The Rising Domestic Danger to India’s Foreign Policy Under Modi - The Diplomat, 6 March 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing international attention and criticism to some of the recent internal developments in India. Whether New Delhi likes it or not, it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic issues are affecting ties with its neighbors and partners and that the costs of this are increasing.

Over the past few months, it has become increasingly clear that India’s domestic issues are increasingly threatening to impact India’s foreign policy. Issues such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and India’s actions in Kashmir are beginning to affect India’s relations with its neighbors, major Islamic countries such as Iran and Indonesia, and strategic partners such as the United States. Last week’s violence in Delhi, in particular, is drawing negative attention to India’s internal matters and could possibly affect its reputation.

For the full essay, click here.



In an exceptional move, and a first for India, the Geneva-based Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has said that it was planning to file an application on the CAA in the Indian Supreme Court. The UN Higher Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet subsequently filed an Intervention Application against the CAA. The MEA responded to this by saying that the CAA is an internal issue of India and “no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.”

Iran is another recent critic, and another surprising one too, and it was vocal in condemning the communal violence in Delhi, especially the targeting of India’s Muslim citizens. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif had a tough tweet on the Delhi violence, saying, “Iran condemns the wave of organized violence against Indian Muslims. For centuries, Iran has been a friend of India. We urge Indian authorities to ensure the well-being of ALL Indians & not let senseless thuggery prevail. Path forward lies in peaceful dialogue and rule of law.”

New Delhi did not respond kindly to the foreign minister’s comments. Responding to a question on the Iranian foreign minister’s tweet, the MEA spokesperson stated that India had summoned Iranian Ambassador Ali Chegeni and “a strong protest was lodged against the unwarranted remarks made by the Iranian Foreign Minister. It was conveyed that his selective and tendentious characterization of recent events in Delhi are not acceptable. We do not expect such comments from a country like Iran.” Apparently, it was made clear to the Iranian ambassador that this was an internal issue of India and that Iranian comments were not appreciated.

It is strange that the Iranian foreign minister’s particularly harsh tweet came just a few days after India joined hands with Iran to speed up the Chabahar port development. While Iran is known to champion the rights of Muslim minorities in other countries, it was a bit incongruous considering that Iran has said little about China’s behavior towards its Muslim Uyghur minority, large numbers of whom have been placed in concentration camps simply because of their Islamic faith. Of course, nations are not always consistent in their policies, and Iran fears China far more than it fears India.

While Iran is not a particularly strategic partner for India and can possibly be ignored, others are more difficult to dismiss. Indonesia, an important partner in India’s Act East and Indo-Pacific strategy, has also voiced serious concerns about the violence in Delhi. Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second largest Muslim group, expressed disquiet about the violent clashes between Hindus and Muslims on account of the CAA. Muhammadiyah secretary-general Abdul Mu’thi while denouncing the violence, said that the violence was “clearly against human rights principles.” A day after the violence, hashtag #ShameOnYouIndia was among the top trending topics on Twitter in Indonesia, and as many as 46,000 tweets were related to the Delhi violence, many condemning the violence.

This was mirrored by some of the government reactions as well. There was an unusually strong statement issued by the Indonesian Religious Affairs Ministry condemning the religious violence in Delhi. Within hours of this statement, the Indonesian foreign ministry made a statement saying that “The Government of Indonesia has complete confidence that the Government of India will be able to manage the situation and ensure the harmonious relations among its religious communities. Moreover, both countries share similar characteristics, as pluralistic countries that uphold democratic values and tolerance.” The Indonesian foreign ministry also called in the Indian Ambassador to Jakarta, Pradeep Rawat, seeking details on the Delhi violence.

Of course, this pales in comparison to any damage that may be caused to India’s ties to the United States, its most important strategic partner. Despite the successful Trump visit to India, this bears watching. India’s foreign minister and its diplomats have done a good job explaining its position in the United States after the revoking Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir, but India’s approach after the CAA has been quite poor. For instance, Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because Pramila Jayapal was part of the delegation possibly did not help. In fact, the resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir, sponsored by Jayapal found 10 additional legislators ready to co-sponsor it right after the cancellation of the meeting.

Last week’s violence in the capital sparked new concerns in the United States with several leading names from the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and others, including Democrat presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, expressing serious concerns. Once again, the MEA spokesperson called these statements “irresponsible.” Raveesh Kumar, the MEA spokesperson went on to state that “Our law enforcement agencies are working on the ground to prevent violence and ensure restoration of confidence and normalcy. Senior representatives of the government have been involved in that process. Prime Minister has publicly appealed for peace and brotherhood.” A lot of India’s diplomatic bandwidth now has to be used for fighting these fires than for improving a vital relationship.

India can continue to dismiss these criticisms and concerns as unnecessary interference in its internal affairs, but it is unlikely this would help much. Even India’s well-wishers are beginning to worry. This will eventually be expensive if these problems are not resolved, especially because New Delhi will be wasting effort in explaining itself and creating unnecessary tensions and discomfort in critical relationships. Of course, the most important reason for resolving these problems is that India should be a society in which no section feels persecuted and differences are resolved peacefully, which it is difficult to say right now.

India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020 - The Diplomat, 4 January 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020, I looked at India's foreign policy challenges for 2020. Sadly, many of them have been the government's own making. Hence, I argue that while the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi has paid significant attention to India’s foreign relations. Though there could be some quibbles about how much he managed to achieve, there is little doubt that his focus at least led to greater energy and push in India’s foreign policy, even if Modi’s foreign policy has not witnessed any significant shifts.

But since his re-election last summer, India’s foreign policy challenges have been growing. And while the reasons for this may be varied, some of it is because of the BJP government’s own mistakes.

For the full essay, click here.



In his first term, Modi was able to undertake significant strategic outreach to the United States, Japan, and Australia. The revival of the Quad is a great indicator of the pragmatism in India’s diplomacy today. Despite some setbacks in between, India also managed to consolidate its position in two important Indian Ocean countries – Sri Lanka and Maldives. Modi can also be credited with a more effective outreach to Southeast Asia, with its Act East Policy.

But there are also growing difficulties. Managing China, India’s most serious challenge, has seen some success but it remains a major and continuing problem. India’s more active role in the Quad in its second avatar is a positive sign. Despite the occasional wavering in India’s Indo-Pacific policy, elevating the Quad to foreign ministerial level deliberations shows the willingness of all the four Quad members to acknowledge the reality of the China problem and the need for the four to work toward strategic coordination.

But there are serious problems with India’s hard capacity to manage the China problem. General V.P. Malik, the former chief of Indian Army Staff, said during the Kargil war that “we will fight with what we have,” but such an approach while facing a much a larger and strong force in China will be dangerous for India. For all the loud rhetoric on national security, the Modi government’s defense budget allocation has been abysmal. Year after year, it has driven down the defense budget, which now has the lowest allocation since the period before the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Even within this allocation, much of it is spent on salaries and pension, leaving very little for capital expenditure, thus leaving procurement issues unresolved. All three Indian services have significant gaps and this is going to test India’s ability to defend successfully against China. The Indian focus appears to be on diplomacy to deal with China, but depending on one toll alone could be dangerous.

Another major challenge is the neighborhood, and the problems here are compounded due to India’s internal developments. Today, India’s neighborhood policy is facing serious challenges, in part because of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Together, they have had a particularly negative impact on India’s relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. With the CAA targeting three Islamic neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – India’s neighborhood diplomacy suddenly faces new problems.

Relations with Bangladesh had improved significantly under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the CAA and the NRC have put the Bangladeshi government in a difficult position. Relations with Afghanistan, another friendly neighbor, are affected also. Moreover, the CAA is seen both as specifically targeting Muslims and as equating Indian citizenship with Hinduism, raising eyebrows across the world. Even India’s partners are questioning its credentials as a multicultural, pluralist society. India did enjoy certain soft power benefit as the world’s largest democracy, with diverse cultures and religions co-existing in a stable political system, but that image has been tarnished by the recent developments.

Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and even External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar can ignore the global concerns by saying these are internal matters of India. But the reality is that India’s moral standing has taken a hit and it will need significant efforts on the part of the Modi government to demonstrate that India is still a multicultural and secular democracy.

Modi did make a smart choice in getting Jaishankar to head the foreign ministry. Jaishankar, a former foreign secretary, is well-respected around the world, and is known to have been an important reason for many of Modi’s foreign policy successes in his first term. But it is unclear if an experienced technocrat like Jaishankar can weather the storms created by poor domestic political decisions. Jaishankar was successful to a large extent in assuaging the fears around the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, after Article 370 was revoked in early July. His extensive engagements in the United States, speaking in nearly a dozen think tanks, as well as other media interviews, helped stem the damage.

But India’s outreach has been poor after the CAA. Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because the delegation included Ms. Pramila Jayapal, for instance, has angered Democrats in the United States to the point where Jayapal now has another 10 legislators co-sponsoring her resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir at the earliest. It is not clear that India still enjoys the kind of bipartisan support in the U.S. as it did in the last 15 years.

This comes on top of Modi’s statement, “Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar,” which has not gone down well with Democrats. It would have been better for Modi to not poke his head into the internal politics of another country. The U.S. relationship is absolutely critical in managing the China issue and it will be a challenge to get it back to even keel, especially if a Democrat wins the White House in November.

It is unclear how the India-Japan relationship has been affected. The annual summit, originally slated to take place in Guwahati in December 2019, was postponed because of CAA-related protests. This has been an annual feature for more than a decade and it is possibly the first time that the summit meeting has been skipped.

India’s democracy and stability plays at least a supporting role in India’s partnerships, and even uncertainty can hurt these relations. While India has faced many external difficulties in the past, they have rarely been the result of domestic politics. Handling these new challenges could be much more difficult than the Indian government assumes.

Is the Washington Consensus on US-India Relations Fraying? - The Diplomat, 1 January 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat for 2020, I looked at the U.S.-India relations, and I argue that recent developments (within India) have raised questions about the future of bipartisan support for U.S.-India relations.

U.S.-India relations have improved over the last two decades, partly due to the strong political consensus in Washington supporting this trend. Both Democrats and Republicans have put aside other differences when it came to India, and, even when different parties controlled them, both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have supported strengthening the relationship.

Recent developments, however, have cast a shadow on the extent of that support and how it might shape up moving forward. Scrutiny on some domestic developments in India has raised some questions about U.S. support for India and the future shape of the bilateral relationship.

Of particular note are the recent Indian actions regarding Indian citizenship and identity issues, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), which have not gone down well, either in India or in the United States.

For the full essay, click here.



The negative Western media attention on India has been generally dismissed by senior Indian officials as biased. The home minister, Amit Shah, blamed Indian opposition parties for raising human rights concerns. Commenting on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir in September, Shah said, “To those who are asking questions about human rights, I want to ask have they ever thought about the human rights of the widows or children of the 41,800 people killed in J&K so far.” Ashok Malik, a respected journalist and former media advisor to the Indian president, categorized the negative publicity as “a familiar assortment of New York/London-based know-alls, fringe left activists, Pakistani state agents masquerading as aggrieved neutrals, and freelance self-determinists representing nothing but their bylines.”

The CAA and NRC, against the backdrop of the Article 370 developments, have compounded the negative international perception of India. The Indian foreign minister’s decision to cancel an important interaction at the U.S. Capitol may create new problems. Jaishankar had requested a meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) on the sidelines of the second India-U.S. two-plus-two dialogue in Washington. But upon learning that Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal, who is not a member of the Committee, would also be present at the HFAC meeting, Jaishankar cancelled the interaction, saying “I have no interest in meeting” the Indian-American congresswoman. Instead, he insisted he would only meet with “people who are objective and open to discussion but not the people who already made up their minds.”

Jayapal, a Democrat, has been an outspoken critic of India’s actions in Kashmir. More importantly, she was introducing a resolution on Kashmir in the House of Representatives, calling for all the communications restrictions imposed by the Indian government to be removed at the earliest. By cancelling the meeting, India appears to have made the issue worse for itself because the resolution saw 10 additional sponsors right after the minister’s snub to Jayapal.

A wiser decision would have been for India to have proceeded with the meeting and explain the situation, even if it was a difficult case to make. This was what Jaishankar had done while on a visit to Washington after the Article 370 developments, by which India managed to pacify at least some of the critics. Cancelling the meeting, on the other hand, clearly created the impression that India did not have a convincing story to tell.

This action has upped the ante and possibly angered Democratic lawmakers in the United States. Should a Democratic candidate win in the 2020 US presidential election, India may have a lot of making-up to do. Even if a Democrat does not win the presidency and Trump gets a second term, India will still need support from Democratic lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

In the last couple of decades, India has generally enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington, D.C., and this was most evident during the U.S-India nuclear deal. Despite a few nonproliferation hardliners in the U.S. Congress, President George W. Bush was able to muster sufficient support for India because both Democrats and Republicans wanted to build a closer strategic partnership. Since then, India has worked hard to keep its support bipartisan. Doing so ensured that even in the very difficult and partisan political environment in Washington, relations with India was one of the few issues on which there was a broad consensus in the U.S. Congress, making for steady legislative support to executive efforts deepen the relationship.

It would be a shame if India managed to fritter away that bipartisan support. India will have to work much harder in Washington if it can count on only the support of one party or smaller segments of both.