What Did India’s Foreign Secretary Achieve on His Trip to Russia? - The Diplomat, April 12, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Russia. Recently, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, the most senior bureaucrat in India’s foreign ministry, completed a visit to Russia. The visit shed light on the ongoing collaboration between the two countries and the opportunities and challenges for the relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



Unsurprisingly, official accounts of the visit focused on areas of collaboration, most of it already ongoing. The Russian embassy release said that the two countries examined “cooperation within the BRICS format, the current issues of the key multilateral export control regimes, including New Delhi’s application for NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] membership, other non-proliferation and arms control issues, as well as topical international issues of mutual interest.”

The evolving situation in Afghanistan too was covered by the two leaders. The foreign secretary is reported to have also met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov for Foreign Office Consultations, where they “reviewed the implementation of the decisions of the 19th Annual Bilateral Summit” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in 2018.

The two officials also discussed the upcoming high-level meetings, including India’s participation at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin has reportedly invited India to participate in the Forum, which is to take place in Vladivostok in September this year.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs press release on the visit characterized the meetings as “in-depth and productive, characteristic of the Special & Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.” The statement added, “The meetings resulted in enhanced mutual convergence and coordination of views on all major regional and international issues in the spirit of long standing and time-tested friendship between India and Russia.”

Despite the ongoing collaboration in these areas, the visit, and the official accounts of it, belie the mixed nature of actual ties. In fact, while India and Russia have had a long and warm relationship historically and Russia remains an important strategic partner (it is one of only two countries India has an annual bilateral summit with, the other being Japan), structural trends are pulling them in different directions.

Part of it has to do with perceptions on both sides. On India’s side, it can at times appear not to acknowledge the reality that Russia needs China far more than it needs India, and that its own diversification of partners in both the economic and security domains can also raise concerns in Moscow and complicate bilateral dealings. On Russia’s side, there is at times not enough of an appreciation for India’s strategic considerations, including its sensitivities toward China, as well as an acknowledgement that some of Moscow’s foreign policy activities can cause headaches in New Delhi.

But developments have also accelerated these perceptions as well. Russia’s adventurism abroad, including in Ukraine, China’s rise and its increasing convergence with Russia as it does so, rising U.S. competition with both Beijing and Moscow as it has gradually warmed to New Delhi, and upped conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the divergent approaches by India and Russia have all contributed to this.

Seen from this perspective, it is arguably even more important to have visits such as the one we saw from Gokhale, in order for both sides to understand each other. But at the same time, it is also critical to distinguish between the rhetoric that comes out of the visits and the reality of the relationship, especially when the gap between the two can seem to be growing wider in some senses.

Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties? - October 4, 2018

In last week's column, I wrote on the Modi-Putin Summit, which took place on 5 October. In the "Modi-Putin Summit: What’s on the Agenda for India-Russia Defense Ties?," I focus as to how both India and Russia remain focused on defence trade to keep the relations on an even keel.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.



On October 5, Russian President Vladimir Putin is to hold the India-Russia annual summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi. The last summit meeting took place in St. Petersburg in 2017, and Putin and Modi met last for an informal summit in Sochi in May this year.

The summit process between India and Russia started way back in 2000 and since then, the relationship has been elevated to a “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.” The India-Russia strategic partnership is important for a number of reasons, but the two countries also face significant challenges. The relationship in the last few years have undergone some big changes, not all of them positive. The key question therefore is to see if the age-old bilateral relationship is sturdy enough to withstand some of the current turbulence.

As Putin arrives in New Delhi, there is both excitement and uneasiness around the visit and what might come of it. There is excitement on both sides about a couple of important defense deals and there are plans to strengthen and streamline civil nuclear cooperation between the two countries. But there is also anxiety in New Delhi about the growing Russia-China ties and what that could mean for India.

On the other hand, Moscow remains anxious about India’s changing strategic orientation, particularly its relationship with the United States, and New Delhi’s defense trade diversification policy, among other issues. Russia has failed to appreciate the Indian strategic calculation behind its closer strategic engagement with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia.

From India’s perspective, Russia remains an important strategic partner for a number of different reasons. The historical character of the bilateral relationship aside, there are several strategic factors that impinge on the Russia-India dynamic. For one, Russia remains the only partner that is still willing to give India critical technologies, such as a nuclear submarine. Two, the emerging Russia-China strategic relationship has important security consequences for India. Even as India is diversifying its defense trade partners, Russia still dominates the Indian defense inventory to the tune of about 70 per cent. This raises worries in India because of the changing nature of the Russia-China defense relationship.

To take just one example, Russia’s sale of Su-30 and especially the Su-35 fighter puts India’s security at some risk. Russia’s sale of advanced Kilo-class submarines is another instance. These are illustrations of the important changes in the Russia-China security dynamics because Beijing for a long time was not given access to the best and most modern Russian technology and there was no technology transfer. The Russia-China oil and gas deals over the last few years also is a testament to this new closer partnership.

On the other hand, there are positive elements also in India-Russia relationship. Civil nuclear cooperation and defense and technology collaboration will dominate the Putin-Modi Summit meeting. The two sides are believed to be formalizing an action plan on nuclear cooperation. The two sides are also expected to sign an agreement for the purchase of the advanced S-400 Triumf air defense systems worth more than $5 billion.

This deal has been under threat because of the US’ CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act) legislation, which seeks to sanction any country that does significant business with Russia in the defense or intelligence domains. Even though U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis has sought an exemption for India, and the U.S. Congress has given the U.S. administration the authority to waive CAATSA, it is up to the president to decide on whether such a waiver will be granted.

Irrespective of how the CAATSA sanctions may play out, India appears quite certain that it wants the S-400 because of the technological superiority of the system. India has explored a financial mechanism where India can make the payment in rupees rather than in U.S. dollars. Though the United States has not indicated how it will react to the S-400 deal, Washington has been somewhat understanding because India over the last few years has diversified its defense procurement and reduced its dependency on Russia to some extent, which is one of the conditions for gaining a CAATSA waiver.

Russia, for its part, appears quite confident that the deal will go through. Igor Korotchenko, head of the Moscow-based Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade noted that “the U.S. won’t impose sanctions on them because they don’t want the Indians to refuse to purchase American weapons in the future.”

There are reports suggesting that there may be an agreement also for the sale of four frigates to India. Under the deal, two of the advanced Talwar-class frigates will be directly purchased from Russia’s Yantar Shipyard and delivered in two years’ time, while the next two will be built at the Goa Shipyard. Although of an earlier previous generation, the Indian Navy already operates six of the Talwar-class frigates. Defense analysts add that the newer frigates will be equipped with the Brahmos missiles.

There is also the possibility of Russia-India cooperation on Amur-class submarine. Andrei I Baranov, Deputy Director General for Foreign Activities at Rubin Design Bureau which builds these submarines, promised that India will be able to have 80 percent indigenization. The potential for collaboration to jointly develop Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) is also a possibility.

Such defense deals and nuclear energy cooperation should keep the India-Russia relationship afloat for the time being. But they will not assuage New Delhi’s long terms concerns about the increasingly close Russia-China strategic partnership.

The Russia-China military exercise: Implications for Asian Military Balance - September 13, 2018

I write for the #ObserverResearchFoundation #Raisina Files on the ongoing #Russia-#China military exercise and the possible implications for Asian military balance.



Russia is hosting this week its largest war games, Vostok-2018. This is considered by the far the largest war games that Russia has held since the end of the Cold War. The Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had said that Vostok-2018 (East-2018), scheduled to take place in Russia’s central and eastern military districts, will see the participation of almost 300,000 troops, over 1,000 military aircraft, two of Russia’s naval fleets, and all its airborne units. Shoigu also said that this “will be the biggest military exercise since 1981.” He added that “it will be unprecedented in terms of geographic scope and the strength of command and control centers and forces due to participate.” Justifying the Vostok-2018, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that this is “essential” as it has to have the capability and capacity to defend itself under the prevailing international situation, which Moscow characterises as “often aggressive and unfriendly toward our country.” In addition to the Russian armed forces, Vostok-2018 will see the participation of the Chinese and Mongolian militaries. China said that it will send “about 3,200 troops, along with more than 900 pieces of weaponry and 30 fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters.” Russian analysts say that the Russia-China partnership is a “de facto military alliance, purposefully not codified to maintain ambiguity.”

More critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



For long, Russia has remained concerned about NATO’s eastward expansion and the military exercises are a way of possibly deterring any military action its close neighbourhood. The war games also come in the backdrop of the increasingly worsening political and strategic ties between Russia and the West, primarily driven by the Russia’s Crimea annexation in 2014. The accusations of the Russian election meddling in the US and Europe have not helped the situation. Since the Ukraine crisis, Russia has sought stronger strategic partnership with China. Speaking about the Chinese participation in Vostok-2018, the Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that it is a sign of the expanded partnership between the two sides. Though China has come out and said that the war games are not targeted at any particular country, suspicions abound among the NATO states, especially those close to Russian borders. In a press statement, NATO’s acting Deputy spokesperson, Dylan White noted that they “fit into a pattern we have seen over some time: a more assertive Russia, significantly increasing its defence budget and its military presence.”

Since 2009, Russian has held periodic military exercises, usually every four years. However, since the Crimean annexation, NATO has been far more concerned about these war games. For instance, last year’s Zapad-2017 exercise covered a vast area from Belarus’ and Russia’s western borders up into the Arctic.. Although Moscow claimed only 12,000 troops took part in it, Western countries put the number at around 100,000. Similarly, Russia’s 15-day war games in the North Caucus region, bordering Georgia, also led to concerns in Georgia and other countries.

Russia has its own concerns about NATO exercises involving East European countries, many of which simulate defense against a Russian attack. Earlier this summer, 19 countries came together in the Sabre Strike exercise, which took place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and simulated a scenario of a Russian attack. In yet another show of strength among the western allies, 13 countries including the UK came together recently to conduct the Noble Partner exercises in Vaziani, outside Georgia’s capital Tbilisi. This is the fourth time that Georgia was hosting the Noble Partner exercise. Even though Georgia is not a NATO member, it contributes to the NATO Response Force and NATO has justified these exercises saying that there is a genuine Russia threat, especially for Eastern Europe member states. Russia on the other hand criticised these exercises saying that the US-led west is creating “Russophobia” and that these exercises could possibly bolster “militarist sentiments” and exacerbate the tensions.

The inevitability of these exercises by Russia and the NATO members (four non-NATO member countries – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine – also do take part in these exercises) are understandable given the state of hostile relations between the two sides. But these exercises also increase the possibilities of accidental conflict and aggravate the already-tense political relationships. But more critically, the Russia-China military drills in September will demonstrate their growing closeness at a time when the US has referred to Russia and China as two “revisionist powers” that are “attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Though Russia continues to be somewhat suspicious and wary of China’s growing military might, the so-called tactical relationship between Moscow and Beijing seems to be becoming a lot more strategic. As some experts have pointed out, “while there is still a lot of distrust between Moscow and Beijing, Moscow sees no other choice but to work with China, especially as relations with the US remain unstable and Chinese financial support is needed to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions.” China has stated that its participation will consolidate “the China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, deepening pragmatic and friendly cooperation between the two armies, and further strengthening their ability to jointly deal with varied security threats, which are conducive to safeguarding regional peace and security.” Other experts have pointed out, Russia did not want China to get the wrong impression that these exercises were aimed at Beijing. Chinese military source were also reported to have said that they are looking forward to learning from Russia’s recent military experience in Syria as “The PLA is the only major military force that has no real battle experience and it is very eager to get its hands on some real lessons.”

The strengthened strategic engagement between Russia and China especially in the defence and security sectors has important implications for the Asian military balance. To give only one example, India, one of Russia’s closest partners, will be increasingly worried about what Moscow’s growing closeness to Beijing will mean for the future of the India-Russia relationship.

What’s Next for the India-Russia Strategic Partnership? - June 16, 2018

I wrote a second piece this week for The Diplomat on what’s next for the India-Russia strategic partnership.

When Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin had an “informal” meeting in Sochi in late May, the two leaders discussed a number of bilateral issues such as military and defense cooperation and international issues relevant to both India and Russia. The meeting once again put the attention on the strategic partnership between New Delhi and Moscow, which continues to be significant, but also faces a number of challenges.

For the full essay, click here.



Many of the areas of convergence were unsurprisingly on display during the meeting at Sochi. In terms of outlook, the two leaders endorsed and emphasized the importance of their Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership for global peace and stability and the role of the two in shaping “an open and equitable world order.” Both Modi and Putin underlined the need to develop “a multipolar world order” while increasing consultations and coordination including on the Indo-Pacific, even though the two sides differ in their characterization. Foreign Minister Lavrov, while speaking to the media on the informal summit, talked about it as the Asia-Pacific region, a formulation preferred by China, whereas the Indian Ministry of External Affairs referred to it as the Indo-Pacific region. Putin and Modi also reiterated the importance of continuing their work together in platforms such as the United Nations, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and G-20.

Issue-wise, cooperation in the energy and economic sectors dominated the two leaders’ discussions. The progress seen in the bilateral trade – about 20 percent in 2017 and about 40 percent in the first few months of 2018 – was highlighted by both sides. In an effort to keep up the momentum, the NITI AAYOG and the Russian Ministry of Economic Development will be engaged in an annual strategic economic dialogue.

Nevertheless, it is the civil nuclear energy and defense cooperation that will dominate the relationship. The technical aspects for the construction of the fifth and sixth units of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant (NPP) have been finalized by Rosatom. During a recent visit to the NPP manufacturing site in Rostov sponsored by Rosatom, I was able to witness the progress of these including the units that will be transported to Kudankulam.

More fundamentally, while the two leaders highlighted the tried and tested nature of their partnership, in truth India-Russia ties have been lately going through a rough patch. For more than a decade now, the bilateral relationship has been characterized by increasing strains.

Several factors have contributed to it. For one, in the wake of the Ukraine crisis in 2013, it is clear that Russia wanted China’s support because China’s opinion carries greater weight globally than India’s. This is evident in the continued strategic outreach efforts made by Russia towards China, further reflected in a number of strategic agreements between Moscow and Beijing. The manner in which Putin in 2013 rapidly wrapped up an agreement on natural gas sale to China for 30 years – negotiations that had been dragging on for a decade – was a reflection of Moscow’s eagerness to work with China. This was over and above the earlier deals in 2009 and 2013 for the sale of oil on a long-term basis.

But far more consequential is the Russian sale of weapons systems to China that have direct security implications for India. Moscow’s sale of Su-30 30MKK/MK2 fighters and especially the Su-35 are likely to have an immediate and tangible impact on the Sino-Indian military balance and India’s security. Then there is the sale of S-400 long-range anti-aircraft missiles, which China is reportedly already deploying, though it seems like India may get the same system too.

Second, India’s efforts at diversifying its defense procurement and thus bringing in other partners such as the United States, Israel, and France has also impacted the relations. In the absence of a strong bilateral economic and trade relationship, India-Russia relations must have a robust defense ties and any downgrading of those ties could have adverse impact on the overall state of India-Russia ties. Till a few years ago, India’s largest defense trade partner was Russia, but Israel and the United States have overtaken Russia in the last few years.

Even so, India’s defense inventory continues to be dominated by Soviet/Russian systems, to the tune of close to 70 percent. Also, when it comes to certain critical platforms such as nuclear submarines, Russia’s importance cannot be understated. Therefore, as India engages in the process of diversifying its defense trade partners, perception management and explaining the rationale and imperative to Russia will go a long way in assuaging Moscow’s concerns about India’s leanings.

Third and possibly the most significant has been India’s growing proximity to the United States. Driven by fear of China, India has grown strategically closer to Washington in recent years, though lately New Delhi’s foreign policy leaning may appear a lot more confused. Prime Minister Modi’s Shangri-La Dialogue speech earlier this month in Singapore was a good reflection of this.

These three developments have dampened bilateral relations between India and Russia. For India, the critical question is whether Russia will stand by India in any dispute with China. Moscow’s stand during last year’s Doklam crisis did not inspire much confidence in New Delhi. On the other hand, New Delhi understands that it cannot afford to drive Moscow into Beijing’s hands. Any strategic partnership between Russia and China does not augur well for India. Whether India can do much about this is unclear, but New Delhi is definitely trying.