Confronting India’s Nuclear Regulation Challenge - The Diplomat, 23 March 2020

In my last week's column for The Diplomat, I focused on India's continuing nuclear regulation challenge, where I argue that New Delhi needs to pay more attention to this aspect of its nuclear policy.

India plans to increase the share of nuclear power in the overall energy mix by more than three times from the current share by 2021. While India has impressive plans to expand its nuclear sector, it also needs to pay more attention to issues such as regulation of the industry.

For the full essay, click here.



Earlier in March, India’s Minister of State for Personnel, Public Grievances, and Pensions and Prime Minister’s Office, Dr. Jitendra Singh, publicized this while responding to a question in the Lok Sabha (lower house) of the Indian Parliament. Dr. Singh said that the current installed nuclear power capacity is 6,780 MW, which makes up around 1.84 percent of the total installed capacity of 368,690 MW. He said that the existing capacity of 6,780 MW will be augmented to 22,480 MW by 2031 by undertaking “progressive completion of projects under construction and accorded sanction.”

He added that there will be a capacity addition of 5,300 MW in the next five years, including a 500 MW Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) being constructed at the Madras Atomic Power Station in Kalpakkam, India and implemented by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Ltd. (BHAVINI). In an earlier debate in the Lok Sabha in June 2019, Singh had said that the installed nuclear power capacity would reach 13,480 MW by 2024-25 with the completion of certain projects.

In a November 2019 debate in the Lok Sabha on India’s nuclear energy target, the government stated that it has instituted several measures for increasing the share of nuclear power in its overall energy matrix, including the “administrative approval and financial sanction” of 10 indigenous 700 MW Pressurized Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs), with a further two Light Water Reactors (LWRs) to be set up in cooperation with Russia. In addition, India had also set up the nuclear insurance pool (INIP) to deal with private sector concerns about India’s nuclear liability bill. India’s Atomic Energy Commission has approved 10 additional uranium mining projects, and further two related projects will come up in Jharkhand.

While these are important steps, the Modi government has been silent about a related issue: that of nuclear security-related legislation or institutional measures. Nuclear safety and security are particularly important for India given the political instability and security environment that prevails in the region. India rightly acknowledged this even before global attention on the issue following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States.

India has also streamlined much of its legislative and institutional practices based on the international guidelines and standards set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). India’s nuclear safety measures have been periodically updated to reflect the changing security concerns. In February 2020, in a statement in the Indian Parliament, Singh reiterated that India “ensures safety of Nuclear Power Plants according to International Standards.”

Nevertheless, India has come under international scrutiny when it comes to its nuclear security standards. This has been the case primarily because India has shied away from openly spelling out its nuclear security policies and practices. Excessive secrecy has actually damaged India’s reputation on this score. Even more importantly, India should take the issue seriously because of its own plans to expand nuclear power generation capacity. This could at some stage also involve private sector participation and it would be better for the government to spell out the rules and regulatory mechanisms.

This is not just a concern expressed by the global nuclear community but also by India’s Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG), which has been critical of the relationship between India’s current nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), and the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). There have been several studies that highlight the need for India to address this is in a more effective manner, so as to strengthen its own security practices but also to improve its international standing.

The government of India has acknowledged the need to address this issue as well. In September 2011, the Manmohan Singh government introduced the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill in an effort to establish a more independent nuclear regulator. However, it was not taken up over the next three years and the bill lapsed. There was expectation that the Modi government would reintroduce the bill and kick-start a debate in the Parliament but there is no sign yet of this happening.

The NSRA Bill is important because it would be a significant improvement over the current AERB regulatory architecture. It would establish a Council of Nuclear Safety (CNS) under the leadership of the prime minister himself. While there are critics of this as well, it is still an important demonstration of the government’s resolve to have a truly independent nuclear regulator. It is important in operational terms as well, in bringing about more stringent auditing practices. In terms of the optics, it would be good that the promoter and regulator of nuclear energy are separated.

This is not difficult for India to do because it has operationalized many of the essential components in ensuring this separation, be it in addressing physical protection, nuclear transportation, or insider threats. But India needs to formalize these changes in a new nuclear legislation in the Parliament so as to strengthen its own credibility and operational practices. India should also take its international reputation seriously in order to strengthen its case with global nonproliferation platforms such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Lastly, India should recognize that no country has a completely fool-proof mechanism and it should not get excessively defensive about its nuclear security policies and practices. More importantly, India has a good record to promote, and a number of developing countries look at India as a model to emulate.

But India’s apparent discomfort in acknowledging its own nuclear security successes and challenges and engaging with the larger global nuclear community can be stifling for New Delhi in beefing up global nuclear security approaches. India must start the NSRA debate in the Parliament as a first step to improve itself. But it also provides a new opportunity for enhancing India’s status now that the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process has come to an end.

Why India’s Nuclear Security Challenge Demands Attention - July 5, 2018

In last week's piece for the Diplomat, "Why India’s Nuclear Security Challenge Demands Attention," I looked at thee urgent need for India to tackle one area in nuclear security - its nuclear regulator. The government for close to a decade has been planning to get a Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill passed in the Parliament that would replace the current Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and also establish a Council of Nuclear Safety (CNS) under the leadership of the Prime Minister. The Bill was originally tabled in the Parliament in 2011 which lapsed in 2014 as the country went into general elections. It is four years since the Modi Government came into office but the Bill is yet to be introduced.

For the full essay, click here.



Nuclear security has been a key issue for India for several decades, well before the world started paying greater attention to the subject after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Given the kind of neighborhood that India is in, securing nuclear and radiological materials from a range of internal and external challenges has remained a major preoccupation.

Such concerns shaped the Indian approach, which took the form of a number of institutional and legal measures, some of which go back to the 1960s. These measures have been periodically revised to adapt to the changing threat environment. Though the likelihood of an attack on a nuclear facility may be remote, the impact of such an attack could potentially be horrendous. This has led to greater official Indian attention leading to better interface between policy, regulation, and technology to implement a more effective security practice.

Even so, India is lagging in one area: the regulation of India’s nuclear sector. For example, India’s nuclear regulator, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB), is not entirely independent of the Department of Atomic Energy, calling into question the independence of the AERB.

One critical step to address this has been the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) Bill that was initially tabled in the Indian Parliament in September 2011. The bill would have created a more independent nuclear regulator. However, with the country going into general elections, that bill lapsed and is yet to be reintroduced in the Parliament. The BJP government has not shown much inclination in attending to the NSRA bill, though it is critical of it for several reasons.

That is unfortunate. The passing of the bill and its consequences at home and abroad would be a major boost for India’s nuclear security. At home, setting up the NSRA would demonstrate the independence of its nuclear regulator, and that would certainly only improve the formulation of India’s nuclear security policies and practices. These additional steps are not difficult to establish either. India has already been practicing many additional measures, be it physical protection, nuclear transportation, or insider threats. However, India has yet to streamline these in a proper framework that is in line with international standards.

Abroad, India’s policies and the steps that it takes, especially on nuclear safety and security issues, are critical in strengthening India’s case for integration into the global non-proliferation architecture. As India once again makes its case for membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in the December plenary, there is an opportunity for New Delhi to showcase its efforts in this regard.

India’s officialdom needs to understand that no country has a fool-proof security regime but as in nuclear safety, nuclear security regime will continually evolve and improve. In that context, taking up and passing the NSRA bill indeed will have positive impact both internally and externally. Internally, it will only improve the security, safety and regulatory practices. Externally, it is critical to strengthen India’s nuclear security credentials among the larger global nuclear community.

The sad part is that India does have a good story to tell when it comes to nuclear security policies and practices. What India seems to lack is the self-confidence about its own achievements in nuclear safety and security and be willing to engage and learn from others as well. India has an opportunity to take the lead especially since the Nuclear Security Summit process has come to an end.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken some initiatives, such as announcing that that India will be hosting a WMD Terrorism Summit in 2018. Not much has been heard about the summit since the announcement but it is believed that India might be holding the Summit sometime early next year. With election around the corner, its prospects, along with that of the NSRA, remain in doubt.

This is why it is essential that before its term ends, the Modi government must go ahead and table the NSRA bill. In addition to replacing the AERB, the bill seeks to establish a Council of Nuclear Safety (CNS) under the leadership of the Prime Minister. This is a significant improvement over the existing AERB structure.

Of course, there are issues with how things will move forward. There are still many who question the independence and autonomy of the regulator even with a new NSRA. In response, the Modi Government undertook a series of inter-ministerial meetings to write a new draft of the NSRA bill back in 2015, but it is yet to see daylight.

But the fact remains that in whatever form an NSRA Bill is introduced, it will still be a big step forward in having a legally autonomous nuclear regulator, similar to ones that exist in countries like France, the United Kingdom and the United States. The key question now is whether this government will prioritize nuclear security and take up the Bill before the next general election.

Seeking Nuclear Legitimacy, my article on India's nuclear security policy...

Here's my short essay on India's nuclear security policy, particularly in the backdrop of India's NSG membership talks... I make two points here: one, even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. two, for many of the NSG members, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

The annual meeting of the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was recently concluded in Buenos Aires, where India's membership issue was discussed with no clear answer. Several countries, including the US, UK, France have remained supportive of India's membership although countries such as China, among a few others, have remained opposed to the Indian membership issue. It is in the interests of India to be part of the NSG if it has to be able to shape the new non-proliferation architecture and exercise a greater say in how the global rules are played. For the international community as well, it is beneficial to have India inside the tent than outside.

Nuclear security has become an important concern for the global community. The threat of nuclear terrorism, including the so-called 'dirty bomb', has continued to increase over the last decade. The need for strengthening the current international mechanisms and establishing new rules if necessary is growing. Recognising the importance of the problem, the global community has held three 'nuclear security summits' which focused just on this problem. India has a lot to contribute to this effort, but we are being stymied by misperception about our own efforts in the nuclear security arena.

For India too, this is an important issue. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister participated in the first two nuclear security summits indicates the importance of this issue to India. New Delhi worries that one of the various terrorists groups in the region, especially those in Pakistan, might acquire some type of nuclear capacity.

While acquisition of nuclear materials and capabilities is not easy given the tight security around facilities and installations, the potential for such should not be ruled out. Accordingly, India has instituted strong measures around nuclear safety and security, which is at par with some of the other major nuclear powers. Analysts have been critical of India's policies and practices, but the reality is that India put in place both its institutional and legal architecture way back in the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously, there have been structural changes as well as amendments brought to these instruments in recognition of new threats and risks. In the backdrop of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks, the potential to carry out commando style attack or a sabotage by Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba is very real and India has to gear up its response mechanisms in a focused manner. Therefore, while terrorism is not a new phenomenon to India given its geographical proximity to global terrorism, it has to plan its response and contingency measures well. The ability to respond quickly and effectively, bringing together all the different agencies involved, will be a major challenge. While various agencies do periodic scenario building and exercises to test their response capabilities, mock drills involving all agencies are done very rarely.

International cooperation is particularly important given the nature of new challenges facing India in this regard. Even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. To a great extent, the consensus has been that we need not be so open in the area of nuclear safety and security. This may have served India's interests to a limited extent so far.

However, as India's interests grow and it makes efforts to integrate with the international nuclear community, its ability to shape the new non-proliferation architecture will depend to a large extent how open it is about its policies and postures. No one is arguing for total transparency wherein our security may be put to risk, but a more pro-active engagement and outlining of our broad approach might do India some good. Having said that, it should also be acknowledged that there has been some effort recently to outline India's nuclear security approach and what different measures India has taken to secure its nuclear facilities and installations. For instance, a report authored by the Ministry of External Affairs lays out in detail the structures and practices that India has adopted in the area of nuclear security.

Despite India having an elaborate system in place, the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) Nuclear Security Index 2014 has clubbed India along with countries that have extremely poor track record in nuclear security. How seriously should this be taken up? Should an attempt by a think tank to quantify this issue be accorded any importance? This question pops up in the backdrop of India trying to garner support for membership into major technology export control regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It should be important that other countries know what we do, in terms of our internal practices but also what we do in the international realm, particularly with bodies such the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

There is little that one could do if groups such as the NTI come with a pre-judged position on India's nuclear security policies and practices. To counter such perceptions, not only must India put in place a lot of institutions and practices but also advertise to the world what it is doing. This is important when we are seeking membership of various nuclear clubs and because we need others' cooperation on a number of nuclear-related issues. Having said that, for many, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

India can consider a few steps that might strengthen its image on this issue among the larger nuclear community. One, India's nuclear doctrine could be elucidated further and updated as a means of bringing about more clarity. This may be something that the Modi government could contemplate upon. Such measures could also be used as important tools of international messaging. Two, India could issue detailed position papers and statement at important forums like the Nuclear Security Summit and such other platforms. Three, India should communicate to the international community by using different platforms to share its perspectives and concerns. For instance, participation in international conferences, which are many a time effectively Track 1.5 platforms, are a way to garner greater support while pro-actively shaping the global discourse. India on many occasions does not appreciate the significance of such platforms and whether intended or not, it has lost out on several opportunities to effect impact. India must take corrective steps in this regard sooner than later. India's establishment of the GCNEP has gone a long way to strengthen its credibility in the area of nuclear security. India could consider additional steps, including possibly establishing a CTBT Monitoring Station, which would be seen as a positive contribution to monitoring non-proliferation challenges in the region and beyond. All this could go a long way in correcting international misperception of India in the nuclear non-proliferation and security arena.