SITMEX: India-Singapore-Thailand Complete Second Trilateral Maritime Exercises - The Diplomat, 27 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-Singapore-Thailand Trilateral Maritime Exercises that were just concluded.  I argue that China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military posturing have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts.  

India, Singapore and Thailand recently concluded their trilateral naval exercise SITMEX-20. This is the second edition of SITMEX. Hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy from November 21-22, the exercise was held in the Andaman Sea. This represents a growing number of naval engagements that India has been holding with various navies, including those in Southeast Asia. But it also indicates the growing willingness of regional navies to look to India as a maritime partner, as well as the increasing comfort level in coming together at the regional level rather than look to just the U.S. in dealing with a rising China. That these exercises were held in spite the challenges imposed by COVID-19 pandemic suggests the importance attached by the three navies to these exercises and also the seriousness of the threats they mutually face.

For the full post, click here.  

This particular trilateral exercise is relatively new. The first edition was held in the Andaman Sea only last year, in September 2019. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi had announced the trilateral exercise at his keynote address at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore.  At the inaugural edition of the exercise, the Indian Navy was represented by the guided missile destroyer INS Ranvir, missile corvette INS Kora, Offshore Patrol Vessel Sumedha and P8I long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft.  

Indian Ministry of Defense said that the second edition of the exercise was being conducted “as a ‘non-contact, at sea only’ exercise in view of COVID-19 pandemic,” emphasizing this as being indicative of the “growing synergy, coordination and cooperation in the maritime domain between the three friendly navies and maritime neighbors.”  The statement added that the three navies would engage in a series of “exercises including naval maneuvers, surface warfare exercises and weapon firings.”  The stated goals of these exercises were to strengthen “mutual interoperability” and to understand and assimilate “best practices” between the three navies.  

The Indian Navy ships participating in the exercise include the indigenously-built ASW (anti-submarine warfare) corvette Kamorta and missile corvette Karmuk. Singapore sent its Formidable-class frigates, Intrepid and the Endeavour, an Endurance-class LST (landing ship tank).  Thailand was represented by a Chao Phraya-class frigate, the Kraburi.  

Explaining the importance of the exercise, the commander of SITMEX 20 Task Force and commanding Officer of RSS Intrepid, Lieutenant Colonel Oh Zongbo said that the SITMEX “serves as a useful exercise for the three like-minded navies to enhance our inter-operability in maritime operations. The ability to execute and conduct these operations together is a testament to the long-standing ties and trust that we have established with one another.”  After the SITMEX concluded, the Singapore Navy joined the Indian Navy for a bilateral naval exercise, SIMBEX 20, in the Bay of Bengal from November 25 to 27.   

The military exercises with Singapore and Thailand also demonstrate the increasingly strategic nature of engagements that India has developed with the countries in Southeast Asia. From a “Look East” policy in the early 1990s (which itself was not very successful) that focused on economic issues to an “Act East” policy initiated by Modi in 2014, bilateral relations in the region as well as the regional context have been transformative. Even though these exercises have been shortened on account of the pandemic, the fact that the navies of the three countries decided to go ahead with the exercise is a clear reflection of the similarity of views between India, Singapore and Thailand.  This could mean that the three navies may continue to strengthen these exercises in terms of scope of the maneuvers, expansion of the geographical areas of their exercise, and greater sophistication in terms of their overall objectives of SITMEX. 

Singapore, of course, has been one of India’s stronger security partners in the region. Defense relations between the two began with the signing of their first Defense Cooperation Agreement in 2003. Since then, the two have signed several more agreements for greater military-to-military interactions. Given that Singapore is a small island nation, India has been a good partner, offering training to the Singapore Armed Forces at its military training facilities like the air force and artillery firing ranges. Their main naval interaction, SIMBEX, has continued now for more than 20 years. The importance of freedom of navigation and open seas, in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as well as respect for international law, have been often-repeated themes in their bilateral discussions.  

India-Thailand bilateral relations are not as deep, but they have also picked up pace over the last decade with a number of high-level political visits and institutional mechanisms. These include periodic Foreign Office Consultations, India-Thailand Joint Commission Meetings (which are held at the foreign ministers level) and defense cooperation mechanisms that have seen military exercises between the armies and the air force of the two countries.  In addition to the annual army and air force exercises, the two countries also hold bi-annual coordinated maritime patrolling by the two navies. Given the slowly brewing tension between Thailand and China, it is likely that Thailand will reach out to countries such as India to hedge against possible longer-term trouble in relations with Beijing. Such moves are also backed by growing popular opposition to Chinese high-handedness across the region. The Milk Tea Alliance, which grew from online squabbles between Chinese and Thai netizens represents “deep-seated reservations about the relationship among Thai people.” The so-called Milk Tea Alliance also quickly expanded, with support pouring in from other countries such as Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong.  

China’s growing economic might and its aggressive military power have provided India, Singapore and Thailand strategic rationale to combine their efforts. Increasing concerns about American commitment to the region have spurred such efforts and they will likely continue.  

Chinese Misbehavior Increases Support for Taiwan - The Diplomat, 24 October 2020

In my October column for The Diplomat, I looked at how China's misbehaviour has increased support for Taiwan.  I argue that Beijing’s pressure on Taiwan and on other countries is generating greater sympathy and support for Taiwan.  

As China’s relations with many countries in the region and outside deteriorate, sympathy for Taiwan and its plight is growing. While there is little to indicate that any country is considering dramatic shifts to their Taiwan policy, China’s aggressive behavior is generating growing concerns about a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. There is also increasing public sympathy for Taiwan in many countries in the region, especially in Southeast Asia and India, because most have now experienced some form of coercion from China. This provides a fertile ground should there be considerations of any shifts in policy toward Taiwan in any of these countries. Equally, China’s sensitivity about Taiwan provides a ready handle for others to retaliate for unfriendly Chinese behavior. 

For the full post, click here.  

Some of these growing concerns are a result of Chinese behavior toward Taiwan itself. Repeated military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan and efforts to pressure Taiwan militarily have been growing. According to Taiwan’s defense minister, the PLA has engaged in 49 military aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line in 2020, the highest number since 1990. The minister, who made a statement in the parliament, said that the Chinese military “conducted 1,710 aircraft sorties and 1,029 military vessel sorties into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ) this year.” The minister added that, countering these moves, Taiwan’s military undertook around “3,000 military aircraft sorties to intercept and monitor the Chinese aircraft and vessels.” There is even some concern that China might be doing this as a tactic to force Taiwan to waste its resources.  

In response to these Chinese moves, the United States has stepped up its diplomatic and military support to Taiwan. In August this year, the U.S. Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar traveled to Taiwan. This was “the highest-level visit by an American Cabinet official since the break in formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Taipei in 1979.” The discussions during the visit focused on COVID-19, the impact on global health, and Taiwan as a possible supplier of medical equipment and technology to deal with the pandemic. In September, another high-level U.S. visit took place with Keith Krach, under secretary of state for economic growth, energy, and the environment. Krach was also accompanied by a U.S. delegation that included Robert A. Destro, assistant secretary of the department of democracy, human rights, and labor. 

More recently, the U.S. has also agreed to a major arms package for Taiwan worth almost $2 billion. The total package may increase to as much as $5 billion. The military package includes sensors, missiles, and artillery, all designed to boost Taiwan’s capacity to defend itself from China. China has threatened unspecified retaliation against the United States for such arms transfers, but it is unlikely that the United States will stop making them. 

Support for Taiwan is growing at the popular levels in countries like India. This was in no small measure the result of Chinese heavy-handedness, such as its recent “instruction” to Indian journalists that they should observe the “One China” principle. This was triggered by reports and advertisements in the Indian media regarding Taiwan’s National Day. Far from winning any compliance, the Indian media dismissed and laughed off Chinese efforts. The Indian government was less than amused. The spokesperson of India’s foreign ministry rejected the Chinese statement saying, “there is free media in India, that reports on issues that they see fit.” The growing sympathy in India toward Taiwan, including at official levels, is most clearly the result of the Sino-Indian confrontation at the border this summer. There was even reportedly considerations in the Indian government of starting free trade talks with Taiwan, though this appears to have been shelved for the time being. The contrast between India’s attempts to curtail its China trade while seeking greater trade with Taiwan is stark. As in the Indian case, sympathy toward Taiwan has also grown in Southeast Asia as a result of crude Chinese pressures. The so-called “Milk Tea Alliance” is one reflection of this phenomena. 

The increasing salience of the Taiwan issue is reflected in the growing debate in the United States about the appropriate level of commitment to Taiwan. There is also some concern in Australia about the potential impact of U.S. involvement in Taiwan on Australia. There are, equally, concerns about whether Taiwan itself is doing enough to defend itself. 

Much of the new attention and support that Taiwan is getting is clearly the consequence of both the Chinese actions in the Taiwan Strait as well as its unrelenting pressures on other countries, even those far from China. China recently engaged in a spat with Sweden after the country banned Huawei from its 5G network. China responded by asking Sweden to “correct its wrong decision” or face consequences for Swedish businesses. Just a few days earlier, the Chinese ambassador to Canada held out a not-so-veiled threat to the 300,000 Canadians living in Hong Kong if Canada continued to grant asylum to democracy activists from Hong Kong. China’s unusually foolish behavior and its growing pressure on Taiwan is likely to continue to garner greater sympathy for Taiwan, a democracy that has successfully fought the coronavirus epidemic which originated in China. 

How China Strengthens the Quad - The Diplomat, 4 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the future of the Quad, looking at the challenges to the group because of Abe's sudden resigning and a possible political change in the US following the November elections. Despite some minor headwinds, I argue that Chinese belligerence further strengthens the motivation for Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to keep the Quad together.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the Quad has regained strength in the face of an aggressive China. The foreign ministers of the four countries – Australia, India, Japan, and the United States – are scheduled to meet in Delhi for a face-to-face meeting in late September. That New Delhi is playing host to the Quad ministerial meeting amid the COVOD-19 pandemic is particularly noteworthy. The countries are reacting to increased bullying by China. The grouping has gained greater traction since early 2020 because of Beijing’s role in the COVID-19 pandemic and the manner in which it has attempted to hijack multilateral institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). The four countries are also concerned about global supply chain problems, recognizing the vulnerability of their dependence on China. The upcoming in-person foreign ministers meeting appears, at the least, aimed at sending a strong message to China about the resoluteness of the Quad.

For the full essay, click here.

That said, the Quad does face some minor headwinds, which are likely to be easily overcome, due to political changes in both Japan and the United States.

Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s sudden resignation was a blow to the Quad because Abe was one of the major proponents of this minilateral initiative, even if his departure does not shift Japan’s policy. Under Abe’s leadership, Japan had become a driving force for the Quad. His strategic vision and determined leadership in the face of China’s belligerent behavior will be missed by Japan’s Quad partners. Although Abe was not successful in changing Japan’s pacifist constitution, he has been instrumental in bringing important changes to Tokyo’s approach to regional and global security.

For New Delhi, Abe was a reliable pillar of support. Takenori Horimoto says that the big push for Japan to build closer relations with India happened in 2004-05 because of anti-Japan protests taking place in China, leading Tokyo to reduce the risks to its investments by moving to other countries. Thus, although India-Japan ties had been gaining momentum even before Abe came into office, the Abe-Modi dynamic helped a great deal. It led to strengthened military and security ties, including military exercises across all the branches of the military, and a civil nuclear agreement. With Abe leaving office, it remains to be seen how bilateral India-Japan relations as well as Japan’s broader strategic engagement in the Indo-Pacific will play out with a new leader in office.

Second, the coming presidential elections in the United States in November also raises some concerns about a possible change in leadership. While Joe Biden and the Democrats are not against the Quad or the free and open Indo-Pacific strategy, a change in the political powers that be could introduce short-term policy turbulence. It will take a few months for a new administration to settle into office before addressing some of the political and strategic issues in the Indo-Pacific region. That said, China’s aggressive behavior will invariably draw any administration’s attention. A Biden administration may differ from the Trump administration more in terms of style and rhetoric than actual policy when it comes to China. Indeed, the two parties are competing over who is harsher on China.

Set against these small challenges is China’s behavior, which serves to promote the Quad. India and Australia, the other two Quad parties, have recently faces even greater aggression from Beijing.

Since early May, China has crossed into Indian territory and engaged in violent clashes, including the one at Galwan in June that resulting in the deaths of 20 Indians and an unknown number of Chinese troops. Since then, there have been several military and diplomatic discussions between India and China, but with no progress. Over the past few days, there has been further activity, with India reportedly occupying areas south of the south bank of Pangong Tso (Lake); the military talks that followed, as usual, have been inconclusive. China claimed that India violated the consensus and crossed the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In India, both the foreign ministry and army put out statements blaming China. The expectation appears to be that the border confrontation will escalate further. India, for good measure, has also banned another 118 Chinese apps.

Similarly, Australia has been under strident Chinese attack almost from the beginning of 2020. China has been using coercive trade practices to target Australia for asking for an independent investigation into the origin of the novel coronavirus. In the latest move, China targeted Australian barley in response to Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s announcement of a new Australian legislation that would “tear up” the Belt and Road Initiative agreements with the state of Victoria that run into billions of dollars. A few days earlier, China targeted Australian beef exports. Prior to this, it was the Australian wine that was banned by China. But Jeffrey Wilson of the Perth USAsia Centre says it is not that the Chinese government cares about wine, beef, or barley, but “the real game is to create societal splits that pressure the Government to change foreign policy toward China.”

China’s crude attempts to put pressure on other countries have met with increasingly stiff resistance, of which the Quad is a clear manifestation. In India, there have even been suggestions for the Quad to assume a military role. Thus, whatever minor headwinds the Quad faces are likely to be easily overcome by the rapidly changing attitudes in the region because of China’s unrelenting pressure on others.