US Returns to Human Spaceflight - The Diplomat, 11 June 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the importance of the US return to human spaceflight. The growing private space sector is beginning to create new energy and excitement about space.

On May 30, SpaceX launched American astronauts into space in its Dragon Endeavor spacecraft, a first for the company and a first for the private sector. For NASA and the broader U.S. space community, this was also a special moment because the United States was sending its astronauts to space from its own soil after many years. Since shutting down its space shuttle program in 2011, the United States had relied on Russia to send American astronauts to space. SpaceX’s launch heralds a new beginning for the U.S. in its human spaceflight missions.

For the full essay, click here.



The mission is also significant in that it sets the stage for U.S. missions to the moon and Mars. The U.S. is set to return to the moon in the next few years, but no date has been set for a future Mars mission. Prior to the recent launch, NASA Deputy Administrator Jim Morhard said, “We’re at the dawn of a new age. We’re leading the beginning of a space revolution.” Following the successful launch, Jim Bridenstine, the NASA administrator, spoke about the U.S. moon mission, the Artemis program, saying, “We don’t want to go [to the moon] alone. We want to go with international partners and we want to go with @Commercial_Crew partners.”

This has been proud moment for the U.S. space program, as well as for ordinary citizens — #LaunchAmerica became a trending hashtag on social media. From Vienna, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Wolcott, representative of the United States to the Vienna Office of the United Nations, commented on the launch saying, “Collaboration with the private sector is essential in this new era of outer space exploration.”

This has been a key moment: The growing private space sector is beginning to create new energy and excitement about space, something that has been missing for a long time.

The NASA-SpaceX launch has been in the works for a while and has been closely watched by U.S. friends and adversaries alike. Back in the 1960s, it was essentially the United States and the Soviet Union that were capable of sending humans to space, but the situation is quite different today, with many more countries in the fray. China has an active human spaceflight program, having sent its first crewed mission to space in 2003. India also has plans to send its first astronauts to outer space in another two years. While space exploration and understanding the cosmos are important by themselves, today’s exploration programs, including the crewed missions, are a demonstration of growing competition in space, much like what happened during the Cold War. The U.S. return to having its own crewed mission is one more piece of evidence that this competition is intensifying.

NASA’s Commercial Crew Program is significant in a number of ways. First and foremost, it removes the U.S. dependency on Russia for sending American astronauts to space. U.S.-China competition may be getting all the attention, but mounting tensions between Russia and the United States in recent years also have ramifications in multiple domains, including outer space. The fact that Russia could stop cooperating in sending Americans into space using the Soyuz vehicle was always a possibility. It is also a major vulnerability that Washington would have liked to rectify so that they remain independent when it comes to ferrying American astronauts to space.

NASA’s new arrangement also brings in important economic benefits. For one, the United States can save on the cost of buying a seat on the Soyuz spaceship. It is reported that NASA has paid Russia around $86 million per seat to send astronauts to the International Space Station using the Soyuz spacecraft. SpaceX Crew Dragon on the other hand is a much cheaper option, costing NASA only around $55 million. Under NASA’s Commercial Crew Program, Boeing is also developing an astronaut taxi, the Crew Space Transportation (CST)-100 Starliner, that can carry seven passengers, or a mix of crew and cargo, into low Earth orbit. Boeing’s astronaut-ferrying taxi is likely to cost around $90 million per seat. In addition to potential direct savings per seat per astronaut, an American crew spaceship industry within the United States will also create an entire industry around it, thus creating a large number of jobs in the country in addition to gaining spin-off technological benefits.

There are also economic benefits in terms of creating a sustainable link between NASA and the private sector, thus helping the emergence of the private sector as a key stakeholder. These direct financial benefits and the indirect technological gains are crucial, especially at a time when great power competition is peaking once again. Additionally, these collaborations with commercial enterprises will help NASA accomplish much of its future plans for the moon, and possibly Mars at a later date.

Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX, himself sees an active role on this. After the successful lift-off of the Crew Dragon, Musk said, “This is hopefully the first step on a journey toward a civilization on Mars.” An array of space industries is coming up, exploring the possibilities of space tourism within the decade. All of these mean economic and strategic advantage to the United States.

Implications of the US Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty - The Diplomat, 29 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote about implications of the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations.

Last week, the Trump administration announced that the US will be pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), a major arms control measure that aided transparency and confidence-building among 34 participating states. In a press statement on May 21, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. will send its six-month notice to all the state parties to this effect. Justifying the move, Pompeo said, “Russia has been a serial violator of many of its arms control obligations and commitments,” and not just the OST. The treaty allows member countries to fly unarmed surveillance planes over each other’s territory with a 72-hour notice. The participating states, under the treaty commitments, fly fixed wing planes, equipped with agreed sensors.

The U.S. decision to walk out of the OST comes against the backdrop of the U.S. walking out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, and much earlier in 2001, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. Global arms control arrangements were in a state of disarray in any case and this adds to the problem. While many of the recent developments have been due to Russia’s apparent violation of its commitments, at least as the US maintains, the real reason is more likely the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition and Washington’s determination not to tie its own hands.

For the full essay, click here.



Nevertheless, the U.S. does have some complaints about Russian behavior. Washington has cited instances where Russia has breached its OST commitments, particularly on U.S. flights over Russia. Pompeo’s press note last week alleged that Russia had denied permission to U.S. observation flights “within a 10-kilometer corridor along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby attempting to advance false Russian claims that these occupied territories are independent states.” Russia has apparently placed restriction on flight distance over Kaliningrad, and this has been particularly concerning because the enclave has seen significant military build-up in recent years.

Such actions have fueled opposition to the treaty, especially from the right wing of the U.S. political spectrum. In an op-ed in the Washington Post in December 2019, Tom Cotton, a Republican Senator from Arkansas, made a case for the U.S. withdrawal by saying, “Russia has breached the treaty for years by imposing limits on U.S. flights while suffering no such restrictions itself. In other words, “open skies for me, closed skies for thee.”

There were other problems too, because the U.S. fears that Russia has gained an unfair technical advantage under the OST. In 2016, Russia reportedly decided to introduce a new digital electro-optical sensor to its Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft used for Open Skies flights. Both the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress raised alarms over this, though it had more to do with the technological advantage Russia gained rather than being a technical violation of the treaty itself. One senior U.S. intelligence official apparently warned that the introduction of new sophisticated planes over the U.S. would provide Russia with “a significant advantage.” In 2019, Russia introduced the Tu-214ON aircraft OST missions over the United States, raising further concerns.

Russia has its own complaints: Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the U.S. of imposing “more sweeping restrictions on observation flights over Alaska.” However, the grievances on the U.S. side have been much more intense.

The treaty came about with good intentions. A hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1992 on the Open Skies Treaty noted that the treaty was not framed as an arms control measure, but as a measure that calls for higher levels of openness and transparency leading to better predictability and stability, thus lessening tensions among the participating states. The initial idea of the OST came from President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 although it led to nothing since it was rejected by the Soviet Union, which said it was a means for spying. Following the end of the Cold War, in May 1989, U.S. President George H. W. Bush once again broached the idea. After a meeting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along with additional negotiations supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OST was signed in March 1992.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from the treaty could be seen as a prelude to what might happen with regard to another arms control measure that will be up for renewal soon. The bilateral START agreement with Russia ,which puts a cap on the number of deployed nuclear missiles to 1,550 on each side, will come up for renewal in February 2021. Given the recent U.S. attitude toward global arms control measures, it is possible that the U.S. will not renew the agreement.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a keen desire for China to join these arms control arrangements. The feeling appears to be that these various U.S.-Russia treaties serve to limit U.S. ability to compete effectively with China because China is not bound by the same agreements. This was definitely true of the INF treaty. But China has been clear in saying that it has no plans to join any future arms control measure involving the U.S. and Russia.

It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been in a state of limbo for more than two decades and it is unlikely that any serious discussions will happen at the CD in the near future. While the U.S. move does not help matters, it is also yet another indication that the intensifying international competition is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. This means that the U.S. and China will need to engage directly for a new era in arms control.

My Perspective On US Space Resources Executive Order: Raji Rajagopalan On The EO’s First Mover Advantage - SpaceWatch Global, April 15, 2020

Recently, I did a Q&A with the SpaceWatch Global on the US Space Resources Executive Order.

On 6 April 2020, US President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order (EO) on Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources. This order addresses US policy regarding the recovery and use of resources in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies. Over the next few weeks, SpaceWatch.Global will publish a range of perspectives supporting and opposing the EO from experts around the world. Today’s two expert perspectives come from Rajeswari Rajagopalan of India (below) and Professor Guoyu Wang of China.

For the full Q&A, click here.



In your opinion, what is the underlying strategic and economic rationale for President Trump’s Executive Order?

The possible underlying economic and strategic rationale is to gain the first mover advantage. While the US and other western space players talk about space mining and resource extraction, China has been making progress. Whether the resource is being extracted for bringing it back to Earth or for making the Moon as the base for more ambitious plans to go to Mars, the technological benefits through spinoffs from such activities are significant. The US clearly does not want to let China gain any unilateral advantage.

The Executive Order explicitly rejects the 1979 Moon Agreement. How do you think this will be received by other countries, particularly other major space powers?

Rejection of the 1979 Moon Agreement is not a surprise because very few countries have signed and ratified it. What is surprising in the Executive Order is the explicit rejection of the idea of outer space as a global commons. Even though the suspicion was that this was how the United States (and others) viewed it, openly saying so in the EO is unusual. For that matter, even other spacefaring powers have had similar attitudes towards space because if space is truly a ‘global commons’, it would prevent other states also from activities such as resource mining in space. And this is possibly the reason why all the major spacefaring powers including the US, Russia, China, Japan and many in Europe have not signed the Moon Treaty. India is among the handful of space powers that is a signatory to it although it has not ratified it.

Similarly, the Executive Order explicitly rejects the view that space is a Global Commons. What, in your opinion, is the policy rationale behind this claim and, again, how do you think this will be received by other countries?

It is correct that this is not the first US administration to hold this view. But equally, other countries also hold such views, though they have not been as explicit about it. Trump’s action, however, might be indicator that competition for resources in space is likely to accelerate because others countries are likely to see this as reason to speed up their programs.

In your view, how likely will this Executive Order “encourage international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space…?”

Trump’s approach on setting up a base camp on the Moon has already seen many countries supporting it. I would assume these players including the UAE, Luxembourg and Canada, Australia, would find a way of supporting this idea as well.

Hypothetically assuming that this Executive Order leads to international support, will it make the prospect of commercial space resource extraction closer to reality?

It might lead to international collaboration. But I wrote an Op-Ed where I raised some of the complications of this. For example, how would national courts arbitrate any disputes unless these are subject to national sovereignty? If this is beyond national courts, how can disputes between parties engaging in such activities be resolved? Unless these legal issues are resolved, technical advances cannot by itself ensure resource extraction from space.

GSLV success: A major technology boost

Here's an analysis of India's successful GSLV launch conducted on January 05, 2014. This puts India in an exclusive club of five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China. Given the complex nature of this technology - the use of rocket propellants at extremely low temperatures, as the ISRO Chairman Dr. Radhakrishnan remarked, "only a few in the world have mastered it."

For the full article, click here.



With the launch of GSLV-D5, India’s indigenously developed cryogenic engine upper stage technology has been proven for the first time, a major feat of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The proven technology demonstrates India’s ability to launch heavier payloads into geostationary orbit. Cryogenic technology is significant due to the thrust gained through burning every kg of propellant that is far higher in a cryogenic engine, which gives the thrust to carry heavier satellites into orbit. In the flight of GSLV-D5, the ISRO also launched a communication satellite GSAT-14 into the Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). The test was a make or break situation for the ISRO after two successive failures in 2010 and a mission cancelled in 2013.

India had undertaken so far seven GSLV launches, including three failures and one mission cancelled hours before the launch. Previous failures included problems such as fuel tank leakage, the mission centre losing control of the rocket with it deviating from predicted flight path, among others. Therefore, the January 5 successful launch is a matter of technology demonstration and a major boost for the Indian space community.

India’s cryogenic journey has been a long one, going back to the 1980s. In December 1982, a Cryogenic Study Team was established that studied all aspects of the technology and questions such as whether India should develop or buy the technology from outside were examined. In 1983, the team submitted a report that recommended developing the engine capable of generating about 10 tonnes of thrust indigenously as against procuring it off the shelf. In addition to the exorbitant cost to buying from elsewhere, export control mechanisms such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that denies transfer of such technologies were also contextualising factors in India’s decision. However, in 1991 after a great deal of indecision, Government of India entered into a deal with the Soviet Union for procuring two cryogenic flight stages and the technology to make them in India. The sale of such technology was seen as a violation of the MTCR commitments made by the Soviet Union and thus the deal was scrapped.

In addition to the prestige factor of being part of an exclusive club of countries that have the proven cryogenic engine technology, the GSLV-D5 launch is important from a commercial and strategic perspective. The growing satellite launch market has a huge commercial angle. So far, this market is dominated by the French and the Chinese to an extent. Given the growing number of countries entering the space domain for a variety of missions from socio-economic and development to military functions, the number of satellite launches is likely to go up significantly in the coming years. India should not lose out opportunities in this ever-growing lucrative foreign satellite launch market.

From a strategic perspective, the successful launch of the GSLV means it is self-reliant in the area of satellite launching, including heavier satellites. This also means that India will not have to depend on foreign agencies to carry their heavier payloads. Without a successfully tested indigenous cryogenic engine GSLV, many of India’s future missions would have been affected by delays. India already has a series of satellites including include GSAT-6A and 7A, two remote sensing satellites, GISATs and the GSAT series including GSAT-9 ready for launch in the near future. Chandrayaan-2 and India’s interplanetary and manned moon missions will also have a huge boost. While India has not faced any serious issue of reliability as far as foreign launchers are concerned, being self-sufficient in this area is significant in addition to having more cost-effective, cheaper options at home.

So far India has used its tried and tested Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) although these do have a weight limitation of just over one tonne. A PSLV can carry 1600 kg satellites in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). On the other hand, a GSLV offers India the ability to launch satellites weighing 3.5-5 tonnes.


1. N. Gopal Raj, "The Long Road to Cryogenic Technology," OpEd, The Hindu, April 21, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-long-road-to-cryogenic-technology/article397441.ece

India's Mars Mission: A Mere Show of Capabilities?, my OpEd in the Global Times...

Here's another OpEd I wrote on India's Mars mission and this was published in the Global Times (China). Despite the cost-effectiveness of India's Mars mission, there have been several questions raised on whether this was necessary given that India has several challenges in the developmental domain. It is indeed true that India has serious issues nevertheless there are several important reasons for conducting such missions.

For one, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved. Two, space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs. Three, given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

For the full article, click here.



India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

Geopolitics of India's Mars mission, my OpEd in The Wall Street Journal....

It has been more than six months since I updated my blog. I thought I will get serious with my blog at least from the beginning of a new year but it has been more hectic than before. There have been couple of different projects that I have been part of as well as coordinating, which have been exciting and challenging but they clearly took a lot of my time as they involved a lot of travelling, meeting and interactions with experts, key stakeholders. Now that I am done with most of the travel for these projects, I hope I will have more time at hand at my blog back on track.

November 2013 was big for India. India's Mars mission undertaken on November 05 was a matter of pride, in terms of technology demonstration. But the Mars mission, called Mangalyaan, was also a reflection of the growing competition in the space domain, especially in Asia. Also to be the first Asian country to conduct such a complex mission must have been an important factor in India's calculation. The fact that India managed to do this mission in a cost-effective manner at around $ 75 million, a fraction of the cost incurred by other spacefaring powers, added to the pride factor.

Here is an OpEd that I wrote in November, one for the Wall Street Journal.

In the Asian Wall Street Journal OpEd, I argue that India did not enter the space domain with big dream projects but the key objective was to bring about change in the socio-economic and development domains through greater utilisation of science in particular, and space utilisation in particular. However, as things have progressed over the decades, there have been challenges, new compulsions which have necessitated India to focus on showcasing of its abilities every now and then.

Full article is given below.




India’s space program did not begin with big ambitions. Vikram Sarabhai, one of the original leaders of the Indian space program in the early 1960s, said that India did “not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight.”

Even if we take Mr. Sarabhai at his word, India’s maiden mission to Mars, set for lift off today, shows that things have changed.

Firstly, it provides an indication of a growing space race between India and China. Fielding its Mars mission before China has reached the Red Planet is clearly a big factor in Delhi’s calculations. China attempted a Mars orbiter mission in 2011, piggybacking it on a Russian Mars spacecraft, but that failed to leave Earth’s orbit.

Setting off to Mars is a demonstration of India’s technological capabilities and an attempt to join the US, Russia and the European Union in successful interplanetary exploration before China.

The mission is not without its critics, including some former officials of Indian Space Research Organisation, India’s space agency, who argue that it is a waste of money, especially in a country where so many live in poverty. It is unlikely that critics will get much of a hearing.

India claims that its missions are much cheaper than similar ones elsewhere, with this attempt costing $73 million, about a tenth as much as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spends on comparable programs.

The bread or gun argument is real for India, but the country doesn’t live in a benign neighborhood and the security imperative also requires it to focus on those capabilities which can prepare it for the challenge presented by its location.

India’s security compulsions are becoming a more compelling driver for its space program. Countries around the world have so far used space for so-called passive military applications such as communications and reconnaissance but there is a growing trend towards ‘weaponizing’ outer space.

The U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike program, which includes using long-range missiles and hypersonic vehicles that will transit through space, has created the impression that it plans to weaponize space. This could provoke reactions from Russia and China and set off a broader arms race in space.

China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 served as a wake-up call to India about the challenges that exist in its neighborhood. The test sparked a new debate, both within the Indian security establishment and the larger Indian strategic community about the country’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and put pressure to develop its own anti-satellite system. While India is yet to demonstrate such capability, the scientific establishment has made it amply clear that they have the technological blocks ready should there be a political decision to do so.

One indicator of Indian concerns about the nature of the space race, is the likely establishment of an Indian aerospace command. Many of the key global powers such as the U.S. and Russia have such commands, India does not. While the Indian government has been debating the issue for close to a decade, there are indications that it is moving forward with the proposal. In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. The cell has functioned well in coordinating between the military, the Department of Space and ISRO.

India also launched the first dedicated military satellite this August for its navy, reflecting a gradual shift in the country’s approach to security. The maritime communications satellite is a necessary tool for the marine force as the competition for the Indian Ocean, particularly with China, gradually gathers pace.

From the outset of its space program, demonstrating technological pride and capability has always been an important consideration for India. No less so today. But the Mars mission is as much about demonstrating India’s capabilities as a force in space, as it is about scientific skill.

India’s Race to Mars Goes Way Beyond Science, my essay in Asian Wall Street Journal on India's Mars mission....

Here's a short essay of mine on India's Mars mission on November 05, published in Asian Wall Street Journal.

India’s space program did not begin with big ambitions. Vikram Sarabhai, one of the original leaders of the Indian space program in the early 1960s, said that India did “not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight.”

Even if we take Mr. Sarabhai at his word, India’s maiden mission to Mars, set for lift off today, shows that things have changed.

For the full essay, click here.

Firstly, it provides an indication of a growing space race between India and China. Fielding its Mars mission before China has reached the Red Planet is clearly a big factor in Delhi’s calculations. China attempted a Mars orbiter mission in 2011, piggybacking it on a Russian Mars spacecraft, but that failed to leave Earth’s orbit.

Setting off to Mars is a demonstration of India’s technological capabilities and an attempt to join the US, Russia and the European Union in successful interplanetary exploration before China.

The mission is not without its critics, including some former officials of Indian Space Research Organisation, India’s space agency, who argue that it is a waste of money, especially in a country where so many live in poverty. It is unlikely that critics will get much of a hearing.

India claims that its missions are much cheaper than similar ones elsewhere, with this attempt costing $73 million, about a tenth as much as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spends on comparable programs.

The bread or gun argument is real for India, but the country doesn’t live in a benign neighborhood and the security imperative also requires it to focus on those capabilities which can prepare it for the challenge presented by its location.

India’s security compulsions are becoming a more compelling driver for its space program. Countries around the world have so far used space for so-called passive military applications such as communications and reconnaissance but there is a growing trend towards ‘weaponizing’ outer space.

The U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike program, which includes using long-range missiles and hypersonic vehicles that will transit through space, has created the impression that it plans to weaponize space. This could provoke reactions from Russia and China and set off a broader arms race in space.

China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 served as a wake-up call to India about the challenges that exist in its neighborhood. The test sparked a new debate, both within the Indian security establishment and the larger Indian strategic community about the country’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and put pressure to develop its own anti-satellite system. While India is yet to demonstrate such capability, the scientific establishment has made it amply clear that they have the technological blocks ready should there be a political decision to do so.

One indicator of Indian concerns about the nature of the space race, is the likely establishment of an Indian aerospace command. Many of the key global powers such as the U.S. and Russia have such commands, India does not. While the Indian government has been debating the issue for close to a decade, there are indications that it is moving forward with the proposal. In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. The cell has functioned well in coordinating between the military, the Department of Space and ISRO.

India also launched the first dedicated military satellite this August for its navy, reflecting a gradual shift in the country’s approach to security. The maritime communications satellite is a necessary tool for the marine force as the competition for the Indian Ocean, particularly with China, gradually gathers pace.

From the outset of its space program, demonstrating technological pride and capability has always been an important consideration for India. No less so today. But the Mars mission is as much about demonstrating India’s capabilities as a force in space, as it is about scientific skill.

Space Fence Solution: International Collaboration... an analysis written by my colleague and I on possible ways to keep the programme running....

Here's an analysis written by Rahul and I on the proposed shut down of the U.S. Space Fence programme and what could be done keep it running until a replacement is ready. This is important given the vulnerabilities in the absence of such a programme. The essay was published in the Space News yesterday.

The proposed shutdown of the U.S. Space Fence programme or what is formally called the U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System (AFSSS) does highlight the increasing trend of budget cuts’ constraining the ability of nations to utilize their capabilities in critical areas. The absence of such programs leaves all of us vulnerable. Given such trends, states have to think of international collaboration to get things going. How this should be worked out is something for all the major spacefaring states to consider.

Should there be a consortium of countries to keep the Space Fence up and running under an international agreement? In the face of divisive politics, it might be more appealing if such an arrangement were routed through a dedicated U.N.-affiliated agency for space traffic, like the International Civil Aviation Organization for air traffic.

For the full post, click here.

U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System
The Space Fence, or what is formally called the U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System (AFSSS), operational since 1961, is being shut down. AFSSS, consisting of three transmitters and six receivers placed across the southern U.S. and using radio waves, has kept a watch on what is going on in outer space. Many may consider outer space to be uninhabited and empty, but the reality is that over the decades it has been filled with millions of pieces of man-made junk that could cause huge harm to functioning assets. We need several systems to have a comprehensive coverage of the space environment. The United States has the largest network, even though its coverage of the Southern Hemisphere is not adequate. Russia has the second-largest network, followed by the European Union.

With the U.S. having shut down one of its major space situational awareness networks, major spacefaring powers need to make it a priority to contemplate possible solutions to track satellites and orbital debris on a continued basis.

The United States plans to set up a new Space Fence, which is to enter service in 2018. It has the potential to track much smaller objects than its predecessor and is also believed to be more accurate.

Until the replacement is ready, the duties of the AFSSS will be distributed to other branches; U.S. Air Force Space Command says it has “devised modified operating modes for the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System at Cavalier Air Force Station, N.D., and for the space surveillance radar at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., which allows the discontinuation of AFSSS operations while still maintaining solid space situational awareness.”

However, the shutdown does highlight the increasing trend of budget cuts’ constraining the ability of nations to utilize their capabilities in such critical areas. The absence of such programs leaves all of us vulnerable. Given such trends, states have to think of international collaboration to get things going. How this should be worked out is something for all the major spacefaring states to consider.

Should there be a consortium of countries to keep the Space Fence up and running under an international agreement? In the face of divisive politics, it might be more appealing if such an arrangement were routed through a dedicated U.N.-affiliated agency for space traffic, like the International Civil Aviation Organization for air traffic.

Even as it sounds clichéd, outer space is becoming more crowded, congested and contested. With new players still emerging in the space domain, and newer and smaller satellites entering into service, the challenges of tracking are significant. Given the potential for damage that could be done if satellites or other objects sent into space collide with each other and the numerous challenges triggered by natural causes, there is a need to build a space monitoring mechanism. Due to the costs and technology involved in creating such a mechanism, international cooperation will be crucial.

So far there have been a total of nine accidents that involved accidental collisions in outer space. Out of these, the collision of the Russian Cosmos satellite with the U.S. Iridium 33 satellite was the only incident where two satellites directly collided. All other collisions involved debris from different activities in outer space. According to NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office, “More than 21,000 orbital debris larger than 10 cm are known to exist. The estimated population of particles between 1 and 10 cm in diameter is approximately 500,000. The number of particles smaller than 1 cm exceeds 100 million.” These objects travel at a very high velocity and inflict significant damage on satellites if they collide. A Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 created more than 3,000 pieces of space debris, further aggravating the problem. Space weather, caused by charged particles created by the sun and Earth’s magnetic field, also creates disturbing conditions for space objects. Given the dependence of military as well as civilian infrastructures on assets in outer space, these threats are likely to create enormous damage if they are able to disrupt the functioning of these assets. Therefore, maintaining a steady monitoring system such as the AFSSS is vital.

The concept of space situational awareness (SSA), which includes predicting collisions in orbit, detecting launches of new space objects, predicting re-entry of space objects into the atmosphere and detecting threats and attacks on spacecraft, is crucial in predicting and preventing such events. This can be done with the use of radars, optical telescopes, electronic signal sensors, infrared sensors and spacecraft that are in orbit between Earth and the sun.

With the shutdown of the old Space Fence program, Air Force Space Command said it would save about $14 million annually. However, the huge amount of data on space objects around the Earth made available through this program was significant. More importantly, as Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation writes, “The U.S. military also uses the data to offer a close approach warning service for owner-operators of the more than 1,000 active satellites in orbit.” Using this data, more than 10,000 warnings of potential collisions were issued, and 75 “avoidance maneuvers” were supported. This highlights the extent of vulnerabilities without a continuing tracking system.

Several established space powers, including India, have a range of technologies set in place to detect and trace objects in space. Russia has the second-largest network of radars and sensors, providing a catalog of space objects. As of now, Russia, through bilateral agreements, collaborates with some of the Central Asian countries where it has located its space surveillance systems. The Russian Space Surveillance System comprises mostly phased array radars and some dedicated radars and optical telescopes.

Europe has sufficient numbers of radars and networks to monitor space objects although they are not nearly as comprehensive as the U.S. or Russian systems. The European effort is also not a coordinated one at this instance given that it is run and operated by only a few countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Norway. In 2008, Europe initiated the SSA Preparatory Programme for creating a European Space Surveillance Network, and it has received support from a number of European countries. Most recently, in March, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union (EU), launched a new initiative to track and monitor space debris. While many European countries have national systems, radars or telescopes for tracking satellites and space debris, most of the European satellite operators have been relying on the U.S. space surveillance and tracking information. With this new initiative, the EU plans to combine all the different networks to track satellites and debris.

Another example of international cooperation in creating SSA is the International Scientific Optical Network — a collaboration between scientific and academic institutions with 20 observatories in 10 countries for tracking objects in space, instituted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The Space Data Association, a grouping of commercial entities, also has a good network in this regard. It operates an automated SSA system that aims to reduce the risk of collisions and radio frequency interference. Its members currently include government and private satellite operators such as NASA, Avanti Communications, Arabsat and Telesat. The costs incurred are shared by participants and therefore reduce individual costs; this particularly could be useful given the tight budgets under which most agencies are operating.

India too possesses a wide array of ground-based tracking facilities. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Tracking and Command Network of ground stations across India offers critical support for India’s space missions and operations. Additionally, the Indian Deep Space Network provides operational assistance to ISRO and other space agencies, and India’s two Swordfish tracking radars have the ability to track activities in space.

All of these cooperative arrangements increase security in space, but a global network for monitoring space would only contribute more toward this goal. It is beyond a single state’s capacity to monitor all activities that could threaten assets in outer space. This is why international cooperation will be crucial to prevent accidental collisions and to predict events such as the recent Chelyabinsk incident. There is a need for countries to come together and create a mechanism for sharing the information they collect about the space environment for improving security and minimizing threats in outer space.

There are several different issues in the shutdown of the Space Fence. SSA and space debris are important, but the larger and longer-term problem is space traffic control or management and safety of navigation in outer space. One could potentially look at strengthening the Space Fence in the first instance, but this has to grow into something bigger like an international space traffic management center. Such a center might come to work as a traffic controller for outer space and at a later stage could be tasked to move or remove space debris. But investment in technologies for removal of space debris is expensive. Given these realities, collaboration in technology development may be the only way to go. It may also be looked at as an incentive to secure greater support for an international code of conduct for space. Any technology developed under such a program should be freely available to all countries.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. She served in India’s National Security Council Secretariat from 2003 to 2007. Rahul Prakash is a Junior Fellow at the Foundation.

International Space Code: EU needs to be patient, my analysis of the EU code making process....

Here's an analysis on the EU space code making process.... The EU setting a deadline of 2014 at the first international consultations in Ukraine is not helpful.

The EU having taken the lead in initiating the international space code must be patient in taking it to a meaningful conclusion. The EU in this regard must engage in wider consultations at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels as a means to bridge the political divide between states and have it endorsed by as many states as possible. However, such endorsement in large numbers can come about only if the EU were to move at a pace that is comfortable to all and not hasten the process by setting artificial deadlines.

For the full article, click here.



Concluding the first round of the open-ended consultations on a Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities in Kiev, Ukraine in May 2013, Principal Adviser and Special Envoy for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament of the European External Action Service Jacek Bylica, in a press statement, said that the EU plans to complete the process and finalise the code by next year. Ambassador Bylica rightly emphasised the worsening of the outer space domain including the growth of space debris even over the last five years when the draft of the Code was being discussed. Meanwhile, the number and types of actors engaged in outer space activities have gone up significantly. Militarisation and potential weaponisation of outer space are also issues of concern. All of this makes outer space crowded, congested and contested. However, as Amb. Bylica also pointed out, there is no one single UN department that looks at both the safety and security of outer space in a holistic manner. There are institutions and mechanisms such as the UN COPUOS that looks at the peaceful activities and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that looks at the security aspects pertaining to outer space. A code may be an apt instrument to cover both these aspects while bringing the existing mechanisms and treaties under its purview. Against this backdrop, the EU has argued that the process of establishing the Code should be completed by 2014.

While this exercise is not an easy process and the Kiev meeting was meant to be part of this process, it certainly was a forward step as it brought together a larger number of countries to start the conversation around the Code. The meeting in Kiev, attended by more than 60 countries, proved itself as an important platform for countries to air their reactions and responses to the EU-proposed Code, both on the process as well as the content. However, setting a deadline of one year appears to be hastening the process a bit too quickly.

Most space-faring states understand and appreciate the need to establish the rules of the road to govern activities in outer space as a means to ensure the long-term sustainability. Nevertheless, the process leading to the formulation of an instrument cannot be hastened to be concluded in such a short span of time. States need to spend considerable time debating issues, from the need for such a mechanism to the principles and scope of such an instrument, as well as the process. For many states, the process is as important as the instrument. To hasten the process may not help in enlisting the support of a large number of countries.

On the other hand, it is understandable that the EU has expended considerable amount of energy and resources into this exercise. However, it has to be more patient in letting the process take its due course if it has to muster the critical support it requires. A process such as this should ensure that it is supported not only by a significant number of countries but also supported by those countries that are seen as significant. Second, a truly international effort in the code formation began only in 2011-12 and it appears that a measure of this nature cannot be concluded in a span of two years.

This is not exclusive to the space code debate but holds true in the larger context of arms control. Any arms control measure must be initiated at the global rather than regional level. These should ideally be taken up in the CD or other UN institution that may carry larger legitimacy at least in the context of many of the developing countries. Enlisting the support of these countries is critical in ensuring the endorsement, and thereby longevity and effectiveness of the instrument. Such measures could also be initiated through pre-proposal consultations among a smaller working group, an inter-governmental group, space agencies of established space-faring powers or even a group within the CD that could deliberate upon and consider the utility of different measures in the context of developing a code or any such measure.

However, the more important aspect in gaining greater traction for any arms control measure is to proceed at a pace that is comfortable to all. This is particularly important for the Code that has seen a bit of resistance from outside of the EU capitals. Countries are going to be skeptical when a group of countries or a particular region takes the initiative to produce a mechanism, particularly if it is an arms control measure, as has been the case with the space code. One group of countries cannot decide upon a course of action and expect it to be endorsed by the rest. These exercises have to be truly global and inclusive if they have to be endorsed by a large number of states.

Meanwhile, other established and emerging space powers also need to make earnest efforts and participate in these processes. Major space powers sitting on the fence need to start shedding their political differences and start contributing to the process in a constructive manner. This is critical given that the challenges facing outer space are huge and space is truly global requiring global attention and action.

In conclusion, the EU having taken the lead in initiating the international space code must be patient in taking it to a meaningful conclusion. The EU in this regard must engage in wider consultations at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels as a means to bridge the political divide between states and have it endorsed by as many states as possible. However, such endorsement in large numbers can come about only if the EU were to move at a pace that is comfortable to all and not hasten the process by setting artificial deadlines.

Asia-Pacific Security: Challenges and Opportunities, one of the latest books on the subject and I have a chapter on it as well....

Here's a chapter of mine on the Asia-Pacific security, edited by Dr. Adam B. Lowther. I have contributed a chapter on the US role in the region, to this edited book, titled, Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities. The book has been published by the US Air Force Research Institute, Alabama.

The United States’ Pacific pivot has been much debated since the end of last year. This chapter addresses three specific questions: (1) how Asia-Pacific nations see the role of the United States in the region; (2) as China rises, how its neighbours in the region will react, whether they will they bandwagon or balance; and (3) how states in the region are hedging their bets on the future. The discussion delves into the new alliances and partnerships that are likely responses in view of the new challenges.

For the full book, click here.



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UNIDIR annual space conference, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability" in Geneva, April 02-03, 2013

Recently, I was at the UNIDIR's annual space security conference titled, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability,"held at UN Headquarters, Geneva, on April 02-03, 2013. The annual space conference of the UNIDIR has become a signature event given the high level participation of all the different stakeholders. I was speaking on space security dialogues and how to ensure widespread representation.

My talk and the PPT are available online now.



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India and ATT: A Contrarian View

Should India be paranoid about the ATT? Could India have voted for a global measure governing transfer of arms? Here's my short essay on the ATT....

India should look at ways to become an active party in arms trade treaty debates if it has to prove its credentials in global governance. While advancing its global governance role, India will have to also ensure that its arms procurement is not adversely affected.



Developing the first ever instrument to regulate the sale of conventional weapons, the UN General Assembly adopted Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) on April 02, 2013. And the treaty will be opened for signature on June 03, 2013.

There have been efforts for some time to bring the global arms trade under some regulatory framework. Negotiations over the ATT in the last several years did not produce any agreement, given the difficulties in producing a consensual decision at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Despite the lack of agreement, the treaty was put to vote at the UN General Assembly on April 02, 2013. While the treaty found favour among 154 countries, 3 countries (Iran, North Korea and Syria) voted against it at the CD and 23 countries including Russia, China and India abstained. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon hailed the treaty as a major achievement saying, "It is a historic diplomatic achievement - the culmination of long-held dreams and many years of effort. This is a victory for the world's people."

The ATT is a good measure that will bring about the much-needed regulation in the field of arms transfer from one country to another. It brings arms transfers of a variety of weapons under its purview, including battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers. The ATT, however, has come under criticism for being concluded in haste. Any arms control measure should be carried on at a comfortable pace to all that can potentially ensure greater participation, and thereby greater compliance.

India, in its statement, pointed out two major flaws with the ATT: the treaty gives an upper hand to arms exporting countries and ignores the needs of the arms importing states; and two, arms sales to terrorist and insurgent groups do not fall within the purview of the treaty.

The principal fear within India is that the ATT would give external arms manufactures the license to cancel bilateral contracts at will, based on political reasons, which could seriously affect India's military preparedness, especially if it were to happen during crises. What then happens to contractual obligations?

On the other hand, it could be argued that neither of these are very serious concerns. On the terrorist issue, while it is nice to have state control on supply of arms to terrorist groups, it is not particularly practical. No international treaty is likely to stop states like Pakistan from supplying arms to terrorist groups.

On supplier obligations, any country that reneges on an arms supply contract with India would lose access to the Indian arms market, which is a huge and growing market.

Nevertheless, this is a threat. If countries were to decide and cancel the contract, how seriously is India likely to be affected? With India's reliance on foreign suppliers continuing to be at around 70%, several procurements could indeed get affected. However, India could find ways to get around these measures by demanding guarantees in future contracts.

In this regard, India should be more concerned about some of the western suppliers, in particular the US and the UK, because they are also some of the key supporters of the treaty. Of particular concern has been the inclusion of ammunition, parts and components of weapon systems as part of the ATT that could potentially squeeze recipient countries during crises.

But India continues to buy a large chunk of arms and weapon systems from Russia which is not a subscriber to ATT. France is a country that has subscribed to the treaty and is also a major supplier of arms to India. Nevertheless, going by India's past experience, France will find a political solution to deal with such situation.

Therefore, India should carefully choose the countries from whom it is seeking to buy weapons and other advanced systems. It should ensure that it finds partners that are not necessarily subscribers to ATT or those that will find political modus vivendi should a problem arise. India could also seek political guarantees from supplier countries that will ensure steady supply of arms. India can also enter into joint ventures as a way of safeguarding its interests. Under such circumstances, the impact is likely to be minimal.

Lastly, India should look at ways to become an active party in these debates if it has to prove its credentials in global governance. While advancing its global governance role, India will have to also ensure that its arms procurement is not adversely affected.

Asteroids, Meteors and Planetary Defence... a short essay on the recent events and how we need to strengthen planetary defence as an important agenda in national space policies, code of conduct....

Here's a short essay on the recent events and how the least probable events could prove most consequential if adequate attention is not paid...

The dramatic events of February 15, both the meteor hit in Chelyabinsk region in Russia and Asteroid 2012 DA 14's close miss, bring home the reality of the threat to human life from asteroids and meteors. Earlier, people had been fairly dismissive of such incidents, taking shelter in the argument of low probability. Even as these may be extremely low probability events, it should be noted that such incidents could have high-consequence. The recent fly-by of asteroid 2012 DA14 (object of this size hit the earth roughly once in a millennia) and the meteor strike over Russia (the second major meteor strike in Siberia in the last 100 years) that injured hundreds of people show that, improbable as they might be, such events do happen.



In fact, it is not that such events have not happened before, just that our space situational awareness has been quite poor that we didn't even know when we had a near miss. The prestigious international astronaut society, the Association of Space Explorers (ASE) has been engaging the United Nations on a possible regime to deal with such threats, and they have stated in their report to the UN that as new telescopes come online, in a little over a decade, we are likely to be tracking as many as 1 million near-Earth asteroids (NEAs), of which 10,000 may have some probability of impacting Earth in the next 100 years, and 50 to 100 will appear threatening enough to require active monitoring and/or deflection.

India is an established space power and one that is interested in shaping emerging regimes such as the International Space Code of Conduct. But there is skepticism as to how serious India is about this issue and how far India will push itself in pursuing this at regional and global forums. Does India, for instance, consider the movement of so-called Near Earth Objects part of its Space Situational Awareness needs?

This is an issue that has been debated and explored by scholars. Peter Garretson, a US Air Force officer and a former visiting fellow at the Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) recently wrote an article and gave an interview where he discussed the threat of asteroids. He suggested that the U.S. and India should consider jointly tackling such problems, just as they are jointly pursuing such ambitious global public good like Space-based Solar Power and Space Debris Mitigation. These are some of "the big ideas" that could take U.S.-India strategic partnership to new levels, and promote first-steps like sharing of Space Situational Awareness data. Of course, these ideas are still to fructify. However, given the multiple challenges, these are issues that India has to pursue with greater enthusiasm. While India may not currently have sufficient technical capabilities, collaborating with like-minded countries is a good way to get over such deficiencies. These ideas, as discussed by several analysts in the US-India context, should be pursued. After the conclusion of the US-India nuclear deal, this relationship is thirsty for such big ideas to push it beyond the rhetoric.

Active participation in Planetary Defense makes strong sense for India as well. India is one of only four great powers (India, US, Russia, China) that are both nuclear-capable and truly space-faring (having independent launch capabilities), the two pre-requisites to being able to deflect large asteroids, according to NASA. India has always seen its space program as serving the common man and the developmental mission of India. Now with the EU-proposed Space Code of Conduct gaining momentum, India is making active efforts to sit at the high table and shape these emerging rules. It is also making efforts to expand cooperation with other major space-faring powers, such as the US. While space exploration for the sake of exploration is exciting, the requirements for a planetary defense system, particularly in the backdrop of the challenges, are significant drivers of high technology cooperation. This should drive both India and the US to develop and share space-situational awareness, and such capabilities are a ticket to the high-table as well. Abilities that lead to protection from asteroid strikes also advance our abilities to use asteroids as resources, as the recent announcements of Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources Incorporated illustrate. A future International Space Code of Conduct and future space governance regime must include and facilitate capabilities that protect the planet and encourage space resource development.

Whether or not India's larger diplomatic organizations comprehend the importance of such on-going rule making, at least ISRO has not been totally absent. India's first-ever participation was to send an ISRO representative to the 2009 IAA Planetary Defense Conference in Grenada, Spain. Such participation should be continued and accelerated. This year, the Planetary Defense Conference will be on 15-19 April in Flagstaff, Arizona, USA. India should contemplate representation at these forums - with not just ISRO, but the MoD and MEA as well.

Even if small asteroids like 2012 DA14 were to hit a metropolis, it would have produced the equivalent destructive effects of a hydrogen bomb. Prior to the events of February 15, the Indian public and its policy makers likely could just not comprehend such a distant, seemingly un-real threat. Perhaps, after the 2012 DA 14 and the Russian meteor strike episodes, this will not be the case.

North Korea's nuclear test: Regional dynamics

Here's a short essay on the recent North Korean nuclear test... looking at regional reactions, most specifically at the Japanese options.

The test, conducted in defiance of regional and global concerns, has been criticised by the UN, US, Japan and South Korea. The test has clearly upped the ante in the neighbourhood with Japan and South Korea raising the military alert levels to be prepared for any eventuality. The test raises a lot of questions: How does this affect the regional threat matrix? How would countries like Japan and South Korea respond? The timing of the test, on the day of President Obama's State of the Union address, is curious, especially in the backdrop of the North Korean state media agency statement pointing to the US as one of the reasons why they have conducted the test.



North Korea conducted a nuclear test for the third time on February 12, sparking criticism from the region and beyond. According to Asahi Shimbun, the state media agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) stated that the test was conducted in a safe manner and this is aimed at coping with "outrageous" US hostility that "violently" undermines the North Korea's peaceful, sovereign rights to launch satellites. The agency went on to say that the test was packed with more explosive power and a "miniaturized" and "lighter" nuclear bomb. If these reports are true, Pyongyang has progressed in mastering the complex and complicated technology involved making the nuclear warhead small enough to fit into its missiles. The missile tests last December exhibited the increased range of new North Korean missiles, raising concerns in the region and beyond. The nuclear test also raised the suspicion about whether North Korea has made the switch from plutonium to uranium for its nuclear weapons. Japanese news media point out that North Korea has abundant deposits of uranium, and it is far simpler to enrich uranium in centrifuges than to reprocess plutonium.

Second, what is the rationale from the North Korean point of view? The new leadership in Pyongyang under Kim Jong Un could be trying to assert power and buy credibility through these tests. The power transition in Pyongyang has not exactly been smooth and there is believed to be infighting among multiple power centers. This test may be a reflection of the fact that King Jong Un is not in control of the affairs in Pyongyang.

Third, since North Korea has tested twice before, how significant is this in international political terms? Is North Korea testing again signify that the region did not respond in sufficiently serious ways to the first two Pyongyang tests? Japan, for instance, had contemplated serious responses, including possibly pre-emptive strikes as well as revisiting Tokyo's own nuclear options in each of the past crises. However, Tokyo has not done anything as yet, for a variety of reasons. These options could seriously impact the US-Japan security alliance. In addition, Japanese public opinion on nuclear weapons has remained uncertain. While a few right-wing politicians have called for exercising these options, the public continues to be wary of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Fukushima notwithstanding, this is changing. The very fact that there is an open debate in Japan today along these lines says a lot about the future prospects of nuclear weapons in Japan. In Japan, those who have favoured these options have found justifications, tracing debates way back to 1956 when Prime Minister Hatoyama stated, "It is not an objective of the Constitution to oblige us to sit and wait to perish."

Japan has possibly looked at these options for two reasons. One, the continuing concerns about the non-proliferation regime and its effectiveness in tackling issues such as North Korea and Iran. Japan has reasons to believe that North Korea's nuclear and missile-related issues cannot be sorted out through international arms control agreements. While the North Korean threat is progressing, Japan is not certain about the effectiveness of international agreements to curb the North Korean threat.

Circumstances may be different today with an Abe administration, a more hardline government, in control in Japan. However, is Tokyo in a better position as far as its response options are concerned? Amendment to the Japanese Constitution and changing Article 9 is often talked about. This will be a significant boost to strengthen Japan's military options. Nevertheless, it is too early to say with certainty how Japan will respond to the changing threat dynamics.

The advancements that Pyongyang has made in terms of miniaturization of the device may be significant particularly in the backdrop of long-range delivery vehicles. With Pyongyang having tested the longer-range missiles in recent months, threat to even the United States has increased, which is reflected in Obama's reactions to the test. The Obama administration, unlike its milder response following the missile test, sounded much more alarmed. Secretary Panetta, for instance, has said, "We just saw what North Korea has done in these last few weeks, a missile test and now a nuclear test. They represent a serious threat to the United States of America, and we've got to be prepared to deal with that." This brings the question about the US response. Beyond the rhetoric, how differently will the US respond? Does the Obama Administration see the nuclear non-proliferation regime as an appropriate vehicle to bring on the pressure on Pyongyang?

The test also raises questions about the relevance of the six-party talks. So far, it appears that the talks have not fructified. The talks stalled in 2009 when North Korea decided to pull out following a failed satellite launch. This brings out into the open also the Chinese role in the six party talks. Beijing has remained the sole friend and benefactor to North Korea, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. While there has been criticism that China has not been proactive in condemning Pyongyang's aggressive actions, the other side of the story may be as to how much of a leeway does China really have on North Korea to stop such posturing. There have been reasons to believe that China may have reached a point of frustration, as some of the WikiLeaks reports suggested.

In conclusion, while all the major players understand the challenges, they find themselves uniquely constrained in responding to North Korea.

India's Policy Approach to Space Security and Cyber Security, my presentation at the Chatham House conference on cyber and space security....

Last week, Chatham House organised a one-day conference, "Making the Connection: The Future of Cyber and Space," identifying trends and developments in cyber and space technology, weigh the risks posed by
dependence with the broader social benefits, assess implications for national and international security, examine the role of the public and private sector in mitigating threats and building resilience, and finally, discuss national and international policy approaches.

I was also speaking at the workshop addressing India's approach to both outer space and cyber space security. Brief outline of my presentation is given below.

Space and cyber security challenges are generally considered the emerging frontiers in our security discourse although the reality is that they present clear and present danger to India and the rest of the world already. While the challenges are known and acknowledged by states, the difficulty has been the lack of an agreed approach in addressing these challenges. Therefore, unlike in the nuclear arena, space and cyber continue to be driven by certain broad definitional understanding without specific guidelines and norms on permissible activities or capabilities that will ensure the long-term sustainability of outer and cyber space. Therefore, the need to define and communicate clear boundaries at all the different levels while developing certain norms of responsible behavior are essential steps in securing the both the outer space and cyber domain.

On the outer space domain, even as India continues with the official stance of non-weaponisation of outer space, the fact remains that China’s ASAT test has upped the ante and stirred a new debate in the Indian establishment about the need for ASAT capabilities as well as other potential applications in the military domain. However, there is continuity in the official policy of India, which is prevention of weaponisation of outer space while strengthening arms control measures in space.

On cyber security, India’s policy approach is guided by two drivers of national security and social harmony. Although India’s policy approach used to be driven primarily by the former concern, given the large number of hacking and jamming-related incidents in India or Indian missions abroad. Lately, the debate has shifted to one with a greater emphasis on social cohesion, which has resulted in stricter monitoring and surveillance of internet and social media activities.

Meanwhile, India has not yet given serious attention to the issue of cyber-linked attack on outer space. Given that satellite communication networks are connected to the internet, the vulnerabilities of the space sector using cyber means have increased exponentially. Under this scenario, the theatre of conflict, means and impact are going to be felt across the domains. What was once possible by states that had hi-tech capabilities, today this is in the realm of possibilities to any cyber-savvy hacker. The threat is not simply destruction or damage of satellites but much beyond including deny or counterfeit satellite transmissions, access and leak data collected by sensors, send in wrong data among other things.

The convergence of space and cyber domains present a complex challenge. Given this cross-domain nature of challenges in the space and cyber domains, states have to invest in regional and global efforts to understand these environments on a real time basis.



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story on India's missile defence in the latest issue of Arms Control Today.... quotes me too ....

Here's a story by Eric Auner on the latest advances in India's missile defence programme, "Indian Missile Defense Program Advances."

India is pressing ahead with its work on missile defense, conducting its latest successful test last November and preparing to test a new kind of interceptor early this year.

In its Nov. 23 announcement of the test earlier that day, India said it had demonstrated the ability to intercept multiple incoming missiles. The test, which was the latest in a series dating to 2006, follows several tests in 2012 of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, including the successful launch in April of the 5,000-kilometer-range Agni-5. (See ACT, May 2012.)

India also has tested the sea-launched version of the hypersonic Brahmos cruise missile, jointly developed with Russia. In addition, air- and submarine-launched versions of the Brahmos missile are in development.

Indian media reports suggest that a test of a new high-altitude anti-missile interceptor will occur in January and that India may soon test a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) for the first time, bringing the country closer to possessing a triad of nuclear weapons delivery systems. (See ACT, September 2012.)

For the full story, click here.



India’s nuclear-armed neighbors, China and Pakistan, have significant cruise and ballistic missile capabilities. China has taken steps to acquire missile defense capabilities although Pakistan apparently has not attempted to do so. In the past, Pakistan has justified its pursuit of cruise missiles by citing their supposed invulnerability to Indian ballistic missile defenses. China possesses SLBMs, and China and Pakistan are able to deliver nuclear weapons by airplane.

The Chinese and Pakistani reaction to Indian missile defense developments is not yet clear, said Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation. “The new capabilities and counter-capabilities add to the already vexed issue of arms race[s] in Asia,” Rajagopalan, a former assistant director of India’s National Security Council Secretariat, said in a Dec. 19 e-mail to Arms Control Today.

In a Dec. 19 analysis for the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, where he is a senior fellow, Vivek Kapur, a group captain in the Indian air force, said that “ballistic missile proliferation in India’s neighbourhood requires the development of a more capable” missile defense system.

In the Nov. 23 press release, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), the Indian government entity responsible for developing offensive and defensive missile and other systems, said the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor destroyed a target missile, a modified Prithvi ballistic missile, at an altitude of 15 kilometers.

The interceptor and target missile were launched from sites in Orissa, a state in the eastern part of the country. In the press release, the DRDO said it had demonstrated an ability to track and destroy multiple incoming ballistic missiles.

Rajagopalan said India’s efforts are “primarily driven by the threat of short-range missiles in Pakistan”; Chinese missile threats “did not figure prominently in the Indian calculation for a missile defence shield,” she said.

The Pakistani government has not issued an official reaction to the AAD interceptor test. Pakistan, however, successfully tested a nuclear-capable Hatf-5, a 1,300-kilometer-range ballistic missile, on Nov. 28. A Pakistani statement following the test of the Hatf-5, also known as the Ghauri, did not mention India specifically, but said the test “strengthens and consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability.” According to the DRDO, the Nov. 23 AAD test demonstrated a capability to intercept ballistic missiles with a range of 1,500 kilometers.

Two-Tiered Defense

India is pursuing a two-tiered missile defense shield, which would give it multiple opportunities to intercept incoming missiles. The AAD interceptor comprises the lower tier, and the higher-altitude, two-stage Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) interceptor currently comprises the upper tier. Like the U.S. Patriot system, both of these Indian systems intercept ballistic missiles in the so-called terminal phase, in which the incoming missiles are descending toward their target.

India first tested the AAD interceptor in December 2007 and, according to the Indian government, has conducted several subsequent tests. India first tested the higher-altitude Prithvi interceptor in November 2006 and again in March 2009. The test reportedly planned for January is of the Prithvi Defence Vehicle, which would be capable of interceptions at a much higher altitude than the PAD interceptor, and may eventually replace that interceptor as the upper tier of the Indian system.

The Indian government has not announced the area that the missile defense system is designed to protect. Media reports have indicated that New Delhi and Mumbai will be the first sites, with the system expanded to protect additional cities later in the decade.

According to the DRDO press release, the AAD interceptor used an explosive warhead to destroy the target missile as the interceptor approached it. In contrast, most U.S. missile defense systems, including the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense and sea-based Aegis systems, rely on “hit-to-kill” interceptors that destroy a target solely through impact.

Eyeing Iron Dome

In addition to developing an anti-ballistic missile capability, India has expressed an interest in purchasing and perhaps producing a domestic variant of the Israeli Iron Dome anti-rocket system, according to the U.S.-based Defense News. The Israel Defense Forces claim Iron Dome successfully intercepted 84 percent of rockets fired at Israeli population centers last November during Operation Pillar of Defense, which was intended to halt rocket attacks from groups in Gaza.

In the past, India has expressed interest in purchasing the Israeli Arrow-2 ballistic missile defense system. New Delhi bought two Israeli Green Pine missile defense radars, used for tracking incoming ballistic missiles, in 2002 and 2005. The Swordfish Long Range Tracking Radar, which was used in the AAD test, is based in part on the Green Pine radar.

India and the United States pursued missile defense cooperation during the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, but such efforts have been less prominent under the Obama administration. Last July, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter said India and the United States intend to discuss missile defense cooperation, calling it “an important future area for our cooperation.” India and the United States should discuss the issue “strategically before they discuss it technically,” he said.