What Does ASEAN’s Evolving Approach to the South China Sea Issue Mean for Vietnam? - The Diplomat, 1 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the ASEAN Summit and what does it mean for Vietnam in terms of the South China Sea issue. Though the regional grouping continues to have difficulties on the issue, it nonetheless remains important to Hanoi’s calculations.

While a range of issues will be in discussion during this weekend’s summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South China Sea will be among them. And for Vietnam in particular, how ASEAN manages the issue will be important for its own calculations and options in dealing with the South China Sea.

For the full post, click here.



ASEAN’s ability to speak in one common voice on important issues such as sovereignty and territorial issues has been under scrutiny in recent years, with the organization working on the basis of consensus and having to accommodate views of countries like Cambodia. The South China Sea issue is no exception to this. While Chinese behavior in the South China Sea has been concerning, there are worries that ASEAN will eventually settle for a code of conduct that will avoid maritime incidents. There are broader realities too: the economic dependency on China for many of the Southeast Asian countries is a reality that these countries cannot afford to ignore.

But the situation in the South China Sea will not wait for these realities to play out. Indeed, the South China Sea has been witnessing increasing tensions in the last year. Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines have all been pushing back against China, albeit to varying degrees and through different pathways. In June this year, a Filipino fishing boat was sunk by a Chinese ship in Bai Co Rong (Recto Bank). Earlier, Malaysia’s oil rig operation near Luconia Shoals off the coast of the Sarawak State was stopped by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel.

But Vietnam has been particularly affected by Chinese activities in the South China Sea, and Hanoi’s pushback has correspondingly been the strongest among the ASEAN claimant states. Since July this year, China has sent one survey vessel and at least four Chinese maritime vessels into Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the south of the East Sea (as Vietnam calls it). Vietnam responded with its own deployment of its Coast Guard vessels. Vietnam has called for greater support for its position but the response from all the big powers in the region and beyond has been fairly low-key. In a further assertion of its claims, China reportedly organized the seventh Sinan Cup Regatta in Duy Mong island, part of the Paracel (Hoang Sa) archipelago.

Vietnam has appeared to be pursuing multiple tracks to address the issues confronting its sovereignty. In the absence of concrete support to Vietnam from within the region and beyond, Vietnam is pursuing diplomatic tracks along with tough posturing. Last week, the Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc told the National Assembly (NA) that “What happened in the East Sea recently was getting very complicated, including serious violations in Vietnam’s sea recognized by international law… We will keep fighting in means in line with international law.” The Vietnamese Foreign Ministry also reiterated last week “that the Vanguard Bank lies completely within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf, as delineated from the Vietnamese shore in accordance with the United Conventions on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 1982, and that the Vanguard Bank is not a disputed area or with overlapping claims.”

Vietnam has also tried the regional route to address its concerns. In late July, Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Binh Minh took China’s latest survey vessel deployment issue to ASEAN, saying that the “Chinese geological survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8’s activities [are] violating Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the waters…” and “seriously threaten legitimate rights of coastal countries, erode trust, and worsen tensions, thus hurting peace and stability in the region.” The response, however, was one of general reiteration of the need “to uphold and comply with international laws, including the UNCLOS 1982, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the East Sea (DOC), toward perfecting an effective COC.”

Given their big focus on trade and investment, it is unlikely that the ASEAN will call out Chinese behavior that directly. And China will have no objections as long as the statements are neutral, calling on all parties to “building trust as well as ensuring peace, stability, safety and freedom of navigation and aviation in the waters.”

But for Vietnam, despite these limitations, the position ASEAN takes on issues like the South China Sea is nonetheless critical. Diplomacy continues to be among the paths Vietnam adopts to manage the South China Sea issue. And with Vietnam taking up the chairmanship of ASEAN next year, Hanoi itself will have to endeavor to find a balance between the economic and strategic interests of the ASEAN and its own disputes with China, alongside other challenges including doubts about the extent and shape of U.S. engagement under U.S. President Donald Trump.

Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy - September 17, 2018

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat exploring the role of Southeast Asia in India's idea of the Indo-Pacific construct. In "Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy," I argue that New Delhi’s approach to Southeast Asia within the wider Indo-Pacific region is strategically sound but has limits.



India’s approach to Southeast Asia has been lately shifting from one dominated by trade and development to one in which strategic considerations play an important complementary role. This has taken a new form, and is now called the “Act East” Policy, marking also an expansion to include other Indo-Pacific countries.

But there are some doubts about whether the ASEAN countries are entirely comfortable with the idea of the “Indo-Pacific.” Several ASEAN states have been lukewarm to the idea, worried about having to take sides between the United States and China. This raises questions about the viability of India’s new “ASEAN-centric” approach to the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN’s weaknesses in managing China is becoming more evident every day. While its success in regional economic integration is undeniable, on more fractious political issues, ASEAN was always less effective. These divisions have become far deeper when it comes to China. It is not clear that ASEAN will be able to act in a united manner when it comes to the South China Sea or on matters relating to China.

Smaller ASEAN countries are still wary of inviting China’s wrath by an open embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept. This is, paradoxically, a consequence of ASEAN’s success in integrating economically with China, making it hard for these countries to break with Beijing. This is particularly so for smaller countries like Cambodia, though several bigger players like Malaysia and Singapore have been resistant as well. ASEAN, therefore, is a divided house.

For the full article, click here.



New Delhi has no good options to deal with this problem. It is probably this recognition that has led India to stress additional platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) which includes Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal.

There has also been some suggestion from experts that BIMSTEC could be expanded to include countries such as Indonesia. On the other hand, BIMSTEC has also so far been less than a grand success. Though India has recently attempted to revive BIMSTEC – partly to sideline the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes Pakistan – New Delhi’s efforts have sometimes fallen flat. An effort to expand the scope of BIMSTEC by conducting its first-ever military exercise saw two countries, Nepal and Thailand, refusing to join.

India and other countries are also stepping up efforts to chip away at one source of ASEAN’s dependence on China – infrastructural aid. India and Japan, along with the United States, have already started doing this. The private sector in India and Japan are also joining the United States under the Indo-Pacific Business Forum to promote infrastructure.

Such measures would provide real choices to countries in ASEAN and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific that are otherwise stuck with China. India and its partners have had some success in pointing out the flaws in China’s model of infrastructure “aid,” which has at times led to debt traps that forced countries to give up valuable assets to China. This new form of neocolonialism is now well recognized. But without alternatives, the temptations of China’s checkbook diplomacy are hard to resist for many smaller countries. Thus, infrastructural assistance has to be an integral part of any strategy to counter China’s efforts in this direction.

The downside here is that India does not enjoy a very good track record in this regard. Despite the rhetoric of a strengthened outreach, the capacity to extend regional connectivity and infrastructure building has been insufficient. The Modi government too appears to have laid more emphasis in its official statements, with very little to show on the ground. The trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand is a case in point: though Thailand has completed its part of the highway, India has yet to do so on the Indian side of the border.

India’s poor track record in its infrastructure building in India’s Northeast is yet another indicator. If India cannot develop even its own connectivity with ASEAN, its pledges to help others in ASEAN with infrastructure are bound to sound hollow. India needs to do more to convert its rhetoric into reality.

India clearly wants to help ASEAN stand up to China because it is in New Delhi’s interest. But while there is little doubt about New Delhi’s desires, ASEAN countries are likely to look for actual deliveries rather than promises. India’s repeated assertion of ASEAN-centrality has so far not given ASEAN countries – especially the smaller ones – sufficient reason to hope that India can be an effective substitute for China. This will only deepen the existing divisions within ASEAN and make India’s ASEAN-centrality strategy that much more difficult to accomplish.

More than just a buzzword: How can Asia’s democracies bring the Indo-Pacific to life? -

Earlier this week, I wrote a short essay on the Indo-Pacific for the Asia & the Pacific Policy Society's Policy Forum, Australian National University. I argue that even as more and more countries are buying in to the Indo-Pacific construct, they must overcome the problems of coordination and burden-sharing if the concept is to have strategic teeth.



For the full essay, click here.

The idea of the Indo-Pacific is not entirely new, although it has certainly received much more attention in recent years. And as the result of changing power dynamics in Asia and beyond, many more countries are becoming comfortable with the construct.

In one of its earliest articulations, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe promoted the Indo-Pacific concept when he addressed a joint session of the Indian Parliament in 2007. As he spoke about the confluence of the two seas, he said “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form.”

Former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, while addressing his East Asian counterparts at the India-ASEAN Commemorative Summit in 2012, noted that India seeks with them a future that is “inter-linked”, for which “a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region is crucial.”

Similarly, former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa called for a region-wide treaty to safeguard an Indo-Pacific “engine for global economic growth.”

Australia, in its 2013 Defence White Paper introduced the concept formally, becoming one of the first countries to officially adopt the term, which was only natural considering the two-ocean geography of the country.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi talked about the Indo-Pacific concept recently at the Shangri-La Dialogue. He said: “India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region is a positive one … India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. Nor as a grouping that seeks to dominate. And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.”

Though the term has been around for a few years, there is still a lack of clarity about its meaning. It broadly refers to the idea of the Indian and Pacific oceans as a single geographical construct, as Abe mentioned in his speech. While there are economic and other linkages that can be attached to the Indo-Pacific concept, it is the political, strategic, and possibly military aspects that have gained greater prominence because of the underlying geopolitical tensions in the region.

More on this:Podcast: the rise of the Indo-Pacific
The idea of Indo-Pacific is that the Indian and Pacific oceans are increasingly a unified and shared strategic space. This implies that what happens in the Indian Ocean will impact on the Pacific Ocean.

Despite these differences, the number of countries embracing the term as a useful strategic idea has increased. Most recently, France reiterated the importance of the concept as its President Emmanuel Macron visited Australia. Using the term means acknowledging the strategic consequences of China’s rise and its muscular policies, and the general balancing strategy underway within Asia.

One of the reasons why India has embraced the term is because ‘Asia-Pacific’ is seen by many to exclude India, even though China’s rise affects everybody in the region. So, Indo-Pacific is a way for India to include itself in the Asia-Pacific, and for the Asia-Pacific to bring India into the mix. This is only natural. Given its geographical location above the Indian Ocean, India’s role cannot be ignored. A country with a vast coastline of 7,500 kilometres and 1,380 islands, more than two million square kilometres of Exclusive Economic Zone, and emerging blue water naval capabilities, will have an important role to play irrespective of geographical or definitional issues.

But it should also be noted that the Indo-Pacific plays out almost entirely as a maritime construct rather than a continental one.

More on this:what should we make of the ‘Indo-Pacific’?
There are a couple of problems that need to be faced. While the Indo-Pacific concept has gained greater salience for larger powers, there is more reluctance on the part of smaller countries because they are understandably concerned about a negative reaction from China. China has taken due note of the concept’s growing popularity and it could turn out to be a lot more aggressive in countering it in the coming years.

Another problem that has to be resolved is how to combine the different concerns, even if they are all about China. Many Pacific powers (Japan, US, Australia, New Zealand) want to focus on countering China’s power in the Pacific and the South China Sea. But India is obviously concerned more about China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. Thus, there are those who argue that India’s Indian Ocean focus and its capacity constraints to exercise any serious power projection will limit New Delhi’s role. In the Indo-Pacific it will be diplomatic, economic and rhetorical.

The question is how to bring about better coordination between these two sets of concerns. For proponents of the Indo-Pacific, there is a need to start focusing on some form of burden-sharing. Without it, coordinated action – and the goal of making the Indo-Pacific concept more than just a strategic buzzword – is going to be difficult.

Military Diplomacy: Time for India to Go Proactive, my article published in The Diplomatist...

Here's an article of mine, wherein I make case for India to effectively use military diplomacy in its conduct of diplomacy, published in the year-end special edition on Indian Diplomacy (December 2013).

Today military diplomacy is construed as one of the essential tools in the pursuit of a nation’s foreign policy. This would mean utilisation of all defence activities and platforms including exchange of international military personnel, visits of ships and aircrafts, engagement of the civil, military bureaucracies and defence ministers, military training and exercises, regional and global defence meetings and forums. India, however, has been shy of using military diplomacy as an active tool in its diplomacy. What is not clear is whether this has been a deliberate attempt on India’s part or more a result of bureaucratic and political inertia. However, India has to become proactive in using military diplomacy in furthering its own national interests.

What Is Military Diplomacy?
Diplomacy is broadly described as the art and practice of pursuing a nation’s foreign relations, and military diplomacy is defined as the conduct of foreign policy by the men in uniform or even the civilian defence departments. As mentioned earlier, this involves military exchanges and accordingly these are categorised under heads such as defence exchanges to include joint training with the militaries of foreign countries.

While this broader definition has come to be used by a considerable number of countries, China, which has used military diplomacy in an effective manner, defines it from a narrower perspective, to say “foreign affairs work performed by defence institutions and armed forces.” (Matsuda Yasuhiro, “An Essay on China’s Military Diplomacy: Examination of Intentions in Foreign Strategy,” NIDS Security Repors, No. 7, December 2006, p. 3.) Yasuhiro, one of the prominent scholars on the subject, quotes Chinese authors who have differentiated military diplomacy from political or regular diplomacy by stating that military diplomacy is “all diplomatic activities relating to national security and military diplomatic activities.” (Yasuhiro quotes Yang Songhe, Junshi waijiao gailun (Survey of Military Diplomacy), Junshi yiwen chubanshe, Beijing, 1999.)

It may be true that military diplomacy does not differ in significant terms from the regular diplomacy in its content given that visits, meetings, exchanges, negotiations, participating in international conferences, treaty signings and exchanges of diplomatic documents are important aspects of military diplomacy. The difference lies in the fact that these would be conducted primarily by men in uniform or otherwise civilians in the defence ministries and that the content would have a large role for the military. However, these functions will form an important part of the larger foreign and security policy goals and ideals dictated by the political leadership. Broadly, military diplomacy has the following objectives: training of one’s own military for any emergency situation, strengthening of ties with other countries, sales of weapons and military technologies, and more importantly establishment of a sphere of influence as also learn a lot about foreign militaries, their way of working, their equipments through direct interaction with such organizations. The exercises are also big opportunities for signalling and messaging about a nation’s security interests and challenges to the foreign countries. If one were to look at the now routine SCO-China military exercises, which started way back in 2007, China announced that it intends to fight the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Despite Russia’s wariness and apprehensions of a rising China, it has been an active participant in these exercises. The exercises were also part of the Chinese efforts to limit the US influence in these countries, as much as an effort to strengthen bilateral and multilateral dealings with these countries. These exercises have also provided an opportunity to understand other militaries’ organizational ethos, culture, philosophies, strengths and weaknesses and most importantly get a sense of the other military’s modernisation processes. Forums like Shangri-La Dialogue are also becoming important conduits for conducting military diplomacy.

The major aspects of military diplomacy include military and strategic level undertakings including defence consultations and strategic dialogues, arms transfers, regional activities, including state to state military protocols, opening of military bases, participation in bilateral and multilateral military exercises, professional military education exchanges, including Track 1.5 and Track II dialogues besides cooperation in non-traditional security areas, like sending armed forces to counter-terrorism exercises, UN Peacekeeping operations, disaster management operations. Military diplomacy also includes: exchange of military attaches, visits by military delegations, military study abroad, participation in international arms control and disarmament programmes, arms import and export, and military assistance to friendly countries.

Military Diplomacy – India
India has been lagging behind in using military diplomacy as an effective tool in its diplomacy. But this has been changing in the last few years. India has recognised the crucial importance of military diplomacy to strengthen this beyond the narrow traditional level of bilateral joint exchanges to include multilateral exercises in our neighbourhood and beyond and also to engage in arms sales. Traditionally, this aspect of arms sales has been left to our neighbours such as Pakistan and China, who have been active in promoting this aspect of diplomacy and thus gaining greater influence beyond their immediate neighbourhood.

India’s participation in the quadrilateral exercises with the US, Japan, Australia was one of the major demonstrations of India taking big steps in this regard. In addition, India has enhanced its defence ties with some of the Southeast Asian countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore, who have been prompting an increased role and presence of India in Southeast Asia over the years. Signing of a defence cooperation pact with Singapore in 2004, for instance, drastically changed the fabric of New Delhi’s defence ties in the region. The manner in which the Indian Navy was able to quickly respond, first on its own, sending 35 ships, and later joined by the US, Japan, Australia in ensuring rapid response and relief, post-Tsunami 2004 was a spectacular display of the soft power aspects of India’s military capabilities. As part of its military diplomacy in Southeast Asia, India (as also Japan) has also been active in stepping up the maritime capabilities of key countries, particularly in meeting the challenges of piracy, sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). These have included regular regional and bilateral dialogues on the safety of SLOCs, coordinated patrols, port calls by ships, training of naval officers in Indian military institutions, and intelligence sharing particularly on maritime affairs. India has also been pursuing several trilateral partnerships in this regard including the US, Japan, India framework.

As regards India’s joint military exercises, India has been fairly active. For example, the Indian Navy has conducted exercises with navies of several friendly countries, including with the French Navy (the Varuna Exercise(s)), the British Navy (the Konkan Exercise(s)), the Russian Navy (the Indra Exercise(s)), the MALABAR series with the US Navy, SIMBEX with the Singapore Navy, Japanese Maritime Self Defense Forces and the Chinese PLA Navy among others. Taking India’s Look East Policy forward, India has intensified its engagement with the ASEAN nations. In December 2012, the India-ASEAN relations were raised to the level of a strategic partnership, in recognition of the security and strategic interests that are gaining a greater say. Similarly, Indian ships have also made regular port calls in Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Libya, Greece, Oman, Thailand, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, South Africa, Kenya, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain and Kuwait. Initiatives involving the IBSA countries (India, Brazil and South Africa) have been on since 2008 – the first joint naval exercise, IBSAMAR I was held in 2008; a second one in 2010. The IBSA series of exercises has been of a sophisticated nature involving live-fire drills, radio compatibility and Visit, Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) exercises as well as anti-aircraft and anti-terrorist drills. Additional measures to strengthen military-to-military cooperation are being explored, especially given the issue of piracy on both the eastern and western coast of Africa. These challenges have also prompted this group to take up issues of ocean governance and freedom of navigation. Unlike the BRICS, the IBSA has far greater potential for military cooperation given that these countries do not share any history of conflict with each other.

In dealing with some of its neighbours, for instance, India has been much more pragmatic than idealistic. India has also been moving closer to Vietnam, with an eye on the rising China factor for both the countries. New Delhi has paid closer attention to Hanoi’s needs, particularly in enhancing its air and maritime capabilities. It has offered huge aid and assistance on both these fronts. In addition, India has also considering the idea of forging closer military ties with Myanmar given the growing Chinese reach in that country. While India along with China had come in for criticism for its proposed arms sales to Myanmar, India-Myanmar military-to-military relations have been warming up. All the three Indian service chiefs had visited Myanmar in the past one year – a sign of the closer bilateral ties and a sign of India gaining greater comfort in pursuing military diplomacy. Despite the apparent close ties with Beijing, Myanmar’s Navy Chief Vice Admiral Thura Thet Swe was in India for closer military cooperation with India. This visit secured higher number of slots for the Myanmarese military officers in Indian military installations, in addition to higher number of air force officers, especially helicopter pilots, to be trained in India. The Indian Shipyard will also be constructing at least four Offshore Patrol Vehicles (OPV) for use by the Myanmarese Navy. In the recent years, Myanmar had procured 105 mm artillery guns, mortars, armoured personnel carriers (APVs) and rifles from India.

Compared to even a decade back, India has made taken major strides in pushing military diplomacy to a new level. Even as that is the case, it has to do more in order to gain influence and leverage, both closer to home and far. India has not only increased the nature and intensity of its military interactions with others but has also strengthened its reach by increasing the number of military officers posted abroad as Defence Attaches and military advisers. Through woken up late to the idea, India is beginning to get a firmer grip on effectively running military diplomacy.

Arms Sales Should be A Big Part of Military Diplomacy
While there have been several important considerations including technological, economic and commercial, India has shied away from pursuing arms sales as an important aspect of its military diplomacy. However, a more critical consideration should have been the strategic considerations, which is to prevent China or Pakistan from gaining particular advantage in spheres of Indian influence and concern.

Accordingly, India should have considered sale of arms and such other items including the Brahmos cruise missile and the INSAS small arms systems to a number of countries who have been on a look-out. Regarding Brahmos, since it was jointly developed with Russia, there have been issues to work out with Moscow before India could make deals. However, these are problems that can be ironed out if India acknowledges the need to do so. For instance, Brahmos has been looked at with keen interest in South Africa, South Korea and Vietnam. Commercial considerations coupled with strategic interests in all of these three countries should be significant drivers pushing India in this direction. Similarly, several smaller western African countries have shown interest in India’s INSAS small arms systems.

India could consider other weapon systems for export purposes such as the Dhruv – the Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH). Dhruv, being a multi-role new generation helicopter, produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd., is believed to have a variety of capabilities, including heliborne assault, logistic support, casualty evacuation, reconnaissance and training, besides its utility as air observation post. Dhruv has appeared in a few international air shows including the 2007 Paris Air Show and potential buyers have been identified as well. HAL entered into deal with Chile to sell six; two to Bolivia, among others. India’s ship-building capabilities are considered fine. Until now, India has been building destroyers though it is also building its own aircraft carrier. India builds whole range of smaller boats, ships, frigates, missile boats, patrol boats, and OPVs. Southeast Asia will provide itself as potential buyers given the nature of challenges faced by the countries in this region.

Among non-lethal weapons, India could possibly sell trucks, other military vehicles and radars. India is already selling trucks to the Malaysian Army; other military vehicles to some African countries and air defence radars – Indra - have been supplied to Sri Lanka. While the effectiveness of the Indra radars has been debated, they nevertheless serve some limited purpose.

Conclusion
Military diplomacy, conducted as part of India’s overall diplomacy, will act as a significant catalyst in strengthening its ties with friendly countries. Successive joint military exercises with a range of nations would further deepen the content and form of bilateral ties. India needs to pursue military diplomacy much more aggressively in order to create a strategic space for itself in India’s own neighbourhood, before losing out to Beijing and Islamabad that have been cashing on India’s lethargic approach in this arena. Keeping in mind larger strategic interests and not just commercial ones, India needs to step up arms transfer relations with important countries.

However, if India has to succeed in this arena, it has to create a strategic industry with significant private sector participation. Private sector participation that could boost India’s own defence sector will also be in a position to drive a profit-driven business if India’s arms export policy is revamped. India has to craft an innovative policy that will minimise delay and red tapism that have been a curse with our state-owned enterprises.

Revamping India’s arms export policy would also involve keeping up to date with the global export control lists such as that of the Waasenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines, which could also go to strengthen India’s own candidature in to these groupings.