Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh.

Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020.

Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing.

For the full essay, click here.



Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted.

After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York tweeted, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said:

We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.

Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well.

Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.”

Despite that slightly gentler tone, India responded harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent interview, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship.

This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi said publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation.

India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar stated that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual meeting with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.

There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time.

Growing Russia-India-China Tensions: Splits in the RIC Strategic Triangle? - The Diplomat, 17 March 2020

In one of my earlier columns for The Diplomat, I looked at the growing tensions within the Russia-India-China strategic triangle. I argue that there are growing tensions in New Delhi’s engagement within this arrangement and its other alignments.

India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar will be heading to Russia later in the month for a ministerial-level trilateral meeting among three Eurasian powers of the RIC group: Russia, India and China (RIC). The meeting, to be held in Sochi on March 22-24, is meant to take stock of major geopolitical developments affecting the Indo-Pacific region.

For the full essay, click here.



According to reports, the meeting will possibly discuss the recently-concluded Afghanistan peace deal, the return of the Quad (quadrilateral security dialogue involving Australia, India, Japan and the United States), the Indo-Pacific concept and the implications of the end of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty for the region. The last RIC leaders meeting took place on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Osaka in July 2019, just after another trilateral between three democracies – Japan, America, and India (JAI).

RIC came together as a strategic triangle in the late 1990s under the mentorship of Yevgeny Primakov as “a counterbalance to the Western alliance.” The Russian goal was the “end[ing] its foreign policy guided by the US,” and rebuilding old partnerships with countries like India nurturing relatively newer friendships such as with China.

While this may have fitted at least partially with India’s goals in those years, it is unclear if this fits with Indian objectives now as New Delhi increases its strategic engagements with the United States and American allies. Indeed, India’s growing strategic partnership with the United States, Japan, and Australia conflicts with the RIC’s goals and objectives of seeking to undermine Washington’s role in the Indo-Pacific. Washington’s support to India on a number of critical issues, demonstrated most recently when China attempted to raise the Kashmir issue at the UN Security Council, is important. In fact, it is the rise of China that is at the front and center of many of India’s strategic engagements.

India has traditionally avoided taking sides in international politics, especially between the great powers, preferring its traditional nonalignment. But China’s rather hostile attitude towards India in recent years is increasingly forcing Indian decisionmakers to confront what China’s growing power has come to mean for India. The 72-day long Doklam crisis, China’s repeated actions at the United Nations, and other forums appears to demonstrate that China is aggressive and unfriendly towards India. This makes it difficult to see how engagements through platforms such as RIC, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are going to alter the basic conflictual nature of relations between India and China.

Even though Russia has remained an old friend for India, New Delhi seems to realize that Moscow is increasingly under stress to follow China’s dictates. In January this year, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov was openly opposing the Indo-Pacific concept, that too at the Raisina Dialogue, a major geopolitical conference organized by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), a prominent Indian think-tank (full disclosure: the author works at the ORF).

Responding to a question on the Russian perspective and role in the Indo-Pacific, he said it is nothing but an initiative “to contain China,” and is divisive in nature. He went on to ask: “Why do you need to call Asia-Pacific as Indo-Pacific? The answer is evident… to exclude China. Terminology should be unifying, not divisive. Neither Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) nor the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) grouping is exclusionary.”

Even on issues such as the Jammu and Kashmir, which China raised at the UN Security Council, Russia preferred taking a middle position, not supporting India’s stand entirely for fear of offending China. It seems that while relations with India are important but for Moscow, its ties with Beijing are far more important and takes precedence over every other relationship.

Russia’s position at the closed-door session of the UN Security Council was revealing. After the meeting, the Russian representative at the UN said, “Russia continues to consistently promote normalization of India – Pakistan ties. We hope that existing divergences around Kashmir will be settled bilaterally by political and diplomatic means only.. .. on the basis of Simla Agreement of 1972 and Lahore declaration of 1999, in accordance with UN Charter, relevant UN resolutions and bilateral agreements between India and Pakistan.” Highlighting the UN resolutions to resolve the bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan “marked a sharp variance from Russia’s traditional position on Kashmir.” The two tweets by the Russian Representative in New York were further retweeted by the Russian foreign ministry Twitter account, which served to confirm the Russian position on the Jammu and Kashmir issue.

Overall, India’s strategic goals appear to be increasingly incongruent with that of Russia and China. As another case in point, even as the three foreign ministers will be meeting to discuss the Afghan peace deal, Moscow did not invite India to the recent meeting it hosted on Afghanistan. For all the rhetoric on finding a regional solution to Afghanistan, India has been kept out of such deliberations at the behest possibly of China and Pakistan. While there is merit to India engaging both Russia and China, it cannot mask the fact that there are growing tensions within the RIC grouping.

Modi-Xi Summit: A More Balanced China Policy? - ORF, 11 October 2019

I wrote a second piece on the second informal summit between Modi and Xi, and this was published by the Observer Research Foundation yesterday.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping are meeting for their second informal summit. Irrespective of the rhetoric of a Wuhan spirit, the relationship is facing difficulties, reflected in a number of disputes between the two countries. This is only a manifestation of the larger strategic problems that exists between India and China, which is rooted in the changing balance of power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. While this is not new, the difference now is that India is also displaying greater willingness to respond to China’s pressure more firmly or at least to not let efforts to improve ties with China come in the way of stopping efforts to counter China.

For the full post, click here.



This has become evident in a number of different ways. While India has engaged China in informal summits and joined platforms such as the Russia-India-China (RIC), Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS), and Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), India is also stepping up its diplomatic and security engagements with other countries and minilaterals. The recent upgradation of the quadrilateral (Quad) engagements between Australia, India, Japan and the US, suggest the seriousness within this grouping in giving more teeth to the initiative. India’s military engagements with a number of countries in the Indo-Pacific is again a testament to the fact that New Delhi will seek to improve its ties with Beijing but it will also build and nurture a network of strategic engagements that will go on to provide India with greater strategic maneuverability.

While the MEA statement said that the two leaders will discuss bilateral, regional and global issues and share ideas and perspectives for deepening India-China partnership, the two sides, have also tried to keep expectations low. The problems that face the bilateral relationship is not for lack of understanding or lack of high-level political attention, clearly, but because of intractable real differences of interest. This means that finding compromises and accommodation will be harder.

China is unlikely to give up on using Pakistan to balance India. Only a few days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing endorsed Pakistan’s stand on the Kashmir dispute by stating that “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” India, understandably, protested the statement and sought clarification on China’s changing position on Jammu and Kashmir. Beijing’s stated position so far had been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue that needs to be resolved between two concerned parties. Moreover, this comes in the backdrop of China taking India to the UN Security Council on behalf of Pakistan, which sought a meeting on the Jammu and Kashmir issue following India’s decision to remove the special status to the state of Jammu and Kashmir through Article 370. India maintained that this is purely an internal matter and other countries like China and Pakistan had no locus standi. China can be expected to continue to support Pakistan, and attempt to bolster its economic and military capability, and this will continue to provoke New Delhi.

Similarly, China has found other ways to undermine India, especially in multilateral forums. China has, for all practical purposes, opposed India’s efforts to reform and expand the UN Security Council and find a permanent seat on the body. China has also opposed India’s inclusion in the Nuclear Supplier’s Group (NSG). Though there are some areas of common interests – climate change, or trade, for example – there are sufficient disagreements even on these areas. And where there are disagreements, expect Beijing to undermine India. This is not so much because China has any particular dislike of India, but simply because of the nature of international politics, but New Delhi has long been dismissive of this.

It is possible that New Delhi’s attitude is changing. In the face of such stiffening positions by China, India has joined a web of networks including the Quad, trilateral groupings such as Japan, India and the US (JAI). India could also upgrade the track II trilateral engagements among countries like Japan, India and Australia, and India, Indonesia and Australia. Reluctantly, New Delhi seems to be coming around to the view that even as it tries to keep the relations with China steady, and do as much as possible to prevent serious downturn or tensions in ties, India will also have to expect that such efforts will not be sufficient or fully successful. Thus, India seems to be now unwilling to stop efforts at alternative arrangements to counter China, while seeking to improve ties with it.

Behind the Second Modi-Xi Informal Summit, the Wuhan Spirit Is Fraying - The Diplomat, 10 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the second Modi-Xi informal summit scheduled to begin later in Mamallapuram today and conclude by tomorrow.

The second informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping is set to take place in Mamallapuram, a coastal town in south India from October 11-12. The meeting between the leaders of the two Asian giants will be closely watched, with consequences not only for their countries but the wider Indo-Pacific region and the world as well.

The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made a formal announcement of the visit just a couple of days before the visit. The statement added that the agenda was discussing “issues of bilateral, regional and global importance and to exchange views on deepening India-China Closer Development Partnership.” The two sides appear to be setting expectations low, with good reason.

For the full essay, click here.



Prior to the announcement, the Indian media was full of speculation that the summit could even be cancelled. Despite the Wuhan Summit in 2017 and the so-called “Wuhan spirit,” India-China relations have been characterized by a growing number of disputes.

The most serious of these, at least from Delhi’s perspective, is the strengthening Chinese support for Pakistan. Just days before the summit, the Chinese ambassador in Pakistan, Yao Jing, expressed strong support for Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir dispute, saying, “We are also working for Kashmiris to help them get their fundamental rights and justice. There should be a justified solution to the issue of Kashmir and China will stand by Pakistan for regional peace and stability.” This was a red flag for India and led to India lodging a strong protest with China and seeking clarification on what appears to be a change in Beijing’s stated stand on Jammu and Kashmir.

Beijing’s official stand has always been that Kashmir was a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan, left over from history, that needs to be resolved directly by the two countries. So, the change in China’s position was surprising and was seen by official New Delhi as an effort to interfere in India’s internal affairs. Moreover, this came after the strong Chinese support for Pakistan on Article 370 issue, when Beijing forced a UN Security Council discussion on the issue. China also took an unusually strong position on India effectively removing Article 370 (which had ensured local autonomy for the Indian state of Jammu Kashmir) and creating a separate Union Territory (a province directly ruled from New Delhi) in Ladakh. This was despite India’s foreign minister S. Jaishankar travelling to Beijing to explain that the Indian actions in Kashmir had no additional or negative or implication for the Sino-Indian border dispute.

After several strong statements on India by Chinese officials, there was a thawing of the tensions with a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement on October 8. While responding to a question, the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said, “China’s position on the issue of Kashmir is consistent and clear. We call on India and Pakistan to step up dialogue on disputes including the Kashmir issue to enhance mutual trust and improve relations. It serves the common interests of both India and Pakistan and represents the shared expectation of regional countries and the international community.” Earlier references to UN resolutions, which irritated India, was missing from this statement.

But the thaw, to the extent that it existed, was short-lived. Not only did China host a visit by the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan just days before the Xi-Modi summit, the joint China-Pakistan press release also brought back language in reference to Kashmir that India had objected to, asking that the dispute be “resolved based on the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements.”

Beijing, of course, has its complaints too. China had raised objections to the Indian military exercise Him-Vijay in Arunachal Pradesh, executed by the Indian Army’s 17 Corps. The Indian government is reported to have clarified that the ongoing exercise is part of the routine familiarization and orientation exercises and has nothing to with Xi’s visit to India.

This is not the first time that China has objected to military exercises or movements in Arunachal Pradesh. China has continued to maintain that Arunachal Pradesh is “southern Tibet” but India has always countered such statements by saying that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. Moreover, India had also participated in an elevated foreign minister-level meeting of the Quad countries in the sidelines of the UN General Assembly annual meeting, despite China’s objections to all such Quad meetings.

Clearly, Modi and Xi have a lot to discuss. But with new issues piling up, it is unclear if such ‘informal’ summits can do much to improve ties. Personal reassurances are unlikely to overcome growing real disagreements between the two sides, especially considering that the two sides do not seem to care very much to even hide their disagreements anymore.

India Bets Big on Kashmir - Handelsblatt (German Newspaper), 30 August 2019

Last week, I wrote an essay on I write on the internal and external dynamics of India’s recent decision on Jammu & Kashmir for a prominent German newspaper, Handelsblatt. Originally, this was a longer essay, as asked by the newspaper editors but they had to cut it short as the newspaper changed the format to include an editor's note and another piece providing a Pakistani perspective. If anyone is interested, I am happy to share the longer version.

Article 370 was a recognition of the India-Pakistan dispute over the State and the conditions of its accession to the Indian Union that made this state different from others in India. Eliminating the provisions of Article 370 means that Jammu and Kashmir loses this special status. Indeed, the current move makes Jammu and Kashmir’s status even lower than other Indian states because the State has also been downgraded to a Union Territory. In the Indian federal structure, Union Territories are provinces that are directly administered by the central government in Delhi and thus have even less autonomy than other Indian states. Furthermore, the State was divided into two, hiving off the Ladakh region which will become another Union Territory.

Given the potentially dire consequences of this action, why did the Indian government decide on this course of action? One reason is ideology: the BJP has for long argued that Article 370 should be removed, and Jammu and Kashmir fully integrated within the Indian Union. This was even listed in the BJP election manifesto.

For the original essay in German, click here.



A more immediate reason may have been worries about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences. Pakistan has significant control over the Taliban, which makes the US beholden to Pakistan because the US wants a semblance of stability as its forces prepare to withdraw. India has bad memories of Pakistan using Afghanistan as a base for training terrorists and sending them into India. An Afghanistan that once again falls under the Taliban – and indirectly under Pakistan and its murderous Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) – is not a happy prospect for India.

Whatever New Delhi’s reasons, this move will likely be deeply unpopular in sections of the State, especially in the predominantly Muslim areas such as the Kashmir Valley. If any such protests are not handled with care, there is also the likelihood that Kashmiri anger could boost the simmering insurgency within the State.

This is one of the immediate dangers: that the insurgency and terrorism in the State will intensify. Indian security forces have been engaged in fighting this war for over three decades now. Though the insurgency has not ended, the Indian security forces have so far managed to keep it under control. A renewed insurgency and increased violence will have obvious grim consequences and it will deepen India’s internal security problems at a time when external security threats are growing.

These external security threats are serious. Pakistan, which never abandoned its claim on all of Kashmir, has already protested India’s moves, though Islamabad itself had assimilated the territories it occupies. It is unlikely that Pakistan will deliberately engage in a direct military assault on India because it is a far weaker power – Pakistan’s GDP at about $250 billion is less than a tenth of India’s at $2.85 trillion. But it could always miscalculate. Pakistan has sponsored terrorist groups that operate in Kashmir and in other parts of India, and terrorist attacks by such groups have repeatedly pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of war. And Pakistan’s possession of a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons makes the consequences of any such miscalculation far more dangerous, a worry for both India and the international community.

Another problem is China. China has taken a strong stand against the Indian move because Beijing says that it affects China’s claim over a part of Ladakh called Aksai Chin. China currently occupies Aksai Chin but it is part of India’s claim. Beijing forced a discussion at the UN Security Council on India’s action (…). In any case, China’s actions have antagonized India, and it seriously weakens a spluttering effort by the two sides to improve their ties after their last serious military confrontation, less than two years back.

New Delhi appears to be betting that the fallout from its decision can be managed and that the actual consequences may prove to be far less dire. (…) Whether India’s bet pans out remains to be seen but this much is clear: it’s a big one.

How Will Recent Tensions Impact India’s Tsentr 2019 Participation? - The Diplomat, 27 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the multinational military exercise, Tsentr 2019. New Delhi’s expected involvement amid recent tensions with some other participants will make for interesting dynamics.

Russia is getting ready to host the 2019 edition of the Tsentr military exercises in the middle of September. The exercise is usually conducted by the Russian armed forces alone, but in a sign of its expansion, back in 2018, Russia invited China to join. The joint exercise ended up being of the biggest multinational military exercises ever, involving a total of about 300,000 troops.

This year, interestingly, Russia invited India to be part of this exercise. New Delhi had accepted the invitation and is expected to be participating. But the recent tensions between India and some of the other participants should make for an interesting dynamic at the event.

For the full post, click here.



Russia has invited a number of Central Asian countries as well as China to the exercise, in addition to India. But according to at least one report, in the Moscow Times, the exercise will include troops from Pakistan also, in addition to Russia, China, India, and four Central Asian Republics — Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. On the other hand, a report in an Indian newspaper has said that Pakistan will not be part of the 2019 edition of these exercises. A Chinese report on the upcoming exercise also did not mention Pakistan’s participation. Thus it is unclear whether Pakistan has been invited or whether it will take part.

According to the Russian Ministry of Defense, a total of 128,000 troops, more than 20,000 pieces of equipment, 600 aircraft, and up to 15 ships and support vessels will be participating in the upcoming military exercises. New Delhi, according to reports, plans to send 140 military personnel.

The exercise is to be divided into two modules, and will have both a defensive and offensive phase. The first phase of the exercise is to focus on counterterrorism operations, repelling air strikes, reconnaissance and search, and defensive actions whereas the second phase will involve managing troops during massive fire strikes and offensive operations involving simulated hostile forces. As per the Ministry of Defense, these exercises will take place in eight training grounds, including Totsky, Donguz, Adanak, Cherbarkulsky, Yurginsky, Aleysky, and two air defense sites at Ashuluk and Safakulevo.

New Delhi’s acceptance of the Russian invitation is not much of a surprise: India has been keen to demonstrate that its foreign policy continues to maintain a wide set of links. Russia, in particular, is an old strategic partner with which India continues to maintain strong military links. India continues to be deeply dependent on Russian arms in its military forces, and Moscow has been willing to transfer weapon systems such as the Akula-class nuclear-powered submarine (on lease) to India.

India also recently decided to purchase the S-400 long-range air defense missile system from Russia, despite the fact that the United States was very opposed to that purchase and knowing that buying the S-400 could potentially jeopardize any future Indian purchase of advanced American fighter planes such as the F-35. Though Washington is also an important partner for India, New Delhi was reluctant to give in to U.S. demands, especially considering the uncertainties of the Trump administration’s policies.

New Delhi would also not have had much objection to participating along with China in a joint exercise in Russia. India and China have conducted joint bilateral military exercises recently. India has been keen to improve relations with China after the Doklam confrontation in 2017, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping were supposed to hold a second “informal” summit in India, to follow up on the one held in Wuhan last year.

However, the recent Sino-Indian spat over India’s decision to withdraw the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and New Delhi’s decision to make the Ladakh region a separate union territory to be administered directly from New Delhi has worsened relations. New Delhi was miffed at China’s active efforts at the UN Security Council to target India. It remains to be seen if this will have any impact on India’s participation in the Tsentr military exercise.

If Pakistan has been invited to the exercise, it will be yet another wrinkle, because Pakistan has vociferously objected to India’s Article 370 decision and it was Islamabad that took the issue to the UNSC. New Delhi will also likely see any Russian invitation to Pakistan to join the exercise as one more example of Moscow’s increasing closeness to Islamabad. New Delhi is already unhappy with Russia’s behavior at the UNSC; this will further deepen Indian unhappiness.

It is extremely unlikely that India will take any dramatic steps, such as withdrawing from the exercise. But Indian discomfort with Russia, which is already growing, is likely to worsen if a Pakistani contingent also shows up at the exercise.

Sino-Indian Relations: Wuhan Spirit Under Growing Strain - The Diplomat, 19 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Sino-Indian relations and how the "Wuhan Spirit" is quickly fading. The already tenuous effort by both sides to manage their ties has been further complicated by contemporary developments.

Last week, in his typically dramatic fashion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced India was changing its relationship with the State of Jammu and Kashmir, withdrawing the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gave the state special rights in the Indian Union. The move included also splitting the state into two, making Ladakh, the eastern part of the state that abuts Tibet, a separate “Union Territory” that will be administered directly from New Delhi.

The decision appears to have wide popular support in India (outside of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), though the manner in which it has been implemented has been severely criticized. In particular, elected local leaders of the state have been detained, telecommunication facilities in the state have been completely cut off and the population itself has been subjected to repeated curfews and other restrictions. Some of these restrictions are now being slowly lifted though as of this writing, political leaders have not been released.

While the internal situation itself is troubling, there are potentially international ramifications to this move. One casualty could be the “Wuhan Spirit,” which refers to the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping that reset the India-China relationship after the Doklam crisis in 2017.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s move was immediately opposed by Pakistan, with the Pakistani foreign minister flying to Beijing to seek China’s support. The Chinese statement of that meeting did not appear to indicate much change in China’s position. Indeed, it was fairly neutral. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted “China is seriously concerned about the latest escalation of tensions in Kashmir” and that “unilateral actions that will complicate the situation should not be taken.” The foreign minister also noted that “Pakistan and India are both China’s friendly neighbors” and called “on the two sides to proceed from their national development and peace in South Asia, properly resolve historical grievances, get rid of the zero-sum mindset, avoid unilateral action and seek a new path to peaceful coexistence.”

This was far less than what Pakistan had appeared to have hoped for and was only obliquely critical of the Indian actions. In fact, China’s position appeared to be quite confused. While one spokesperson had identified the issue on August 6 as one between India and Pakistan and one that was an issue “left from the past,” another reportedly criticized India giving special status to Ladakh, stating that it “challenged China’s sovereign interests.”

The Chinese position appears to have solidified in the next few days, by the time India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reached Beijing on a pre-arranged visit on August 12. Though the Chinese statement of that meeting noted a number of areas of cooperation between the two sides in the evolving global political and trading systems, China’s position had also settled on the harsher of the two statements from August 6. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Jaishankar “the Chinese side’s principled position” on what was characterized as India’s unilateral move on the Kashmir issue.

Another statement issued on the same date titled, “Wang Yi States Clear Position on the Kashmir Issue” was even harsher. It noted that “the constitutional amendment of the Indian side will change the current situation in Kashmir and give rise to tensions in the region.” This statement went well beyond stating China’s worries about India-Pakistan tensions. As the statement said, “the Indian side’s measures also challenge the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese side and go against the agreements between the two countries on safeguarding peace and stability in border areas, about which the Chinese side is seriously concerned.” The statement went on to say that “Such practice of the Indian side is neither valid in relation to the Chinese side nor will it change the status quo that the Chinese side exercises sovereignty and effective administrative jurisdiction over the territory.” In brief, China’s position went from calling on both India and Pakistan to resolve historical grievances and get rid of zero-sum mindsets to not only blaming India directly for creating tensions, but also questioning the sovereign rights and interests of China.

The Indian side does appear to have pushed back. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement on the meeting between Jaishankar and Wang Yi not only reiterated that this was an internal matter, but also noted that “There was no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. India was not raising any additional territorial claims. The Chinese concerns in this regard were therefore misplaced.” When the Chinese foreign minister referred to the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, the MEA statement noted that the Foreign Minister Jaishankar stated that “Where India Pakistan relations are concerned, Chinese side should base its assessment on realities.”

There is little doubt that both sides are trying hard to maintain the Wuhan Spirit: indeed, Jaishankar’s visit itself was meant to prepare the ground for a second informal summit between Modi and Xi to be held in October in India. But there is also little doubt that the Article 370 issue has created a fresh bone of contention between India and China.

Things have possibly gotten worse because China has also pushed for a discussion on India’s actions in the UN Security Council. The discussion was originally sought by Pakistan but it was rejected by the Polish Permanent Representative, who is currently chairing the UN Security Council. But China put its shoulders behind Pakistan’s request and forced a discussion in the UN Security Council, though it was a closed-door “informal consultations” rather than an open one which China had originally wanted. It appears that during the consultations, the United States and France strongly supported the Indian position that the issue was an internal matter while China was of the opinion that what India had done was a unilateral action that should not have been undertaken.

India is unlikely to take kindly China’s behavior. It is clear that both India and China want to maintain the Wuhan Spirit especially given the multiple tensions and uncertainties that both countries face internationally and domestically. But there is also little doubt that though the Wuhan spirit may continue, it is under serious strain.

What Does Trump’s Kashmir Storm Mean for US-India Relations?, The Diplomat, 26 July 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on Trump's statements on Jammu and Kashmir and see if this would have any significant lasting impact on U.S.-India relations. I argue that while the controversy risked being added to the list of issues both sides are having, thus far the fallout has been managed relatively well.

While attention ahead of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan’s visit to Washington focused on a list of expected discussion points and deliverables, ultimately the trip was dominated by the fallout from an unexpected controversy that emerged during his meeting with U.S. President Donald Trump. While responding to Khan’s request for U.S. assistance to resolve the issue of Kashmir, Trump said that India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi had also asked Trump to mediate the Kashmir dispute.
For the full post, click here.



The Pakistani government was understandably gleeful. In India, meanwhile, there was consternation, with opposition parties raising the issue in the Parliament and demanding that Modi clarify whether he had indeed asked Trump to mediate. Nonetheless, overall, India has thus far managed the issue quite well and prevented another challenge from being added to the list New Delhi and Washington both face.

India’s long-standing position has been that Kashmir is a bilateral issue that needs to be negotiated directly between India and Pakistan. India had always refused overt third-party involvement in the Kashmir dispute especially in terms of any mediation between India and Pakistan. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar reiterated that position and stated that India had not indeed asked for any mediation. India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) also put out a statement rebutting Trump’s assertion that Modi had asked him to mediate.

This unexpected kerfuffle briefly threatened to put a dent in U.S.-India relations, which is already facing a number of other difficulties. For instance, India’s decision to buy the S-400 air defense missile from Russia puts India afoul of the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), even though India felt that the capabilities that it was acquiring with the missile were too important for it to give in to the U.S. objections about buying the missile.

Similarly, the worsening tensions between the United States and Iran and Washington’s demands that India comply with the U.S. sanctions on Tehran have not gone down well in New Delhi because India sees Iran as strategically important to flank Pakistan. Finally, the U.S. efforts to find a way out of Afghanistan led Washington to once again seek Pakistan’s help, much to India’s discomfort. India has been left out of the discussions on the future of Afghanistan and it feels abandoned by the United States. In addition, Trump’s withdrawal of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) on India and the tariff war between the two countries are not helping either.

Indian unhappiness with Washington is only one part of the problem. In Washington itself, there is are still doubts about the balance of obligations and whether the American strategic bet on India is worthwhile. Though these are as yet murmurs, the fact that even some of the strongest supporters of closer U.S.-India relations are now expressing doubt about India’s commitment should be worrisome to New Delhi.

Coming on top of these growing mutual doubts, Trump’s gaffe could potentially have proved to be quite damaging. But New Delhi has reacted with surprising maturity. That suggests that this will not lead to any lasting negative fallout.

Though the Indian foreign minister was firm in rejecting Trump’s assertion that he was asked to mediate, the response was also quite measured. While India’s opposition parties raised a ruckus in the Parliament on the issue, the Indian government did not panic.

The government could have taken a much stronger stance in the Parliament in order to pacify the domestic opinion in India, but it may have felt it did not need to given political dynamics. Despite the noise, the Indian opposition is in a considerably weak state. They are yet to recover from the drubbing they received in the recent general elections. The main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, is grappling with internal problems and is currently leader-less and direction-less. Despite a lot of pre-election chatter about regional parties coming together to form a national alternative to the BJP, nothing has come of it and many regional parties suffered serious setbacks in the elections. The comfortable domestic political situation might be one reason why the government felt little need to go overboard in criticizing the Trump statement.

Another factor is the general state of U.S.-India relations itself. With a number of issues already rocking the relationship, New Delhi probably did not want to fuel any further controversy in the relationship. Though India is trying to maintain some level of stable relationships with all the major powers, including Russia and China, there is probably a recognition that India also has to maintain its closeness to the United States.

Finally, there is also probably acceptance that Trump will be Trump and that India should discount some of Trump’s antics in the interest of the relationship. It helped that within hours of Trump’s statement, the U.S. State Department discounted Trump’s statement about India seeking mediation. Other U.S. leaders such as the Congressman Brad Sherman also publicly castigated Trump for the statement. The U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs too came out with a statement supporting the Indian point of view. Not only that, Representative Eliot L Engel, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “reaffirmed that in order for dialogue to be meaningful, Pakistan must first take concrete and irreversible steps to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure on Pakistan’s soil.”

Since all of these statements, coming from various sources beyond just the president himself, clarified that Trump’s statement was not U.S. policy, New Delhi probably felt confident that it need not worry that Trump’s statement had presaged any change in the U.S. policy on Kashmir.

U.S.-India relations do face some challenges. But the mature handling in New Delhi of this unexpected controversy during Khan’s visit to Washington has ensured that another item was not added to the list of grievances on both sides.

PM's China Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

Here's the link to an article of mine on the PM's visit to China, published by ORF. Indian Prime Minister has left for China for the third BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa) Summit, but one of the key questions is as to what such coalitions mean for India-China bilateral relations.

For the full article, click here.



Besides the BRICS Summit in Sanya, on Hainan Island, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao are scheduled to hold separate bilateral meetings, discuss a range of issues from economic to political and strategic issues. However, the Chinese officials have clarified to the Indian side that only multilateral issues and trade (establishing a strategic economic dialogue at the BRICS level is one item on the agenda) be discussed and that bilateral controversial issues are off the table during the Summit meeting.

At the multilateral level, the BRICS grouping is expected to discuss the international situation in the economic, financial, political and security domain. Obviously Libya is an important issue for all the BRICS countries. Except for South Africa that voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the other four countries - India, China, Brazil and Russia - had abstained from voting sending vague and ambiguous signals to Libya and the rest of the international community. However, it should be noted that the Libya vote was not the result of any collective decision taken by the BRICS. It was driven primarily by each country's individual foreign policy orientations than a common BRICS position. While China has justified its abstention by arguing that it does not interfere in another country's internal affairs, the Indian position has not been very clear. Some reports have argued that the open-ended nature of the Allied action is what got New Delhi worried. However, India's stand on the issue of use of military power against civilian population is contradictory. India stands aside while another government is using military power against unarmed civilians, even though India observes strict limitation on the use of military force in domestic rebellions. This contradiction will create problems to its standing in the coming years on the issue of UN's R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle and willingness to take on greater responsibility in global affairs commensurate with its growing stature.

What does BRICS really mean? The fact that Goldman Sachs identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as the fastest growing economies and coined the term BRIC does not mean anything and cannot become effective glue to stitch the group together as a cohesive unit. The grouping has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on what may be termed as "soft" issues such as climate change, trade issues and so on. The lack of strategic content in the grouping has impeded the growth and development of BRICS as a forum that can effect significant changes in global politics.

Even on the climate change issue, there has been no common position. Russia's stance on climate change has been significantly different from that of India and China's. Despite the fact that China has become the largest emitter of green house gas, India has found it convenient to go under the Beijing shadow although India has taken important steps to curb green house gas emissions, thereby compromising India's position in the climate change debate. However, India and China coming together and taking common positions has often been cited as major breakthroughs in India-China relations.

How far is this claim valid? It can be argued that while the two countries may have cooperated at the multilateral fora, India-China bilateral relations have also witnessed worsening of the ties partly because of China's less than supportive role at the multilateral fora when it came to strategic issues affecting India (China's role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are examples).

From the Chinese side, it supports India when they perceive a potential benefit in improving ties, which by and large have remained in the economic arena or improving its own image as it holds major events. The two recent instances have been when China issued regular stamped visas to one singer who was travelling to China for performing at the closing ceremony of the Asian Games; and when four journalists hailing from J&K travelling with PM for the BRICS Summit, because they did not want the visa issue to become a dampener on either of the two occasions held by China on its soil.

For Beijing, the West (including the US and Europe) is no more the market for their products. Asia is the future market and in Asia, India provides the largest market for the Chinese products and services. This explains the Chinese rationale in emphasising economics as the biggest agenda in the bilateral ties (evident during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India with a 400-member economic delegation).

India is all for strengthening ties with China, including in the economic arena. The bilateral trade had touched nearly $62 bn in 2010 and the two countries are expected to take this to $100 bn by 2015, which is not an unrealistic target. However, India has to address a few issues even in this area, which is otherwise booming. While the trade touched $62 billion, China's exports had gone beyond $40 bn, further increasing the trade imbalance between the two. Another issue for India has been the lack of access to the Chinese markets for Indian products particularly in three sectors - agriculture, IT and pharmaceuticals.

Lastly, what is that India achieves through BRIC/S that it cannot or has not achieved through bilateral means?

Global governance is one issue through which India-China relations may be tested. Is China willing to live with an India that is more assertive and influential in Asian and global affairs? China has so far not exhibited such support as it deals with India. Its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir (manifested through the issuance of stapled visas; circulation of internal documents in China indicating the deletion of 1500 square kilometres from LAC on the Ladakh sector) questioning the territorial integrity of India; its South Asia policy aimed at circumscribing India's manoeuvrability even within South Asia (China-Pakistan defence and nuclear weapons collaboration, China-Nepal, -Sri Lanka defence ties, and more recently utilising economic aid as an effective tool in furthering the Chinese interests are few examples) are some of the underlying issues that trouble India-China relations.

Three of the four BRIC countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, yet the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non-proliferation or outer space issues. The lack of strategic depth and mutual trust among these countries come as major impediments in making this bloc a strategic one - one with teeth that can challenge the current policies on these issues or one that can institute a new mechanism to avert the dangers of proliferation or weaponization of outer space.

Each of the five BRICS countries has their own strengths in the S&T arena. While this area should have been an ideal candidate for strengthening cooperation among these five countries, the group has not been able to exploit this strength for a variety of reasons.

Therefore, India has to be realistic enough to understand that heightened engagement between India and China in BRICS or any other multilateral fora has serious limitations - limitations imposed by the underlying Chinese objective of keeping India bogged down in South Asia as a regional power.

India-China Relations: Economics Is Not All

Here's the link to an article of mine on India-China relations, arguing that economics is not all. Trade and commercial ties have a limited role in fostering ties; in fact, they are subordinate to and occur within the more important structure of inter-state relations.

India and China have grown lot closer in the last few years compared to the previous decade. There has, however, been a simultaneous rise of mutual suspicions. While the economic interaction between the two sides may have reached great heights, this cannot eliminate the growing suspicion on the strategic front.



An NBR study recently argued that “Economic interdependence is hardly a “silver bullet” guaranteed to pacify interstate conflicts. Though it may constrain conflict escalation processes, interdependence also generates serious economic frictions that can easily offset or overwhelm its conflict-suppressing effects.”1 Meanwhile, there have been several studies arguing that economic traction between the two sides have several positive spin-off effects on India-China relations.2 I would argue that commerce clearly has a limited role to play in a country’s strategic game plan. Trade and commerce do not alter the realities of the strategic front.

India-China economic and trade ties have been growing in the last few years, from just US $ 1.99 bn in 1999 to nearly US $ 60 bn. in 2010. Despite the imbalance in the trade, trade is one area that has continued to flourish without major hurdles. Liberal theorists assume that improved trade relations will diminish the scope for international conflict. The theorists believe in the “trade brings peace” argument,3 which is opposite to what the Realists would argue. The Realists are of the view that “trade and investment flows as occurring within — and being subordinate to — the more significant and enduring structure of interstate relations. It is international peace that permits and enables trade, not the reverse.” Additionally, Realists argue that “rational and responsible national leaders never lose sight of the fundamentally anarchic nature of the global system,” and “consequently, where economic liberals stress mutual absolute gains from trade, realists are primed to notice relative gains in which one party, or one country, benefits more than the other.” 4 Realists essentially see international politics as a state of anarchy, with none able to enforce law. Even when states agree to certain international rules and regulations, it is up to the state to enforce such laws, depending whether those laws are favourable to the state or not; protect their interests/security or not. As Armijo explains, “In such a self-help system of mutual distrust, the only rational stance for a responsible national government, sadly but inevitably, leads to large defense expenditures, arms races, and the potential for instability and even war, as insecure states may be tempted to attack preemptively.” This clearly explains the emerging India-China dynamics. Is trade and economic well-being of the other in the mutual interest of India and China? While it may be the case, but this trade and well-being aspect need to be situated within the overall framework of inter-state relations between India and China. Under such a scenario, economic well-being of each other may not be the case. For instance, India trying to create its own markets in Asia will not seen favourably by China.

Another liberal argument is that both India and China have collaborated at various international fora on issues like climate change and WTO issues and that these interactions have fostered closer partnership between New Delhi and Beijing.5 Have these interactions, however, penetrated deep enough to reduce the suspicion and tension that has characterised India-China relations in the last few years? The answer may be no. While the two countries have worked together on some of these issues, competition and rivalry between them has only risen in the past few years.6 China has been increasingly testing India’s dominance in its own backyard. Despite SAARC being India’s creation, Beijing is much more active today in the organisation than India is.7 Beijing’s presence in South Asian countries, solidified through increasing trade and investment measures, have reduced India to a big geographical entity with not much influence.8 China’s pro-active approach towards South Asia appears to be a result of its own deepening relationship with South Asian countries as well as fulfilling its objective to emerge as a kind of “guardian” to all the South Asian countries. Second, it seems as an after-effect of the US-China Joint Statement in November 2009 for the two countries to jointly manage South Asia.

As India continues to re-define and modify its foreign and security policies, given its increasing stature in the international arena, there is bound to be competition for influence, resources and so on. For instance, China has been critical of India’s closer ties with the United States or other Asian powers that could be apparently detrimental to Beijing’s own regional and global role. Beijing has also been wary of India’s Look East policy, its strengthened relations with Japan, Vietnam and several other ASEAN countries. Beijing feels that India’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia could potentially hamper China-ASEAN ties as well as reduce Beijing’s manoeuvring space in Asia. China’s increasing foray into Indian Ocean region has been allegedly to secure its own energy supplies and ensuring energy security. China has been seeking to build alternate energy transport and trade routes, anticipating problems on the Malacca Strait sometime in the future. However, given the kind of China wariness that exists in New Delhi, China’s expanding influence and presence in India’s neighbourhood has clearly upped the ante within the establishment as well as outside.

Chinese actions raise suspicions in Delhi mainly for two reasons. One, factors like history and unsettled boundary and territorial issues will continue to hinder any prospect of India and China forging closer meaningful ties in the foreseeable future. The baggage of history continues to be a strong factor in India-China ties. The history and unsettled boundary issues as well as their respective roles in the emerging Asian strategic framework have created severe constraints in working out a good partnership between India and China. The trust deficit between New Delhi and Beijing is not something that is going to change dramatically in the next few years. Border issue is a symptom of the larger problem that exists between India and China. It is India’s increasing role and influence which is the crux. Even while both India and China recognise their inevitable role in shaping the Asian security order, they do differ radically on the kind of Asian layout for the future.9 India has continued to work at an inclusive approach as opposed to the Chinese’ exclusivist approach which appears directed against India, US and Japan. Beijing has continued to believe that its peaceful rise and the emergence as a dominant power in Asia is only an assumption of its rightful place in the region and in fact a return to the old, but natural order for the region. India may not be willing to see an Asia dominated by any one power.
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1 William R. Thompson and David P. Rapkin, “Will Economic Interdependence Encourage China’s and India’s Peaceful Ascent?,” in Strategic Asia 2006-07: Trade, Interdependence and Security (National Bureau of Asian Research, Washington), available at http://www.nbr.org/publications/strategic_asia/pdf/Preview/SA06/SA06_China_India_Rise_preview.pdf.
2 For example, Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf;

3 John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, “Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47, 2003, pp. 371-93; Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf, cited in Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-a.pdf.

4 Leslie Elliott Armijo, “The BRICS Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) As Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight?,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-a.pdf.

5 Christopher J. Rusko and Karthika Sasikumar, “India and China: From Trade to Peace,” Asian Perspective, vol. 31 no. 4, 2007, available at http://www.asianperspective.org/articles/v31n4-d.pdf.

6 The increasing number of intrusions /and transgression on the India-China border, even in the sectors that were otherwise peaceful; Chinese Ambassador in India stating that the entire State of Arunachal Pradesh belongs to China; China’s issuance of stapled visas to people from Jammu & Kashmir; denial of visa to Gen. BS Jaswal, Commander, Northern Command; China gaining de facto control of Gilgit-Baltistan region, are instances of China trying to test India on the politico-strategic front.

7 While one can say that India has been laid back and even apathetic to its own neighbours, China’s argument that it is simply engaged in practical diplomacy may be farfetched.

8 China is clearly taking important steps to solidify its relationship with SAARC as a whole, in addition to having excellent relations with each of the member countries. At the recently concluded SAARC Summit, Beijing proposed an assistance of $300,000 to the SAARC Development Fund.

9 Gwadar Port in Pakistan and Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka are cases in point. However, each of the relations that Beijing has cultivated in India’s neighbourhood has had its negative impact on India’s own bilateral ties.