India-Iran-Uzbekistan Pursue Central Asian Connectivity - The Diplomat, 18 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat this week, I looked at India-Iran-Uzbekistan plans for Central Asian connectivity.  The region has its fair share of great power politics, but the Iranian port of Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India's favor.   

India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have held their first trilateral meeting for possible joint use of Chabahar port. The meeting was chaired jointly by India’s Secretary of Shipping Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport Davron Dehkanov, and Iran’s Deputy Transport Minister Shahram Adamnejad. Using Chabahar port for trade and transit purposes as well as strengthened regional connectivity were the key agenda items at the meeting. India’s keenness to explore this option comes from its desire to extend connectivity into Eurasia. Double landlocked Uzbekistan has also been interested in using the port for transit facilities into the Indian Ocean and as a means to expand its trade and transit options. That Uzbekistan has already developed rail connectivity into Afghanistan as a means to link with Iranian railway lines reflects Tashkent’s seriousness. Other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan have also been interested in exploring such options.  

For the full post, click here.  

Given the geostrategic location of Central Asia, the region is also witnessing a fair share of great power competition. While the region is viewed as Russia’s immediate backyard and Moscow has traditionally maintained a dominant role in relations with Central Asia, China has steadily strengthened its footprint. India has also been pursuing both geopolitical and economic ties with the region. 

Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India’s favor. First, it could prove to be a gateway to Central Asia and Eurasia, which can, most importantly, avoid Pakistan. A year ago, the Trump administration exempted India from sanctions for the development of the port because of the benefits it potentially had for both India and Afghanistan. A Trump administration official said, “We have provided a narrow exemption for the development of Chabahar that allows for the construction of the port and rail line that allows for the export of refined oil products to Afghanistan.” 

This week’s trilateral meeting is reported to be an outcome of last week’s India-Uzbekistan bilateral summit between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This is clearly an effort at exploring an alternate option for Central Asia to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has long historic connections to Central Asia, but its relations with the region waned for a number of reasons, most importantly the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan, which blocked Indian access to the region. Since coming to office, Modi has made fresh efforts to re-establish linkages with the region, calling Central Asia a part of the country’s extended neighborhood. 

But lack of physical connectivity has proven to be a major hurdle in building trade and economic ties. Modi became the first Indian leader to travel to all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in 2015. In addition to energy security cooperation, India and Central Asia have both shunned Islamic terrorism and extremist ideology. Fighting cross-border terrorism has become an important common issue shaping their agenda. India has also been stepping up defense cooperation with the region, with a defense attaché posted in each of the Indian missions in Central Asia. Among the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the more proactive players in its engagement with India. The two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in January 2019, under which Uzbekistan agreed to supply India with uranium.  

Regional connectivity and infrastructure projects have also been high on Uzbekistan’s agenda. Seeing Chabahar port as a connectivity solution for Uzbekistan is not new either. In fact, in June 2018, following an earlier meeting between Modi and Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said the two leaders were keen to use Chabahar port as an additional connectivity route.  

Not surprisingly, at last week’s bilateral summit meeting between India and Uzbekistan, infrastructure and connectivity projects figured prominently. The two countries signed nine agreements including on counterterrorism and infrastructure-related issues. Both Modi and Mirziyoyev agreed to pursue connectivity projects via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative spanning around 7,200 km. It encompasses a network of ship, rail and road routes for transporting freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe, with the goal of creating transport linkages among major cities including Astrakhan, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Moscow, and Mumbai. Feasibility studies undertaken so far has shown significant reduction of transportation costs, to the tune of $2,500 per 15 tons of cargo. India is “pitching for” Uzbek participation in the INSTC connectivity project.  

India’s push with the trilateral arrangement for Uzbekistan to use Chabahar port is important in the context of expanding bilateral, trilateral, as well as broader regional cooperation. But more significantly, it is a geopolitical move aimed at countering growing Chinese influence in the region. India has capacity issues in this regard compared to China, but New Delhi is planning on cashing in on existing projects to expand its reach and linkages so that the Central Asian republics have an alternative to China’s BRI.  

Australia-Japan-India Trilateral Sets Sights on Supply Chain Resilience - The Diplomat, 2 October 2020

In my first article for The Diplomat in October, I looked at the Australia-Japan-India trilateral which has its eyes on supply chain resilience as the first concrete agenda driving their cooperation.  I argue that China's assertive behaviour is the glue that holds the trilateral together.  

Recently, the trade ministers of Australia, Japan and India agreed to develop a supply chain resilience program for the Indo-Pacific region. The announcement, which followed a video conference between Australia’s Simon Birmingham, Japan’s Kajiyama Hiroshi and India’s Piyush Goyal in in early September, came amid a growing recognition in all three nations of the dangers of excessive economic reliance on China. While the details of the initiative remain sketchy, the three countries have tasked their respective bureaucracies with looking for ways to develop an initiative that would strengthen alternate supply chains in an effort to counter China’s control of the trade of essential supplies. The initiative is being planned for launch next year. It is meant to be an inclusive initiative and the three countries are looking to extend it into Southeast Asia.

For the full post, click here.  

The idea of the Australia-Japan-India (AJI) trilateral is not itself new. The three countries had their first trilateral dialogue in June 2015. The meeting saw the participation of then Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, Japanese Vice Foreign Minister Akitaka Saiki and Peter Varghese, the secretary of Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Predictably, a dominant theme in the discussions was maritime security and freedom of navigation, which continues to be the case five years later. In fact, the three nations’ shared concerns on the maritime front have only increased due to China’s recent assertive behavior in the region. While the Indo-Pacific region has an alphabet soup of minilaterals and formal arrangements, the AJI trilateral appears to be one of the strongest, despite some challenges. A recent report on the trilateral by the Perth USAsia Centre highlights the potentials of the trilateral, as well as some of the challenges that still persist. Nevertheless, the decision to form a trilateral supply chain initiative is an indicator of the actionable agenda that could be pursued by the AJI in the coming years.

China’s behavior has provided the glue that binds the trilateral together. For all the rhetoric about its peaceful rise, China’s behavior since the beginning of 2020 has antagonized many. China’s actions have forced the AJI trilateral to acknowledge the danger of economic over-dependence on China. As such, supply chain diversification and resilience has become an important issue for all three countries. Commenting on the initiative, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has stated the need to reshape global supply chains “based on trust and stability.”

Reducing dependence on China is not going to be easy for India in the short term. At the same time, difficulties with China have reached a point where opinion is shifting in New Delhi. Indian elite opinionmakers have made it amply clear that India will need to bite the bullet, even if it means going through some hard times. India is still not considering complete economic decoupling, of course, but a significant reduction in terms of its reliance on China. Because India exports mostly primary commodities, China can easily replace India, but it is going to be difficult for India to overcome its dependence on China  This is not a challenge unique to India, but it forces India and other countries to consider together what steps to take to diversify their economies away from a heavy reliance on China.

India would also like to take advantage of the general interest that many countries have in moving their manufacturing out of China, but this is easier said than done. For instance, even though many industries leaving China may want to come to India – and though India may be even keener to attract them – India still faces many challenges, including problems of land acquisition, outdated labor laws, an uncertain tax regime and growing domestic conflicts, to name just a few. In contrast, Vietnam is emerging as a major destination for businesses leaving China.  

Discussing these measures together with like-minded partners may help in setting up alternatives to these nations’ economic dependence on China  Each country in the AJI trilateral recognizes that alone, they are no match for China’s economic power. Alone, each is much more vulnerable because of their dependence. But together, they might be able to find some solutions. Whether this will work is yet to be seen, but a beginning is being made.

Another area that is high on the agenda for the AJI is maritime security and ensuring freedom of the seas in the Indo-Pacific. This is not all about navies and formal security collaboration, but will also involve the important notion of “norm entrepreneurship,” as identified in the Perth USAsia Report. The trilateral will thus try to promote respect for international law, and a free, open, rules-based and inclusive Indo-Pacific. The hope is that eventually the three nations can think in terms of doing joint military exercises or even coordinated patrols in the Indo-Pacific. India has resisted such steps for a long time, but China’s aggressive actions on the borders and elsewhere are likely to make New Delhi more amenable to considering bolder steps.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.