#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.

Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.

The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race? - The Diplomat, 1 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the global impact of the end of the INF Treaty, "Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race?." I argue that the end of INF will have strategic implications well beyond Russia and the United States.

On August 2, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral arms control treaty originally signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia), will end. U.S. President Donald Trump had announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty six months back, and the withdrawal period is about to end.

While the focus of the INF Treaty itself was on the United States and Russia, is likely to have a much broader impact than just between the two countries. The INF Treaty was seen as having the ability to bring about a semblance of stability much beyond Washington and Moscow. Now there are growing concerns that this will give rise to a new arms race.

For the full essay, click here.



The 1987 INF Treaty saw the United States and the Soviet Union agree to remove an entire class of weapons – nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including Soviet SS-20s and the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Based on the commitments made in the treaty, the two countries destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by June 1, 1991, the treaty implementation deadline. This is the only nuclear arms control treaty that eliminated an entire class of existing weapons.

The Trump announcement of the U.S. intent to leave the treaty came about after repeated reports of Russian breaches of its INF commitments. The Russian breaches are not new. The complaints had been around under the Obama administration, for instance, when Russia developed a new cruise missile, the 9M729 (NATO name: SSC-8). NATO has also remained concerned about the treaty breaches. In fact, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “the ‘ongoing Russian violation’ was the only reason the 1987 treaty was under threat.”

Russia of course denied that they were violating any commitment made under the INF Treaty. A senior Russian official is reported to have said that it is not in violation of any commitment and that the missile 9M729 is within the INF range limit of 500 kilometers. In fact, a Russian commander, General Mikhail Matveyevsky has reportedly stated that its maximum flight range is 480 km.

There are concerns within the United States and outside about the impact of the treaty withdrawal. U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (a Democrat from New Jersey), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said that withdrawing without a follow-on treaty taking the place of the INF is a recipe for an arms race. Menendez argues that “Russia will clearly spend money on updating and amplifying its weapons systems.”

Yes, Russia might respond by building more INF-range missiles. But it is important to identify another key reason for the U.S. walkout from the treaty — China. One key problem facing the INF Treaty has been the development and deployment of a large number of missiles by China, which is not a member of the treaty and therefore not bound by its terms. That has had the effect of changing the military balance in East Asia and beyond. In fact, in October last year, Trump had said, “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us, and China comes to us, and they all come to us and they say ‘let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.’ If Russia’s doing it, and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.”

There is substance to all of this. A recent U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report detailing the Chinese missile inventory highlights that it has “more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, approximately 95 percent of which, according to US officials, would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.” So, there are genuine security concerns that have driven the U.S. withdrawal, which will also mean that any future arms control initiative can get off the ground under the Trump administration only if China actively participates in it.

China remains concerned about the ending of the INF Treaty. Their worries stem from the fact that this could lead to the United States deploying conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia, which could further force China to increase its own inventory. Experts warn that with the United States becoming free to now deploy INF-range missiles in Asia, “the development of Chinese missiles is likely to rapidly accelerate.” But as long as China continues its unimpeded development of missiles, the United States, Russia, and even India might be compelled to build up their own inventories, which points to the possibility of a budding arms race.

Japan, which will also be affected by such an arms race, had suggested a multilateral successor to the INF, but China is categorical that it will not be party to such initiatives. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, said that the INF “is a bilateral deal between Russia and the United States. If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will influence a whole range of complex political, military, and legal issues…. The Chinese side does not give its consent.” As for suggestions on a possible trilateral agreement involving the U.S., Russia and China, Beijing was once again firm in saying no. China is reported to have said that “the premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations do not exist at all, and China will never participate in them.”

To be sure, this might just be an initial bargaining tactic. But if not, a new post-INF arms race may be in the offing, this time encompassing Asia too. That will have implications for the wider Indo-Pacific region, and developments in this regard will be critical to watch.