a recent interview of mine on the new Chinese defence White Paper....

Here's a recent interview of mine on the new Chinese defence White Paper, conducted yesterday.

There may have some minor improvements in terms of giving some information on the PLA strength, this does not include the PAP, the militia or the Second Artillery Force (SAF). Information on the SAF is fairly important as they are in charge of China's missiles and strategic weapons.




Type rest of the post here

Chinese Defence White Paper: An Initial Assessment

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the just released Chinese Defence White Paper.

China's defence White Paper, titled China's National Defense in 2010, the seventh in the series, was published on March 31, 2011. Does the White Paper bring out anything new? The answer may be a "No" given that it has continued reiterating the same positions on all of these issues. Because of criticism of lack of transparency on security issues, China has decided to come out with these white papers but unfortunately it sheds no new light on the PLA, its objectives or the military modernization. While it remains an important CBM measure, the suspicions about the long term intentions of Beijing can be hardly wished away with the publication of these white papers. The White Paper is essentially what the Chinese want the world to believe what they are doing. Therefore, if China is serious about reducing the regional suspicion about its rise, it has to do something more meaningful.



Underlying the fact that the momentum for economic globalization and multi-polar world are irreversible, the White Paper identifies a few challenges as it outlines its security environment. The "intermittent tension" on the Korean Peninsula and the unraveling security scenario in Afghanistan are seen as major concerns, and the White Paper argues that the Asia-Pacific security has become "more intricate and volatile." Occasional disputes and flare-ups over undemarcated territorial issues and maritime rights have been mentioned as issues contributing to the volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific though thereis no mention of the recent incidents at sea, fuelled by Chinese naval actions.2 The presence of external powers in China's extended neighbourhood - the US and its strengthened regional partnerships -is an issue for Beijing. However, China claims that it is still in "the period of important strategic opportunities for its development," and therefore the idea of cooperating with major traditional powers and new emerging powers, along with good neighbourly relationship, is seen as something Beijing must continue with for mutual benefits. While acknowledging relations with the United States as significant and as a stabilizing tool, Beijing does not mince its words in criticizing Washington for its alliance-kind of relationship, particularly the military sales to the region.

Describing its national defense policy as purely defensive, the White Paper sets out four critical tasks for its armed forces: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. It further details its strategy as adhering to "the principles of independence and self-defense by the whole nation" and is essentially for maintaining the territorial integrity of its land border, territorial sea and air defenses. China has also begun to emphasize on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), again a theme that began with the last defense White Paper. Beijing argues that there is an increased role for its armed forces on a range of missions, from disaster management missions to riot control to search and rescue operations given the penetrating nature of non-traditional security threats faced by Asia today.

On the modernization of national defense capabilities, the White Paper argues that the PLA is modernizing its forces and equipment "with mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, while making extensive use of its achievements in information technology, and stepping up the composite and integrated development of mechanization and informationization." Talking of PLA modernization, it emphasizes shifting from a "manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive model." The document mentions the formation of new types of combat forces,without divulging much detail. There is also the modernization of the artillery forces - with the introduction of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles- for undertaking important military maneuvers - "to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities." In addition, the PLA Army aviation wing has made significant changes to its role and function - moving away from being a support arm to being a main-battle assault force. Air power has been given a lot of emphasis evident from the upgradation undertaken in its armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, thereby making marked differences in its ability to move and support infantry forces, force projection as well as extending support role in various missions.

There has been marked progress on the naval front as well. Introduction of new submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels in support of China's offshore defense strategy or "Far Sea Defense Strategy" as stated by Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in April last year.3 Accordingly, PLA Navy plans construction of new support bases in order to strengthen the shore-based support system while complementing the deployment of forces and development of weaponry and equipment. This suggests the future intentions of the Navy to project power beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

However, the most significant pronouncement has been regarding the role of the PLA Air Force - to meet "the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations." The Air Force is projected to have important roles in the coming years that emphasizes "air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection," while improving its "leadership and command system for an informationized, networked base support system."Similarly, it has been training on various scenarios involving extensive electromagnetic environment, recognizing the importance of these in future warfare scenarios. Similarly, there has been major push for modernizing its Second Artillery Force with an objective of sharpening their capabilities for "rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations."

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need to accelerate the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment for undertaking the above-mentioned missions and goals. Accordingly, it has strengthened "the retrofitting and management of existing equipment, and promoting the composite development of mechanized and informationized weaponry and equipment."

Additionally, the White Paper discusses defence expenditure and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation involves a range of issues from joint military exercises and training to strengthening cooperation as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Confidence building measures are also discussed for maintaining social stability and non-proliferation and arms control issues.

Rising Chinese Power: A Common Agenda in India-Australia Dialogue?

While the recent attacks against Indian students in Australia will top Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna’s agenda in Canberra, India should not lose sight of certain strategic imperatives that could potentially drive the two countries to a closer partnership. Can a rising Chinese power emerge as a striking imperative between New Delhi and Canberra in the coming years?



Joel Fitzgibbon, in the preface to the 2009 Defence White Paper titled, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, noted that the “biggest changes to our outlook … have been the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar movement.”
The white paper added that Chinese rise in the economic, political and military spheres and the resultant regional military modernisation have triggered significant concerns in Australia. More specifically, the defence white paper noted that the Chinese military modernisation could “affect the strategic reach and global postures of the major powers.” It added that the Chinese military will also be the strongest in Asia, with significant margin and will have power projection as one of its major features. The “pace, scope and structure” of such modernisation, the white paper notes, can trigger concern among the Asian neighbours, unless China undertakes some serious confidence building measures among these neighbours. The more serious worry for Australia is the implication of a reduced US strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific that would trigger regional powers to shoulder their own security. These concerns are reflected in a series of research essays and analyses in Australia looking carefully at the growing Chinese power and more importantly at how that power will be used or what kind of an international player would China turn out to be.
The 2007 Australian National Security Report had also highlighted concerns about China. It stated that “the pace and scope of China’s military modernisation, particularly the development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, could create misunderstandings and instability in the region.” However Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, during his recent visit to Beijing, backtracked a bit, saying that Chinese military modernisation programme was not a threat and that Australia’s support of an anti-ballistic missile defence system being developed by the US and Japan was directed at “rogue states” such as North Korea and non-state actors and not at China. He also had to reassure his hosts that India was not being included in any emerging coalition, something that appears to be particularly bothering Beijing.
In the case of Australia, there appears to be significant difference between the intelligence agencies and the policy makers, particularly the defence department. The intelligence agencies appear to be going along with a more benign China (“the growth of an ‘engaged’ China”) as opposed to the defence department that visualizes “inevitable collisions” as China becomes more powerful.
India also has concerns about China. Although economic ties between the two countries have improved significantly, there is a significant gap between the two countries on politico-strategic affairs and the evolving Asian security framework. While the rise of China has created ripples in India, the most worrying has been the pace of its military modernisation and the secrecy that shrouds it. There have been concerns also about the decision-making process in China. The military leadership in China sometimes appears to have an agenda of its own as was witnessed in a few cases in the recent past. More importantly, decision-making during crises is almost a prerogative of the military leadership. This will have adverse implications particularly for countries like India, US, Japan, Australia and Russia.
Another concern stems from the uncertainty of a more powerful China It is not certain whether the China’s rise would lead to a period of stability or be one with destabilising consequences for the region and the world at large. This fear arises from the fact that China has pursued an aggressive military modernisation, much beyond its stated objective of defending against external intervention in Taiwan. While China has continued to argue that its military modernisation and capability building are geared towards a crisis on the Taiwan Straits, its ambitions could go well beyond that, as several recent reports show, including the Australian defence White Paper. There have been many reports of China developing an aircraft carrier. Reports also show that China has deployed new missile units outfitted with conventional theatre-range missiles at various locations in China that could be operationalised in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies, which has implications for India. Similarly, the missile re-organisation that China undertook in July 2007 is noteworthy. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), satellite photographs reveal the deployment of the DF-21 medium-range missiles at Delingha, which could put at risk all of northern India, including New Delhi. These missiles could potentially target Russian ICBM fields, although it is reasonably certain that China does not intend to target Russia. There have also been significant improvements in China’s AWACS capabilities (Air-borne Early Warning and Control) and aerial-refuelling programmes.
In the long-term, the increasing Chinese defence expenditure and its military modernization could give China arena capacity to dominate Asia. These trends also suggest that other powers need to be cautious in estimating the consequences of China’s rise. Rise of new powers have altered the security milieu historically. However, if the rising power indicates that its intentions are peaceful and defensive, essentially through its defence/military postures, this could reduce the suspicion and thereby help create a peaceful region. This has not been the case with China. China has exhibited ambitions to form a Greater China comprising of the Mainland, a politically and economically integrated Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macau.
If these trends continue, rising Chinese power could possibly become the biggest strategic imperative for both India and Australia to strengthen their strategic partnership. Although the earlier efforts in terms of quadrilateral initiative have died, it might be in the interest of like-minded countries to join their hands together in cementing a stable and peaceful order in Asia. It may also be worth the effort to see how China can be brought into the camp through CBMs, particularly in the military-security arena.

Chinese Defence White Paper: Highlights

This analysis on the Chinese defence White Paper first appeared on the ORF website.

China released its latest defence white paper titled, “China’s National Defense in 2008” on January 21, 2009. While categorical and specific about the threats and challenges that China faces today, it says that there are “long-term and complicated threats” that are more general. The long-term challenges cover all aspects: “existence security” and development security, traditional security threats and non-traditional security threats, and domestic security and international security which the report sees as interdependent in nature. The specific challenges that are highlighted include Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet, all issues of Chinese national integration. Ministry of Defense Spokesman Colonel Hu Changming, while releasing the report stated that the separatist moves by these three forces “form a major security threat to the unity of the nation and a challenge to our security organs,” and in the case of Taiwan, the issue is further complicated by US arms sales, which China opposes vehemently.



The white paper outlines that China is “pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy solely aimed at protecting its territory and people, and endeavouring to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.” The report also makes the point that while major powers are increasing the level of cooperation and drawing on each other’s strengths, they continue “to compete with and hold each other in check.” Identifying the challenges and difficulties, it says that there is an intensification of struggle for strategic resources, strategic locations and strategic dominance, along with hegemonism and power politics continuing with new power blocs emerging.

China continues to reiterate that its defence policy is purely defensive in nature, although it contradicts itself to state that it implements a military strategy of active defense.[1] According to the report, China formulated a military strategic guideline of active defense keeping in tune with the changes in international security as well as the concepts of warfare. One China scholar, Andrew Scobell, describes the Chinese strategic culture as a result of the “interplay between Confucian and Realpolitik strands.”[2] He in fact has coined the term “Cult of Defense” in which the Chinese elites believe that their country is pacifist, non-expansionist and purely defensive, but simultaneously be able to justify any use of force, including offensive and pre-emptive strikes and consider them defensive in nature. The aspect of offensive operations is another evidence of the continued relevance of Sun Tzu’s in the Chinese military strategy.[3]

Some of the key aspects highlighted in the white paper are informationization, training and jointness.

According to the report, informationization of the Chinese defense and armed forces is a key goal for China, for which it actively promotes the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) with Chinese characteristics. Making national defense building an “organic part of its social and economic development,” China is making efforts to balance between social & economic development and the military needs and in fact making the military and civilian forces compatible with and beneficial to each other, particularly in peacetime. China also has strategized plans to “lay a solid foundation” in its endeavour towards “national defense and armed forces building,” complete mechanization process and make significant progress towards informationization by 2020, and achieve a scale of modernisation of their forces by the middle of the century.[4] As part of reforming the PLA, China believes that it is essential to accelerate the processes of mechanization and informationization, improve training under conditions of informationization, advance innovation in military theory, technology, organisation and management, continuously increase core military capability of winning local wars under conditions of informationization as well as strengthening the capability to conduct MOOTW (military operations other than war). MOOTW has been introduced as an important “form of applying national military forces”; this would particularly be important under the concept of local wars in an informationalized scenario.

Training has been given particular emphasis in augmenting the overall fighting capabilities of the forces. In this regard, China reiterates the need to intensify strategic- and operational-level command post training and training in conditions of informationization, night training, integrated exercises for logistical and equipment support, on-base training and simulated training, web-based training, training with opposing players and training complex electromagnetic environments. The training evaluation mechanism as well as the standards of training is reported to have been improved. Training for jointness and on informationized platforms is seen as the key.

Logistics reform is another area that has been highlighted in the white paper. Upgradation of the logistical support and deepening the logistics reform are important objectives in this regard. Carrying it to the next level, the Jinan (Military) Theater in April 2007 formally adopted the joint logistics system based on the integration of tri-service logistical support. The leadership clearly sees the crucial importance of this in achieving tri-service integration and jointness in their operations. Maintaining that integrated joint operations are the way of the future, the PLA has established an army equipment system with high mobility and three-dimensional assault, a naval equipment system with integrated sea-air capabilities for offshore defensive operations, an air force equipment system with integrated air-land capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations, a surface-to-surface missile equipment system for the Second Artillery Force with both nuclear and conventional missiles, and an electronic information equipment system featuring systems integration and joint development. The white paper states that progress has been achieved in the field of command and control systems for integrated joint operations, which has improved the capability of battlefield information support in a significant manner. Main battle weapon systems are believed to have been informationized to a great extent, with particular focus on rapid detection, target location, friend-or-foe identification and precision strikes.[5]

China has also focused on the upgradation of weapons and equipment systems, with emphasis on MOOTW. PLA has been building new types of submarines, destroyers, frigates and aircraft, forming a preliminary weaponry and equipment system with second-generation equipment as the core and the third generation as the backbone. According to the report, the submarine force has underwater anti-ship, anti-submarine and mine-laying capabilities, as well as some nuclear counterattack capabilities. The surface ship force has developed a surface striking force represented by new types of missile destroyers and frigates, and has maritime reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine, air-defense, mine-laying and other operational capabilities. The aviation wing has developed an air striking force represented by sea-attack aircraft, and possesses reconnaissance, anti-ship, anti-submarine and air-defense operational capabilities. The Marine Corps has developed an amphibious operational force represented by amphibious armoured vehicles, and possesses amphibious operational capabilities.[6] Lastly, the coastal defense force is represented by new types of shore-to-ship missiles and possesses high coastal defense operations capability. China has also been building new ship bases, berthing areas, supply points, docks and airfields. Recently, a new naval base was discovered in Sanya on Hainan Island, which could house a large fleet of surface warships, and also serve as an underground base for submarines. The location is indeed critical as it will let China extend a greater influence in the South China Sea area besides allowing it greater access to the critical Straits of Malacca, while enabling China to have a larger naval presence closer to important sea lanes.[7] This development has certainly upped the ante for several countries including Japan, South Korea, India and the US. Housing of nuclear and non-nuclear submarines in Sanya, so close to the ASEAN region will also go against the 1996 Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty.

As a rising superpower, China can be expected eventually to seek sufficient capabilities for a sea control strategy, but clearly, China is decades away from such capabilities. The continued significance of an aircraft carrier[8] in the PLA’s strategic thinking comes out essentially from its objectives of sea control and sea denial as also the recognition that air superiority is essential in future combat, besides for power projection purposes, which was evident when PLA officials told visiting US Commanders that “there is no more prominent and visible signal of a nation’s resolve and might than an aircraft carrier coming into a port.”[9]

Similar has been the efforts made by the ground forces, moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, making its units small, modular and multi-functional and has stepped up the development of aviation, light mechanised and information countermeasure forces, prioritised the development of operational and tactical missile, ground-to-air missiles, in order to improve capabilities for air-ground integrated operations, long distance manoeuvres, rapid assaults and special operations. In a similar manner, the Air Force has been improving its equipment and weapon systems, with the development of new types of fighters, air and anti-missile defense weapons, and command automation systems, which will increase the air forces’s capability to undertake both offensive and defensive operations. Lastly, the most important arm of the PLA, the Second Artillery Force too has kept up with upgradation, logistical reforms and innovations, suited to informationized warfare.

While China reiterates that it is separatism – Taiwan, East Turkistan and Tibet -- that is the major challenge, its concepts of warfare and capability upgradation go well beyond meeting these challenges. The report once again highlights the Chinese intention to become a global power by the middle of the century.
[1] Mao’s People War and Deng Xiaoping’s local war concepts continue to be guiding factors in China’s military strategy even as it modernizes its forces. The white paper states, “China is striving to make innovations in the content and forms of people’s war, exploring new approaches of the people in participating in warfare and support for the front, and developing new strategies and tactics for people’s war in conditions of informationization.” Themes like active defense and local wars also have been modified keeping in tune with the changes in modern warfare. Even while modernizing its warfare concepts, China continues to emphasize the “people” aspect, saying that “China always relies on the people to build national defense and the armed forces, combines a lean standing force with a powerful reserve force.” Significant changes were brought in the Chinese military strategy after the 1991 Gulf War where the PLA recognised the importance of fighting a ‘modern war under high technology conditions.’ See, Y. Ji, “The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China’s Strategic Thinking,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 21, no. 3, December 1999, p. 353, cited in Dennis Woodward, “The People’s Liberation Army: a Threat to India?,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 2, June 2003, p. 231.
[2] Andrew Scobell, “China and Strategic Culture” (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College: Carlisle, PA, May 2002), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub60.pdf.
[3] Sun Tzu in his Art of War stated, “Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.” See, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Foreword by James Clavell (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 1981), p. 23.
[4] Chinese military is the world’s largest military force, with the largest standing army (approx. 2.25 million strong), with well-established five wings – PLA Army, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, Second Artillery Corps and PLA Reserved Force. Chinese defence expenditure for 2008 stood at 417.77 billion yuan, which is a rise of 62.379 billion yuan from the previous year’s actual spending, a 17.6 per cent increase. China is the world’s fourth largest military spender after the US, UK, and France, but in PPP terms (which is more relevant), China stands second at $188.2 bn after the US which spends $528.7 bn. Consistent with global changes taking place in defence science & technology and weaponry, Chinese military has maintained the pace in its modernisation too. Yet, China believes that it will be able to lay a strong foundation only by 2010.
[5] These have become of particular focus to the Chinese since the first Gulf War. Some of their tanks, artillery pieces, ships and aircraft are believed to be informationized, new types of informationized platforms are being developed and the ratio and number of precision-guided munitions are also on the rise. China, since 1991, has been in the process of development/procurement of precision-guided weapons, improvement of command and control structures as well as the non-conventional methods of warfare like electronic warfare, use of ultra-sonic weapons, laser weapons, stealth weapons, ultrahigh frequency weapons, and electromagnetic guns. The PLA is also believed to be designing a three-tier (land, sea and air) defence system for “outer detection and implicit warning, intermediate interception, and inner denial, including the lethal use of force against intruders.” See, Kenneth Lieberthal, “How Domestic Forces Shape the PRC’s Grand Strategy and International Impact,” Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2007-08 (Washington D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2007), p.61.
[6] China has improved its amphibious capabilities in the recent years, with Beijing conducting more than a dozen such exercises in the last decade or so, with several exercises focusing on a Taiwan scenario. Given the logistics-intensive nature of these operations, and the need to have air and sea superiority, the probability of the Chinese venturing into amphibious operations against the Taiwanese is unlikely. However, the fact remains that China has significantly beefed up its capabilities in this regard.
[7] The new satellite images that are available now reveal cave openings around the Sanya base that can house up to at least eight submarines. It is also believed that there is space for a supported underground structure that could have more than 20 submarines. See, Richard Fisher, Jr., “China’s Naval Secrets,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 05, 2008, available at http://www.strategycenter.net/printVersion/print_pub.asp?pubID=185. See also, “Japan urges greater Chinese transparency on military plans,” AFP, May 31, 2008, available at http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gjnjcMWGDOTstNWHZOU8dwzg7nYw.
[8] There were media reports towards the middle of 2007 that China had given contracts to few Chinese companies for the development of systems and components for the aircraft carrier. Further, towards the end of the year, there was another media report, citing Xu Guangyu, an analyst and director of the government-backed China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, saying that it has almost been decided that the Chinese navy will build aircraft carriers. See, “China: Construction of An Aircraft Carrier,” ABC Radio Australia, July 11, 2007, available at http://www.abc.net.au/ra/connectasia/stories/s1975537.htm and http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html. Earlier, in 1997, Hong Kong media had reported Chinese plans to acquire a smaller aircraft carrier, rather than a large carrier. Later in 1999, the media reported that the Chinese leadership had essentially sanctioned Y 250 million for two carrier, estimated to be completed by 2009, with a displacement of 48,000 tons and could carry 24 Su-27Ks. However, it appears that these were speculations made on the basis of the arrival of a partially finished ex-Soviet carrier, the ‘Varyag’ at a Dalian shipyard. See, Sibapada Rath, “China’s Tryst with Aircraft Carrier,” Naval Despatch, December 2005, p. 37.
[9] Tim Johnson, “Aircraft Carriers on Horizon for China?,” November 11, 2007, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071111/news_1n11chinashp.html.