Managing the AfPak Challenge in US-India Relations - The Diplomat, 9 August 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the AfPak challenge in US-India relations and both sides need to carefully manage this issue to avoid damaging the wider relationship, especially as it has other longer term strategic challenges to confront in the broader Asian strategic context.

Indo-U.S. relations have been running into rough weather recently. Trade problems, India’s decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and differences over Iran have all taken a toll. Both sides are gamely working to ensure that these don’t do lasting damage, but a new issue – disagreements over the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences – now threatens to overload the agenda and potentially do serious damage, especially to their common interests in the Indo-Pacific.

It is not clear that their differences over AfPak can be entirely resolved but both sides can take efforts to limit the fallout from these disagreements before it is too late. This does require though that both New Delhi and Washington understand each other’s compulsions in AfPak and recognize that their common interests in the Indo-Pacific are more important.

For the full essay, click here.



After almost two decades of fighting to keep the Taliban out, Washington is understandably exhausted. There is little hope that that the United States can win the war and even lesser hope that it can strengthen Afghan government forces sufficiently that they can contain the Taliban without American assistance. So, the choice the United States faces is to stay on for the foreseeable future or try and cut a deal with the Taliban to withdraw with a modicum of grace.

Added to this is President Trump’s domestic compulsion. Americans are weary of the war, and have been for some time. Barack Obama promised to get the United States out of Afghanistan but was unable to do so. President Trump, who came to power complaining of the costs of the United States’ over-commitments abroad is even more motivated. With the election campaign beginning, and the election itself fifteen months away, he appears intent on succeeding where his predecessor failed.

The key problem is that it is unlikely that the United States can withdraw from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support and cooperation. Though the Taliban in Afghanistan is a diverse and a somewhat less than unified force, it does appear clear that Pakistan has sufficient control over them to ensure that no negotiations can take place without the good offices of Islamabad. Trump has been critical of Pakistani behavior in the past, and Washington in general, is well aware of the history of Pakistani duplicity.

Moreover, the Taliban’s commitments that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for terrorist activities against the United States and the West is a laughable proposition. Once the United States withdraws, there is little that Washington can do to ensure that a Taliban government will live up to the promises they make. Nevertheless, these commitments are a useful fiction that provides cover for Washington to blame that they have withdrawn honorably.

If the United States’ imperative is understandable, so is India’s. If the Taliban come back to power in Afghanistan, there is little doubt that Islamabad will be able to use Afghan territory to, once again, base anti-India terrorists there. With India demonstrating that it now has the political willingness to strike terror camps in Pakistan, Pakistan’s incentive for exploiting Afghan territory is even greater.

Though India’s interests in preventing a Taliban takeover is clear, its options are limited. India appears to have done little to build up any specific source of support of proxies within Afghanistan, to give India any voice in the negotiations for the U.S. withdrawal. What this means is that while the Taliban might give at least some paper guarantee to the United States about non-use of its territory for international terrorism purposes, India cannot even expect that. New Delhi would prefer that the U.S. forces stay on in Afghanistan but that is not likely. And nobody gives much heed to India’s mantras like “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” process.

A key question is how the disagreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in it can be managed. Washington and President Trump personally are not likely to look at any Indian efforts to slow down or sabotage the U.S. withdrawal very kindly. Equally, New Delhi is likely to be more than a bit peeved if the United States facilitates Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, especially with Pakistan’s assistance. Thus, there is little doubt that when it comes to the AfPak, the Indian and American interests are directly contradictory.

What is worrying is the possibility that these disagreements will bleed into other areas and affect cooperation in critical areas, especially the Indo-Pacific. Though there are disagreements between India and the United States on how to balance China in the Indo-Pacific, these are relatively minor. But unhappiness over AfPak can raise issues of dependability about the other in both capitals. There are already increasing concerns in Washington about whether the United States was wise to bet on India; and in New Delhi, concerns about American dependability have never been far from the surface. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient maturity on both sides to continue cooperating on one area while they have significant differences in another.

India, US and the Afghanistan Quagmire

Here's an analysis on the Afghanistan issue and the options left with India, US and other major players. The analysis appeared first on the ORF website.

Former US President George Bush, while speaking recently at the Hindustan Times leadership summit, argued that India and the US should work together in Afghanistan both to build a democratic nation in Afghanistan as well as for the larger goal of peace and stability in the region. But this will work only if India and the US have shared objectives and a shared vision for the future of Afghanistan.



While the US has reiterated time and again that securing and stabilising Afghanistan remains a vital US national security interest, in reality it appears to have a much more limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US.

While it is abundantly clear that it remains an important goal to ensure that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US, it can be achieved two ways. One, as several US officials point out, it can be achieved through reconstruction and development of the Afghan society; and second, by putting together some sort of a coalition of forces, including the so-called moderate Taliban, thereby making them responsible partners in the governance of Afghanistan. There are many who believe that the US is actually looking at a face-saving exit option at the earliest possible. Even as early as February this year, the Obama Administration was hinting at moving away from the objective of establishing a full-fledged democracy to simply stabilizing and ensuring that the country is not a haven for terrorists. The US will be willing to get out of Afghanistan the minute they are able to stitch together a coalition of parties, including the so-called moderate Taliban, who might give a guarantee of ‘no-attacks’ for a short span of time.

However, if the US were to leave Afghanistan after putting together some sort of a coalition, what are the consequences?

One possibility is that China might step into the breech. China has vital strategic interests – economic and energy interests – driving its Afghanistan policy. The role of Pakistan in achieving those interests is significant. Gwadar port is a case in point. Gwadar port offers China the ability to monitor the transport of its energy from the Persian Gulf, and in the eventuality of some disruption, it will offer a safer alternative route. Besides, Chinese interests in Afghanistan span from natural resources to its problems with Uighurs in the Xinjiang Province. In terms of natural resources, China already has its footprint there in Aynak copper mine site. In 2007, when President Karzai invited foreign investment in the natural resources sector, China Metallurgical Group won the rights to develop the copper mine site at $ 3.5 billion. Aynak copper mine site is one of the world’s largest undeveloped fields. Additionally, Chinese companies are looking at the prospect of developing untapped oil, gas and iron resources in Afghanistan. Chinese entry into Afghanistan will also be in the interests of Pakistan, as it will keep India at a distance (at least Pakistan hopes that way). Second, Chinese entry into Afghanistan with Pakistani acquiescence will ensure that they do not come under Taliban attack. Pakistan will ensure an understanding with the Taliban that China is not there for exploitation of the country, but will be beneficial for the country for its overall development. Under such a scenario, China will gain certain amount of accommodation with the Taliban, which might also be beneficial to China in dealing with its own problem in Xinjiang. The role of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in this issue cannot be minimised. A renewed relationship between China and Pakistan/Saudi Arabia may not be in the best interests of India. In fact, this could become the new bloc of non-democracies under the Chinese leadership against the democratic world of US, India and other countries such as Japan and Australia. The possibility of China exercising better influence in these medium-sized countries, thereby reducing US role and influence in the coming decades, cannot be ruled out. The changes in Singapore is one example. Singapore, which has been a US ally, is increasingly looking to China for answers. It is even considering a change of official language from English to Mandarin. Therefore, China will not let go of an opportunity to enter Afghanistan keeping in view several strategic interests thereby achievable.

If the US leaves Afghanistan, Pakistan could also step into its place. Islamabad will use the opportunity to solidify Taliban influence across the country, thereby serving its interests and limiting Indian influence. For Pakistan, Taliban offers the best bet for countering and curtailing India’s regional influence. However, there are some Pakistan watchers in India who believe that a Talibanised-Afghanistan may not be in the interests of Pakistan. It was Pakistan which created, nurtured and sustained Taliban all through the late 1990s and early 2000s. The difference today is that Taliban is not the same “pure” Taliban as in early 2000s, but has gotten enmeshed totally with Al Qaeda and it is very difficult to differentiate today between Afghan Taliban and the Al Qaeda. Pakistan is deeply worried about the Al Qaeda factor. However, the point is that if the US leaves Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda does not really have a purpose hanging on in Afghanistan unless they want a safe haven. It is quite possible that Al Qaeda will leave Afghanistan for Africa or elsewhere where the US interests are becoming deeper because of increasing Chinese penetration.

Will Russia comeback to Afghanistan? Russian interests are to see that Afghanistan does not fall completely into the hands of Taliban, which will drag the entire country into becoming a terrorist haven. Although Russia does not share a border with Afghanistan, many of the Central Asian states do, and there are ethnic and cultural linkages between the two sides and a Taliban takeover could have negative effects in Russia that is already battling terrorism. Besides, a Talibanised-Afghanistan could, in the long-term, build the prospects for a US return not only to Afghanistan but also to several countries in Central Asia, where it will be looking for bases. Therefore, Russian interests are to ensure that there is no Taliban takeover of Afghanistan besides development of Afghanistan as a peaceful and stable country in its neighbourhood. In the development arena, there are already several Russian companies (under the Russia-Afghanistan business council formed in 2007) supplying flour, timber, sunflower oil and other products. Additionally, they are looking at exporting building technology; they are in the process of commissioning a cement factory in Afghanistan and a hydropower station on the River Salang.

Finally, what are India’s options? In the backdrop of US departure from Kabul, there will be vacuum waiting to be filled by China and Pakistan. Indian interests go beyond natural resources to seeing a stable and democratic Afghanistan that will be congenial to Indian interests. In tactical terms, Indian interests might be ensuring safety of its 4,000-odd workers and security personnel who are engaged on a number of infrastructure and other reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan remains crucial to India in other ways. India has invested $ 1.2 billion in Afghanistan for the reconstruction of the country since the US war on terror began in 2001, making it the largest regional donor. However, Pakistan continues to view India’s growing influence in Afghanistan as a direct threat to its own interests. Indian influence in the country paled as the Pakistan-supported Taliban gained power in 1996. During the Taliban period, India extended its support to an anti-Taliban coalition, the Northern Alliance, mainly consisting of Tajik and other non-Pushtoon groups. Can India revive such ties in the current setting? There are several analysts who suggest that India should lend support to the non-Pushtoon Northern part of Afghanistan against the Pushtoon-dominated Southern part of Afghanistan. Some analysts have gone to the extent of suggesting that the country should be split up on these lines. Some Russians too have argued on similar lines, although they recognize that this will not be a long-term solution to several problems emanating from southern Afghanistan. While splitting the country is not in the long-term interests of India, it could probably undertake measures to enhance development in northern Afghanistan, where by the way, influence of Pakistan is also minimal. India will have to step-up its developmental activities, including construction of schools, hospitals, which will gain India significant support among the local populace. In this regard, it might do well if India manages the support of other major regional players like Russia, Iran that might like to see a strengthened Northern Alliance. While India should strive to make Northern Alliance stronger, it also has to engage with the Pushtoons, at least to gain in tactical terms. India should also canvass with the US to bring together a larger coalition of nations including Russia, China, Iran and may be some of the Central Asian states in bringing about long-lasting peace in Afghanistan. What India does today in Afghanistan will have long-term impact not only for the entire region, but for its own role as a major Asian player.