India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020

In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short essay on India-Russia relations for The Diplomat.  The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision?  

India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India suggested that the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by saying, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a statement saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” 

But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings.  

For the full essay, click here.  

Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new.  There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov publicly stated so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov returned to the theme, saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”

Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson stating that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also added, for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” 

All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, commented that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “very significantly damaged” over the past year.  

These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border.   

Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet saying, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.  

While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have written previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior.  Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India.  

Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020

In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I looked at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region.  

Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here.  So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given here.  

Major Takeaways are: 

→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its perceptions and priorities in the region. 

→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. 

→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. 

→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. 

→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. 

The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now, undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 

India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. 

For the full brief, click here.  

Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern

India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front. From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power, with a growing footprint in the region. 

Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2 .” The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and increasing naval presence in the region. 

India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. 

This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts.  

Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture towards China. 

It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 

But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding, most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. 

The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate. India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to consider burden-sharing between the partners. 

Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those posed by China. 

There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. 

There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.

Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020

In an earlier column for The Diplomat in November, I wrote on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein.  I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests.  The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop?  

BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would discuss intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. 

For the full post, click here.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.”  

Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi highlighted the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.”  

It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent.  

The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as Abhijnan Rej highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially.  

Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground.  

China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with the United States as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific.  

That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context.  

India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow.  

How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.

Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today Interview on India-China relations post-Galwan and other developments including Quad- July 15, 2020

On July 15, I did an interview with Australia-based Business Now Asia Pacific (BNAP) Today on the India-China Galwan clash, where I argued that the Galwan clash is pushing a major shift in India’s security and foreign policies and how the changing Sino-Indian relationship is influencing India’s relations with QUAD and QUAD Plus countries.

For the full interview, click here.



Some of the major points I made include:

1. Difficult to imagine that it will be business as usual after Galwan.

2. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements; Quad Plus in the Covid context; Australia could be invited to the Malabar naval exercises.

3. India is yet to make a decision on the 5G but in all likelihood, Huawei will be blocked. Even prior to the Galwan clash, India had its apprehensions but after the last month clash, signing up with China is extremely unlikely.

4. India’s pharma industry will be affected for instance because we still buy a lot of the chemicals from China. Like I said, India will need to bite the bullet and go through some hard times because the economic impact will be significant.

5. Here is the need for the Indo-Pacific powers to come together to take decisions to consciously diversify their over-dependence on China and engage with each other even in the face of some difficulties.

Towards A Quad-Plus Arrangement? - Perth USAsia Centre, 21 April 2020

As I mentioned in previous blog, along with my regular work at the Observer Research Foundation as a Distinguished Fellow and head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative, I am also a Non-Resident Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre for a period of 9 months starting in April. As part of this, I will be doing a series of papers, video blogs and webinars. The first of my papers is this: Towards a Quad-Plus Arrangement? which came out in the third week of April (I have been late in updating my blog).

It is probably too early to sense the shape of the post-COVID world. But there are some early hints of how international partnerships might be shaped by the crisis. Recently, senior officials of the four “Quad” countries (Australia, India, Japan and the
United States) teleconferenced about how to respond to the pandemic.

Quad meetings are no longer unusual. But this one was special because it included three additional Indo-Pacific powers:NewZealand, South Korea and Vietnam. The call, reportedly initiated by the US Deputy Secretary of State Steve Beigun, was intended to exchange notes on how these powers were tackling the COVID-19 pandemic.

But it also raises a broader question: Is this is a sign of possible expansion of the Quad mechanism, and how might such an expansion be feasible?

For the full essay, click here.



I concluded the essay with the following thoughts. Efforts to coordinate responses to COVID-19 by the Quad-Plus countries may be a means to expand the original formulation at a pace that would be comfortable to potential new members and without eliciting a Chinese rebuke. It would be hypocritical for China to oppose countries collaborating on COVID-19 when it has itself made precisely such calls. But such cooperation
also sets the stage for further Quad dialogue on other problems these countries face, potentially including security problems.

Indeed, a Quad-Plus expansion makes sense for a number of reasons. One is the common security concern these countries share regarding China’s behaviours. Each have faced Chinese pressure plays in recent years, and harbor concerns regarding China’s military and political expansion into areas they consider their ‘neighbourhood’. Additionally, none are in a position to effectively challenge China on a bilateral basis,
making minilateral cooperation with likeminded partners a better approach.

Together, these factors provide a pragmatic path to greater security cooperation via a Quad-Plus arrangement in future years. Expanding the Quad is not going to be easy, and will bring with it challenges of divergent concerns and burdensharing problems. But there is clearly an impetus for Quad expansion that will begin to find expression in coming months.

The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership - East Asia Forum, 1 February 2020

In February, I wrote a short essay on India-Australia strategic partnership for the East Asia Forum. The essay, "The push and pull in the Australia–India partnership", looked at the pulls and pressures of this partnership and what lies ahead.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has grown quite rapidly over the last few years. This is impressive considering how indifferent New Delhi and Canberra were towards each other a decade ago. The change in the tone and direction of the relationship over the past decade is driven by shared concerns about China’s rise and its strategic implications for the Asia Pacific order.

For the full post, click here.



Despite the number of high-level political visits and military exchanges, such as the 2+2 Dialogue, there still remains scepticism about the relationship. Many believe that the shared concerns of both countries have not yet translated into a shared policy approach. Frederic Grare raised this point in 2014, but six years later India and Australia remain unable to forge a coherent strategy or a common policy approach to China.

There has traditionally been some wariness among Australian security analysts about the India–Australia relationship, and vice-versa. But as the threat from China grows, New Delhi and Canberra should find more innovative ways to work together to shape a stable Asian strategic order. The two already work together in larger strategic formulations such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad).

A new wrinkle in the relationship is the Modi government’s identity politics. Many argue that India’s recent internal developments go against the grain of its strategic partnerships — based on shared liberal democratic values.

Whether mutual concerns about China are serious enough to offset worries about the unhelpful direction of India’s internal politics and nurture the budding India–Australia strategic partnership remains to be seen.

Australian officials are very positive about the direction of relations. At the fourth Raisina Dialogue in January 2019, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne noted that as ‘competition intensifies, Australia and India have shared interests in ensuring the peaceful development of an open, inclusive and prosperous Indo‑Pacific region — a region in which the rights of all states are respected, large and small’.

The signing of a Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia in 2014 by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and then-prime minister Tony Abbott still provides the much-needed impetus for greater security engagement between the two countries.

The two countries are currently finalising a mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. These are expected to increase military interoperability and help ‘elevate’ the strategic partnership.

There remain areas that need greater clarity. One of the problems with the India–Australia relationship is that both countries have a different set of concerns about China. Australian concerns have to do with China’s increased activities in the Pacific, while India is concerned about China’s greater presence and influence in the Indian Ocean. India has also been uncertain about Australia’s reliance since Canberra backed out of the Quad in 2007, though this uncertainty is slowly disappearing. It is equally likely that Canberra has a certain lack of confidence given that New Delhi seems ambiguous about whether to balance or hedge. These differences might partly have to do with strategic histories. Australia has long been an American ally, while India remains uncomfortable about alliances.

This need not be an impediment to the strategic relationship if the two countries are able to forge their partnership based on some key principles, norms and ideals. Both countries should champion the rule of law, a rules-based order, respect for human rights and norms of responsible behaviour.

The joint naval exercise AUSINDEX (which began in 2015) reflects the convergence of Indian and Australian approaches to maritime and regional security. The two countries conducted the third edition of AUSINDEX in April 2019. The exercise was reported to have been the biggest in terms of the scale of participation from both navies.

The second issue with the relationship is the deficit of military capabilities, especially on the Indian side. While the two militaries have been able to showcase their prowess during exercises, their ability to come to each other’s aid during conflict remains in question. The joint logistics services agreement would go a long way in addressing this issue as it would provide joint access to each other’s military facilities.

Third, there is a need for greater agreement among the Quad member states about burden-sharing. A discussion about the operational aspects of their cooperation would create greater synergy between their forces when dealing with common problems.

From an Australian perspective, the fourth and final irritant in the relationship is India’s reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar trilateral naval exercise alongside the other three Quad nations — India, Japan and the United States. Indian media reports indicate that India might be open to involving Australia at the next Malabar naval exercises scheduled to take place later in the summer.

Indian reluctance to involve Australia in the Malabar exercise has not produced significant negativity towards India, especially given the progress in bilateral relations more broadly. But if India thinks Australia is a legitimate security partner, it must expand the trilateral to include Australia as well. The fact that Australia is included in other bilateral and multinational military exercises should not be an excuse.

The India–Australia strategic partnership has seen impressive advancements in the last few years, but its potential and promise are yet to be fully realised. It will require dedicated attention and political leadership from both capitals to become more than a work in progress going forward.

Will India Now Finally Invite Australia to the Malabar Exercise? - The Diplomat, 31 January 2020

In my last column for the month for The Diplomat, I looked at the question if India is going to finally invite Australia to the Malabar exercise. New reports have surfaced regarding a previously headline-grabbing, controversial development.

In a significant development that has been through multiple rounds of headlines and controversy, India might be finally getting ready to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, according to media reports. The next edition of the exercise is scheduled to take place around July or August this year.

For the full post, click here.



The question of inviting Australia to the exercise, which currently includes India, Japan and the United States, has been controversial. India has for several years resisted bringing Australia on board, reportedly because of possible negative reactions from China. The fact is that the first and only time Australia has been part of this exercise was in 2007, when both Australia and Singapore were invited to join India, Japan and the United States.

Nonetheless, if India finally agrees to invite Australia for the 2020 Malabar naval exercises, it will be a welcome break and would suggest the growing seriousness and synergy among four key Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

The India-U.S. Malabar series of naval exercises go back to 1992 and became a regular annual feature since 2002, after it was suspended following India’s nuclear tests in 1998. The initial series of exercises were held off the coast of Malabar, and hence the name of the series but these naval engagements have been held in other areas as well including the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and in the Western Pacific.

In 2007, there were two editions of the Malabar exercise – one held in the Western Pacific along with Japan in April 2007 and a second one in the Bay of Bengal with the participation of Australia, Japan and Singapore in September 2007. That year also saw the first meeting of the Quadrilateral group – India, Japan, Australia and the United States.

China’s displeasure at the forming of the group – it sent a demarche to all four countries – ended the Quadrilateral group and also ended the practice of such naval exercises. Neither India nor Australia was willing to cross China. So, for the next few years, Malabar reverted to being a U.S.-India naval exercise.

Japan has joined Malabar sporadically for several years before becoming a permanent member in 2015. Bringing Tokyo into the mix was an important strategic signaling itself. It indicated the growing strategic convergence among the three nations on the one hand, while also illustrating the fact that the three countries recognized the need to undertake joint exercises to make interoperability a viable proposition.

Around the same time, relations between New Delhi and Canberra too were improving, but the apprehension of Australia’s dependability (after the 2007 experience) made India cautious. But other reasons could have played into this as well, including the fact that India wanted to first be confident of the durability of the existing trilateral exercise before expanding it.

In truth, neither of these explanations can satisfactorily account for India’s reluctance to move on this front if New Delhi were serious enough. If India were serious about strategic messaging to China, it would not waste any opportunity because fearing Chinese negative reaction and appeasing China has not brought India any goodwill previously. China’s behavior does not automatically call for any restraint; equally, if not more important, was New Delhi’s own reluctance to antagonize Beijing.

But as the Quad diplomatic group has revived, Australia has sought to be part of the Malabar exercises. Indeed, Australia appears to have pushed hard for an invite. This is not entirely surprising: It also fits with the growing strategic interaction between India and Australia that now includes on both bilateral as well as multinational military engagements. Kakadu, AUSINDEX, and the Black Carillon military exercises are illustrative of this. In January 2019, a defense source is reported to have said that including Australia and engaging in a Quad naval exercise would lead to sending a political message to China, something for which India apparently is not ready.

A year later, India now reportedly appears to be more confident about inviting Australia to the naval exercise. Several recent developments could have contributed to this development. One, the upgrading of the Quad engagements to the foreign minister level is reflective of a growing seriousness with which Quad members are treating each other. This can be viewed as part of that wider strategic development.

Two, India’s bilateral strategic partnership with Australia has improved dramatically in recent years. The 2+2 strategic dialogue, the military exercises, and the regular political and security conversations between India and Australia have strengthened India’s confidence about Canberra as a security partner. There were as many as 39 bilateral interactions in 2019 alone.

Three, despite two informal summits between India and China, the two sides do not appear to have made any substantial progress in improving their relations. Indeed, China has continued to make inroads into South Asia with little consideration for India’s concerns. Beijing’s Belt and Road push in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar has given it a greater foothold in Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal.

Four, India’s own comfort level in building strategic relationships has grown and it is evident in the manner in which India has gradually expanded Malabar to include Japan first and now possibly Australia. India also engages Australia through another trilateral – India, Indonesia and Australia. Therefore, India’s ease of doing business with Australia in the strategic realm has gone up several notches even in the last three years since the quad has made a comeback.

Five and lastly, the shared concerns among the four countries about the future of the Indo-Pacific has possibly been the biggest factor pushing India to expand the trilateral. The convergence around these notions of broader regional order have reinforced the shared interests between them and also acted as another boost for developing ties.

An expanded Malabar series of exercises is obviously important in terms of developing coherent strategic approaches to addressing many of the region’s security challenges. On the diplomatic side, a useful first step was the Quad ministerial level consultations. And on the defense side now, further engagement in naval exercises could strengthen interoperability among the four partner navies, which ultimately will be important in addressing the very issues they are speaking about.

India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020 - The Diplomat, 4 January 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020, I looked at India's foreign policy challenges for 2020. Sadly, many of them have been the government's own making. Hence, I argue that while the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi has paid significant attention to India’s foreign relations. Though there could be some quibbles about how much he managed to achieve, there is little doubt that his focus at least led to greater energy and push in India’s foreign policy, even if Modi’s foreign policy has not witnessed any significant shifts.

But since his re-election last summer, India’s foreign policy challenges have been growing. And while the reasons for this may be varied, some of it is because of the BJP government’s own mistakes.

For the full essay, click here.



In his first term, Modi was able to undertake significant strategic outreach to the United States, Japan, and Australia. The revival of the Quad is a great indicator of the pragmatism in India’s diplomacy today. Despite some setbacks in between, India also managed to consolidate its position in two important Indian Ocean countries – Sri Lanka and Maldives. Modi can also be credited with a more effective outreach to Southeast Asia, with its Act East Policy.

But there are also growing difficulties. Managing China, India’s most serious challenge, has seen some success but it remains a major and continuing problem. India’s more active role in the Quad in its second avatar is a positive sign. Despite the occasional wavering in India’s Indo-Pacific policy, elevating the Quad to foreign ministerial level deliberations shows the willingness of all the four Quad members to acknowledge the reality of the China problem and the need for the four to work toward strategic coordination.

But there are serious problems with India’s hard capacity to manage the China problem. General V.P. Malik, the former chief of Indian Army Staff, said during the Kargil war that “we will fight with what we have,” but such an approach while facing a much a larger and strong force in China will be dangerous for India. For all the loud rhetoric on national security, the Modi government’s defense budget allocation has been abysmal. Year after year, it has driven down the defense budget, which now has the lowest allocation since the period before the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Even within this allocation, much of it is spent on salaries and pension, leaving very little for capital expenditure, thus leaving procurement issues unresolved. All three Indian services have significant gaps and this is going to test India’s ability to defend successfully against China. The Indian focus appears to be on diplomacy to deal with China, but depending on one toll alone could be dangerous.

Another major challenge is the neighborhood, and the problems here are compounded due to India’s internal developments. Today, India’s neighborhood policy is facing serious challenges, in part because of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Together, they have had a particularly negative impact on India’s relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. With the CAA targeting three Islamic neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – India’s neighborhood diplomacy suddenly faces new problems.

Relations with Bangladesh had improved significantly under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the CAA and the NRC have put the Bangladeshi government in a difficult position. Relations with Afghanistan, another friendly neighbor, are affected also. Moreover, the CAA is seen both as specifically targeting Muslims and as equating Indian citizenship with Hinduism, raising eyebrows across the world. Even India’s partners are questioning its credentials as a multicultural, pluralist society. India did enjoy certain soft power benefit as the world’s largest democracy, with diverse cultures and religions co-existing in a stable political system, but that image has been tarnished by the recent developments.

Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and even External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar can ignore the global concerns by saying these are internal matters of India. But the reality is that India’s moral standing has taken a hit and it will need significant efforts on the part of the Modi government to demonstrate that India is still a multicultural and secular democracy.

Modi did make a smart choice in getting Jaishankar to head the foreign ministry. Jaishankar, a former foreign secretary, is well-respected around the world, and is known to have been an important reason for many of Modi’s foreign policy successes in his first term. But it is unclear if an experienced technocrat like Jaishankar can weather the storms created by poor domestic political decisions. Jaishankar was successful to a large extent in assuaging the fears around the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, after Article 370 was revoked in early July. His extensive engagements in the United States, speaking in nearly a dozen think tanks, as well as other media interviews, helped stem the damage.

But India’s outreach has been poor after the CAA. Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because the delegation included Ms. Pramila Jayapal, for instance, has angered Democrats in the United States to the point where Jayapal now has another 10 legislators co-sponsoring her resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir at the earliest. It is not clear that India still enjoys the kind of bipartisan support in the U.S. as it did in the last 15 years.

This comes on top of Modi’s statement, “Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar,” which has not gone down well with Democrats. It would have been better for Modi to not poke his head into the internal politics of another country. The U.S. relationship is absolutely critical in managing the China issue and it will be a challenge to get it back to even keel, especially if a Democrat wins the White House in November.

It is unclear how the India-Japan relationship has been affected. The annual summit, originally slated to take place in Guwahati in December 2019, was postponed because of CAA-related protests. This has been an annual feature for more than a decade and it is possibly the first time that the summit meeting has been skipped.

India’s democracy and stability plays at least a supporting role in India’s partnerships, and even uncertainty can hurt these relations. While India has faced many external difficulties in the past, they have rarely been the result of domestic politics. Handling these new challenges could be much more difficult than the Indian government assumes.

Is the Washington Consensus on US-India Relations Fraying? - The Diplomat, 1 January 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat for 2020, I looked at the U.S.-India relations, and I argue that recent developments (within India) have raised questions about the future of bipartisan support for U.S.-India relations.

U.S.-India relations have improved over the last two decades, partly due to the strong political consensus in Washington supporting this trend. Both Democrats and Republicans have put aside other differences when it came to India, and, even when different parties controlled them, both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have supported strengthening the relationship.

Recent developments, however, have cast a shadow on the extent of that support and how it might shape up moving forward. Scrutiny on some domestic developments in India has raised some questions about U.S. support for India and the future shape of the bilateral relationship.

Of particular note are the recent Indian actions regarding Indian citizenship and identity issues, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), which have not gone down well, either in India or in the United States.

For the full essay, click here.



The negative Western media attention on India has been generally dismissed by senior Indian officials as biased. The home minister, Amit Shah, blamed Indian opposition parties for raising human rights concerns. Commenting on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir in September, Shah said, “To those who are asking questions about human rights, I want to ask have they ever thought about the human rights of the widows or children of the 41,800 people killed in J&K so far.” Ashok Malik, a respected journalist and former media advisor to the Indian president, categorized the negative publicity as “a familiar assortment of New York/London-based know-alls, fringe left activists, Pakistani state agents masquerading as aggrieved neutrals, and freelance self-determinists representing nothing but their bylines.”

The CAA and NRC, against the backdrop of the Article 370 developments, have compounded the negative international perception of India. The Indian foreign minister’s decision to cancel an important interaction at the U.S. Capitol may create new problems. Jaishankar had requested a meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) on the sidelines of the second India-U.S. two-plus-two dialogue in Washington. But upon learning that Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal, who is not a member of the Committee, would also be present at the HFAC meeting, Jaishankar cancelled the interaction, saying “I have no interest in meeting” the Indian-American congresswoman. Instead, he insisted he would only meet with “people who are objective and open to discussion but not the people who already made up their minds.”

Jayapal, a Democrat, has been an outspoken critic of India’s actions in Kashmir. More importantly, she was introducing a resolution on Kashmir in the House of Representatives, calling for all the communications restrictions imposed by the Indian government to be removed at the earliest. By cancelling the meeting, India appears to have made the issue worse for itself because the resolution saw 10 additional sponsors right after the minister’s snub to Jayapal.

A wiser decision would have been for India to have proceeded with the meeting and explain the situation, even if it was a difficult case to make. This was what Jaishankar had done while on a visit to Washington after the Article 370 developments, by which India managed to pacify at least some of the critics. Cancelling the meeting, on the other hand, clearly created the impression that India did not have a convincing story to tell.

This action has upped the ante and possibly angered Democratic lawmakers in the United States. Should a Democratic candidate win in the 2020 US presidential election, India may have a lot of making-up to do. Even if a Democrat does not win the presidency and Trump gets a second term, India will still need support from Democratic lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

In the last couple of decades, India has generally enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington, D.C., and this was most evident during the U.S-India nuclear deal. Despite a few nonproliferation hardliners in the U.S. Congress, President George W. Bush was able to muster sufficient support for India because both Democrats and Republicans wanted to build a closer strategic partnership. Since then, India has worked hard to keep its support bipartisan. Doing so ensured that even in the very difficult and partisan political environment in Washington, relations with India was one of the few issues on which there was a broad consensus in the U.S. Congress, making for steady legislative support to executive efforts deepen the relationship.

It would be a shame if India managed to fritter away that bipartisan support. India will have to work much harder in Washington if it can count on only the support of one party or smaller segments of both.

What’s in the Growing Russia-China-Iran Trilateral Convergence? - The Diplomat, 23 December 2019

Once again, I am lagging behind in posting my articles. I will try and rectify this in the new year.

On December 23, I published a short essay in The Diplomat on the recent Russia-China-Iran joint naval drills in the Indian Ocean. Potential security engagements among the three have spotlighted their increasing convergence.

While much of the focus in terms of minilateral alignments in the Asian region tends to be on those involving U.S. allies and partners, be it the Quad or U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral dynamics, there are other arrangements beyond this as well. Of particular note are the arrangements that have been forged by China and Russia over the past few years.

One of these is the China-Russia-Iran relationship. Like many other arrangements, this represents the outgrowth of the combination of existing links between the three countries and recent convergences due to various trends and developments, including growing opposition to the United States that has risen further under President Donald Trump. And it continues to attract headlines about other countries that could join as well, including Pakistan.

For the full essay, click here.



Spotlight on the arrangement has been growing in recent weeks with the three countries scheduled to hold their first joint naval drill in the Indian Ocean later this month. Iran’s semi-official Fars news agency reported that the commander of the Iranian Navy, Rear Admiral Hossein Khanzadi, has said that Iran will engage in a trilateral exercise called Marine Security Belt beginning on December 27. Khanzadi revealed that this is part of a broader naval collaboration between Iran and China, which includes also production of destroyers and submarines.

Details have been rather scarce on the engagement. Last week, while speaking to IRNA, Iran’s official news agency, Khanzadi had mentioned that the naval drill will take place in the northern Indian Ocean, although he did not then announce the date. And reports also suggest that both Tehran and Beijing are considering a “long term blueprint of military collaboration.” Confirming Russian participation, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “We, the People’s Republic of China, and Iran are preparing naval drills for fighting terrorists and pirates in this part of the Indian Ocean.” Commenting on the trilateral exercise, Lavrov stated on October 2 that the exercise will be undertaken to train their forces in anti-piracy and anti-terrorism efforts.

Irrespective of what is being said and not said publicly, the geopolitical underpinnings of the trilateral group are quite evident: all the three maintain a rather hostile relationship with the United States and have proven increasingly willing to take cooperative actions in the security realm to illustrate their own capabilities. While speaking to the Iranian Mehr News Agency earlier, Rear Admiral Khanzadi had hinted at the fact that a “joint wargame between several countries, whether on land, at sea or in the air, indicates a remarkable expansion of cooperation among them.”

But the strategic significance of this ought to be understood more broadly too. This is a region that has witnessed increasing military activity. The United States conducted a naval operation in Bahrain in November to safeguard shipping in the Persian Gulf waters, which has seen increasing tensions in recent times, and Washington also plans to initiate and lead an International Maritime Security Construct in the Gulf, with the participation of Australia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the U.K. Other actors are also stepping in, with French Defense Minister Florence Parly saying in November that a European-led maritime surveillance initiative, stationed at the French naval base in Abu Dhabi, UAE, will be engaged in maintaining a watch on the Gulf waters.

The activities of Russia, China, and Iran on their own terms have also attracted interest. Russia has its own initiative, the Collective Security in the Persian Gulf, which is also backed by China. Meanwhile, Iran has plans to pursue a “Hormuz Peace Endeavor” called HOPE, with the Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Shamkhani saying that its own initiative would not include any foreign powers and that it will be a coalition of regional states (while Iran’s naval prowess thus far has been limited to its use of fast boats to harass and chase foreign naval vessels, which has been undertaken by the IRGC and not the actual navy, the Iranian Navy is gaining teeth with acquisition of new drones and other technologies).

Seen from this perspective, China, Iran, and Russia all have an incentive to use the trilateral naval exercise to showcase their growing alignment. From Iran’s perspective, for instance, it has directly said that the trilateral naval exercise is to send a strategic message that the three participating countries have “reached a meaningful strategic point in their relations, with regard to their shared and non-shared interests, and by non-shared I mean the respect we have for one another’s national interests.” China has been more cautious about formal statements, partly because Chinese security analysts say Beijing would not want “to be drawn into Middle East conflicts.”

In the backdrop of these heightened maritime engagements by different coalitions of powers, the China-Iran-Russia trilateral naval exercise will be watched with some concern. As mentioned previously, it is occurring in an area that has seen increased military engagement. Beyond that, for countries like India, there are concerns about additional partners, notably Pakistan, whose potential invitation has been the source of headlines with Rear Admiral Khanzadi mentioning that Islamabad was welcome.

The coming together of China, Iran, and Russia itself is a major strategic development, and the addition of countries like Pakistan into the mix increases the stakes. Irrespective of how things play out, one can expect continued attention to trilateral and quadrilateral configurations such as these that go beyond the ones usually talked about involving U.S. allies and partners.

What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

For the full post, click here.



Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

For the full post, click here.



India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.