Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020

In an earlier column for The Diplomat in November, I wrote on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein.  I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests.  The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop?  

BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would discuss intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. 

For the full post, click here.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.”  

Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi highlighted the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.”  

It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent.  

The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as Abhijnan Rej highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially.  

Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground.  

China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with the United States as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific.  

That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context.  

India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow.  

The Sino-Indian Clash: Russia in the Middle - The Diplomat, 25 June 2020

Once again, I am lagging with my blog updates. A couple of weeks ago, I wrote a piece for The Diplomat on the Sino-Indian border clash and how Russia has positioned itself on the same. Clearly, the Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position.

In the midst of a border crisis with China, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh is away in Moscow. At the same time, India’s foreign minister joined his Russian and Chinese counterparts online for an Russia-India-China (RIC) meeting. The Sino-Indian crisis potentially puts Russia in a difficult position, having to choose between its traditional partners in India, which also represents a lucrative arms market, and its new but much more powerful friend in the east, China.

For the full essay, click here.



The ostensible reason for Singh’s visit to Russia was to attend the rescheduled Victory Day Parade. The annual parade commemorating the end of World War II was supposed to be held on May 9, but was postponed due to the pandemic. A 75-member tri-service Indian military contingent participated in the parade.

The Chinese defense minister was also in Moscow to attend the same parade. However, the Indian side made it clear that there would be no meeting between the two ministers. All negotiations between India and China on the border crisis are taking place bilaterally either through diplomatic channels or through local military commanders. The fact that the RIC meeting was an online affair also helps to ensure that Russia is not forced to mediate between the two sides.

Indian anger at China is palpable. In fact, Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar in his speech at the RIC pointedly stated that “the challenge today is not just one of concepts and norms, but equally of their practice. The leading voices of the world must be exemplars in every way.”

India’s interests in Russia are obvious. A significant part of Indian military equipment comes from Russia. In the midst of the crisis with China, the Indian Air Force has asked for 33 new fighter aircraft including 21 MiG-29s and 12 Su-30 MKIs from Russia. This is an old acquisition plan, but it has been pushed for accelerated delivery. The deal is worth over 60 billion Indian rupees ($793 million) and is expected to be approved by the Ministry of Defense in the coming days. In addition, India had already ordered 272 Su-30 MKIs spread over a 10 to 15-year time frame.

Meanwhile, India has also asked Russia for the expedited delivery of the S-400 anti-missile system. The two sides signed a contract for the S-400s in 2019. The original delivery was scheduled for 2021. There were reports that because of COVID-19, the delivery would be delayed. Singh was expected to seek an expedited delivery of the system.

Singh was also seeking assurances that the spare parts supply for Russian equipment that India already has in its arsenal will not be delayed during any crisis with China. Specifically, he was referring to the issue of spare parts for Russian-origin fighter aircraft (including the Su-30MKIs and MiG-29s of the Air Force and the MiG29Ks of the Indian Navy), the T-90 battle tanks for the Army, and the Navy’s Kilo-class submarines.

The Sino-Indian clash puts Russia in an awkward position as a recent analysis in The Wall Street Journal by Yaroslav Trofimov and Thomas Grove pointed out. There is growing recognition in Moscow about pressure from Beijing. But as the report pointed out, Russia is also stuck with China because of pressure from the West. Russia’s difficulties in improving relations with Europe have left Moscow with few options.

In the current crisis, Russia appears to have little interest in mediating between China and India. As Konstantin Kosachev, a senior lawmaker and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Federation Council, told the Indian media that Russia should not interfere in the India-China dispute and that these should be dealt with through bilateral channels.

At the recent RIC meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also maintained that India and China do not need any help in resolving their bilateral issues. Although Russia might want to keep its head down in the current crisis, Russian reactions are also being closely watched by the Indian public. Russia has a reservoir of support in India because of its traditional support, including during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. This support glosses over the fact that Russia was neutral during the 1962 Sino-Indian War because it occurred simultaneously with the Cuban missile crisis. Russia’s relations with China had become increasingly rocky – in fact, closer Soviet relations with India were one factor in the Sino-Soviet rift – but the need for Beijing’s support during the Cuban missile crisis forced Moscow to be neutral. That removed an important leg of India’s diplomatic strategy at the time. Almost 60 years later, New Delhi is probably worried that history will repeat and Russia might lean toward China simply by staying neutral.

Growing Russia-India-China Tensions: Splits in the RIC Strategic Triangle? - The Diplomat, 17 March 2020

In one of my earlier columns for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing tensions within the Russia-India-China strategic triangle. I argue that there are growing tensions in New Delhi’s engagement within this arrangement and its other alignments.

India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar will be heading to Russia later in the month for a ministerial-level trilateral meeting among three Eurasian powers of the RIC group: Russia, India and China (RIC). The meeting, to be held in Sochi on March 22-24, is meant to take stock of major geopolitical developments affecting the Indo-Pacific region.

For the full essay, click here.



According to reports, the meeting will possibly discuss the recently-concluded Afghanistan peace deal, the return of the Quad (quadrilateral security dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States), the Indo-Pacific concept and the implications of the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty for the region. The last RIC leaders meeting took place on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Osaka in July 2019, just after another trilateral between three democracies – Japan, America, and India (JAI).

RIC came together as a strategic triangle in the late 1990s under the mentorship of Yevgeny Primakov as “a counterbalance to the Western alliance.” The Russian goal was the “end[ing] its foreign policy guided by the US,” and rebuilding old partnerships with countries like India nurturing relatively newer friendships such as with China.

While this may have fitted at least partially with India’s goals in those years, it is unclear if this fits with Indian objectives now as New Delhi increases its strategic engagements with the United States and American allies. Indeed, India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, and Australia conflicts with the RIC’s goals and objectives of seeking to undermine Washington’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s support to India on a number of critical issues, demonstrated most recently when China attempted to raise the Kashmir issue at the UN Security Council, is important. In fact, it is the rise of China that is at the front and center of many of India’s strategic engagements.

India has traditionally avoided taking sides in international politics, especially between the great powers, preferring its traditional nonalignment. But China’s rather hostile attitude towards India in recent years is increasingly forcing Indian decisionmakers to confront what China’s growing power has come to mean for India. The 72-day long Doklam crisis, China’s repeated actions at the United Nations, and other forums appears to demonstrate that China is aggressive and unfriendly towards India. This makes it difficult to see how engagements through platforms such as RIC, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are going to alter the basic conflictual nature of relations between India and China.

Even though Russia has remained an old friend for India, New Delhi seems to realize that Moscow is increasingly under stress to follow China’s dictates. In January this year, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was openly opposing the Indo-Pacific concept, that too at the Raisina Dialogue, a major geopolitical conference organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), a prominent Indian think-tank (full disclosure: the author works at the ORF).

Responding to a question on the Russian perspective and role in the Indo-Pacific, he said it is nothing but an initiative “to contain China,” and is divisive in nature. He went on to ask: “Why do you need to call Asia-Pacific as Indo-Pacific? The answer is evident… to exclude China. Terminology should be unifying, not divisive. Neither Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) nor the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping is exclusionary.”

Even on issues such as the Jammu and Kashmir, which China raised at the UN Security Council, Russia preferred taking a middle position, not supporting India’s stand entirely for fear of offending China. It seems that while relations with India are important but for Moscow, its ties with Beijing are far more important and takes precedence over every other relationship.

Russia’s position at the closed-door session of the UN Security Council was revealing. After the meeting, the Russian representative at the UN said, “Russia continues to consistently promote normalization of India – Pakistan ties. We hope that existing divergences around Kashmir will be settled bilaterally by political and diplomatic means only.. .. on the basis of Simla Agreement of 1972 and Lahore declaration of 1999, in accordance with UN Charter, relevant UN resolutions and bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan.” Highlighting the UN resolutions to resolve the bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan “marked a sharp variance from Russia’s traditional position on Kashmir.” The two tweets by the Russian Representative in New York were further retweeted by the Russian foreign ministry Twitter account, which served to confirm the Russian position on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Overall, India’s strategic goals appear to be increasingly incongruent with that of Russia and China. As another case in point, even as the three foreign ministers will be meeting to discuss the Afghan peace deal, Moscow did not invite India to the recent meeting it hosted on Afghanistan. For all the rhetoric on finding a regional solution to Afghanistan, India has been kept out of such deliberations at the behest possibly of China and Pakistan. While there is merit to India engaging both Russia and China, it cannot mask the fact that there are growing tensions within the RIC grouping.

Russia-India-China Trilateral Grouping: More Than Hype? - The Diplomat, 5 July 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the Russia-India-China grouping, looking at the rhetoric and reality of it.

During the G-20 Summit in Osaka, Russia, India, and China (RIC) held the latest iteration of a trilateral meeting between them. While the grouping itself is nothing new – the notion of meeting on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting began last year and many other meetings were held during the G-20 meeting this year as well – the RIC nonetheless stole the headlines this year.

For the full post, click here.



RIC as a strategic grouping first took shape in the late 1990s under the leadership of Yevgeny Primakov as “a counterbalance to the Western alliance.” Primakov, a Russian politician and diplomat who was also the prime minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999, is credited with the idea for RIC. The group was founded on the basis of “end[ing] its subservient foreign policy guided by the U.S.,” and “renewing old ties with India and fostering the newly discovered friendship with China.”

But the idea of meeting at the leader’s level on a more sustained basis has only surfaced over the past couple of years. The three sides had done so last year at the G-20 meeting in Argentina, where there was also a focus on the trilateral summit between the United States, India and Japan, called JAI (Japan, America, India). And on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Kyrgyzstan, the leaders agreed to meet again in Osaka during the G-20 Summit.

The RIC meeting this year is only the third heads of state meeting of the group in 12 years, which speaks to the state of the play among the three countries in nurturing this strategic grouping. Nonetheless, in the current period of geopolitical transition, there is an effort to renew and rebuild some of these old initiatives as a way to counter the U.S.-led world order.

These efforts started in Bishkek, when Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Chinese President Xi Jinping held separate bilateral meetings on the sidelines of the SCO Summit. Reports speak of great “personal chemistry between Putin, Xi and Modi” that has “worked wonders.” While the Russia-China leg of the triangle has been fairly strong in the last few years, Modi has also had reasons in recent times to cozy up to Russia and China in the wake of U.S. President Donald Trump’s tariff war with India, especially since the Trump administration has withdrawn India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and imposed tariffs on Indian goods.

To be sure, India has remained a key partner in the United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy, and Modi too has sought a close strategic partnership with the United States in an effort to address China’s rising power. But the recent trade and tariff war may cast a negative shadow on the broader U.S.-India strategic ties, which stands to advantage China and Russia. It is no coincidence that the RIC meeting and the strengthened bonhomie among the three leaders has come amid these difficulties between the United States and India. While U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo was in India in late June to assuage some of the growing difficulties in the India-U.S. bilateral ties, the trip, as well as Pompeo’s statement “Modi hai toh Mumkin Hai” (“Modi makes it possible”), did very little to change the broader strategic dynamics with New Delhi.

In this respect, how the RIC meeting was perceived and portrayed at G-20 in Osaka came as no surprise. Unlike the second edition of the JAI Summit, which did not get much attention, the RIC meeting was trumpeted as a major success for developing economies, emphasizing the need for free and open markets, and opposing any efforts at protectionism, all clearly targeting Trump’s America. Clearly, Xi and Putin pitched this at the ideal moment, when New Delhi is the latest of many who have come under Trump’s tariff war.

Modi, in his opening remarks to the RIC meeting in Osaka, underlined the importance of the RIC grouping and the exchange among the three on the global economic, political, and security situation. He highlighted the usefulness of the exchange of views at the earlier meeting of the RIC foreign ministers in China in February. Modi said that the foreign ministers had discussed all important issues including “promotion of counterterrorism, international hot-spot issues, reformed multilateralism, climate change and cooperation under RIC.”

Xi, for his part, is reported to have emphasized the importance of the three countries in the context of upholding multilateralism. He urged the leaders of Russia and India to assume “global responsibility” to defend their national interests while pushing for a multilateral world order. Xi went on to add that “the rise of protectionism and unilateralism has severely affected global stability and economic growth, as well as the existing international order which emerging economies and developing countries have relied on.” Clearly, Xi was trying to muster greater support amidst the ongoing U.S.-China trade war.

It is not clear how Modi will weather the tariffs issue, and New Delhi may not find much relief by going with the RIC to address this issue. While Modi has to be mindful of the charm offensive by Xi and Putin, which obviously works to their own self-interest because of their own difficulties with the United States, Washington must also play its cards carefully and not let New Delhi fall into Beijing’s lap. The United States and India must ensure their current trade and tariff issues do not lead to serious strategic disagreement. The two cannot afford to miss the emerging geopolitical realities driven by China’s growing power. So far, the United States and India have been able to more or less maintain the momentum in the relationship and it has been mutually beneficial. It is too early to say if the calculations are changing.