Can the New China-India Thaw Last? - October 19, 2018

Last week, I did my weekly column for The Diplomat on the state of the India-China relations and whether the current thaw is long lasting or not. In the "Can the New China-India Thaw Last?," I argue that despite India’s recent seeking of friendlier ties with Beijing, the future prospects for relations remain uncertain.

A year after Doklam, India appears to be intent on seeking friendlier ties with Beijing. Whether this is sustainable for the long-term, however, is unclear. Even as this process has unfolded, India continues to worry about China’s activities in the neighborhood and continues to build up its ties with other partners, though cautiously.



For the full essay, click here.



Since April, there have been a series of meetings between the top Indian and Chinese leaders, Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping. After the “informal” summit in Wuhan in April, the two met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Qingdao in June and the BRICS leaders’ summit in Johannesburg in July.

At the Wuhan Summit, Modi and Xi agreed to the China-India Plus cooperation format to work in third countries such as Afghanistan. Thereafter, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale went on to develop an outline for a capacity-building project, which was announced on the sidelines of the SCO summit in Qingdao in June.

On October 15, India and China jointly began a training program for Afghan diplomats in New Delhi, a significant development. Chinese Ambassador to India Luo Zhaohui is reported to have said that the two countries should collaborate in other neighboring countries such as Iran, Nepal, and Myanmar. The 10 Afghan officers, on finishing the training at the Foreign Service Institute in India, will go to China for the second leg as part of the joint training program.

Though Afghanistan sent its diplomats for training under the program, the Afghan leadership is reportedly disappointed with India. Kabul is apparently of the view that because of India joining hands with China, there has been a downgrading of India’s assistance to Afghanistan to “smaller” projects as a way of assuaging Pakistan’s concerns. Reports indicate that “India had, in fact, conceded [to] China’s request to jointly implement a limited ‘capacity building’ project to opt for a smaller project in Afghanistan, possibly to assuage its ally Pakistan’s misgivings.”

India’s efforts to assuage China are not limited to Afghanistan alone. The two sides are slated to sign a bilateral internal security cooperation pact on October 22 during the visit of Zhao Kezhi, China’s minister of public security to India. Intelligence exchange, sharing of best practices, exchange programs, and cooperation in disaster mitigation are some of the areas the two sides intend to cooperate on under this agreement.

Quoting officials, reports suggest that this security cooperation arrangement could possibly lead to an agreement to exchange prisoners in each other’s countries. There are apparently 10 Indian prisoners is Chinese prisons and “an equal number of Chinese in Indian prisons as well,” according to the Financial Express. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi is scheduled to come to India in December to co-chair a meeting that focuses on people-to-people ties, a decision that was taken by Modi and Xi in the wake of the Doklam crisis.

While New Delhi tries to address Beijing’s concerns, there are questions about how long all this will last, given that there seems to be no letup in the expansion of China’s military and diplomatic presence in India’s periphery. For instance, just as India and China started their joint training program for Afghan diplomats, China was busy deploying PLA Navy submarines in the Indian Ocean after a gap of more than a year. It has been reported that China had sent a Type 039A Yuan class SSK diesel submarine and submarine rescue vessel, which were sighted in the Indian Ocean earlier this month. This is the first such PLA Navy mission in the Indian Ocean since the Doklam crisis.

How India will respond remains to be seen. India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sunil Lanba recently said that India was “working with all like-minded nations and we are in dialogue with China as well.”

Meanwhile, China is also continuing to demonstrate its interest in pushing into India’s sphere of influence in Bhutan. Even though Beijing has no formal diplomatic ties with Thimphu, it has been expanding its footprint in Bhutan for a while now. Reports suggest that China has increased the number of shipments into Bhutan in the past decade, everything from machinery to cement to electrical equipment to toys to the point where China is now “the third largest source of foreign products” to Bhutan.

As India seeks better ties with China, it is also continuing to build up its partnerships in the region. India-Japan maritime cooperation saw a boost with the re-starting of the exercise, JIMEX that concluded earlier this week. India also held the inaugural 2+2 Dialogue with the United States last month and signed the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). India-Australia ties are also seeing some revival with a number of security dialogues and military exercises between the two sides.

On the other hand, in a demonstration of “strategic autonomy” from the United States, India has signed an agreement to purchase the S-400s anti-aircraft missiles from Russia and also plans to buy more oil from Iran from November, despite the threat of U.S. sanctions. Whether India can continue this high stakes strategic tightrope-walking remains to be seen.

India in the world power ladder

Here's a short OpEd of mine on where India stands in the world power game, published by Bombay-based News Bharati on August 16, 2012.

India is an emerging great power but whether it will emerge successfully or not will depend on a range of challenges at the domestic and international levels. Of these, the domestic challenges are of far greater consequences. Internal challenges range from poor infrastructure to coalition politics and external challenges include managing great power relations and ensuring a stable South Asia.


Some of the serious economic challenges that India faces include its economic growth. India traditionally had the Hindu growth rate of 2-3 percent for decades where the economy was dominated by a strong state that remained closed to international interaction. It also had put serious restrictions on its private sector and the market-driven growth. Starting in the late 1980s, India did slowly liberalise its economy but it took the 1990s economic crisis for liberalization to pick up the pace. The liberalization process that followed led to much higher growth rate, reaching levels of 8-10 percent. In fact, over the last three years, this growth rate has begun to suffer. India did successfully deal with the global financial crisis but nevertheless its economic growth rate has begun to slow down, nevertheless high by global standards. However, India starting from a lower base, (even though its growth rate is higher than most other countries)and if India has to catch up to the more developed economies, it has to sustain its 8-10 percent growth rate annually but domestic politics is coming in the way of faster growth.

One of the factors for slow growth rate is India’s poor infrastructure. The recent double blackout is only one indicator of that. India’s power sector suffers from both lack of capacity and poor distribution. The US-India nuclear deal was supposed to help India in this regard by increasing the nuclear component in the energy basket but the nuclear liability bill is preventing progress in the nuclear energy sector. Additionally, the Fukushima nuclear disaster has led to greater concern in India about the nuclear safety, leading to further slow down.

Situation is not much better in another area of infrastructure – highways and transportation links. Land acquisition troubles, inadequate attention preventing highway and other transportation hub developments at a fast-enough pace are big enough issues but the more serious problem is politics!! Coalition governments and differences between the centre and state governments are preventing the much-needed market reforms as a number of international agencies have already pointed out. There is also increasing objection to faster economic growth because of the assumption that faster economic growth leads to greater economic inequality. While income inequalities are a problem, the assumption that GDP growth rates will lead to inequality is wrong. The GDP-led growth needs to lead to better distribution but the government has to push for greater economic growth as well. These are not mutually incompatible.

Maoist violence is another serious domestic issue. While India has always faced domestic rebellion, the Maoist violence is a qualitatively different problem. Lack of coordination between state and central forces, inadequate trained personnel available for combatting the violence has meant serious blows to India.

Yet another issue is corruption. Corruption is not only a political issue but also an economic issue. Unfortunately, none of the major political parties are paying any serious attention to it other than pointing fingers at each other. Corruption makes not only an incompetent economy but also makes it an unattractive option for foreign investors, affecting further India’s growth story.

A final domestic issue is the state of the intellectual infrastructure. India’s educational system, especially at the school level, is going from bad to worse. But since education at the school level is a responsibility of the state government rather than the central government, there are huge problems at that level. Some states do perform better than the other but the situation overall is quite abysmal. There is lot of tinkering going on at the higher education level, but unless the school education is taken seriously, reforming higher education is not going to matter much. The effect of the educational weakness can be seen already in the shortages in some sectors of the industry, in terms of quality manpower.

One of the major international challenges is managing the rise of China. While rise of China is a challenge to the whole world, India faces a particular challenge given the history of relations including the 1962 border war. In addition, China’s border infrastructure, its support to Pakistan in the military and non-military arena is of concern. For that matter, China’s South Asia relations areno different!

India has also problems with relationship with the United States. Although US-India relations have improved dramatically, India is afraid of being caught between the United States and China. Therefore, India has to play the complicated game of trying to balance its relations with these two powers.

Meanwhile, what affect us most are the developments in our neighbourhood and India’s position is nothing to envy about. We are faced with new challenges all around India, with many having serious issues of instability that has the potential to spill over. On our Western front, the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan are sliding from bad to worse. With the US plan to exit Afghanistan in 2014, it opens up new challenges and opportunities for India and the region.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is going through serious internal turmoil although the geopolitical importance of Pakistan will come handy for Islamabad with neither the US nor China letting it slide to become a “failed state.” This may be the only hope we have of preventing the worst from happening in Pakistan. While a stable Pakistan may be in the interest of India and the region, an unstable Pakistan with nuclear weapons is going to be a greater concern for the West, particularly the US. For India, the issue has not been really the growing size of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal or its safety (this is important by all means) but Islamabad’s sponsorship of cross-border terrorism.

Coming to Afghanistan, India has played a critical role in the development and reconstruction efforts despite the Pakistani effort to keep India out on a sustained basis. However, with the US exit plan being readied, India has to take the lead in formalizing a large coalition of nations including its immediate neighbours such as Pakistan, Iran, China, if Afghanistan is to witness any long-term peace and stability.

These are no easy challenges and how India manages all these will determine its position in Asia and the world.

Gilani's Visit to China: Further Consolidation of Ties?

Here's the link to an article of mine on Pakistan President Gilani's visit to China published by ORF.

The Chinese objectives are in perfect congruence with those of Pakistan. Pakistan is also mindful of the fact that an enhanced Chinese presence will keep India away (at least Pakistan is hopeful of), thereby ensuring Pakistan the strategic depth that it has been seeking to achieve in Afghanistan.



Pakistani Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani has just concluded his four-day visit to China - the "all weather friend" whose friendship he described as "taller than the Himalayas and deeper than oceans." Some have suggested that there are limits to China-Pakistan relationship and that Beijing may no more be willing to stick its head out for Islamabad. However, the statement from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) does not suggest so; neither does the statement by the Chinese Foreign Minister who spoke at last week's US-China strategic dialogue and economic talks. He is reported to have said that "any attack on Pakistan would be construed as an attack on China" though this has been reported only in the Pakistani press and not been confirmed by any Chinese sources. While there is understandable scepticism about such strong assurances, the New York Times reported a signed commentary in the People's Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party, that "urged Americans to critically examine the unilateral nature of its raid and infringement of Pakistan's territorial rights."

When the whole world was critical of Pakistan's role in sheltering Osama Bin Laden, China extended full backing to Pakistan, saying Islamabad was a victim of terror and that the sacrifices that it had made in the global war against terror should not go unnoticed. The MOFA spokesperson Jiang Yu also noted that Beijing looks forward to "further consolidating and developing friendship and cooperation" as it is in the interests of both the countries to have a "stable" Pakistan.

The Pakistan-China relations are based on a bedrock of mutually beneficial strategic requirements. Both Pakistan and China have strong reasons for continuing these ties. Thus, there is little likelihood that these ties will wither in the near future.

There are several strategic interests that keep China involved in the AfPak region. Whether China has acknowledged it or not, India has been a significant factor in its South Asia policy. Beijing's foreign and security policies in respect to South Asia have been shaped with an objective to balance New Delhi in its own backyard. Of all the countries in South Asia, the interests of China and Pakistan coincide the most and that has been the foundation for this strong partnership.

While China may have had its calculations, Gilani's visit to Beijing at this juncture is not without strategic reasons from Pakistan's point of view. The visit comes at a critical time when its relations with the US and even India are yet again on a downward spiral. Additionally, a post-Osama situation throws open several important questions for South Asia in general and Pakistan, Afghanistan in particular. In the face of the harsh and rampant criticism, particularly from the US, Pakistan is trying to reach out to and consolidate its ties with "friends" - Russia and China - countries that are wary of the US and its presence in Asia.

In fact, by playing the Beijing card, Pakistan is sending an important message for the United States. In one of the first statements in the floor of the Parliament after the Osama killing, Prime Minister Gilani appreciated China's gesture as Pakistan's all-weather friend, which commended the Pakistani sacrifices in the war against terror. The Pakistani government is also trying to shore updomestic support by suggesting that even if the US were to punish or discard them, they have a reliable friend in China. In a rebuff to the US, Gilani is reported to have stated in an interview to the Xinhua news agency that "we are proud to have China as our best and most trusted friend and China will always find Pakistan standing beside it at all times."1

In addition, now that Osama is dead, the US could possibly look out for an early exit option, which would mean that Afghanistan will go back to the dark ages with Pakistan controlling the Taliban and the Taliban taking over Afghanistan. Along with Pakistan, China will make a quick entry into Afghanistan.

China's interests in Afghanistan are both strategic and resource-based. China's increasing role and influence in Kabul will be a factor that India will have to consider. Chinese policy towards Kabul will be driven by three objectives - rich mineral resources, strategic gateway to Central Asia (a region rich in resources) and the Xinjiang Uighur problem. Managing all the three successfully (in the typical Chinese way) dictate closer relationship with Pakistan and Afghanistan (and even Saudi Arabia).

China is already the largest investor in resource-rich Afghanistan. It already has a $3.5 billion investment in the Aynak copper mine project and Beijing plans to make additional investments in tapping the oil, gas and iron mine sectors in Afghanistan. Therefore, the Chinese interests in Afghanistan are long-term and the role of Pakistan in aiding those interests is critical.

Second, the role of Pakistan and Afghanistan in keeping the Uighur problem under wraps is equally important an imperative that drives the Chinese AfPak policy. At one level, China has been careful not to openly criticise the Pakistan-based terror groups that may bring about wrath of these groups in Xinjiang. At another level, China does not want a weakened Islamic country taken over by terror groups that may fuel trouble among the Uighurs in the Xinjiang Province.

A third strategic imperative that dictates the Chinese AfPak policy is the potential for Pakistan and Afghanistan to become gateways into Iran and Central Asia besides providing alternate routes for energy transportation, in the event of being choked in the crucial Malacca Straits. China's large-scale investments in infrastructural projects - Gwadar Port and overland routes - have been undertaken keeping in mind this objective.

Given these three compulsions, it is unlikely that Pakistan's importance to China is going to be diminishing in the near future. On the contrary, the relationship will be consolidated even further and broad-based to include some of the non-traditional areas of cooperation such as outer space.2

The Chinese objectives are in perfect congruence with those of Pakistan. Pakistan is also mindful of the fact that an enhanced Chinese presence will keep India away (at least Pakistan is hopeful of), thereby ensuring Pakistan the strategic depth that it has been seeking to achieve in Afghanistan.

There are other imperatives too that drive the partnership. From its historical experience in dealing with the US, Pakistan has been rather circumspect, characterising the US as an unreliable partner, who will discard Pakistan "like a used Kleenex" once its purpose is over. On the other hand, China has always stood by Pakistan, extending support at critical times when the entire world turns its back on Pakistan. Even in the recent past, the manner in which China went out of the way to save Pakistan on its role in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks is not forgotten. Pakistan, in return, will ascertain safety and security of the Chinese who may be involved in various mining projects in Afghanistan. From a resource point of view as well as keeping the Uighur problem under control, China will accept some sort of accommodation while dealing with Taliban and other terrorist groups.

The role of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in this issue cannot be minimised. A renewed relationship between China and Pakistan/Saudi Arabia may not be in the best interests of India. Will this become the new bloc of non-democracies under the Chinese leadership against the democratic world of US, India and other countries such as Japan and Australia?3 The possibility of China reaching out to these medium-sized countries, resulting in a reduced US role and influence in the coming decades, cannot be ruled out.

Given these factors, the US options such as cutting off aid to Pakistan or minimising its military presence in Afghanistan may not be quite feasible. Additionally, given that about 40 per cent of the US-ISAF logistics are transported through Pakistan makes it difficult for the US to cut off the aid. Meanwhile, Pakistan too has benefitted from the US operations in Afghanistan, and therefore while Pakistan will try different manoeuvres to get the best bargain out of Washington, it is unlikely that Islamabad will close its doors to the US.

1 "Pakistan PM Hails China Ties Amid Strains with US," AFP, Dawn, May 17, 2011, available at http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/17/pakistan-pm-hails-china-ties-amid-strains-with-us.html.
2 China has agreed to strengthen their work on Pakistan's satellite, which is currently being built in China, to be launched into orbit on August 14, 2011. Other agreements in the military-security arena include: agreement to provide Pakistan 50 new JF-17 Thunder multi-role fighter planes (the Block-58 planes would be produced in Pakistan under a co-production agreement; the production likely to start in June 2012); the supply of 50 JF-17 planes (agreement signed earlier); discussing the supply of J-20 Stealth and Xiaolong/FC-1 multi-purpose light fighter aircraft to Pakistan (the mode of payment and the number of planes to be provided to Pakistan are being discussed). See Mohammad SalehZaffir, "Respect Pak Sovereignty, China Tells US," The News, May 19, 2011, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=6094&Cat=13&dt=5%2F19%2F2011.
3 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, "India, US and the Afghanistan Quagmire," Analysis, Observer Research Foundation, November 09, 2009, available at http://www.orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=17585&mmacmaid=17586.

McChrystal's Exit: What Does It Mean for Afghanistan?

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the exit of Gen. McChrystal and what it means for Afghanistan.

Indiscretion is the one thing that General Stanley McChrystal could be blamed for. It is not the COIN strategy, also now known as the McChrystal strategy that was at fault, but the manner in which he dismissed some members of the political or diplomatic class that was at fault. Should he have been sacrificed on account of that? What about punishing Ambassador Eikenberry and others for leaking secret cables to the media and bringing out in the open the country's divisiveness in its AfPak strategy? What does McChrystal's exit mean for the war on terror in Afghanistan?


President Obama opting for General Patraeus to take charge of Afghanistan appears to be not a bad option given that both he and General McChrystal had worked together in developing and implementing the current COIN strategy in Afghanistan. Even Obama's statement that replacing McChrystal with Patraeus was not “based on any difference in policy with General McChrystal” makes one believe that there is going to be continuity in the strategy and the manner in which the war will be taken forward. This is not to suggest that Patraeus and Obama have an excellent equation. A story in Time brought out their problems which seem to have begun in Obama's first meeting with Patraeus in Baghdad in 2008 during the presidential campaign. Apparently, the Obama-Patraeus disagreement was over Obama's intention to pull out all combat troops from Iraq by 2010.

Eikenberry's argument that the surge strategy, which has been a critical component of the current strategy, was not going to be effective was little premature. McChrystal's strategy was being criticized as a failure even before it could take off. The facts on the ground may appear to support such criticism because of the sharp spike in the violence level in Afghanistan in the last few months. But this spike was expected. In fact, the violence level in Iraq went up before it started coming down. The fact of the matter is that McChrystal had a dedicated team of men with him to do what had to be done.

More importantly, the General was liked by President Hamid Karzai. And Eikenberry is wrong about Karzai too. Instead of ridiculing Karzai, as evident in Eikenberry's cable message, he should have realized that the US has to go with the best choice it has. It is also wrong to sit and pass judgment at Karzai making deals with Taliban given that the US has made it clear that it will be packing its bag in a year's time. Karzai was left with no option but to make peace with the good/bad Taliban. It is naïve to assume that he would sacrifice his government and see Taliban in power in Afghanistan again. In the absence of a clear policy from Washington, Karzai can be seen to be doing more peace jirgas and gain some kind of recognition from the Taliban even at the cost of US unhappiness.

If the current COIN strategy continued, McChrystal was going to request for another 30,000 soldiers for Afghanistan. It remains to be seen whether such a request will be made by General Patraeus and whether it will be accepted by Washington. But Eikenberry's argument that increased strength of US forces in Afghanistan will only increase Afghan dependence on the US instead of developing their own forces is a bit of a stretch.

The more fundamental issue after having thrown McChrystal out is whether there is clarity in Washington about what they want to do in Afghanistan and what kind of an outcome they would like to see in Afghanistan. What kind of a message is Washington sending to Karzai and even Pakistan for that matter? Is there any agreement between the political and diplomatic sections in Washington as to what they want to achieve in Afghanistan? Or is the superpower ready to take a beating and leave Afghanistan?

Lastly, it is unclear what this episode says about President Obama. Obama's approach has left even coalition partners wondering on the AfPak strategy. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, Britain's special envoy to Afghanistan, has already gone on an extended leave – an indication of his disagreement over the US policy. The Obama Administration has to recognise that Afghanistan is not a war that can be fought easily or alone; the US has to build in a larger coalition of nations, particularly the neighbours, to make long-lasting changes in Afghanistan. Until then, Obama is going to be taken for a ride by Pakistan by making piece-meal arrangements that have kept the Americans happy all this while.

1.However, there are significant differences between Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, most of the war was fought in urban centres, which is not the case in Afghanistan. Afghan is much larger and given the mountainous terrain, it is a much harder task. Therefore, the kind of force level that is needed to clean up an area and then hold is going to be significantly larger. There was also the application of full-spectrum warfare – to use all the available tools in the kit – in Iraq which needs to be replicated in Afghanistan.

India's Soft Power: Does It Translate into Favorable Outcomes for India?

There was a renaissance of the concept of soft power after 9/11 terror attacks in the US, when the US believed that its soft power was not strong or powerful enough among the vast Muslim population in the Middle East and that’s why they targeted the US, so on and so forth. The reality is something very different. The people of the Middle East or the Muslim population elsewhere in Europe do enjoy eating McDonald food or the KFC chicken, but they were fundamentally against the US policies. No amount of soft power can do anything about that. Therefore, I would argue that soft power is good, but it can be an effective tool in foreign policy only if it matched by hard power, effective diplomacy, including military diplomacy. Soft power cannot be turned into effective influence in a nation or a region unless followed by its hard power. That is how they is a term coined, smart power, a mix of both hard and soft power. A country needs to pursue both hard and soft power to get the right influence and affect policies in a country.



The whole concept of soft power became very popular in the early 1990s. There are those who argue that it was US’ soft power and liberal values that led to the collapse of Soviet Union. It was not the US soft power that led to the Soviet collapse, but its own collapsing economic since the 1980s which led to the Soviet collapse. So, the concept got reinvigorated with the end of the Cold War. Once again, there was a renaissance of the concept after 9/11 terror attacks in the US, who believe that US’ soft power was not strong or powerful enough among the vast Muslim population in the Middle East and that’s why they targeted the US, so on and so forth. The reality is something very different. The people of the Middle East or the Muslim population elsewhere in Europe do enjoy eating McDonald food or the KFC chicken, but they were fundamentally against the US policies. No amount of soft power can do anything about that.

India has a lot of soft power, cultural influence in various parts of Asia. India’s vibrant culture, diverse culture reflected in its music, bollywood movies, arts are tremendous.

Here, am going to bring in what others have had to say. Mr. Shashi Tharoor, Indian Minister of State for External Affairs, has been writing a lot on the issue. However, I am going to disagree with most of the arguments when they say that India’s influence in cultural spheres actually gets translated into political decisions or impact policy changes.

As many have shown, one of the best examples is Afghanistan. Afghanistan remains important for more than one reason. What is going on there raises serious concerns not just in India, but for several other important global players. India is believed to have great assets in Afghanistan. Certainly not from its military; India does not have a military presence there. But its greatest advantage there lies in its soft power. Some of India’s TV serials are so popular -- the famous "Kyunki Saas Bhi Kabhi Bahu Thi," dubbed into Dari, is telecast on Tolo TV, is so popular and no one likes to miss it. "Saas" is another one. It is believed to have a 90 percent audience penetration.

Again, after the fall of Taliban, Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh was one of the first dignitaries to reach Kabul. Jaswant Singh who wanted to ensure a better Indian presence, replacing Pakistan, was not carrying food or medicines, but tapes of Hindi movies and music that have been so popular there. This is surely soft power.

Similarly, Indian art, classical music and dance have the same effect. One of the popular Bollywood movies, Inside Man, started with a popular Hindi song, Chaiyya chaiyya and was a real surprise. Similarly, Part 3 of the Matrix series ended to the chant of Asatoma Sadgamaya.

In the field of music too, Indian pop stars such as Nitin Sawhney are inspiring western bands to mix Asian melodies and instruments. Some of the popular dance numbers of choreographer Farah Khan and music composer A.R. Rahman, have created waves, and are making way into Broadway and Hollywood. While Hollywood has inspired many Asian movies, directors such as Martin Scorsese are now remaking films like Rajkumar Hirani's Munnabhai MBBS.

Similarly, when Indian women make it to Miss World or Miss Universe contests, or when Indian bhangra beat is mixed into a Western pop record or when Lagaan is nominated for Oscar; or when Indian writers like Arundathi Roy wins the Booker Prizes, India's soft power is enhanced.

But the most significant ripple effect of Asia's soft power is how it's altering the 'country of origin' problem. For instance, when Titan Watches first entered the international market, it was branded as 'the world watch', partly to disguise its origins. The company knew that many customers just wouldn't accept a high-end watch made in India. Today, that is changing and the made in China or India mark is not something to be hidden.

Therefore, what one sees today is a cross-pollination of several different forces -- forces propelling globalization of Indian popular culture and the forces of market liberalization -- that have seen the benefits of the economic potential of the nation as well as its market of 1 billion people, with a significant middle class population.

Significantly for both India and China, the political advantages of taking their culture global are alluring as well as economic. It is also argued by some that this is encouraging for both China and India, who want US support in their standoffs with Taiwan and Pakistan, respectively, to pursue their own public diplomacy. The two are spending millions of dollars on overseas public relations. The two countries are working hard at promoting cultural exports, and on image campaigns.

While introduction of Asia or India in particular to the west would have been a more recent phenomenon, India’s soft power had penetrated several countries in South and Southeast Asia for decades or even centuries.

In fact, in Southeast Asia, there is an increasing competition or rivalry between China and India for influence, which has resulted in India going that extra mile to draw attention to its solid Buddhist credentials. Buddhism originated in India around the 5th century BC, although it declined after having flourished for many centuries. However, it spread across Asia, winning adherents in countries such as Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Japan, Korea, Tibet, Mongolia and China. Buddhist monks traveled far to spread the religion. Scholars came to India to study at its universities. There was a healthy exchange of ideas, of philosophic, religious and cultural traditions right from ancient times. The impact of this interaction and exchange can be seen and felt to date across Asia. It is this shared Buddhist heritage that Delhi is now emphasizing in its engagement with East and Southeast Asia.

Although the founder of Buddhism, Siddhartha Gautama, or the Buddha as he came to be called, was born in Nepal and not India, all the important milestones in his life, whether it was his enlightenment, his first sermon or his attainment of nirvana, happened in India. Most of the important sites of significance to Buddhists the world over are in India.

While India has emphasized its cultural and civilizational links with East and Southeast Asia for decades, this diplomacy has received a boost with the pan-Asian initiative to revive Nalanda University. An ancient seat of learning, Nalanda University was primarily a center of Buddhist studies, but it also imparted training in fine arts, astronomy, politics and languages. The university died a slow death around the 12th century AD. However, there is a giant, multinational effort now to set up an international university at Nalanda that will capture the grandeur, spirit and essence of this renowned seat of learning. Several countries, including India, Japan, Singapore and China, are part of this effort. And while India is at the center of the Nalanda initiative (the university being located here), China is ensuring that its links with the university are not forgotten. Besides being part of a mentor group (headed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen) that will provide vision and direction to the Nalanda initiative, China has contributed funds for the Xuan Zang Memorial Hall in the university. It is making sure that its links with Buddhism are taken note of.

Meanwhile, China has been making systematic efforts to be seen as the main Buddhist centre. However, China's effort to project its Buddhist credentials has been tarnished by its record in Tibet. Indian officials say that so long as the Dalai Lama lives in India and millions of Tibetan Buddhist refugees remain in India, China's claims over Buddhism will be weak. While China's Buddhist credentials are questionable thanks to its record vis-a-vis Tibetan Buddhists, that of India's is impeccable. China cannot match India's formidable record as a protector of Buddhism. India has provided refuge to millions of Tibetan Buddhists fleeing Chinese oppression.

Indian officials now admit that in the past India neglected highlighting adequately its central role in the Buddhist world and its Buddhist legacy. In the process, "it surrendered the mantle of being the custodian of Buddhist heritage and its leadership role in the Buddhist world, which was quickly appropriated by countries like China and even Japan, which is being corrected now.

In the past five years, India has fought back, to reclaim what the government believes is India's by right - that it is India which is at the heart of the Asian civilization, that in many ways, India has been the cultural trend setter. Last year, India built a Buddhist temple in Luoyang in China. It underscores the fact that Buddhism in China is an Indian export. The temple is in the Baima temple complex where a Chinese emperor welcomed Buddhist monks from India 2,000 years ago. "The temple in Luoyang has been built in the Indian style. It marks the fact that Buddhism traveled to China from India.

India has made Buddhism the core of its soft-power push in Asia. This is aimed not only at reminding countries of their long-standing links with India but also that the roots of their cultural heritage lie in India.

Similarly, the spread of Hinduism to Southeast Asia. The civilization of India influenced the languages, scripts, calendars, and artistic aspects of these peoples and nations. Prominent Hindus (e.g., Swami Sadananda Maharaja) from India have visited South East Asia for the purpose of exploring the Hinduism of these places.

Spread of Hinduism in Southeast Asia in particular, introduced by the Indianized kingdoms of the 5th to 15th centuries, but may also extend to the earlier spread of Buddhism from India to Central Asia and China by way of the Silk Road during the early centuries CE. The concept of the Indianized kingdoms is based on the Hindu and Buddhist cultural and economic influences in Southeast Asia. These Indianized kingdoms developed a close affinity and internalised Indian religious, cultural and economic practices without significant direct input from Indian rulers themselves.

While the issue remains controversial, it is thought that Indianization was the work of Indian traders and merchants, although later the travels of Buddhist monks such as Atisha became important. Most Indianized kingdoms combined both Hindu and Buddhist beliefs and practices in a syncretic manner. Kertanagara, the last king of Singhasari, described himself as Sivabuddha, a simultaneous incarnation of the Hindu god and the Buddha.

Similarly, Southeast Asian rulers enthusiastically adopted elements of rajadharma, (Hindu and Buddhist beliefs, codes and court practices) to legitimate their own rule and constructed cities, such as Angkor, to affirm royal power by reproducing a map of sacred space derived from the Ramayana and Mahabharata.

In terms of cultural commonalities, a defining characteristic of the cultural link between South East Asia and Indian subcontinent is the spread of ancient Indian Vedic/Hindu and Buddhist culture and philosophy into Myanmar, Thailand, Malaya, Laos and Cambodia. Indian scripts are also found in South East Asian islands ranging from Sumatra, Java, Bali, south Sulawesi and most of the the Philippines. The impact of Indian culture is visible in the following notable examples:

• Hinduism is practiced by majority of Bali's population.
• Hindu mythological figure Garuda features in the coat of arms of Indonesia, Thailand and Ulan Bator.
• Hindu temple architecture-style features prominently on several ancient temples in South East Asia including Angkor Wat, which was dedicated to Hindu God Vishnu and features on the flag of Cambodia.
• Batu Caves in Malaysia is the most popular Hindu shrine outside India.
• Erawan Shrine, dedicated to Brahma, in Thailand is one of the most popular religious shrines in the country

Having said all these, I want to see what has been the impact of soft power in international politics. I would argue that soft power is good, but it can be an effective tool in foreign policy only if it matched by hard power, effective diplomacy, including military diplomacy. Soft power cannot be turned into effective influence in a nation or a region unless followed by its hard power. That is how they is a term coined, smart power, a mix of both hard and soft power. A country needs to pursue both hard and soft power to get the right influence and affect policies in a country. Indian movies have been popular in Afghanistan even in the 1990s, but that soft power did not help India in any way. Pakistan, with the help of Taliban, swayed their influence in that country, belittle what India has had.

Let us look at something closer home. Chinese food, Chinese movies have been popular all over the world. Indians love Chinese food. My husband loves Chinese food, the kung-fu movies, but that does not affect his perception on China. He has very hardline views on China. Similarly, Indian curry has been very popular, but that has not necessarily reflected in favourable outcomes for India. Nonetheless, it is a useful tool in enhancing one’s image. But it has to be matched by and followed up with hard power, effective diplomacy. Otherwise, India’s music and culture, will remain as simple attraction for the outside world but not anything of influence in international politics.

India, US and the Afghanistan Quagmire

Here's an analysis on the Afghanistan issue and the options left with India, US and other major players. The analysis appeared first on the ORF website.

Former US President George Bush, while speaking recently at the Hindustan Times leadership summit, argued that India and the US should work together in Afghanistan both to build a democratic nation in Afghanistan as well as for the larger goal of peace and stability in the region. But this will work only if India and the US have shared objectives and a shared vision for the future of Afghanistan.



While the US has reiterated time and again that securing and stabilising Afghanistan remains a vital US national security interest, in reality it appears to have a much more limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US.

While it is abundantly clear that it remains an important goal to ensure that the Taliban/ al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US, it can be achieved two ways. One, as several US officials point out, it can be achieved through reconstruction and development of the Afghan society; and second, by putting together some sort of a coalition of forces, including the so-called moderate Taliban, thereby making them responsible partners in the governance of Afghanistan. There are many who believe that the US is actually looking at a face-saving exit option at the earliest possible. Even as early as February this year, the Obama Administration was hinting at moving away from the objective of establishing a full-fledged democracy to simply stabilizing and ensuring that the country is not a haven for terrorists. The US will be willing to get out of Afghanistan the minute they are able to stitch together a coalition of parties, including the so-called moderate Taliban, who might give a guarantee of ‘no-attacks’ for a short span of time.

However, if the US were to leave Afghanistan after putting together some sort of a coalition, what are the consequences?

One possibility is that China might step into the breech. China has vital strategic interests – economic and energy interests – driving its Afghanistan policy. The role of Pakistan in achieving those interests is significant. Gwadar port is a case in point. Gwadar port offers China the ability to monitor the transport of its energy from the Persian Gulf, and in the eventuality of some disruption, it will offer a safer alternative route. Besides, Chinese interests in Afghanistan span from natural resources to its problems with Uighurs in the Xinjiang Province. In terms of natural resources, China already has its footprint there in Aynak copper mine site. In 2007, when President Karzai invited foreign investment in the natural resources sector, China Metallurgical Group won the rights to develop the copper mine site at $ 3.5 billion. Aynak copper mine site is one of the world’s largest undeveloped fields. Additionally, Chinese companies are looking at the prospect of developing untapped oil, gas and iron resources in Afghanistan. Chinese entry into Afghanistan will also be in the interests of Pakistan, as it will keep India at a distance (at least Pakistan hopes that way). Second, Chinese entry into Afghanistan with Pakistani acquiescence will ensure that they do not come under Taliban attack. Pakistan will ensure an understanding with the Taliban that China is not there for exploitation of the country, but will be beneficial for the country for its overall development. Under such a scenario, China will gain certain amount of accommodation with the Taliban, which might also be beneficial to China in dealing with its own problem in Xinjiang. The role of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in this issue cannot be minimised. A renewed relationship between China and Pakistan/Saudi Arabia may not be in the best interests of India. In fact, this could become the new bloc of non-democracies under the Chinese leadership against the democratic world of US, India and other countries such as Japan and Australia. The possibility of China exercising better influence in these medium-sized countries, thereby reducing US role and influence in the coming decades, cannot be ruled out. The changes in Singapore is one example. Singapore, which has been a US ally, is increasingly looking to China for answers. It is even considering a change of official language from English to Mandarin. Therefore, China will not let go of an opportunity to enter Afghanistan keeping in view several strategic interests thereby achievable.

If the US leaves Afghanistan, Pakistan could also step into its place. Islamabad will use the opportunity to solidify Taliban influence across the country, thereby serving its interests and limiting Indian influence. For Pakistan, Taliban offers the best bet for countering and curtailing India’s regional influence. However, there are some Pakistan watchers in India who believe that a Talibanised-Afghanistan may not be in the interests of Pakistan. It was Pakistan which created, nurtured and sustained Taliban all through the late 1990s and early 2000s. The difference today is that Taliban is not the same “pure” Taliban as in early 2000s, but has gotten enmeshed totally with Al Qaeda and it is very difficult to differentiate today between Afghan Taliban and the Al Qaeda. Pakistan is deeply worried about the Al Qaeda factor. However, the point is that if the US leaves Afghanistan, the Al Qaeda does not really have a purpose hanging on in Afghanistan unless they want a safe haven. It is quite possible that Al Qaeda will leave Afghanistan for Africa or elsewhere where the US interests are becoming deeper because of increasing Chinese penetration.

Will Russia comeback to Afghanistan? Russian interests are to see that Afghanistan does not fall completely into the hands of Taliban, which will drag the entire country into becoming a terrorist haven. Although Russia does not share a border with Afghanistan, many of the Central Asian states do, and there are ethnic and cultural linkages between the two sides and a Taliban takeover could have negative effects in Russia that is already battling terrorism. Besides, a Talibanised-Afghanistan could, in the long-term, build the prospects for a US return not only to Afghanistan but also to several countries in Central Asia, where it will be looking for bases. Therefore, Russian interests are to ensure that there is no Taliban takeover of Afghanistan besides development of Afghanistan as a peaceful and stable country in its neighbourhood. In the development arena, there are already several Russian companies (under the Russia-Afghanistan business council formed in 2007) supplying flour, timber, sunflower oil and other products. Additionally, they are looking at exporting building technology; they are in the process of commissioning a cement factory in Afghanistan and a hydropower station on the River Salang.

Finally, what are India’s options? In the backdrop of US departure from Kabul, there will be vacuum waiting to be filled by China and Pakistan. Indian interests go beyond natural resources to seeing a stable and democratic Afghanistan that will be congenial to Indian interests. In tactical terms, Indian interests might be ensuring safety of its 4,000-odd workers and security personnel who are engaged on a number of infrastructure and other reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan remains crucial to India in other ways. India has invested $ 1.2 billion in Afghanistan for the reconstruction of the country since the US war on terror began in 2001, making it the largest regional donor. However, Pakistan continues to view India’s growing influence in Afghanistan as a direct threat to its own interests. Indian influence in the country paled as the Pakistan-supported Taliban gained power in 1996. During the Taliban period, India extended its support to an anti-Taliban coalition, the Northern Alliance, mainly consisting of Tajik and other non-Pushtoon groups. Can India revive such ties in the current setting? There are several analysts who suggest that India should lend support to the non-Pushtoon Northern part of Afghanistan against the Pushtoon-dominated Southern part of Afghanistan. Some analysts have gone to the extent of suggesting that the country should be split up on these lines. Some Russians too have argued on similar lines, although they recognize that this will not be a long-term solution to several problems emanating from southern Afghanistan. While splitting the country is not in the long-term interests of India, it could probably undertake measures to enhance development in northern Afghanistan, where by the way, influence of Pakistan is also minimal. India will have to step-up its developmental activities, including construction of schools, hospitals, which will gain India significant support among the local populace. In this regard, it might do well if India manages the support of other major regional players like Russia, Iran that might like to see a strengthened Northern Alliance. While India should strive to make Northern Alliance stronger, it also has to engage with the Pushtoons, at least to gain in tactical terms. India should also canvass with the US to bring together a larger coalition of nations including Russia, China, Iran and may be some of the Central Asian states in bringing about long-lasting peace in Afghanistan. What India does today in Afghanistan will have long-term impact not only for the entire region, but for its own role as a major Asian player.