Can the New China-India Thaw Last? - October 19, 2018

Last week, I did my weekly column for The Diplomat on the state of the India-China relations and whether the current thaw is long lasting or not. In the "Can the New China-India Thaw Last?," I argue that despite India’s recent seeking of friendlier ties with Beijing, the future prospects for relations remain uncertain.

A year after Doklam, India appears to be intent on seeking friendlier ties with Beijing. Whether this is sustainable for the long-term, however, is unclear. Even as this process has unfolded, India continues to worry about China’s activities in the neighborhood and continues to build up its ties with other partners, though cautiously.



For the full essay, click here.



Since April, there have been a series of meetings between the top Indian and Chinese leaders, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. After the “informal” summit in Wuhan in April, the two met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao in June and the BRICS leaders’ summit in Johannesburg in July.

At the Wuhan Summit, Modi and Xi agreed to the China-India Plus cooperation format to work in third countries such as Afghanistan. Thereafter, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale went on to develop an outline for a capacity-building project, which was announced on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Qingdao in June.

On October 15, India and China jointly began a training program for Afghan diplomats in New Delhi, a significant development. Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui is reported to have said that the two countries should collaborate in other neighboring countries such as Iran, Nepal, and Myanmar. The 10 Afghan officers, on finishing the training at the Foreign Service Institute in India, will go to China for the second leg as part of the joint training program.

Though Afghanistan sent its diplomats for training under the program, the Afghan leadership is reportedly disappointed with India. Kabul is apparently of the view that because of India joining hands with China, there has been a downgrading of India’s assistance to Afghanistan to “smaller” projects as a way of assuaging Pakistan’s concerns. Reports indicate that “India had, in fact, conceded [to] China’s request to jointly implement a limited ‘capacity building’ project to opt for a smaller project in Afghanistan, possibly to assuage its ally Pakistan’s misgivings.”

India’s efforts to assuage China are not limited to Afghanistan alone. The two sides are slated to sign a bilateral internal security cooperation pact on October 22 during the visit of Zhao Kezhi, China’s minister of public security to India. Intelligence exchange, sharing of best practices, exchange programs, and cooperation in disaster mitigation are some of the areas the two sides intend to cooperate on under this agreement.

Quoting officials, reports suggest that this security cooperation arrangement could possibly lead to an agreement to exchange prisoners in each other’s countries. There are apparently 10 Indian prisoners is Chinese prisons and “an equal number of Chinese in Indian prisons as well,” according to the Financial Express. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to come to India in December to co-chair a meeting that focuses on people-to-people ties, a decision that was taken by Modi and Xi in the wake of the Doklam crisis.

While New Delhi tries to address Beijing’s concerns, there are questions about how long all this will last, given that there seems to be no letup in the expansion of China’s military and diplomatic presence in India’s periphery. For instance, just as India and China started their joint training program for Afghan diplomats, China was busy deploying PLA Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean after a gap of more than a year. It has been reported that China had sent a Type 039A Yuan class SSK diesel submarine and submarine rescue vessel, which were sighted in the Indian Ocean earlier this month. This is the first such PLA Navy mission in the Indian Ocean since the Doklam crisis.

How India will respond remains to be seen. India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba recently said that India was “working with all like-minded nations and we are in dialogue with China as well.”

Meanwhile, China is also continuing to demonstrate its interest in pushing into India’s sphere of influence in Bhutan. Even though Beijing has no formal diplomatic ties with Thimphu, it has been expanding its footprint in Bhutan for a while now. Reports suggest that China has increased the number of shipments into Bhutan in the past decade, everything from machinery to cement to electrical equipment to toys to the point where China is now “the third largest source of foreign products” to Bhutan.

As India seeks better ties with China, it is also continuing to build up its partnerships in the region. India-Japan maritime cooperation saw a boost with the re-starting of the exercise, JIMEX that concluded earlier this week. India also held the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue with the United States last month and signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). India-Australia ties are also seeing some revival with a number of security dialogues and military exercises between the two sides.

On the other hand, in a demonstration of “strategic autonomy” from the United States, India has signed an agreement to purchase the S-400s anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and also plans to buy more oil from Iran from November, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. Whether India can continue this high stakes strategic tightrope-walking remains to be seen.

Japan-India Maritime Exercise 2018: Operational Clarity, Strategic Confusion? - October 16, 2018

In the latest piece for The Diplomat, I wrote on the just-concluded Japan-India Maritime Exercise JIMEX 2018, the third in the series between India and Japan. I argue that while New Delhi’s desire to cultivate closer defense ties with Tokyo is clear, its overall strategic approach is much less so.

Despite India’s ambiguous tone from time to time on the Indo-Pacific strategic concept and the Quad, the revival of the India-Japan maritime exercise underlines the growing concern in the two capitals about the threats to the freedom of navigation and respect for international rules of the road in the Indo-Pacific. JIMEX-18 also reflects the growing comfort level and sophistication of India-Japan military ties, which are informed by the closer strategic vision shared by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe.

But whether or not this represents India’s broader strategic alignment with states such as the United States and Japan as part of an effort to balance against China and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as envisioned by Washington is less clear.



For more, click here.



From October 7 to 15, India and Japan held the third edition of the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) in Visakhapatnam, in southern India. While the exercise is indicative of better bilateral defense ties between the two sides, the strategic message by New Delhi is less clear.

In recent years, interactions between the Indian and Japanese militaries have grown tremendously. The two navies have been coordinating anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden. Japan is also a permanent participant in the Malabar series of naval exercises since 2015, which originally started between the Indian and U.S. navies in 1992. The Malabar 2018 trilateral exercises were held off Guam in June.

The JIMEX series is designed to create better interoperability, ensure better understanding, and share best practices between the two navies. JIMEX-18, the third one in the series, is taking place after a gap of five years and is demonstrative of the worsening maritime scenario in the Indo-Pacific and the greater coincidence of interests between New Delhi and Tokyo especially in the defense and security arena. The last JIMEX took place off the Chennai coast in December 2013.

Despite India’s ambiguous tone from time to time on the Indo-Pacific strategic concept and the Quad, the revival of the India-Japan maritime exercise underlines the growing concern in the two capitals about the threats to the freedom of navigation and respect for international rules of the road in the Indo-Pacific. JIMEX-18 also reflects the growing comfort level and sophistication of India-Japan military ties, which are informed by the closer strategic vision shared by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe.

But whether or not this represents India’s broader strategic alignment with states such as the United States and Japan as part of an effort to balance against China and ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as envisioned by Washington is less clear.

In that sense, the JIMEX exercises are another example of the apparent inconsistent Indian approach to the Indo-Pacific that is likely to confuse both India’s partners as much as China. On the one hand, the fact that it was restarted after five years appears to suggest that India is intent on partnering with other countries to dealing with challenges that China’s rise poses.

More broadly, over the last several months, India has sent several signals to this effect. It signed the COMCASA (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement) with the United States, and conducted bilateral maritime exercises with Australia, in addition to joining the Australian-led multilateral Pitch Black air combat exercise for the first time and the India-Singapore joint naval exercise SIMBEX.

However, over the last few months, India has also taken steps that can only create concerns among the same potential partners. For one, after the Wuhan Summit between Modi and Xi, India’s approach to China appears to have considerably softened, as indicated by Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La Dialogue keynote speech back in June. In addition, India has also refused to allow Australia to join the Malabar exercises – despite Australia expressing a keen desire to do so. That would have brought India together with other key potential players in the Indo-Pacific.

India also attended the Senior-Level official meeting of the Quad in June, but it seemed quite lukewarm about the idea. Most recently, India has signed a deal with Russia for the S-400 anti-aircraft systems and Indian government oil companies announced that it was buying more oil from Iran in November, both of which will raise tensions with the United States, a key partner.

Thus, despite restarting the JIMEX exercise, India’s approach continues to show incoherence. To be sure, it is not uncommon for states to hedge their bets. But Indian political and bureaucratic leaders need to consider the effect of such mixed signaling and aim for more consistent policy or if there is an underlying logic to it, explain it better to India’s partners and observers.

Asia in space: cooperation or conflict? - 10 October 2018

In this week as we celebrate the World Space Week from 4-10 October 2018, I published a short essay examining where Asia is in the outer space domain, what the prospects and challenges are in the coming years. In this essay, Asia in space: cooperation or conflict?, published by APPS Policy Forum, an initiative of the Crawford School of Public Policy, I argue that national security casts a dark shadow on Asia’s spacefaring ambitions. As in other domains, space will likely be no exception to Asia's great power rivalries.



The outer space environment has undergone significant changes in the last decade. Countries in Asia, Latin America and Africa are driving many of these changes. Nevertheless, there are differences in the storylines of these regions as far as their space programs are concerned.

Asia presents a mixed story. While many countries approach space activities in the context of climate change and natural calamities, there are also countries looking at space with an excessive focus on national security. This is not the case in Africa and Latin America, where space programs almost have a total focus on social and development aspects.

For the full essay, click here.



Space programs in the Asian and Indo-Pacific region are dominated by three established spacefaring powers – China, India and Japan – and several emerging players, including Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Malaysia, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam.

Six of the ten countries that have demonstrated independent launch capabilities are in Asia – China, India, Iran, Israel, Japan and North Korea – a fact that demonstrates the increasing proficiency of the space programs in the region. The key question is whether this increasing Asian proficiency in outer space will lead to more cooperation or competition. Also of interest will be how the established and emerging spacefaring nations in Asia will contribute to the global governance of outer space.

There are currently two regional space cooperation organisations – the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) promoted by Japan, and the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) under China’s leadership. The very existence of two regional space organisations indicates the sharp divisions at play in the Asian context. At the same time, there is no institutional mechanism to coordinate between these two regional initiatives.

APRSAF, APSCO, and the major players in the region must find a way to cooperate in a couple of different areas. One area is climate change and related environmental issues – here countries could find ways to cut costs on key technologies as a parameter for collaboration.

A second, pertinent area for Asian countries to come together would be in writing the rules of the road for space, whether through legally binding rules or through normative instruments. Given the contentious nature of major power relationships in Asia, it appears unlikely that space will emerge as a platform for cooperation among all the major Asian spacefaring powers. Instead, it is possible that the divide will only get deeper, with one set of countries led by China and a second one led by Japan and India.

Unfortunately, this is likely to be the case because the underlying disagreements are quite deep-rooted. While all the major Asian powers acknowledge that space should be used only for peaceful purposes, the growing gap between the rhetoric and reality on the ground is stunning.

China’s anti-satellite test in 2007 is a case in point. The 2007 test, as well as the ones that were conducted subsequently under the garb of missile defence tests, have created new debates in countries such as India and Japan as to how they must respond in order to protect their own interests in space and create an effective deterrence. Clearly, the geopolitical tensions in the terrestrial world have managed to infect the sanctity of one of the global commons.

China’s longer-term plans for outer space have also raised concerns. China’s human space activities have remained an integral part of its goal to construct and operate a space station in low earth orbit by 2024, by which time it could be the only operating space station. Unless the partners in the International Space Station (ISS) are able to find a financially sustainable option, the ISS could be winding down by this time.

After dismissing the utility of inter-planetary or human spaceflight missions for decades, India has decided to join in too. For years, India had remained hesitant about human spaceflight programs, arguing that there are no major spin-offs in technological terms. The decision by the Indian government in August to have a manned mission by 2022 is a partial reflection of the competition in Asia.

Inter-planetary missions were similarly not a big priority for India, but again New Delhi is mindful of the need to undertake such missions to demonstrate its own advancing space prowess. Such demonstrations have implications for both security and the global commercial space market. A similar trajectory can also be seen in Japan, where a purely civilian space program is shifting gears towards a more military orientation.

The 20th century saw outer space competition play out between the two superpowers of the day, the US and the USSR. Today, space technology and programs are more spread out, with over 60 players including non-state, private commercial players.

While the participation of the private sector in space is still largely a Western phenomenon, there are many private space firms beginning to develop in China, India and Japan as well. The entry of commercial actors has driven innovation, making access to space a lot cheaper and more competitive.

These are important developments, yet what has had the most significant impact in driving space-related competition is the shift in the global balance of power. The international power struggle has had a deleterious impact on the governance of this particular global commons.

The trend towards developing counter-space capabilities is particularly worrying, and it’s a trend that is quite evident in Asia. The fact that Asia has some of the fastest growing economies also means higher military spending, including for military outer-space programs. On top of this, the seemingly unending sovereignty and territorial disputes make it difficult to generate better collaboration on even unrelated issues, such as writing the rules of the road in outer space.

Ultimately, while all powers would possibly benefit from greater cooperation in outer space, the prospects appear dim.

Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties? - October 4, 2018

In last week's column, I wrote on the Modi-Putin Summit, which took place on 5 October. In the "Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?," I focus as to how both India and Russia remain focused on defence trade to keep the relations on an even keel.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.



On October 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin is to hold the India-Russia annual summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. The last summit meeting took place in St. Petersburg in 2017, and Putin and Modi met last for an informal summit in Sochi in May this year.

The summit process between India and Russia started way back in 2000 and since then, the relationship has been elevated to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” The India-Russia strategic partnership is important for a number of reasons, but the two countries also face significant challenges. The relationship in the last few years have undergone some big changes, not all of them positive. The key question therefore is to see if the age-old bilateral relationship is sturdy enough to withstand some of the current turbulence.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.

On the other hand, Moscow remains anxious about India’s changing strategic orientation, particularly its relationship with the United States, and New Delhi’s defense trade diversification policy, among other issues. Russia has failed to appreciate the Indian strategic calculation behind its closer strategic engagement with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia.

From India’s perspective, Russia remains an important strategic partner for a number of different reasons. The historical character of the bilateral relationship aside, there are several strategic factors that impinge on the Russia-India dynamic. For one, Russia remains the only partner that is still willing to give India critical technologies, such as a nuclear submarine. Two, the emerging Russia-China strategic relationship has important security consequences for India. Even as India is diversifying its defense trade partners, Russia still dominates the Indian defense inventory to the tune of about 70 per cent. This raises worries in India because of the changing nature of the Russia-China defense relationship.

To take just one example, Russia’s sale of Su-30 and especially the Su-35 fighter puts India’s security at some risk. Russia’s sale of advanced Kilo-class submarines is another instance. These are illustrations of the important changes in the Russia-China security dynamics because Beijing for a long time was not given access to the best and most modern Russian technology and there was no technology transfer. The Russia-China oil and gas deals over the last few years also is a testament to this new closer partnership.

On the other hand, there are positive elements also in India-Russia relationship. Civil nuclear cooperation and defense and technology collaboration will dominate the Putin-Modi Summit meeting. The two sides are believed to be formalizing an action plan on nuclear cooperation. The two sides are also expected to sign an agreement for the purchase of the advanced S-400 Triumf air defense systems worth more than $5 billion.

This deal has been under threat because of the US’ CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) legislation, which seeks to sanction any country that does significant business with Russia in the defense or intelligence domains. Even though U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis has sought an exemption for India, and the U.S. Congress has given the U.S. administration the authority to waive CAATSA, it is up to the president to decide on whether such a waiver will be granted.

Irrespective of how the CAATSA sanctions may play out, India appears quite certain that it wants the S-400 because of the technological superiority of the system. India has explored a financial mechanism where India can make the payment in rupees rather than in U.S. dollars. Though the United States has not indicated how it will react to the S-400 deal, Washington has been somewhat understanding because India over the last few years has diversified its defense procurement and reduced its dependency on Russia to some extent, which is one of the conditions for gaining a CAATSA waiver.

Russia, for its part, appears quite confident that the deal will go through. Igor Korotchenko, head of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade noted that “the U.S. won’t impose sanctions on them because they don’t want the Indians to refuse to purchase American weapons in the future.”

There are reports suggesting that there may be an agreement also for the sale of four frigates to India. Under the deal, two of the advanced Talwar-class frigates will be directly purchased from Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and delivered in two years’ time, while the next two will be built at the Goa Shipyard. Although of an earlier previous generation, the Indian Navy already operates six of the Talwar-class frigates. Defense analysts add that the newer frigates will be equipped with the Brahmos missiles.

There is also the possibility of Russia-India cooperation on Amur-class submarine. Andrei I Baranov, Deputy Director General for Foreign Activities at Rubin Design Bureau which builds these submarines, promised that India will be able to have 80 percent indigenization. The potential for collaboration to jointly develop Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) is also a possibility.

Such defense deals and nuclear energy cooperation should keep the India-Russia relationship afloat for the time being. But they will not assuage New Delhi’s long terms concerns about the increasingly close Russia-China strategic partnership.