India-Japan Defense Ties to Get a Boost With Modi-Abe Virtual Summit - The Diplomat, 20 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the upcoming virtual summit meeting between India and Japan. I argue that despite some disappointments on both sides, the India-Japan relationship looks set to further deepen in the face of an aggressive China.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe will meet for a virtual summit in September. This will be Modi’s second virtual summit this year, after one with the Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison in June. According to Indian media reports, citing India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), the two sides are expected to sign an important military logistics agreement, the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). While this remains an important milestone moment for New Delhi and Tokyo, it also remains key for both countries to take stock of what has been accomplished so far.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan missed their planned 2019 summit because of protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) in Guwahati, in the northeastern Indian state of Assam, where the meeting was supposed to be held. Although the Modi government was reportedly keen to shift the meeting venue to Delhi, the Japanese side insisted that the focus of the 2019 summit was on Japanese investment in India’s Northeast infrastructure development and therefore, as a Japanese diplomat said, “The venue is the message.” Since then, India and Japan have been trying to reschedule the summit, but the COVID-19 pandemic further delayed their plans.

The current summit meeting comes against the backdrop of Chinese aggression against both countries, along the Sino-Indian border and the East China Sea. The Abe government is reportedly also keen to explore the possibility of shifting some Japanese manufacturing to India as part of its efforts to shift such operations out of China. This is part of a concerted effort of several countries to shift their manufacturing out of China in order to reduce their dependency on Beijing. The two leaders are also reportedly working to strengthen the Quad agenda in this regard.

The ACSA should also boost the geographical reach and influence of both countries’ militaries. India has so far signed such logistics agreement with the United States, South Korea, and Australia. Such logistics agreements are meant to simplify the processes involved in using each other’s facilities. It took India more than a decade to sign the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the U.S. on account of several misperceptions, but since its signing in 2016 it has become easier for India to negotiate such deals with other countries. Probably to maintain some semblance of balance, India is negotiating a similar agreement with Russia. The Russian agreement is named differently, the Agreement on Reciprocal Logistics Support (ARLS).

The India-Japan ACSA got a big push during the last summit in Japan in October 2018. India’s MEA in a statement at the time said, “The two leaders welcomed the joint exercise between each of the three services and the commencement of negotiations on the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which will enhance the strategic depth of bilateral security and defense cooperation.” The inaugural 2+2 dialogue, the India-Japan Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting, also noted “the significant progress” made in the negotiations of ACSA and their desire “for early conclusion of the negotiations” which would “further contribute to enhancing defense cooperation between the two sides.”

The India-Japan ACSA would provide the two militaries with access to each other’s military facilities for repair and replenishment of provisions as well as overall improve the scope and sophistication of military-to-military cooperation. In fact, the India-Japan ACSA is reported to be broader in scope, encompassing overall defense cooperation between the two countries, with logistics as one important leg in the expanding defense partnership. Japan could get access to India’s key naval bases, including in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, close to the Malacca Straits, a key international sea lane. The agreement will also enhance India’s own operational reach, most specifically for the Indian Navy. India could gain access to Japanese bases such as in Djibouti. Some of the agenda items for broader India-Japan defense cooperation could include stepping up defense trade and technology cooperation under existing mechanisms, such as the Joint Working Group on Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation (JWG-DETC). There is already cooperative research work being done on areas such as unmanned ground vehicle (UGV)/robotics under this framework, but it could be expanded to an entire range of existing and emerging technologies.

It is also possible that Japan would like to see more discussion on the Japanese-built US-2 amphibious aircraft, which India has been soft-pedaling for a while now. Capacity-building for better maritime security and maritime domain awareness (MDA) are also high on the agenda for India and Japan. Establishment of the Information Fusion Center – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) by India in December 2018 has been deemed an important step in this regard and Japan will have a liaison officer at the IFC-IOR. Other Indo-Pacific powers such as Australia, France, and the United States will also have their officers at this center.

While ACSA and the defense agenda are forward-looking in furthering cooperation between India and Japan, there are also some difficulties in the relationship. Japan seems to have been considerably disappointed with the Indian decision to walk out of the regional trading agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). The fact that Abe was not even informed before New Delhi made the announcement appears to have been a jolt to the Abe administration. Japan was counting on India to be a powerful player within the RCEP to push back on China’s aggressive economic agenda. Tokyo is also possibly disappointed about the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi about pursuing the defense trade agenda, with the US-2 being a case in point. On the other hand, although India was keen on considering the Soryu-class submarine, Japan has been somewhat cautious, and indeed has not bid for India’s submarine contract.

Nevertheless, Japan has remained a steadfast partner to India. For instance, after the Galwan Valley clash in mid-June, the Japanese ambassador to India strongly supported India, tweeting that “Japan opposes any unilateral attempts to change the status quo.” This suggests that the pressure from China will continue to strengthen India-Japan ties, despite some disappointments on both sides.

What’s Next for India-Japan Defense Relations? - The Diplomat, 6 September 2019

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I write on the Indian defence minister Rajnath Singh's visit to Japan as part of a 5-nation East Asian trip. While the impetus for closer alignment is clear, much work remains to be done on the security side and within the wider bilateral relationship.

India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is on a five-nation East Asian tour, starting with Japan, one of India’s increasingly important strategic partners. India’s ties with Japan have grown tremendously in the last decade, though there are still many areas that remain untapped in this relationship.

In Tokyo, Singh co-chaired the annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue with his Japanese counterpart Takeshi Iwaya, and his trip had several other interactions as well including a call with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Concerns about the strategic consequences of a rising China in the Indo-Pacific is providing greater momentum to the India-Japan partnership. This annual ministerial dialogue is one more platform for strengthening the defense and security bonds between the two countries.

For the full essay, click here.



India and Japan have grown particularly close since the Modi government took office in 2014. The personal chemistry between Abe and Modi has had a positive impact. Earlier this year, the two countries agreed to hold a two-plus-two ministerial dialogue with the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the two countries. This will be the second such dialogue that India will be engaged in after the India-U.S. 2+2 strategic dialogue.

The India-Japan 2+2 dialogue is set to take place prior to the summit meeting between Abe and Modi this year, although no details are available as yet. Nevertheless, the commitment to hold such a dialogue is noteworthy as it reflects the growing desire and determination on the part of the political leadership of both countries to deepen their partnership in the security arena. This will also add to the existing dialogue platforms such as the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue and the National Security Adviser’s Dialogue.

After the meeting, Singh in a tweet said that he and his counterpart Iwaya had a fruitful discussion covering the entire gamut of issues in the defense and security realm. Commenting on the overall visit, the minister added that it was a remarkable one, taking forward the vision spelled out by the two prime ministers in achieving a stable and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.

While specific details of the dialogue are not known, one issue that was expected to be discussed was the sale of ShinMaywa US-2i amphibious aircraft to India. The debate on the amphibious aircraft has gone on for a while now but the deal was reportedly stuck because of pricing issues. Given the greater engagement of the Indian Navy and Coast Guard in stabilizing the Indo-Pacific, India is thought to be keen on this platform, if pricing issues can be resolved. The Japanese company developing these aircraft has offered India complete transfer of technology, besides agreeing to manufacture them in India.

Speaking to the media, the Japanese ambassador to India, Kenji Hiramatsu was very upbeat about the partnership, stating that “Mr (Rajnath) Singh’s visit to Japan is very significant to compare notes on various aspects of Japan-India defense cooperation, including some joint exercises, defense equipment cooperation and some senior-level exchanges. We are very excited to have a good discussion on opening the Pacific also. We are on the same page on various aspects of international affairs.”

The strategic rationale and context of the India-Japan relationship are clearly important, but the two countries have to move beyond dialogues and meetings to engage in some concrete efforts to cooperate in the region. One area that requires immediate attention is strategic infrastructure, an area in which China has performed very well through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Giving fillip to this agenda, India and Japan announced the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) at the 52nd Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank (AfDB) summit in India in May 2017. The concept took off from the joint declaration issued by Modi and Abe in November 2016.

But though it has been a few years now, there is little indication that the AAGC is moving forward. The Partnership for Quality Infrastructure suggested by Japan is again an important initiative that could provide alternatives to China’s BRI. But unless these initiatives are operationalized and given the necessary momentum, India and Japan will not be able to compete with China.

Though there are clear strategic reasons for the two powers to cooperate, there are also some important difficulties the partnership faces. One is geography: the two countries are just too far away from each other to be of much use to the other. The other is the particularities of their interests: while both have a common interest in standing up to China, the specific disputes they have with China are bilateral and territorial, and it is not clear that India and Japan can support each other on these.

But on the positive side, cross service agreements that are being negotiated between the two sides will give access to each other’s military facilities and could foster much closer mil-to-mil relations. Ultimately, the reality is that while this is a partnership that still requires a lot of work, the impetus and drive to foster closer ties is clearly seen and is likely set to endure.

What Does the New 2+2 Dialogue Mean for the India-Japan Relationship? - The Diplomat, 8 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the recently announced 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan and how this will further the relationship. I believe the new mechanism holds significance not only within bilateral ties, but for Indian foreign policy and the region more generally.

India and Japan have agreed to hold a two-plus-two dialogue between the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries. This will take place ahead of the summit-level meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe later in the year.

The decision is no doubt a significant one, both within India-Japan relations and Indian foreign policy more generally. So far, India had engaged in such a dialogue format at this level only with the United States, the inaugural edition of which was held in September last year. But India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono, took the decision to set this new mechanism up during a recent telephone conversation.

The concept is by no means new – the idea of establishing a two-plus-two dialogue between India and Japan was visible during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe during the former’s visit to Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement issued following the summit meeting said that the two leaders had reiterated their “desire to further deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation and institute [a] Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)” in addition to existing institutional arrangements including the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue.

For the full essay, click here.



The upcoming Foreign and Defense Ministerial Two-Plus-Two Dialogue reflects the growing special relationship between India and Japan, which is driven by a number of factors including the desire to create an Asian strategic framework that is free, fair, and inclusive. The call for such a framework has become louder against the backdrop of increasingly muscular behavior by China. The more confrontational China becomes, the more willing countries like India are to play the balance of power games in Asia and beyond.

Traditionally, India has resisted taking sides in great power competition. But that option is becoming increasingly difficult. New Delhi has been compelled to astutely choose its strategic partners in order to strengthen its strategic maneuverability.

The India-Japan strategic partnership goes back a number of years. The two countries began a two-plus-two dialogue at the level of foreign and defense secretaries (not ministers) almost a decade ago in 2010. This dialogue was mandated by the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation concluded between the two countries in December 2009. Key issues discussed under this format include maritime, cyber, and outer space security.

However, Japan’s engagement with India goes back much longer. As one recent report pointed out, Japan has played an important role in developing India’s infrastructure. India is one of the largest recipients of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans since 2003, even if trade and investment levels are still modest. But in an era of strategic uncertainties driven by shifting global and Asian power dynamics, India and Japan have felt the need to strengthen their defense and security linkages.

One of the primary objectives for both New Delhi and Tokyo is to prevent the rise of a unipolar Asia dominated by one single hegemonic power. It is this political objective that has been driving the relationship and the new two-plus-two dialogue will strengthen it further, especially the security relationship between New Delhi and Tokyo.

Some aspects of this offer much promise. One such facet is military exercises, with the first joint exercise between the armies and air forces of the two countries taking place last year. On the other hand, the defense trade relationship has not seen much traction as yet. The Japanese offer of the US-2 amphibious aircraft to India is just one case in point: despite much expectation, this deal appears dead. Japan is not a major arms exporter, and the Indian military services have little experience in buying Japanese equipment. In addition, India’s notoriously difficult arms procurement process is also likely to be a hindrance.

But Japan does have a technologically advanced arms industry and it is possible that India could tap into it in order to make up for its own weaknesses in critical areas. Another area where Japan could help is with submarines: India was reported to have been interested in buying Japanese submarines, though Tokyo did not appear keen. The two-plus-two dialogue could possibly give a political push to future arms sales.

Part of the reason for the growing strategic partnership between India and Japan is that it comes with no negative baggage in either country. In India, in particular, a security partnership with Japan carries none of the connotations or controversies that continue to dog a partnership with Washington. On the other hand, this partnership by itself will not suffice to achieve the kind of Asian balance that both sides desire.

Modi Visits Japan: What’s on the Security Agenda? @ The Diplomat, October 26, 2018

Here's an article, "Modi Visits Japan: What’s on the Security Agenda?" I wrote for the Diplomat in October before Prime Minister Modi's visit to Japan. Due to some personal issues, I have not updated my blog for more than a month, but hoping to get back on track from now on.

India’s Ministry of External Affairs recently announced that Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to Japan on October 28-29 for the 13th India-Japan Annual Summit. The fifth annual summit meeting between Modi and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will put the bilateral relationship in the spotlight amid wider regional and global changes.

In this article, I examine some of the agenda items on the defense side between India and Japan.

For the full essay, click here.



The India-Japan relationship has expanded over the years, and given the rapidly changing strategic dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the two leaders are expected to further boost and deepen their bilateral cooperation and discuss a range of bilateral, regional, and global issues that impinge on their security. Nevertheless, there are specific areas on defense that will stand out and potentially further elevate the India-Japan partnership.

At a broad level, the mutual concern between India and Japan about China is evident, and Tokyo and New Delhi hope to be able to present clear and credible alternatives to smaller nations in the Indo-Pacific on economic and infrastructural assistance. So, in that vein, establishing regional connectivity appears to be high on the agenda for both Abe and Modi. Kenji Hiramitsu, Japan’s Ambassador to India, hinted that there may be certain projects for South Asia that may be announced during the summit meeting.

He also reiterated what Abe had stated in his address to the Indian Parliament a decade back, that “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Many Indian officials acknowledge the importance of Japan in India’s strategic calculations and say that “Few governments align their foreign policies as closely to New Delhi’s as Tokyo. Even fewer have committed as much aid and investment to boost India’s economy.”

Even as there is collaboration across several other sectors between India and Japan, defense and security cooperation has been at the forefront driving the relations in recent years. At a recent interaction at a think tank in India, Hiramitsu said the two sides will strengthen maritime cooperation further on all aspects from maritime domain awareness (MDA) to logistics support and joint exercises. He said, “We are also expecting to sign agreement between Indian Navy and Japan’s Naval Defence Force with regard to maritime domain awareness and security issues. Also defence equipment and technology cooperation, we have agreed to have joint research activities with regard to unmanned vehicles and robotics.”

He also added that for the first time, the two armies will exercise together in a joint drill at the Counter Insurgency Warfare School in Vairengte in India’s northeast, in November. The exercise, to be called “Dharma Guardian 2018” will see the participation of 6/1 Gorkha Rifles on the Indian side and the 32 Infantry Regiment on the Japanese side. This will come close on the heels of the just concluded the JIMEX series of maritime exercises earlier this month. Japan will also participate as an Observer at Cope India, a joint air exercise between India and the United States.

Defense trade is also an important facet of India-Japan defense ties. Talks to procure the US-2 amphibious aircraft are apparently once again on – the ShinMaywa Industries Limited and India’s Mahindra have reportedly signed a Memorandum of Understanding “to manufacture and assemble structural parts and components for the US-2 amphibious aircraft.” Reports have also suggested that this will feature as an important item during Modi’s visit and that there is willingness on both sides to push the deal through a G2G route.

In a particularly significant move, Japan and India are also contemplating the signing of a Mutual Logistical Support Agreement. This agreement, something along the lines of Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), would be strategically beneficial as it would permit the Indian armed forces and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) to access each other’s military bases for logistics support.

While neither the Japanese nor the Indian officials have provided any details, it is possibly one like the arrangement India signed with France earlier this year and the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) with the United States in 2016. According to one report, “sources said the pact would require armed forces of India and Japan to help each other with logistic supports, including food, water, billet, transport (airlift, if necessary), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications, medical services, base support, storage, use of facilities, training services, spare parts, repair and maintenance and airport and seaport services.”

Signing such an agreement would give the Indian military access to Japan’s base in Djibouti and the Japanese forces would in turn gain access to Indian military facilities on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the Indian Ocean.

But the implications of the pact would be beyond that as well, and it would be a huge boost to the India-Japan strategic partnership more widely too. A major handicap of geographical distance between India and Japan, and therefore the inability of the two sides to reach out in times of crisis and conflict, can be addressed quite effectively with such an arrangement.

Therefore, it is no surprise that logistics and base sharing proposals were initially discussed at the annual defense ministers meeting held in New Delhi earlier this year. Speaking to reporters after that meeting, Japanese Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera said, “The (early) conclusion of the bilateral ACSA is important for creating an environment to allow the SDF and the Indian military to conduct sufficient joint exercises.” This agreement will indeed expand the military reach for the two navies across the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The possible signing of a logistics agreement and the increasing number of military and security engagements between India and Japan are clear attempts at balancing the growing Chinese muscle in the Indo-Pacific region. The relations have seen a big boost with Abe and Modi at the helm. With both leaders likely to stay in power for a few more years, the prospects for India-Japan security and defense relations continue to remain quite good.