Showing posts with label China-Nepal Relations. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China-Nepal Relations. Show all posts

Saturday, October 19, 2019

Xi’s Visit Exposes the Limits of China-Nepal Strategic Convergence - The Diplomat, 17 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal. It appears that despite the interests both sides have for better ties, there are real limits and challenges to this.


Last week, as expected, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, for a state visit on his way back to China after an informal summit with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Xi’s Nepal trip itself came as no surprise: China has been attempting to woo India’s smaller neighbors in South Asia, and there is clearly interest among some including Nepal to use the Sino-Indian competition for their own benefits. But Xi’s trip also showed the limits of these converging interests. Indeed, the lack of progress on issues, with an extradition agreement not signed being a case in point, reinforces the fact that any alignment has its limits despite the strategic interests that both Nepal and China see in the wider relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



The mutual attraction between Nepal and China is easy enough to understand. From Beijing’s perspective, Nepal is important for a few strategic reasons. For one, Nepal borders China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though Tibet is relatively quiet, China always worries about the possibility of a resurgence of Tibetan nationalism. Though the largest chunk of Tibetan refugees lives in India, Nepal also hosts about 20,000 Tibetan exiles. Any disturbance in Tibet will likely have some reverberations in Nepal too.

Thus, China is concerned about ensuring that the Tibetan exile population in Nepal does not become an issue of concern. This appears to have been the primary reason why China was pushing for an extradition treaty with Nepal. This also makes good relations with Nepal an important means of managing any future problems in Tibet itself.

In addition to this direct linkage, China also has more general and obvious balance of power considerations in befriending Nepal. As a small South Asian neighbor of India, Nepal affords the opportunity to balance India within the region itself. Nepal’s relations with India, which had its ups and downs, makes Kathmandu a potentially attractive partner for Beijing. There is nothing unusual in this because this is at least part of the reason for Beijing’s outreach to all of India’s smaller neighbors. And of course, India returns the favor, trying to partner with China’s own smaller neighbors such as Vietnam.

A third reason for China’s interests in Nepal is China’s drive to develop the Belt and Road scheme, both as a means of exporting Chinese capital and labor but also expanding its interests. China has discussed several BRI projects with Nepal, including a railroad that would link Lhasa and Kathmandu as well as a Parliament building, National Defence University, and other infrastructure projects.

Nepal also has some interest in developing this partnership with China. For one, a closer relationship with China makes India a lot more receptive to Nepali concerns. Nepal, like India’s other neighbors, has complaints about the lackadaisical manner in which New Delhi approaches development projects in Nepal. Chinese help with infrastructure kills two birds with one stone. It potentially helps Nepal develop economic infrastructure – China has been very efficient in completing such projects, especially in comparison to India – while also putting pressure on India to pay greater attention to Nepali connectivity requirements. Seen from this perspective, having two great powers competing for Nepal’s attention will not be entirely unwelcome in Kathmandu.

In addition, Nepal, a small, landlocked country, also feels vulnerable to Indian pressures. India has been known to impose blockades on Nepal because much of Nepal’s international trade either originates in India or passes through Indian territory. The most recent of these blockades was in 2015, when India imposed an unofficial blockade in an ill-advised move to pressure Kathmandu over what was perceived by India to be discrimination against the Madhesi population in the new Nepali constitution. Though it appears somewhat impractical, Nepal would like to reduce its dependence on India by building trade and transit linkages through China. At the very least, closer linkages with China might make India more careful antagonizing Nepal.

But the strategic interests both sides have for better ties does not mean that there are not limits and challenges for relations. Indeed, if anything, Xi’s visit to Nepal, which saw the relative lack of substantive outcomes despite the hype, reinforced this reality. Despite the seeming attractiveness of the China partnership, there appears to be some disquiet within sections of the Nepali elite about getting too close to China as well as other dangers such as the potential debt-trap by way of involvement in the BRI. India’s unwillingness is also possibly an issue, because as Constantino Xavier, a close observer of India’s relations with its neighbors, has pointed out, one of the projects was meant to be a Sino-Nepalese-Indian, which India is now reluctant to pursue.

All this suggests that mutual interests by itself may not be sufficient to power China-Nepal relations. Negotiating the terms of actual deals, domestic national concerns, as well as the fear of getting dragged into the Sino-Indian competition, are all likely to limit how close India’s neighbors such as Nepal will get to China.

Friday, September 14, 2018

Why Nepal’s Access to China Ports Matters - September 14, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at why Nepal's access to China's ports matters. The move deserves attention for its potentially wider significance.



In a surprise move last week, Nepal was granted access to Chinese land and sea ports, ending Kathmandu’s dependence on Indian ports. While the move is just one of several within the bilateral relationship, it nonetheless deserves attention for its potential wider significance.

In March 2016, Kathmandu and Beijing signed a Transit and Transport Agreement (TTA) that promised to provide Nepal access for third party trade through Chinese sea and land ports. The decision to implement the TTA was taken after the two sides signed a TTA protocol in a bilateral meeting in Kathmandu last week. Until now, Nepal had to engage in third party trade through the Indian port in Kolkata in West Bengal (Nepal has a similar access pact with Bangladesh as well).

For the full essay, click here.



The TTA protocol allows Nepal access and use of four Chinese sea ports – Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang, and Zhanjiang – and three dry ports – Lanzhou, Lhasa, and Xigatse. With the signing of the protocol, Rabi Shankar Sainju, Joint-Secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) said, “Now we have access to additional ports as an alternative. They can be used in trading with the countries in east and north-east Asia.”

There are considerable infrastructure development issues to be resolved before these can be totally operational, but ending the dependency on India is seen as particularly a “joyful” moment in Kathmandu. India’s “unofficial” blockade in 2015 had a lot to do with Nepal’s open embrace of China since then. The blockade that led to serious hardships for ordinary Nepalese citizens has created large pockets of anti-Indian and correspondingly pro-China sentiments within Nepal.

Though this is a considerable setback for New Delhi, India has been attempting to play harder for Nepalese affections especially in terms of building up infrastructure for Nepal. India is currently in the process of constructing two railway lines and there are three additional lines being planned to beef up Nepal’s options. India is also refurbishing and upgrading four major custom checkpoints at Birgunj-Raxaul, Biratnagar-Jogbani, Bhairahawa-Sunauli and Nepalgunj-Rupediya in addition to expanding and renovating the road network in the Terai region of Nepal. In addition to Kolkata, India has also opened the port of Visakhapatinam to Nepal and there is a small amount of trade taking place through it. Between India and Nepal, there are reportedly 25 crossing points, two integrated checkpoints, and there are two additional checkpoints being developed now.

The latest TTP is one more iteration of the growing Nepal-China multifaceted relationship. And there are clearly strategic consequences to this growing relationship. One important impact of the Nepal-China TTA is that Nepal’s access to Chinese ports will be through six checkpoints at Rasuwa, Tatopani (Sindhupalchok), Korala (Mustang), Kimathanka (Sankhuwasabha), Yari (Humla), and Olangchung Gola (Taplejung). These and other road and railway projects between China and Nepal will allow China to potentially project power against India on a different section of the Sino-Indian boundary, and possibly even outflank Indian military forces at the border.

As a follow-up to an earlier assurance by China to support mega infrastructure projects in Nepal, Nepal’s Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Ramesh Lekhak suggested to his Chinese counterpart that the connectivity projects should be speeded up since Nepal’s endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative. A projected route includes connectivity from Kerung in China all the way to Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Lumbini. Lumbini is just about 100 kilometers from the Indian border state of Uttar Pradesh, making it uncomfortably close to the Indian capital.

The expanded and deepened Nepal-China relationship also restricts India’s own strategic space in its own backyard. The growing profile and role of China in South Asia is becoming more prominent, with Beijing making unprecedented penetration in other countries in the region such as Sri Lanka and Maldives. Despite caught up in a debt-trap diplomacy with China to the point of being forced to lease the Hambantota Port to China for 99 years, Sri Lanka does not appear to have learned any lessons: Colombo has gone back to China for more funds to address its next debt repayment cycle in 2019.

China’s successes leave other major powers in a bit of a quandary. While the United States, Japan, and India are all stepping up their efforts to warn poorer states of the dangers involved in seeking Chinese infrastructure funding, their incapacity or unwillingness to provide any credible alternative means China’s is the only real game in town.

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