with Sweden after the country banned Huawei from its 5G network. China responded by asking Sweden to “correct its wrong decision” or face consequences for Swedish businesses. Just a few days earlier, the Chinese ambassador to Canada held out a not-so-veiled threat to the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong if Canada continued to grant asylum to democracy activists from Hong Kong. China’s unusually foolish behavior and its growing pressure on Taiwan is likely to continue to garner greater sympathy for Taiwan, a democracy that has successfully fought the coronavirus epidemic which originated in China. 

Rise of the Minilaterals: Examining the India-France-Australia Trilateral - The Diplomat, 17 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I look at the rise of the minilaterals, wherein I examine the India-France-Australia Trilateral. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last week, India, France, and Australia held their first trilateral meeting. The senior officials’ meeting, held in a virtual setting, was co-chaired by Vardhan Shringla, India’s foreign secretary; François Delattre, secretary-general of the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs; and Frances Adamson, secretary of the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT).

For the full post, click here.

The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a statement, said that the trilateral meeting was an effort at strengthening cooperation among the three countries in the Indo-Pacific region. The statement also noted that the three countries plan to meet on an annual basis. Tweeting about the meeting, the MEA said, “We agreed to build convergences in our approach to the Indo-Pacific region and to explore ways to strengthen trilateral cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain.”

An Australian readout of the meeting was similar to the Indian statement, while the French readout was more explicit in emphasizing the importance of international law, peace, and security in the Indo-Pacific. The French statement said that the meeting “helped underscore the goal of guaranteeing peace, security and adherence to international law in the Indo-Pacific by drawing on the excellence of bilateral relations between France, India and Australia.” The French ambassador in India also tweeted, saying that “Together we will uphold our values and interests!”

While none of the readouts mention China per se, China is clearly the key reason for the emergence of this and a number of other minilaterals in the region. The India-France-Australia trilateral is only the latest of the many minilaterals that are taking shape in the Indo-Pacific region. India, which traditionally did not join these exclusive small groups, has shown greater interest and capacity in the last few years. There is also an India-Australia-Indonesia trilateral that is taking shape. In fact, Indian media reports note that India, Australia, and Indonesia are getting ready for two virtual meetings in the coming weeks between the foreign and defense ministries of the three countries in order to enhance broader regional strategic cooperation as well as maritime security in the Indo-Pacific region.

There is also the India-Japan-Australia trilateral, another significant group, which had its first meeting in 2015. There is already an India-U.S.-Japan trilateral. Since 2015, Japan has also participated with India and the United States in India’s Malabar series of naval exercises as a permanent partner.

Indeed, even the idea of the India-France-Australia trilateral is not new. The need for such initiatives has been discussed in track 2 and track 1.5 formats and experts and officials have long made the case for elevating these conversations to an official level. In 2018, Carnegie India, the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and the National Security College of the Australian National University came together to explore the potential areas of cooperation as well as the extent of possibilities under such a framework. In an op-ed in May 2018, C. Raja Mohan, Rory Medcalf, and Bruno Tertrais (representing the three think tanks that had organized one such track 1.5 forum) detailed the “striking convergence of security interests, defense capabilities and maritime geography” that bring Delhi, Canberra, and Paris together. They argued that the three “respect a rules-based order informed by the sovereign equality of nations and the need to guard against coercion and interference, whether from states or from terrorism.” Thereafter, French President Emmanuel Macron during his visit to Australia spoke of “the Paris-Delhi-Canberra axis” that should be strengthened as “an established regional structure, reflecting an Indo-Pacific ‘geo-strategic reality in the making.’”

At the inaugural India-France-Australia trilateral, the three officials took stock of the prevailing and future economic and strategic challenges and possible ways of cooperation in addressing the challenges of COVID-19 and beyond. Maritime security and securing the marine global commons were particularly identified as important issues for trilateral and broader regional cooperation through regional institutions such as ASEAN, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), and the Indian Ocean Commission. That India has concluded logistics agreements with both France and Australia brings their cooperation around maritime security issues a bit closer to reality.

According to the MEA, the three leaders also focused on trends, challenges, and priorities in regional and global multilateral institutions and discussed ways to review, strengthen, and reform multilateralism. This assumes particular importance in the context of the functioning of institutions such as the World Health Organization (WHO) especially in the initial weeks of the COVID-19 pandemic The fact that the WHO was influenced heavily by a single power, China, which some argue has resulted in the current global health crisis, will remain a constant reminder of the trends and challenges in multilateralism and multilateral institutions.

The India-France-Australia trilateral meeting was also a result of the deepening bilateral relations among the three countries across multiple sectors, and aimed at “synergizing their respective strengths to ensure a peaceful, secure, prosperous and rules-based Indo-Pacific Region.” In fact, this was part of a set of recommendations made by the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Committee to “explore the India France Australia trilateral dialogue to enhance strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.” Related issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime domain awareness, the blue economy, and marine biodiversity were also discussed at the meeting. Given the increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, one area that could gain greater attention from the three countries is maritime surveillance to monitor the Chinese naval activities in these waters. The three could work out some burden sharing in this regard to step up vigilance on these waters.

Commenting on the rationale for the India-France-Australia trilateral, Abhijnan Rej, The Diplomat’s security and defense editor, wrote that against the backdrop of “recent American unpredictability” U.S. allies in the region are looking to create “a more networked architecture involving a range of often-overlapping minilateral arrangements and consultative mechanisms.” Given this strategic rationale, the India-France-Australia trilateral is a natural fit for all three because of their stake in ensuring a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific order. France, via its overseas territories, has 8,000 defense personnel, 1.5 million French citizens, and 93 percent of its maritime economic exclusive zone in the Indo-Pacific, making it a legitimate stakeholder, with huge stakes in the Indo-Pacific region.

The other important rationale for many of these trilaterals has to do with capacity issues. The Indo-Pacific region has several capable navies and yet their ability to match up to China on their own is questionable. The individual capacities of these countries have remained inadequate to protect their vital security interests, and therefore there is a stronger case to be made for these kinds of minilaterals.

Given these factors, this trilateral is likely here to stay. While the U.S. will remain an important source of support for these minilateral conversations in the Indo-Pacific, the fact that New Delhi, Paris, and Canberra can also discuss various strategic issues without Washington present in the room may also be appealing to these countries from time to time.

India-Japan Defense Ties to Get a Boost With Modi-Abe Virtual Summit - The Diplomat, 20 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the upcoming virtual summit meeting between India and Japan. I argue that despite some disappointments on both sides, the India-Japan relationship looks set to further deepen in the face of an aggressive China.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe will meet for a virtual summit in September. This will be Modi’s second virtual summit this year, after one with the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in June. According to Indian media reports, citing India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the two sides are expected to sign an important military logistics agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While this remains an important milestone moment for New Delhi and Tokyo, it also remains key for both countries to take stock of what has been accomplished so far.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan missed their planned 2019 summit because of protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in Guwahati, in the northeastern Indian state of Assam, where the meeting was supposed to be held. Although the Modi government was reportedly keen to shift the meeting venue to Delhi, the Japanese side insisted that the focus of the 2019 summit was on Japanese investment in India’s Northeast infrastructure development and therefore, as a Japanese diplomat said, “The venue is the message.” Since then, India and Japan have been trying to reschedule the summit, but the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed their plans.

The current summit meeting comes against the backdrop of Chinese aggression against both countries, along the Sino-Indian border and the East China Sea. The Abe government is reportedly also keen to explore the possibility of shifting some Japanese manufacturing to India as part of its efforts to shift such operations out of China. This is part of a concerted effort of several countries to shift their manufacturing out of China in order to reduce their dependency on Beijing. The two leaders are also reportedly working to strengthen the Quad agenda in this regard.

The ACSA should also boost the geographical reach and influence of both countries’ militaries. India has so far signed such logistics agreement with the United States, South Korea, and Australia. Such logistics agreements are meant to simplify the processes involved in using each other’s facilities. It took India more than a decade to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. on account of several misperceptions, but since its signing in 2016 it has become easier for India to negotiate such deals with other countries. Probably to maintain some semblance of balance, India is negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. The Russian agreement is named differently, the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS).

The India-Japan ACSA got a big push during the last summit in Japan in October 2018. India’s MEA in a statement at the time said, “The two leaders welcomed the joint exercise between each of the three services and the commencement of negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defense cooperation.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue, the India-Japan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, also noted “the significant progress” made in the negotiations of ACSA and their desire “for early conclusion of the negotiations” which would “further contribute to enhancing defense cooperation between the two sides.”

The India-Japan ACSA would provide the two militaries with access to each other’s military facilities for repair and replenishment of provisions as well as overall improve the scope and sophistication of military-to-military cooperation. In fact, the India-Japan ACSA is reported to be broader in scope, encompassing overall defense cooperation between the two countries, with logistics as one important leg in the expanding defense partnership. Japan could get access to India’s key naval bases, including in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, close to the Malacca Straits, a key international sea lane. The agreement will also enhance India’s own operational reach, most specifically for the Indian Navy. India could gain access to Japanese bases such as in Djibouti. Some of the agenda items for broader India-Japan defense cooperation could include stepping up defense trade and technology cooperation under existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC). There is already cooperative research work being done on areas such as unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)/robotics under this framework, but it could be expanded to an entire range of existing and emerging technologies.

It is also possible that Japan would like to see more discussion on the Japanese-built US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India has been soft-pedaling for a while now. Capacity-building for better maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA) are also high on the agenda for India and Japan. Establishment of the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) by India in December 2018 has been deemed an important step in this regard and Japan will have a liaison officer at the IFC-IOR. Other Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, France, and the United States will also have their officers at this center.

While ACSA and the defense agenda are forward-looking in furthering cooperation between India and Japan, there are also some difficulties in the relationship. Japan seems to have been considerably disappointed with the Indian decision to walk out of the regional trading agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The fact that Abe was not even informed before New Delhi made the announcement appears to have been a jolt to the Abe administration. Japan was counting on India to be a powerful player within the RCEP to push back on China’s aggressive economic agenda. Tokyo is also possibly disappointed about the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi about pursuing the defense trade agenda, with the US-2 being a case in point. On the other hand, although India was keen on considering the Soryu-class submarine, Japan has been somewhat cautious, and indeed has not bid for India’s submarine contract.

Nevertheless, Japan has remained a steadfast partner to India. For instance, after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-June, the Japanese ambassador to India strongly supported India, tweeting that “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” This suggests that the pressure from China will continue to strengthen India-Japan ties, despite some disappointments on both sides.

Russian ASAT Test: More Trouble for Space Security - The Diplomat, 31 July 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recent Russian ASAT test and what it means for space security. I argue that even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space.

On July 23, the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) released a statement saying that Russia had “conducted a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.” According to the statement, Russia, on July 15 “injected a new object into orbit from Cosmos 2543” in close proximity to another Russia satellite. This reportedly is similar to a prior Russian in-orbit activity undertaken in 2017. The latest Russian action also comes against the backdrop of a Russian anti-satellite test in April, when it fired a missile into space. Although Russia did not destroy any target during this test, the April test along with the July one raises doubts about Russia’s rhetoric of non-weaponization of space.

If these activities continue unabated, it will only further intensify competition among the major space players, potentially leading to weaponizing space. The space security regime is already in trouble; the Russian test creates additional problems. The experience of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a reflection of the current poor state of dealing with issues of global space governance. The failure of the major space powers to address space security challenges and agree upon a future path will be detrimental to maintaining space as a safe, secure, and sustainable domain.

For the full essay, click here.



This is not the first time that Russia has undertaken such an action. In 2017, the Russian “inspector” satellite Cosmos 2519 released a subsatellite, Cosmos 2521. The United States has been direct and harsh in its criticism of Russia. Well before the July tests, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford categorically characterized Russian actions thus: “Not to put too fine a point on it, but Cosmos 2521 demonstrated the ability to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile” (italics in original). Quoting Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of USSPACECOM, Ford explained that the U.S. has specific concerns because Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its capabilities in this regard. Apparently, there were two other Russian satellites, Cosmos 2542 and 2543, that were launched by Russia in November and December 2019 and these have undertaken maneuvers close to a U.S. satellite in low earth orbit. The United States views these actions, Ford said, as “highly provocative.”

U.S. criticism became even sharper after the July 23 Russian test. Raymond noted that “the United States, in coordination with our allies, is ready and committed to deterring aggression and defending the nation, our allies and vital U.S. interests from hostile acts in space.” Ford said that this action “highlights Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program — both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry.”

Meanwhile, Russia has rejected the U.S. claims as “propaganda.” The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that the test “did not create a threat for other space equipment and most importantly, did not breach any norms or principles of international law.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also dismissed the U.S. claims, saying that “Russia has always been and remains a country that is committed to the goal of fully demilitarizing outer space and non-deployment of any kinds of arms in outer space.”

It has to be noted that Russia has been trying to push initiatives to prevent weaponization of space for some time. Russia, along with China, has been calling for a treaty banning the placement of weapons in outer space. In 2008, the two together submitted a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). A revised text was submitted in the summer of 2014. A second Russian proposal is that of the “No First Placement” initiative, in which countries are expected to voluntarily agree not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

Neither of these proposals have found many takers for a number of reasons. First, many countries argue against a treaty-based mechanism in the current international political climate. They would instead prefer political instruments such as transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) or a code of conduct, all of which are non-legal instruments. But other countries argue that while non-legal measures can be useful, they cannot be a substitute for legal instruments. Second, there are also practical issues such as the definition of a “weapon” in space. In the absence of definitional clarity, it is likely to be difficult to come up with a mechanism to prevent the placement of weapon in outer space.

While there is merit to both these arguments, the reality is also that unless steps are taken to improve transparency and predictability with regard to outer space activities, states will likely find themselves spiraling toward weaponizing outer space.

Even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space. We are witnessing a number of escalatory actions including ASAT tests, cyber and electronic warfare targeted at space assets, and now what appears to be an actual kinetic weapon in space. Unless decisive steps are agreed upon by the major space players, access to space for civil and peaceful as well as security requirements will be harmed. While formal treaty mechanisms have been favored previously, today’s contentious global politics may not allow for such measures in the near term. These trends are of course dictated by global power transition leading to a new and competitive geopolitics. Therefore, expecting to develop a legal measure in the near term will remain difficult. Finding alternate approaches, such as developing norms of responsible behavior, may be a better path.

US Returns to Human Spaceflight - The Diplomat, 11 June 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the importance of the US return to human spaceflight. The growing private space sector is beginning to create new energy and excitement about space.

On May 30, SpaceX launched American astronauts into space in its Dragon Endeavor spacecraft, a first for the company and a first for the private sector. For NASA and the broader U.S. space community, this was also a special moment because the United States was sending its astronauts to space from its own soil after many years. Since shutting down its space shuttle program in 2011, the United States had relied on Russia to send American astronauts to space. SpaceX’s launch heralds a new beginning for the U.S. in its human spaceflight missions.

For the full essay, click here.



The mission is also significant in that it sets the stage for U.S. missions to the moon and Mars. The U.S. is set to return to the moon in the next few years, but no date has been set for a future Mars mission. Prior to the recent launch, NASA Deputy Administrator Jim Morhard said, “We’re at the dawn of a new age. We’re leading the beginning of a space revolution.” Following the successful launch, Jim Bridenstine, the NASA administrator, spoke about the U.S. moon mission, the Artemis program, saying, “We don’t want to go [to the moon] alone. We want to go with international partners and we want to go with @Commercial_Crew partners.”

This has been proud moment for the U.S. space program, as well as for ordinary citizens — #LaunchAmerica became a trending hashtag on social media. From Vienna, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, representative of the United States to the Vienna Office of the United Nations, commented on the launch saying, “Collaboration with the private sector is essential in this new era of outer space exploration.”

This has been a key moment: The growing private space sector is beginning to create new energy and excitement about space, something that has been missing for a long time.

The NASA-SpaceX launch has been in the works for a while and has been closely watched by U.S. friends and adversaries alike. Back in the 1960s, it was essentially the United States and the Soviet Union that were capable of sending humans to space, but the situation is quite different today, with many more countries in the fray. China has an active human spaceflight program, having sent its first crewed mission to space in 2003. India also has plans to send its first astronauts to outer space in another two years. While space exploration and understanding the cosmos are important by themselves, today’s exploration programs, including the crewed missions, are a demonstration of growing competition in space, much like what happened during the Cold War. The U.S. return to having its own crewed mission is one more piece of evidence that this competition is intensifying.

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is significant in a number of ways. First and foremost, it removes the U.S. dependency on Russia for sending American astronauts to space. U.S.-China competition may be getting all the attention, but mounting tensions between Russia and the United States in recent years also have ramifications in multiple domains, including outer space. The fact that Russia could stop cooperating in sending Americans into space using the Soyuz vehicle was always a possibility. It is also a major vulnerability that Washington would have liked to rectify so that they remain independent when it comes to ferrying American astronauts to space.

NASA’s new arrangement also brings in important economic benefits. For one, the United States can save on the cost of buying a seat on the Soyuz spaceship. It is reported that NASA has paid Russia around $86 million per seat to send astronauts to the International Space Station using the Soyuz spacecraft. SpaceX Crew Dragon on the other hand is a much cheaper option, costing NASA only around $55 million. Under NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, Boeing is also developing an astronaut taxi, the Crew Space Transportation (CST)-100 Starliner, that can carry seven passengers, or a mix of crew and cargo, into low Earth orbit. Boeing’s astronaut-ferrying taxi is likely to cost around $90 million per seat. In addition to potential direct savings per seat per astronaut, an American crew spaceship industry within the United States will also create an entire industry around it, thus creating a large number of jobs in the country in addition to gaining spin-off technological benefits.

There are also economic benefits in terms of creating a sustainable link between NASA and the private sector, thus helping the emergence of the private sector as a key stakeholder. These direct financial benefits and the indirect technological gains are crucial, especially at a time when great power competition is peaking once again. Additionally, these collaborations with commercial enterprises will help NASA accomplish much of its future plans for the moon, and possibly Mars at a later date.

Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, himself sees an active role on this. After the successful lift-off of the Crew Dragon, Musk said, “This is hopefully the first step on a journey toward a civilization on Mars.” An array of space industries is coming up, exploring the possibilities of space tourism within the decade. All of these mean economic and strategic advantage to the United States.

Implications of the US Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty - The Diplomat, 29 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote about implications of the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations.

Last week, the Trump administration announced that the US will be pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), a major arms control measure that aided transparency and confidence-building among 34 participating states. In a press statement on May 21, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. will send its six-month notice to all the state parties to this effect. Justifying the move, Pompeo said, “Russia has been a serial violator of many of its arms control obligations and commitments,” and not just the OST. The treaty allows member countries to fly unarmed surveillance planes over each other’s territory with a 72-hour notice. The participating states, under the treaty commitments, fly fixed wing planes, equipped with agreed sensors.

The U.S. decision to walk out of the OST comes against the backdrop of the U.S. walking out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, and much earlier in 2001, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. Global arms control arrangements were in a state of disarray in any case and this adds to the problem. While many of the recent developments have been due to Russia’s apparent violation of its commitments, at least as the US maintains, the real reason is more likely the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition and Washington’s determination not to tie its own hands.

For the full essay, click here.



Nevertheless, the U.S. does have some complaints about Russian behavior. Washington has cited instances where Russia has breached its OST commitments, particularly on U.S. flights over Russia. Pompeo’s press note last week alleged that Russia had denied permission to U.S. observation flights “within a 10-kilometer corridor along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby attempting to advance false Russian claims that these occupied territories are independent states.” Russia has apparently placed restriction on flight distance over Kaliningrad, and this has been particularly concerning because the enclave has seen significant military build-up in recent years.

Such actions have fueled opposition to the treaty, especially from the right wing of the U.S. political spectrum. In an op-ed in the Washington Post in December 2019, Tom Cotton, a Republican Senator from Arkansas, made a case for the U.S. withdrawal by saying, “Russia has breached the treaty for years by imposing limits on U.S. flights while suffering no such restrictions itself. In other words, “open skies for me, closed skies for thee.”

There were other problems too, because the U.S. fears that Russia has gained an unfair technical advantage under the OST. In 2016, Russia reportedly decided to introduce a new digital electro-optical sensor to its Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft used for Open Skies flights. Both the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress raised alarms over this, though it had more to do with the technological advantage Russia gained rather than being a technical violation of the treaty itself. One senior U.S. intelligence official apparently warned that the introduction of new sophisticated planes over the U.S. would provide Russia with “a significant advantage.” In 2019, Russia introduced the Tu-214ON aircraft OST missions over the United States, raising further concerns.

Russia has its own complaints: Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the U.S. of imposing “more sweeping restrictions on observation flights over Alaska.” However, the grievances on the U.S. side have been much more intense.

The treaty came about with good intentions. A hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1992 on the Open Skies Treaty noted that the treaty was not framed as an arms control measure, but as a measure that calls for higher levels of openness and transparency leading to better predictability and stability, thus lessening tensions among the participating states. The initial idea of the OST came from President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 although it led to nothing since it was rejected by the Soviet Union, which said it was a means for spying. Following the end of the Cold War, in May 1989, U.S. President George H. W. Bush once again broached the idea. After a meeting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along with additional negotiations supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OST was signed in March 1992.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from the treaty could be seen as a prelude to what might happen with regard to another arms control measure that will be up for renewal soon. The bilateral START agreement with Russia ,which puts a cap on the number of deployed nuclear missiles to 1,550 on each side, will come up for renewal in February 2021. Given the recent U.S. attitude toward global arms control measures, it is possible that the U.S. will not renew the agreement.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a keen desire for China to join these arms control arrangements. The feeling appears to be that these various U.S.-Russia treaties serve to limit U.S. ability to compete effectively with China because China is not bound by the same agreements. This was definitely true of the INF treaty. But China has been clear in saying that it has no plans to join any future arms control measure involving the U.S. and Russia.

It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been in a state of limbo for more than two decades and it is unlikely that any serious discussions will happen at the CD in the near future. While the U.S. move does not help matters, it is also yet another indication that the intensifying international competition is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. This means that the U.S. and China will need to engage directly for a new era in arms control.

Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement? - Perth USAsia Centre, 21 April 2020

As I mentioned in previous blog, along with my regular work at the Observer Research Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, I am also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre for a period of 9 months starting in April. As part of this, I will be doing a series of papers, video blogs and webinars. The first of my papers is this: Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement? which came out in the third week of April (I have been late in updating my blog).

It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the
United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.

Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers:NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible?

For the full essay, click here.



I concluded the essay with the following thoughts. Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls. But such cooperation
also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.

Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’s military and political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis,
making minilateral cooperation with likeminded partners a better approach.

Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burdensharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.

India-Russia Defense Ties Amid COVID-19 - The Diplomat, 01 May 2020

In my last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the state of India-Russia defence ties, amid Covid-19 pandemic. I argue that despite kind words, cooperation, and defense ties, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve.

The pandemic appears not to have had much impact on India-Russia relations. The relationship was showing signs of strain even before to the pandemic, mainly because both countries are drifting toward different sides in the emerging competition between the United States and China. India’s concerns about China’s behavior have made it inch closer to the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific coalition. While increasing tensions between Russia and the West appear to be driving Moscow toward a deeper partnership with Beijing. Neither side seems particularly happy with the effect of these tendencies on their bilateral relations and both have tried to insulate their ties from these larger movements. The India-Russia relationship continues to be dependent on some level of residual diplomatic empathy toward each other. Beyond this, the arms transfer relationship is the primary driver and despite the pandemic this aspect continues apace.

For the full essay, click here.



The S-400 long-range air defense system is the most visible recent indicator of the arms transfer relationship. There have been some concerns about possible delays, but Indian Ambassador to Russia Bala Venkatesh Varma stated that there will be no significant delays in the supply of the S-400s. India is buying five batteries of the S-400 system in a deal worth more than $5 billion despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. That India went ahead with the system regardless of the threat of sanctions is an indicator of both India’s desire to maintain this aspect of its relationship with Russia but also India’s vulnerability to Pakistan’s missile forces. The S-400 is claimed to have some level of anti-ballistic capability.

In addition, Russia recently offered India three more Kilo-class submarines. These refurbished Kilos will join the nine other Kilo-class submarines in the Indian Navy. This should be welcome because India has just 15 submarines, according to the latest Military Balance published by the IISS, against a projected requirement of 24. India’s declining submarine fleet has been a concern especially as the Chinese PLA Navy gets more active in the waters around India.

Last month, India decided to purchase an additional 400 T-90S battle tanks from Russia, according to reports. These will join the more than 1,000 T-90S that India already has, part of India’s 3,500-strong Main Battle Tank inventory. With the exception of the 100-plus Arjun tanks, everything else in the inventory are Russian T-72s or T-90Ss, which is an indicator of the close historical Indo-Russian military relations.

But the relationship has not been without its hiccups. India was originally part of the next generation Su-57 fighter program but pulled out of the deal because of dissatisfaction with the jet’s performance and manufacturing quality. This highlights a problem that the defense relationship has, which is that Russia is falling behind in terms of weapons technology. More than a decade after the United States started operationally flying fifth generation combat aircraft, Russia has not been able to develop jets with comparable performance. This could mean that India will increasingly have to look elsewhere if it wants weapons with performance capabilities comparable to the top of the line platforms in the world. India’s purchase of the French Rafale fighter is just one indicator of this trend.

As regards the direct effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the bilateral relationship, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar has maintained contact with his counterparts in Russia as recently as last week. In a tweet, he said that he discussed a number of issues including the upcoming BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting as well as developments in Afghanistan and cooperation in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic. Although this was part of a series of discussions that the foreign minister had with various counterparts including U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, it does indicate that the relationship is maintaining force. The virus is spreading rapidly in Russia — even Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin confirmed that he tested positive for the virus. The Indian prime minister lost no time in wishing his counterpart an early recovery and good health.

Both sides have also helped each other deal with the effects of the pandemic. Russia expressed its gratitude for India’s decision to supply key drugs to fight the pandemic, HCQ and paracetamol. Russia’s main defense export agency, Rosoboronexport also donated $2 million to the Indian prime minister’s special fund for fighting the pandemic, called the PM Cares Fund. The pandemic has affected the training of four Indian Air Force pilots who have been selected for India’s first manned space flight and were undergoing astronaut training at the Yuri Gagarin Research and Test Cosmonaut Training Center. Nevertheless, training is likely to continue after the various lockdowns end.

But despite the kind words, emergency cooperation, and the defense relationship, there are longer term difficulties in the India-Russia relationship that are unlikely to be easy to resolve. The pandemic has accelerated the competition between China and the region and that is likely to eventually add stress to the India-Russia relationship.

China’s Worrying Military Exercises Near Taiwan, The Diplomat - 17 April 2020

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at China's worrying military exercises near Taiwan. I argued that China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China’s military activities and resultant confrontation with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite the Indo-Pacific region reeling under the coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active farther east as well. There have been reports of several Chinese naval and air intrusions in Taiwan and Japan.

Back in the first half of February, the PLA Eastern Theater Command started sending its fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Air Force had to scramble its own fighters to shadow the Chinese aircraft. On February 10, Chinese jets reportedly briefly crossed “an unofficial middle line in the Taiwan Strait.” The same day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that its military has been engaged in “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” Further, Zhang Chunhui, Air Force spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theater, said that “following the February 9 sea-air combat readiness cruise, the theater forces organized a joint exercise of sea and air forces in the sea area of ​​southeastern Taiwan on February 10, mainly carrying out air-ground assault, firepower support and other actual combat training, further tempering and testing the joint combat capabilities of multiple arms in the theater.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a tweet asked Beijing to stop threatening Taiwan militarily, and instead focus on the coronavirus. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in a statement affirmed that “provocations by PLA warships and planes which have frequented the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to seek unification through military force gravely undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and heighten regional tensions.” Commenting on the situation, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said, “It was completely inappropriate of China to take such an aggressive act.” Elaborating on the impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific, Cooper said that “there should be responsible behavior to make sure that the region is free and open — not just for navigation but also for trade and for relationships. Such coercive, aggressive behavior is counter to having a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. In mid-March, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated that they had to respond to Chinese J-11 fighters and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which flew into the waters southwest of Taiwan conducting night-time exercises. This was possibly the first time that they were engaged in a night-time drill near Taiwan. The Ministry also said that these aircraft had come close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. The Ministry added that “After our air reconnaissance and patrol aircraft responded appropriately, and broadcast (an order) to drive them away, the communist aircraft flew away from our Air Defense Identification Zone.” Toward the end of March, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry claimed that there were as many as four “targeted” drills by China around Taiwan, which Taipei considered as “concrete evidence of provocations and threats.” In response, Taiwan conducted its own exercise, deploying its F-16 fighter jets. The PLA Daily reportedly said that the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan had carried out long-endurance training with its early-warning aircraft lasting for 36 hours.

Tensions between China and Taiwan are not new. Friction has been increasingly evident since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016 and her re-election in January has served to further increase tensions. Put simply: Beijing fears that Tsai will encourage pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and five other warships were reportedly sighted sailing past Taiwan waters and through the Miyako Strait. A Japanese Ministry of Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that they tracked the Chinese aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, two multirole warships, and one supply-class fast combat support ship. Citing Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense statement, the report said that the Taiwanese navy, too, had sent its ships to monitor the carrier strike group as it sailed east of Taiwan. Taiwan’s vice defense minister, Chang Guan-chung, stated in parliament that when the pandemic was spreading worldwide, “if the Chinese Communists attempted to make any military adventure leading to regional conflict, they would be condemned by the world, and regardless of what would happen, we are all ready and have made the best preparation for this.”

Currently, the Chinese aircraft carrier is the only one in the area. Two U.S. carriers, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, are in port. The Theodore Roosevelt is now in Guam, on account of an outbreak of coronavirus cases among the crew, and the Ronald Reagan is in Yokosuka Naval Base for maintenance. However, the increase in PLA military activities in the Taiwanese waters and airspace have spurred greater U.S. military engagements as well. It has been reported that a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was sighted close to Taiwanese airspace near Kaohsiung. Increased military drills of such kinds could potentially lead to unintended mishaps. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 should be a useful reminder regarding the kind of mishaps that can happen. China’s military moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear in the region and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

My Perspective On US Space Resources Executive Order: Raji Rajagopalan On The EO’s First Mover Advantage - SpaceWatch Global, April 15, 2020

Recently, I did a Q&A with the SpaceWatch Global on the US Space Resources Executive Order.

On 6 April 2020, US President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources. This order addresses US policy regarding the recovery and use of resources in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Over the next few weeks, SpaceWatch.Global will publish a range of perspectives supporting and opposing the EO from experts around the world. Today’s two expert perspectives come from Rajeswari Rajagopalan of India (below) and Professor Guoyu Wang of China.

For the full Q&A, click here.



In your opinion, what is the underlying strategic and economic rationale for President Trump’s Executive Order?

The possible underlying economic and strategic rationale is to gain the first mover advantage. While the US and other western space players talk about space mining and resource extraction, China has been making progress. Whether the resource is being extracted for bringing it back to Earth or for making the Moon as the base for more ambitious plans to go to Mars, the technological benefits through spinoffs from such activities are significant. The US clearly does not want to let China gain any unilateral advantage.

The Executive Order explicitly rejects the 1979 Moon Agreement. How do you think this will be received by other countries, particularly other major space powers?

Rejection of the 1979 Moon Agreement is not a surprise because very few countries have signed and ratified it. What is surprising in the Executive Order is the explicit rejection of the idea of outer space as a global commons. Even though the suspicion was that this was how the United States (and others) viewed it, openly saying so in the EO is unusual. For that matter, even other spacefaring powers have had similar attitudes towards space because if space is truly a ‘global commons’, it would prevent other states also from activities such as resource mining in space. And this is possibly the reason why all the major spacefaring powers including the US, Russia, China, Japan and many in Europe have not signed the Moon Treaty. India is among the handful of space powers that is a signatory to it although it has not ratified it.

Similarly, the Executive Order explicitly rejects the view that space is a Global Commons. What, in your opinion, is the policy rationale behind this claim and, again, how do you think this will be received by other countries?

It is correct that this is not the first US administration to hold this view. But equally, other countries also hold such views, though they have not been as explicit about it. Trump’s action, however, might be indicator that competition for resources in space is likely to accelerate because others countries are likely to see this as reason to speed up their programs.

In your view, how likely will this Executive Order “encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space…?”

Trump’s approach on setting up a base camp on the Moon has already seen many countries supporting it. I would assume these players including the UAE, Luxembourg and Canada, Australia, would find a way of supporting this idea as well.

Hypothetically assuming that this Executive Order leads to international support, will it make the prospect of commercial space resource extraction closer to reality?

It might lead to international collaboration. But I wrote an Op-Ed where I raised some of the complications of this. For example, how would national courts arbitrate any disputes unless these are subject to national sovereignty? If this is beyond national courts, how can disputes between parties engaging in such activities be resolved? Unless these legal issues are resolved, technical advances cannot by itself ensure resource extraction from space.

Amidst a Pandemic, Donald Trump Signs Order to Mine on the Moon - The Wire, 12 April 2020

I write for The Wire on US President Trump's Executive Order to mine on the Moon. On the anniversary of Yuri Gagarin's (and humankind's) first journey into space, the US Executive Order, stipulating that Americans should have the right use the resources of space, rings outrageous.

In the midst of the global pandemic crisis, US President Donald Trump has found time to sign an Executive Order charting out a new US policy on recovery and use of resources on the Moon, including water and minerals.

Despite the pandemic, the move has received global attention, much of it critical. But there are also some seeking to partner with the US on lunar exploration.

For the full post, click here.

The Executive Order reads that Americans “should have the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space, consistent with applicable law. Outer space is a legally and physically unique domain of human activity, and the United States does not view it as a global commons.”

The US seeking “the right to engage in commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space” is possibly in line with international law. Nevertheless, it is controversial because it is unclear who other than national courts could enforce any mining rights, and national courts, in turn, cannot do so without exercising sovereign rights, as lawyers have pointed out.

But the explicit assertion that outer space will not be considered as part of global commons is new.

Space powers have generally been uncomfortable with idea of space as a global common because this was thought to preclude mining and extracting resources from space.

This was a major reason why the US and many other spacefaring nations such as the Soviet Union/Russia, China and Japan and even many of the countries making up the European space consortium refused to sign the Moon treaty. India is the only space power that has signed the treaty, though New Delhi has not yet ratified it.

Following the Executive Order, Dr. Scott Pace, Deputy Assistant to the President and Executive Secretary of the National Space Council, stated in a press statement that as the US “prepares to return humans to the Moon and journey on to Mars, this Executive Order establishes US policy toward the recovery and use of space resources, such as water and certain minerals, in order to encourage the commercial development of space.”

He went on to add that “the order reaffirms US support for the 1967 Outer Space Treaty while continuing to reject the 1979 Moon Agreement, which only 17 of the 95 Member States of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space have ratified in the past four decades.”

He also pointed out that the Executive Order “reinforces the 2015 decision by Congress that Americans should have the right to engage in the commercial exploration, recovery, and use of resources in outer space.”

This Executive Order needs to be seen in the light of this 2015 US legislation that Dr. Pace referenced, the “Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015”, signed into law by President Barack Obama, which permits American companies to extract space resources.

A second document that relates to the Executive Order is the NASA’s Artemis lunar exploration programme. Last week, NASA came out with a report, the Plan for Sustained Lunar Exploration and Development, which outlines plans for long-term space exploration. The reports details plans for the next several years which includes humans returning to the Moon and a mission thereafter to “also emplacing and building the infrastructure, systems, and robotic missions that can enable a sustained lunar surface presence.” In order to do this, NASA wants to “develop Artemis Base Camp at the South Pole of the Moon.”

On the lunar exploration for water and other minerals, a White House space adviser is reported to have told the media that “it was important to clarify what US policy was toward the Moon Agreement and then lay out a more positive vision going forward.” Section 2 of the Executive Order talks about the Moon Agreement, saying that the US is not a party to the Agreement; and that the US does not believe “the Moon Agreement to be an effective or necessary instrument to guide nation states regarding the promotion of commercial participation in the long-term exploration, scientific discovery, and use of the Moon, Mars, or other celestial bodies.”

Trump has further directed the Secretary of State to oppose to any state or multilateral organisation that would consider the Moon Agreement as customary international law.

The other aspect that is emphasised in the Executive Order is the US seeking collaboration with like-minded partners. To this end, Trump has directed the Secretary of State to work out bilateral and multilateral statements of intent and arrangements “regarding safe and sustainable operations for the public and private recovery and use of space resources.”

The president has sought action on this within 180 days. It remains unclear what happens to the body of work done by The Hague Space Resources Governance Working Group which has been working to develop a legal framework for the use of space resources found on asteroids and other celestial bodies.

While most spacefaring countries are yet to make a formal response to the Executive Order, deputy head of Russian Roscosmos in charge of international cooperation is reported to have said that Trump’s Executive Order is “comparable” to colonialism. The Roscosmos has stated that “Attempts to expropriate outer space and aggressive plans to actually seize territories of other planets hardly set the countries (on course for) fruitful cooperation.” The Kremlin is also reported to have remarked that “any colonization of space would be ‘unacceptable’.”

The US is not the only country that has plans for the Moon and other celestial bodies. China has ambitious plans in this regard too. A few years ago, Ye Peijian, chief commander and designer of China’s lunar exploration programme stated that China would send the first batch of asteroid exploration spacecraft around 2020.

Ye added that “many of the asteroids near the Earth contain high concentrations of precious metals,” which could rationalise the huge cost and risks involved in these activities. He estimated their economic value to be in the trillions of US dollars.

Despite its criticism of the US move, Russia is not lagging behind when it comes to asteroid mining and other space exploration plans either. Russia plans to have a permanent base on the Moon somewhere after 2025 for possible extraction of Helium. In the mid-2000s, Russia had said that it will have a lunar base between 2015 and 2025. These plans appear to have been delayed because of domestic difficulties. Additionally, both Russia and China are also planning to team up, contributing science payloads to their respective Luna-26 and Chang’e-7 spacecraft sometime in the 2020s. They also plan to establish a joint lunar and deep space data centre with hubs in both the countries.

Given the changing balance of power dynamics, the outer space domain is once again becoming a victim to great power competition and rivalry.

To minimise the harmful impact of this competition and to establish certain amount of predictability in outer space affairs, there have been several efforts to develop certain global rules of the road. But these efforts have not made any progress.