Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh.

Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020.

Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing.

For the full essay, click here.



Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted.

After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York tweeted, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said:

We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.

Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well.

Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.”

Despite that slightly gentler tone, India responded harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent interview, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship.

This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi said publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation.

India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar stated that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual meeting with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.

There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time.

Calls for India to Play the Taiwan Card Grow Louder - The Diplomat, 9 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the growing calls for strengthening India's relations with Taiwan. I argued that as tensions simmer between New Delhi and Beijing, some have called for India to focus on developing stronger relations with Taiwan.

Amid the continuing border standoff, there is increasing public antagonism toward China in India. This matches growing anger among Indian elites toward China and India’s current China policy, which I wrote about last week. This is leading to more public discussion about possible asymmetric diplomatic strategies to challenge China, such as altering India’s “one China policy” to enhance India’s relations with Taiwan.

For the full essay, click here.



For example, a prominent Indian national newspaper, Indian Express, editorialized in May that India should be pragmatic in considering the question of Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Assembly: the decision “should not be made either out of peevishness or fear.” The editorial argued that New Delhi should judge the issue on “apolitical appreciation of the specific technical issues involved.” Thus, though the paper did not call for changing India’s general policy on China and Taiwan, it was a reflection of the growing debate about the general unhappiness with India’s ultra-cautious policy when it comes to China.

Other opinions have been much more insistent. The Times of India, editorializing on the same issue, asked the government to “not shy away from supporting Taiwan.” The editorial went one step further than the Indian Express by saying that this should remain an important aspect of the reform of the World Health Organization (WHO). It also argued that India should stop being “overly deferential to Beijing” when China has routinely worked against Indian interests in the UN and other multilateral organizations. The Times of India concluded that “if Delhi is to get itself taken seriously, it must demonstrate that it can stand up and be counted.”

It should be noted that this is not the first time that the Times of India has taken such a stand on Taiwan. In 2019, in the wake of Chinese threats to Taiwan, the paper put out an editorial arguing that India should step up its cooperation with Taiwan. It also made reference to a 2018 Indian Parliamentary Standing Committee report on India-China relations, which called for stronger partnership between India and Taiwan, adding that it was strange that India has shied away from cooperating with Taiwan, whereas Taipei and Beijing had active trade and investment ties despite their political disagreements.

Such views are finding greater traction. Sana Hashmi, formerly a consultant with India’s Ministry of External Affairs and currently a Taiwan Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University in Taipei, argued for a stronger role for Taiwan in India’s Indo-Pacific strategic construct. She suggested that the recent Sino-Indian border clash in Galwan was an apt moment for India to start engaging with Taiwan more seriously. She cautioned, however, that India-Taiwan ties should not be approached just through the China angle, but that Beijing’s recent behavior has provided an opening for developing greater traction in relations between New Delhi and Taipei.

Echoing similar sentiments, Namrata Hasija, a research associate at the Delhi-based Centre for China Analysis and Strategy, asserts that India must stop seeing Taiwan through the China lens that gets activated every time there is tension in Sino-Indian ties. Instead, she argues that it is time for India to develop independent ties with Taiwan across economic and strategic sectors.

Highlighting that Taiwan was one of the first countries to send medical equipment to India, former diplomat G. Parthasarathy also made the case for India to strengthen its relations with Taiwan. He added that Taiwan offers opportunities for cooperation in several key sectors, especially in India’s semiconductor industry, which could also possibly reduce India’s reliance on China in the electronics and communication industries. He added that this also fits well with the general objective of other Indian strategic partners such as the United States, Japan, and South Korea in diversifying global supply chains.

This, of course, is music to the ears of Taiwanese electronic industry giants such as Foxconn, which have wanted a stronger presence in India. Amid the border standoff, Foxconn’s Chairman Liu Young-Way, while speaking at its annual general meeting, portrayed India as a “bright spot” for the company’s growth and expansion. He said that the Foxconn is “fully pushing ahead with next steps there, and maybe in a few months’ time we can reveal on our website the next steps and report back to everyone. We’ll have further investment there.” Currently, Foxconn has most of its factories in China and possible entry into India will form part of the recent plans of many industries to shift their base out of China. Others are less sanguine and worry about the consequence of Sino-Indian tensions on their businesses.

Understandably, Taiwanese opinion supports closer ties with India. For example, Taipei Times called on Taiwan to “deepen ties with India, in particular economic, military and intelligence ties, to contain Chinese expansionism and put Xi back into his box.” This also fits well with President Tsai Ing-wen’s New Southbound policy which has a particular focus on India.

It is unlikely that the extremely cautious Modi government will accept such suggestions. But the calls for greater engagement with Taiwan are a clear sign of popular and elite Indian anger and frustration in dealing with China.

Sino-Indian Competition in Myanmar in the Spotlight With Indian Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, February 24, 2020

I have been lagging with my blog posts but I am trying to get it back on track. Here's a short essay on the Sino-Indian competition in Myanmar, I did for The Diplomat in February. The Indian Navy Chief who was on a visit to Myanmar a couple of weeks ago again focused attention on the role of India and China in the Southeast Asian state, even though New Delhi’s weakness lies more in non-security realms.

Last week, India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Karambir Singh visited Myanmar in a trip lasting from February 17 to 20. The trip, which came just weeks after Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to the country, spotlighted the tussle between China and India for influence in the Southeast Asian state.

Myanmar has long factored into India’s strategic calculations: Delhi considers relations with Myanmar to be very important, particularly in the context of evolving Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics, and Myanmar is also a key link in furthering India’s ‘Act East’ Policy. For China, which has a bigger political and economic footprint in Myanmar, its inroads into Myanmar have geostrategic implications because it gives Beijing proximity to the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, maritime space that is crucial to Indian security.

For the full essay, click here.



But India nonetheless continues to compete and consolidate its ties with Myanmar for its own interests. As the statement from the Indian Ministry of Defense said, Admiral Singh’s “visit is intended to consolidate and enhance the bilateral maritime relations between India and Myanmar.”

That was seen in aspects of the visit itself as well. During his visit, Admiral Singh called on a range of top officials, including Admiral Tin Aung San, commander in chief of the Myanmar Navy, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander in Chief of Defense Services, and other senior government officials, including Aung San Suu Kyi, the State Counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

During his meeting with Admiral Tin Aung San, Adm. Singh offered increased training assistance for the Myanmar Navy. The Indian Navy chief is reported to have briefed the officials on the state of cooperation between the two navies. The navy chief also held interactions with trainees of the National Defense College in Naypyidaw and visited the Naval Dockyard and Training Command of the Myanmar Navy in Yangon.

These gains were notable but not necessarily surprising. The defense aspect of the relationship has been built on by both sides over the past few years, including not just regular exercises, visits, and training, but also defense equipment, with a case in point being when India handed over a diesel-electric Kilo-class submarine, INS Sindhuvir, which India refurbished after procuring from Russia in the 1980s.

Furthermore, the challenge for India in competing with China in Myanmar lies less in the naval domain and more in other aspects. In the economic domain, for instance, India’s lack of capacity to reach out and address many of Myanmar’s requirements is stark, especially when pitted against China and its Belt and Road initiative. Key projects, such as the trilateral India-Myanmar-Thailand highway project and the multi-modal Kaladhan Transit Transport project, are behind schedule.

Myanmar’s importance to India cannot emphasized enough. Given India’s push for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Myanmar remains a critical pillar for closer engagement with the southeast Asian region. But New Delhi is still to resolve its problem with delivering on its promises.

What Does the New Counterterrorism Exercise Mean for the Quad? - The Diplomat, December 6, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recently concluded counter-terrorism exercise of the Quad. Certainly, the recent development again put the minilateral arrangement in the headlines.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) between the U.S., Japan, India and Australia has often been questioned about its purpose and capacity. For critics, other than occasionally irritating Beijing, the Quad did not appear to have much purpose. And, at times, even these expressions of occasional irritation from China had been sufficient to send one or the other Quad countries into a funk.

But in the last two years, the Quad has slowly become somewhat sturdier, with the level of interaction between the countries improving, and the members themselves becoming less skittish when Beijing criticizes the venture. Now, the Quad countries have taken a new step, holding a table-top counter-terrorism exercise together. What can we make of this?

For the full post, click here.



Details are skimpy. India has hosted the first counter-terrorism table-top exercise (CT-TTX) among the Quad countries in New Delhi on November 21-22. India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA), which hosted the TTX, is reported to have said the exercise is meant to assess and validate counter-terror mechanisms against a range of existing and emerging terrorist threats at both the regional and global levels.

At the most basic level, the CT-TTX is not surprising considering India’s concern about the issue. India’s own insufficient military capabilities are well-known, and New Delhi has been open to cooperation in this regard. This is clearly an important reason why India has shown willingness to tie up with the Quad on counter-terrorism.

The exercise was also aimed at sharing best practices in terms of preparedness, mitigation strategies and in developing coordinated strategies, and to expand the areas for strengthened cooperation among the four Quad countries. Seen from that perspective, the exercise would help highlight the interagency coordination issues within each of the countries and also bolster the multi-agency coordination between security and counter-terror agencies among the four countries.

The exercise is significant because this was the first concrete joint security initiative by the four countries. The TTX also reflected the shared resolve among the Quad countries in addressing a major challenge they all face. Importantly, though this was a security exercise, it did not target China. But still, it is a step up from the usual HA/DR type of exercises that many of these countries, especially India, prefers. The fact that the Quad has been upgraded to foreign ministerial platform is also an important indicator of the significance the four participating countries attach to the Quad.

That said, one should not exaggerate the significance of this development. The Quad’s revival and the carrying out of the exercise reconfirms the fact that the original concerns that led to the Quad were valid and getting more serious. But the level of commitment of different countries within the Quad has been suspect, and their mutual trust is still a work in progress.

India is no exception to this. On the one hand, India has been open to the Quad as one of several mechanisms that allows it to build on partnerships without entering into alliances, and China’s behavior and its hostility (despite the Chennai informal summit) towards India has pushed New Delhi to be less reluctant about the Quad. But on the other hand, for the time-being, India’s willingness to participate in the Quad is limited to testing out non-military alliance initiatives such as the CT-TTX to assess the possibilities and limitations.

India Must Look Beyond ASEAN in Regional Security - The Diplomat, 8 November 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India's diplomatic outreach to ASEAN and the possible limits to that engagement. I argue that in recognition of ASEAN’s limitations, New Delhi must also continue to strengthen its ties with other institutions, frameworks, and countries as well.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in Thailand recently for three major summits – the India-ASEAN Summit, the East Asia Summit, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Summit. His visit was focused on a number of issues such as trade and connectivity, as well as security partnerships.

India’s diplomatic establishment was keen to highlight this aspect of India’s engagement of ASEAN. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), in a special press briefing on Modi’s visit, said “The ASEAN-related summits are an integral part of our diplomatic calendar,” highlighting the fact that this was Modi’s ASEAN-India summit and sixth East Asia Summit.”

With India’s renewed focus on Southeast Asia with the Act East Policy, this should not surprise anyone. But while India sees a central role for the ASEAN in its Indo-Pacific strategy, it also needs to be cognizant of the fact that ASEAN has its own limitations.

For the full post, click here.



India has been keen on warming up its ties to Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. It initially adopted what was called the “Look East” policy which emphasized trade and economic linkages, but over the last decade this relationship has evolved into one that is at least equally concerned with security and strategic considerations. The policy was rebranded as “Act East” under the Modi government, to emphasize greater activism and commitment on India’s part. In January 2018, India hosted the 25th anniversary of the India-ASEAN friendship and the 15th year of the India-ASEAN summit, in which all the ten ASEAN leaders participated.

Clearly, this new approach is dictated by India’s concern about China. But if that is so, it is not clear how far ASEAN will or can go in balancing China. ASEAN’s tepid reaction to the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept is reflective of the ASEAN’s wariness in annoying China. Earlier in the year, ASEAN did release its “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” document, which was appreciated by New Delhi, which saw this as converging with its own Act East policy. But managing China would require a more coherent strategy and ASEAN has not been able to present a unified front when it comes to China. This division within ASEAN will likely only get deeper as Beijing becomes more muscular.

Thus far, in the face of China’s extensive economic linkages with the region, ASEAN has found it harder to take strong positions against China. While it has been particularly hard for smaller countries like Cambodia and Laos, even bigger players such as Malaysia have said they cannot afford to confront China. Most recently, the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad said that “Malaysia does not want to take a confrontational stance toward China over the disputed South China Sea and Beijing’s alleged mistreatment of its minority Uighur Muslims.”

In the face of a divided ASEAN, India needs to strengthen its engagement with the region through other but associated platforms such as the East Asia Summit which includes key Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, Japan and the United States. Many analysts believe that despite East Asia Summit being a key leaders forum, it has never gained the kind of traction that APEC or the G-20 has. However, they argue that it has the potential to become a major platform because of the “broad remit” it enjoys and the “inclusive” nature of the institution.

Other initiatives proposed by India also bear careful watching. At this year’s East Asia Summit, Modi proposed a new initiative called the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, which is a reiteration of India’s commitment towards a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific region based on a rules-based order. The new initiative enlarges the focus on the strategic maritime space in the Indo-Pacific and is also a clear indicator of India’s willingness to address China’s maritime aggressiveness in an emphatic manner. The proposal was reportedly welcomed by ASEAN’s outgoing chair, Thailand, as well as Australia. Vijay Thakur Singh, Secretary of the MEA, detailed Modi’s new initiative as “creating partnerships among interested States in several pillars ranging from enhancing maritime security to preserving and sustainably using marine resources, building capacity, disaster prevention and management as well as working together in trade and maritime transport.”

On the sidelines of these summits, there was also a consultative meeting of the Quad countries where the Quad members reiterated “their commitment towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region based on shared values and principles and respect for international law” while reflecting on “ongoing and additional practical cooperation in the areas of connectivity and infrastructure development, and security matters, including counterterrorism, cyber and maritime security, with a view to promoting peace, security, stability, prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.” This came in the backdrop of a status report on the Indo-Pacific strategy from the U.S. State Department which also highlighted a “critical role” for India in the Indo-Pacific.

New Delhi is likely to continue to engage in large regional meetings and summits, but is probably also likely to step up engagement at bilateral and trilateral levels as well as the Quad and other minilaterals. A thicket of overlapping partnerships with like-minded partners is a better bet than following just single-track partnership with ASEAN alone. In order to develop concrete ideas on the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, India’s efforts cannot be limited to a normative exercise alone. Strategic partnerships with other key (and financially more capable) Indo-Pacific powers such as Japan has also become crucial.

How Will Recent Tensions Impact India’s Tsentr 2019 Participation? - The Diplomat, 27 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the multinational military exercise, Tsentr 2019. New Delhi’s expected involvement amid recent tensions with some other participants will make for interesting dynamics.

Russia is getting ready to host the 2019 edition of the Tsentr military exercises in the middle of September. The exercise is usually conducted by the Russian armed forces alone, but in a sign of its expansion, back in 2018, Russia invited China to join. The joint exercise ended up being of the biggest multinational military exercises ever, involving a total of about 300,000 troops.

This year, interestingly, Russia invited India to be part of this exercise. New Delhi had accepted the invitation and is expected to be participating. But the recent tensions between India and some of the other participants should make for an interesting dynamic at the event.

For the full post, click here.



Russia has invited a number of Central Asian countries as well as China to the exercise, in addition to India. But according to at least one report, in the Moscow Times, the exercise will include troops from Pakistan also, in addition to Russia, China, India, and four Central Asian Republics — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, a report in an Indian newspaper has said that Pakistan will not be part of the 2019 edition of these exercises. A Chinese report on the upcoming exercise also did not mention Pakistan’s participation. Thus it is unclear whether Pakistan has been invited or whether it will take part.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, a total of 128,000 troops, more than 20,000 pieces of equipment, 600 aircraft, and up to 15 ships and support vessels will be participating in the upcoming military exercises. New Delhi, according to reports, plans to send 140 military personnel.

The exercise is to be divided into two modules, and will have both a defensive and offensive phase. The first phase of the exercise is to focus on counterterrorism operations, repelling air strikes, reconnaissance and search, and defensive actions whereas the second phase will involve managing troops during massive fire strikes and offensive operations involving simulated hostile forces. As per the Ministry of Defense, these exercises will take place in eight training grounds, including Totsky, Donguz, Adanak, Cherbarkulsky, Yurginsky, Aleysky, and two air defense sites at Ashuluk and Safakulevo.

New Delhi’s acceptance of the Russian invitation is not much of a surprise: India has been keen to demonstrate that its foreign policy continues to maintain a wide set of links. Russia, in particular, is an old strategic partner with which India continues to maintain strong military links. India continues to be deeply dependent on Russian arms in its military forces, and Moscow has been willing to transfer weapon systems such as the Akula-class nuclear-powered submarine (on lease) to India.

India also recently decided to purchase the S-400 long-range air defense missile system from Russia, despite the fact that the United States was very opposed to that purchase and knowing that buying the S-400 could potentially jeopardize any future Indian purchase of advanced American fighter planes such as the F-35. Though Washington is also an important partner for India, New Delhi was reluctant to give in to U.S. demands, especially considering the uncertainties of the Trump administration’s policies.

New Delhi would also not have had much objection to participating along with China in a joint exercise in Russia. India and China have conducted joint bilateral military exercises recently. India has been keen to improve relations with China after the Doklam confrontation in 2017, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping were supposed to hold a second “informal” summit in India, to follow up on the one held in Wuhan last year.

However, the recent Sino-Indian spat over India’s decision to withdraw the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and New Delhi’s decision to make the Ladakh region a separate union territory to be administered directly from New Delhi has worsened relations. New Delhi was miffed at China’s active efforts at the UN Security Council to target India. It remains to be seen if this will have any impact on India’s participation in the Tsentr military exercise.

If Pakistan has been invited to the exercise, it will be yet another wrinkle, because Pakistan has vociferously objected to India’s Article 370 decision and it was Islamabad that took the issue to the UNSC. New Delhi will also likely see any Russian invitation to Pakistan to join the exercise as one more example of Moscow’s increasing closeness to Islamabad. New Delhi is already unhappy with Russia’s behavior at the UNSC; this will further deepen Indian unhappiness.

It is extremely unlikely that India will take any dramatic steps, such as withdrawing from the exercise. But Indian discomfort with Russia, which is already growing, is likely to worsen if a Pakistani contingent also shows up at the exercise.

What Did India’s Foreign Secretary Achieve on His Trip to Russia? - The Diplomat, April 12, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Indian Foreign Secretary's visit to Russia. Recently, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, the most senior bureaucrat in India’s foreign ministry, completed a visit to Russia. The visit shed light on the ongoing collaboration between the two countries and the opportunities and challenges for the relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



Unsurprisingly, official accounts of the visit focused on areas of collaboration, most of it already ongoing. The Russian embassy release said that the two countries examined “cooperation within the BRICS format, the current issues of the key multilateral export control regimes, including New Delhi’s application for NSG [Nuclear Suppliers Group] membership, other non-proliferation and arms control issues, as well as topical international issues of mutual interest.”

The evolving situation in Afghanistan too was covered by the two leaders. The foreign secretary is reported to have also met Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov for Foreign Office Consultations, where they “reviewed the implementation of the decisions of the 19th Annual Bilateral Summit” between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin in 2018.

The two officials also discussed the upcoming high-level meetings, including India’s participation at the Eastern Economic Forum. Putin has reportedly invited India to participate in the Forum, which is to take place in Vladivostok in September this year.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of External Affairs press release on the visit characterized the meetings as “in-depth and productive, characteristic of the Special & Privileged Strategic Partnership between India and Russia.” The statement added, “The meetings resulted in enhanced mutual convergence and coordination of views on all major regional and international issues in the spirit of long standing and time-tested friendship between India and Russia.”

Despite the ongoing collaboration in these areas, the visit, and the official accounts of it, belie the mixed nature of actual ties. In fact, while India and Russia have had a long and warm relationship historically and Russia remains an important strategic partner (it is one of only two countries India has an annual bilateral summit with, the other being Japan), structural trends are pulling them in different directions.

Part of it has to do with perceptions on both sides. On India’s side, it can at times appear not to acknowledge the reality that Russia needs China far more than it needs India, and that its own diversification of partners in both the economic and security domains can also raise concerns in Moscow and complicate bilateral dealings. On Russia’s side, there is at times not enough of an appreciation for India’s strategic considerations, including its sensitivities toward China, as well as an acknowledgement that some of Moscow’s foreign policy activities can cause headaches in New Delhi.

But developments have also accelerated these perceptions as well. Russia’s adventurism abroad, including in Ukraine, China’s rise and its increasing convergence with Russia as it does so, rising U.S. competition with both Beijing and Moscow as it has gradually warmed to New Delhi, and upped conversation on the Indo-Pacific and the divergent approaches by India and Russia have all contributed to this.

Seen from this perspective, it is arguably even more important to have visits such as the one we saw from Gokhale, in order for both sides to understand each other. But at the same time, it is also critical to distinguish between the rhetoric that comes out of the visits and the reality of the relationship, especially when the gap between the two can seem to be growing wider in some senses.

Why India’s New Defense Budget Falls Short - The Diplomat, 12 February 2019

For The Diplomat this month, I start with an analysis of the Indian defence budget and highlight that the new budget does little to advance the very objectives the country has outlined for itself.

On February 1, India’s acting Finance Minister Piyush Goyal (presented the Indian interim budget for 2019-20. Unsurprisingly for an election year, there was a big focus on agriculture and social sectors, and the defense allocation was certainly not the highlight.

Specifically, Goyal, in his speech said, “Our Defence Budget will be crossing 3,00,000 crore rupees [INR 3 trillion or about $42 billion] for the first time in 2019-20. For securing our borders and to maintain preparedness of the highest order, if necessary, additional funds would be provided.”

Newspaper headlines highlighted the fact that the defense budget had crossed the INR 3 trillion mark. But the key question is if this is sufficient against the backdrop of growing security challenges and the life-cycle driven military modernization that Indian military forces urgently require.

In fact, the defense allocation in real terms has gone down if one were to look at the rate of inflation and foreign exchange depreciation over the last year. Commenting on the defense budget, Air Marshal Nirdosh Tyagi, a former Deputy Chief of Air Staff, said, “Last defence budget had increase of just about 7.7 percent over the previous year. Inflation and rupee depreciation more than neutralized this. Thus, no increase in real terms.” Other commentators also echoed this general sentiment that Indian defense budget has stagnated.

For the full essay, click here.



With major plans for defense modernization on the anvil, the current defense allocation is far too meager to make any meaningful progress. In fact, in the last few years, each Indian defense budget has been criticized as being the lowest budget allocation since the 1962 war with China. Indian defense spending in the pre-1962 phase was about 1.5 percent of GDP annually, going up only as a consequence of the disastrous border war with China in late 1962 and the rebuilding of the Indian military that took place subsequently. It peaked at over 4 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s, according to the World Bank (based on SIPRI data), declining since then.

The government has made a total allocation for defense of INR 4.31 trillion which is slightly over 6.35 percent of the revised estimates for 2018-19. The total Ministry of Defense (MoD) budget includes all allocations to the Ministry of Defense, revenue allocations to the three services, Defense R&D Organization (DRDO) and Ordnance Factories and capital allocations to these entities and also defense pensions. Thus, the actual allocation for the defense forces is only INR 3.01 trillion, of which only a third (INR 1.03 trillion) is allocated for capital expenditure, which goes into modernization of the military.

Analysts have provided further break down of the budget in terms of the modernization funds available to army, navy and air force which shows that the resource crunch will continue to be a major problem for all the services. Most of the 6.3 percent hike in the defense budget actually goes to meet the salary and pension requirements, thus making the allocation for modernization a lot smaller than even the previous year. A quick look at the modernization budget shows that Air Force has got the largest share at INR 363.7 billion followed by Army and the Navy at about INR 220 billion.

Why does the continuing almost-stagnant defense allocation create anxieties? This year’s defense allocation is despite the Parliament Committee Report of 2018 which highlighted the serious deficiencies faced by the Indian military. India’s Vice Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Sarath Chand had last year made a case for increasing the budget, telling a parliamentary panel that the budget “has dashed our hopes”. He pointed to the possibility of a two-front war and to the continuing threats that India faced, saying India did not have sufficient funds for emergency necessary purchases, and the army did not have sufficient war reserves to fight a high-intensity war for more than ten days. He is not likely to be pleased with this year’s budget either.

More recently, the Indian Army has released its Land Warfare doctrine which clearly emphasizes a two-front threat scenario (China-Pakistan) for which the Indian Army has to be prepared against, signifying a shift from the single-threat scenario, which was the predominant thinking until a decade ago. Similarly, last year the Indian Air Force (IAF) conducted the Gagan Shakti exercises reportedly with a two-front war scenario.

It is somewhat surprising that a nationalist government that prides itself on a muscular foreign policy devotes so little for defense. While the current budget may be dictated by the impending elections and the need for providing sops to various domestic groups, that does not explain the consistently lower defense budget for several years. This also has an impact on India’s strategic options: India’s much softer approach to China over the last year may very well be dictated by the realization that New Delhi simply does not have the military capacity to do anything else.

my Shangri-La Dialogue Remarks

This was my second time at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue which is Asia's premier defence summit, a unique meeting of ministers and delegates from over 50 countries. 2017 was my first appearance at this premier Dialogue and I had contributed an essay on India's evolving strategic response to China which appeared in the IISS' Regional Security Assessment 2017.

This year, the keynote address was delivered by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This was a much-awaited one, particularly because of the general low-key and irregular participation from the Indian establishment.

This time around, the IISS organised an inaugural female leaders panel to talk about the strategic implications of new technology on the security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. It was a terrific panel featuring Australian Minister of Defence Ms. Marise Payne, Canadian Deputy Minister of Defence Ms. Jody Thomas and CEO of Boeing Defence, Space and Security Ms. Leanne Caret and ably chaired by the IISS’ Deputy Director General Dr. Kori Schake. My brief was to look at the nuclear and space advancements and competition in the Asia Pacific, and also the strategic competition between India and China in the Asia Pacific as it relates to these two domains.

Here is the synopsis of my remarks.

Asia is already rife with mistrust, rivalry, competition and both nuclear and space domains are beginning to see a fresh phase of competition. This is a reflection of the larger geopolitical competition in the Asia Pacific and beyond. While there are several factors that have driven this competition, China’s rise has been most consequential. The rise of China and the strategic uncertainties it has created has necessitated countries like India, US, Japan, Australia and other like-minded countries to come together, though this is still at a nascent stage. The augmentation of nuclear and space capabilities will only accentuate the already existing tensions.

I outlined two sets of concerns each with regard to nuclear and space technologies. On the nuclear front, the key concern is potentially the inability of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to deal with the many challenges which present with serious problems for strategic stability. One is the development of hypersonic weapons. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the potential for surprise attacks, because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers in the region, all of whom are working on developing these weapons. An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially erode the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability. Another evolving technology is BMD, which also has similar problems.

Coming to outer space issues, two issues stand out. There is a growing intensity of competition which is partially due to the increasing number of commercial players and partially due to underlying geopolitical tensions. Outer space has become one more area of the strategic competition on Earth, as seen during the Cold War. This means that the race to return to the moon, as well as to explore the moon and asteroids for mining and resource extraction, are likely to intensify in the coming years. Two, the number of countries using space assets to step up their military capabilities and national security functions has gone up. Also, the fact that states are looking at space utilization for conventional military operations as against the use for strategic operations in the earlier decades, has added a new dimension.

Over and above, automation, machine learning and AI bring in new dynamics to security in the Asia-Pacific.

Finally, I took a couple of minutes to speak about the strategic competition primarily between India and China in the nuclear and space arenas. India’s nuclear weapons programme has been evolving at a slow but steady pace, and it can be expected to continue expanding in both quantity and quality. Like in space and other areas, much of this expansion is driven by the need to build adequate deterrent capacity against China. It is estimated that India currently has around 100 nuclear warheads, of which only half are strategic missiles. But most of India’s long-range missiles are not sufficiently long enough to cover all of China unless they are deployed in northern India. This is true of both the land-based and submarine-based missiles. This means that India will continue developing its capabilities for the near- to long-term but this could trigger negative reactions from China on the one side, and from Pakistan from the other.

However, it must be noted that India is at least a couple of generations behind China and India is not in competition with China in numerical terms but the need to develop certain capabilities and capacities as a deterrent against China will continue. In the space sector, demonstration of China’s military space capabilities, including ASATs, is driving the militarization of India’s space program. This will propel further competition between these two powers.


Type rest of the post here

How India Can Beat China in Nepal, my essay for The Diplomat, April 12, 2018

How India Can Beat China in Nepal, this was my essay for The Diplomat published on April 12, 2018, where I analysed Nepal Prime Minister KP Sharma Oli's visit to India. The visit comes in the wake of a troubled phase in the last couple of years. The recent visit provides an opportunity for India to begin delivering on its bilateral ties with Kathmandu amid growing competition from Beijing.

Nepal’s newly elected Prime Minister, KP Sharma Oli, in keeping with tradition, made his first foreign trip to India last week. Considering that he is generally considered “pro-China,” this must come as a relief to the Indian government.

Moreover, going by his press briefing after his return, it appears that the visit went well, which is yet another surprise. He said that the visit “has increased confidence between India and Nepal and bilateral relations will move forward in a new direction on the basis of equality, mutual respect and interest and enhance cooperation.” He also claimed that the visit has “helped in clearing misunderstanding and mistrust and strengthening mutual trust and understanding.”

The optics during the meeting were also suggestive of a successful meeting. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, congratulating Oli on the successful elections in recent months, said that his principle of “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (Together with all, development for all) and Oli’s vision of “Samruddha Nepal, Sukhi Nepal” (Prosperous Nepal, Happy Nepal) were complimentary in nature. Modi went on to say that, India will cooperate with Nepal in its journey towards greater prosperity but also thoughtfully added that such cooperation “will be based on the priorities and requirements set by the Government of Nepal.”

For the full essay, click here.



New Delhi must be hopeful that this successful visit will undo the damage done by the “unofficial blockade” of 2016. The multi-month blockade resulted in significant hardships for the people of Nepal – it affected everything from petroleum to medicines and earthquake relief material, leading to huge price rise for basic commodities in Nepal. The Indian government, taking up the cause of Madhesis in an aggressive manner and asking Nepal to amend the constitution, created huge resentment towards New Delhi.

Complicating this complex relationship is the China factor. In the face of rising anti-India sentiment, China has only been too happy to step into the role that India played earlier. Further, Nepal’s support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative widened the trust gap between Kathmandu and New Delhi.

Nevertheless, Oli’s visit may be the first step towards repairing the damage generated in the last few years. Oli’s second tenure in office is also seeing a far stronger leader who has been able to consolidate his power, although traction was initially gained on an anti-India platform. Since coming to office, he has taken some populist and smart decisions that affect the people, for instance on the power situation within the country. Parts of Nepal used to witness 16-20 hours if power cuts everyday, but Oli was able to take action on this and improve the situation. If India wants to win over Nepal and let it not slip into China’s grasp entirely, this is the time and Oli might be the man to deliver, despite his alleged pro-China leanings.

Unlike Oli’s previous visit to India when no joint statement was issued, this time around, not only was one issued but it outlines a bilateral cooperative agenda across three key sectors of rail connectivity, developing inland waterways, and agriculture. There were three separate joint statements issued on each laying out in detail the tasks ahead. Cross-border rail connectivity in particular will be significant in strengthening people-to-people and economic linkages between the two countries. During Oli’s visit, the two prime ministers decided to construct a new electrified railway line, linking Raxaul in India and Kathmandu in Nepal. India has agreed to finance this project.

Similarly, the agreement on inland waterways is vital in establishing access to sea for the landlocked Nepal. The joint statement specifically noted the two prime ministers’ agreement “to develop the inland waterways for the movement of cargo … providing additional access to sea for Nepal.” The third key sector, agriculture, also offer big promises, with collaborative ventures in a number of areas. The two sides have also agreed to encourage exchanges between the Indian Council for Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the Nepal Agricultural Research Council (NARC).

New Delhi is clearly concerned about China’s growing clout in Nepal. It must be noted that Beijing has also focused on regional connectivity and hydropower projects in its dealings with Kathmandu, and therefore India’s ability to deliver on the three key sectors will be assessed against those of China, however fair or unfair that might be. China’s involvement for a couple of decades in mini hydropower projects is noteworthy.

To China, Nepal is a strategic buffer. Nepal’s importance to China comes more from the thousands of Tibetans living in the country and therefore, “controlling Tibetan activism there is a priority for Beijing.” The India angle comes as a close second political objective, even though it is often presented as a singular or the dominant one.

Oli’s visit offers India an opportunity to repair the damage it caused in recent years. India has to focus on implementation and delivery on the three key sectors identified during the visit. That means India must rectify the terrible track record that it suffers in project implementation. The four Integrated Check Posts (ICP) on the India-Nepal border is a case in point. Several problems from both sides may have caused the delays, but India’s overall record in completing projects does not bode well. If it wants to truly address growing competition from China in its neighborhood in general and Nepal in particular, India will have to perform better this time around.