Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the recent UK proposal on space security governance.  That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important.  It is a critical first step.  

Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure, or guaranteed. 

For the full post, click here.  

Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. 

All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion.  

The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence.  

The United Kingdom has also made a recent proposal — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:

encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.

It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” 

One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. 

Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. 

A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. 

While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.

Washington Watching as Beijing’s Space Power Grows -The Diplomat, 10 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the latest U.S. Defense Department report on Chinese military power that recounts Beijing’s growing space and counterspace capabilities.

The U.S. Department of Defense last week released its annual report on China’s military power. The report details all aspects of China’s military including land, naval, air, space and information domains. The report identifies a few areas such as shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems where China has “achieved parity with – or even exceeded – the United States.”

According to the report, China has also made impressive strides in critical sectors such as cyber and space. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there has been greater focus on overall military capabilities and the PLA has devoted more attention to space and information capabilities. The last Chinese Defence White Paper (2019) identified space as “a critical domain of international strategic competition.” The 2019 White Paper also identified the important role that space will play in “improv[ing] the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.”

With China emerging as a global power, it is only natural to expect it to develop a range of space and counterspace capabilities. However, Beijing’s emphasis on developing these capabilities to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” as well as “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” means others have to take note. This, Beijing believes, can enable it to disrupt and deny any space-based advantage that an advanced military like the U.S. may have. The Pentagon’s report highlights PLA writings that have noted “the effectiveness of IO and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts and advocate targeting C2 and logistics networks to affect” an adversary in times of conflict. The report also cites “authoritative PLA sources” who have called for “the coordinated employment of space, cyber and EW as strategic weapons” in order to create significant disruptions in an adversary’s command and control as well as logistics networks.

Worryingly, the U.S. report states that China has plans to use a combination of these capabilities on assets beyond military ones to include “political and economic targets with clear ‘awing effects’ – as part of its deterrence.” This would entail the PLA’s possible use of its cyber warfare capabilities “to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense infrastructure; or, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.”

With the goal of being a “world-class military power,” China has gone about advancing its space power, both in terms of institutional reorganization and development of space and counterspace capabilities. The military modernization and reorganization undertaken by China since 2015 is worth noting. In terms of institutional architecture, the most significant development is the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), a theater command-level organization designed to combine “the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.” The U.S. report adds that the PLASSF’s Network Systems Department, which controls information warfare, has identified the U.S. as the “current major target.” The PLASSF is an institutional innovation to bring about greater synergies in functions that were previously spread across a number of departments. Under the reorganization, the PLASSF is directly under the Central Military Commission and is responsible for extending support to the entire PLA. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper clearly outlined the goals of the PLASSF as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.”

The U.S. Department of Defense’s report details the structure and functions of some of the key institutions under the PLASSF. The PLASSF houses two near-independent departments – the Network Systems and the Space Systems Departments – that are responsible for an entire range of capabilities and missions involving space, cyber and electronic warfare technologies. The Space Systems Department, for instance, has the complete responsibility for almost all of the PLA space operations including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control, and space warfare. While it is not clear where the counterspace capabilities fit and which institution is responsible for it, China is clear on the role of space in future conflicts to enable “long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.”

Unlike many other space powers, China’s space program has historically been under the PLA, and it continues to play a critical role in developing China as a major space power Today, China has fielded a large fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communication and navigation satellite constellations which is enabled by strengthened launch capabilities. China has been also active in its human spaceflight and lunar exploration missions, plus a debut Mars mission in 2020. China has additionally gone about developing a larger space ecosystem that has resulted in diversification to include several sub-sectors beyond the military, to the political, defense-industrial and commercial arenas. It is not clear if this was a deliberate decision by the PLA or not, but it could possibly help in strengthening China’s overall space competitiveness. China is also thought to have developed “quick response” small satellite launch vehicles to cater to the growing small satellite market. This capability could be helpful to China “to rapidly reconstitute low Earth orbit space capabilities,” which could come into play during conflicts should Beijing have the need to launch a large number of satellites to replace satellites that are damaged or increase the number of satellites in a particular orbit for better services.

While China’s development of space capabilities has been impressive, it has also pursued counterspace capabilities in a focused manner. Beijing has an array of counterspace capabilities including direct ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers, as well as directed energy weapons that can target an adversary’s system and create disruptions or denial of services, thereby cutting off “an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.” According to the U.S. report, China has expanded its space surveillance capabilities which aids Beijing in keeping a watch on “objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.” China has demonstrated its ground-based ASAT capability which is capable of targeting satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) but the report notes that China possibly has plans to expand its ASAT capabilities to destroy satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit, targets that are much farther away.

Over the last few years, a number of open-source reports have detailed growing Chinese counterspace capabilities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report of 2019 also highlighted these growing threats. China is known to be engaged in testing certain dual-use technologies in space that could be used for counterspace activities as well. For example, China’s “Roaming Dragon” system, fitted with a robotic arm, is supposed to be used for space debris removal missions but can very well be used for counterspace missions. In fact, Chinese scholars have stated that the “Roaming Dragon” could be engaged in debris removal activities during peacetime but at times of conflict, “they could be used as deterrents or directly against enemy assets in space.”

The U.S. report also outlines China’s efforts at espionage to steal U.S. military technology including space technology. According to the report, a number of U.S. criminal indictments have been handed down involving Chinese nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens from China, and U.S. citizens since 2015, for attempts at “procuring and exporting controlled items to China.” Some of the sensitive, dual-use technology or military-grade equipment in these cases have included radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, syntactic foam trade secrets and space communications technologies, among others. The report listed some recent cases including one in October 2019 when a Chinese national was sent to prison for 40 months for “conspiring to export military- and space-grade technology illegally” from the U.S. to China. The individual is reported to have worked with others in China “to purchase radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits used for military and space applications.”

China’s achievements in the space domain are indeed impressive but the increasingly contested geopolitics make space yet another arena for competition and rivalry. China’s actions will be closely watched and, in many respects, will fuel further rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

Russian ASAT Test: More Trouble for Space Security - The Diplomat, 31 July 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recent Russian ASAT test and what it means for space security. I argue that even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space.

On July 23, the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) released a statement saying that Russia had “conducted a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.” According to the statement, Russia, on July 15 “injected a new object into orbit from Cosmos 2543” in close proximity to another Russia satellite. This reportedly is similar to a prior Russian in-orbit activity undertaken in 2017. The latest Russian action also comes against the backdrop of a Russian anti-satellite test in April, when it fired a missile into space. Although Russia did not destroy any target during this test, the April test along with the July one raises doubts about Russia’s rhetoric of non-weaponization of space.

If these activities continue unabated, it will only further intensify competition among the major space players, potentially leading to weaponizing space. The space security regime is already in trouble; the Russian test creates additional problems. The experience of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a reflection of the current poor state of dealing with issues of global space governance. The failure of the major space powers to address space security challenges and agree upon a future path will be detrimental to maintaining space as a safe, secure, and sustainable domain.

For the full essay, click here.



This is not the first time that Russia has undertaken such an action. In 2017, the Russian “inspector” satellite Cosmos 2519 released a subsatellite, Cosmos 2521. The United States has been direct and harsh in its criticism of Russia. Well before the July tests, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford categorically characterized Russian actions thus: “Not to put too fine a point on it, but Cosmos 2521 demonstrated the ability to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile” (italics in original). Quoting Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of USSPACECOM, Ford explained that the U.S. has specific concerns because Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its capabilities in this regard. Apparently, there were two other Russian satellites, Cosmos 2542 and 2543, that were launched by Russia in November and December 2019 and these have undertaken maneuvers close to a U.S. satellite in low earth orbit. The United States views these actions, Ford said, as “highly provocative.”

U.S. criticism became even sharper after the July 23 Russian test. Raymond noted that “the United States, in coordination with our allies, is ready and committed to deterring aggression and defending the nation, our allies and vital U.S. interests from hostile acts in space.” Ford said that this action “highlights Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program — both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry.”

Meanwhile, Russia has rejected the U.S. claims as “propaganda.” The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that the test “did not create a threat for other space equipment and most importantly, did not breach any norms or principles of international law.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also dismissed the U.S. claims, saying that “Russia has always been and remains a country that is committed to the goal of fully demilitarizing outer space and non-deployment of any kinds of arms in outer space.”

It has to be noted that Russia has been trying to push initiatives to prevent weaponization of space for some time. Russia, along with China, has been calling for a treaty banning the placement of weapons in outer space. In 2008, the two together submitted a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). A revised text was submitted in the summer of 2014. A second Russian proposal is that of the “No First Placement” initiative, in which countries are expected to voluntarily agree not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

Neither of these proposals have found many takers for a number of reasons. First, many countries argue against a treaty-based mechanism in the current international political climate. They would instead prefer political instruments such as transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) or a code of conduct, all of which are non-legal instruments. But other countries argue that while non-legal measures can be useful, they cannot be a substitute for legal instruments. Second, there are also practical issues such as the definition of a “weapon” in space. In the absence of definitional clarity, it is likely to be difficult to come up with a mechanism to prevent the placement of weapon in outer space.

While there is merit to both these arguments, the reality is also that unless steps are taken to improve transparency and predictability with regard to outer space activities, states will likely find themselves spiraling toward weaponizing outer space.

Even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space. We are witnessing a number of escalatory actions including ASAT tests, cyber and electronic warfare targeted at space assets, and now what appears to be an actual kinetic weapon in space. Unless decisive steps are agreed upon by the major space players, access to space for civil and peaceful as well as security requirements will be harmed. While formal treaty mechanisms have been favored previously, today’s contentious global politics may not allow for such measures in the near term. These trends are of course dictated by global power transition leading to a new and competitive geopolitics. Therefore, expecting to develop a legal measure in the near term will remain difficult. Finding alternate approaches, such as developing norms of responsible behavior, may be a better path.

It Is Time for Space Governance Talks - The Diplomat, 21 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the urgent need for space governance talks. I argue that the window of opportunity for such talks is shrinking, and delay could see space emerge as an active domain for conflict.

Recent developments in outer space activities point to the urgent need to get global space governance talks back on track. Japan’s launch of a new defense space unit within the Air Self-Defense Force, Russia’s ASAT test last month, and the announcement by France of its new defense space strategy are indicators of rapidly change space security dynamics. The absence of successful multilateral discussions could accentuate security concerns and force states to rely on deterrence in space as a state policy, with negative consequences for all. While this is yet to happen, there are signs of states beginning to act as if they are not left with any choice but to develop deterrence strategies for space. It is also to be noted that the window of opportunity for states to engage in talks is already quite small and any delay holds out the possibility that outer space could emerge as an active domain for conflict.

For the full essay, click here.



This week, Japan launched a new defense space unit, the Space Operations Squadron, to track space debris and suspicious satellites in an effort to prevent satellite collisions. The squadron will be part of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and will be based in the ASDF’s Fuchu base in Tokyo. It is initially planned to be a small unit with 20 personnel, to be gradually increased to around 100. Despite the small size, experts suggest that the establishment of the new unit is a recognition of Japan’s greater reliance on space As noted in the December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines, the newly-formed division is meant “To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.” But given the contested and competitive nature of space including deployment and use of counter-space capabilities, the guidelines also seek to “to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.” Reports suggest that the new unit will also be engaged in Japan’s satellite-based navigation and communication for the troops in the field. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono said that the new squadron will collaborate with the United States, especially the U.S. Space Command that was set up last year. On the domestic front, the squadron will cooperate with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) with the goal of establishing a space monitoring system by 2023. Japan plans to launch its own space surveillance satellite by 2026. Meanwhile, in August 2019, Japan announced plans to develop a satellite interceptor by the mid-2020s in order to have the option to counter attack satellites if Japanese assets in space are targeted. There will be a formal decision on it by the end of March 2021. This development rises again from Japan’s concerns about how certain countries could use counter-space capabilities to disrupt, disable or destroy satellite networks.

Japan’s move comes against the backdrop of increasing space security competition among the major space powers. There are also growing concerns in Japan about security threats from China and Russia, which have been developing counter-space capabilities to interfere, deny, disable or even destroy satellites. China’s development of a robotic arm and ASAT missile capabilities has been referred to in this context in Japanese writings. Similarly, Russia’s multiple anti-satellite tests remain a concern. Even though Japan has maintained a peaceful space program, there are compelling security factors that are beginning to impact Tokyo’s future space orientation. This is also in line with the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2018, which seek to augment Japan’s military capabilities as far as outer space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum are concerned. The guidelines for FY19 and beyond noted that “rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security.”

Similarly, France undertook some significant changes to its space policy, driven by what it sees as developments “threatening our freedom of access and action in space.” Accordingly, France in July 2019 introduced certain institutional changes, with national space governance being reviewed and placed within a Space Command, which remains under the Air Force. India, too, has been making gradual changes to its approach toward space. Even as it continues reiterating that it is for peaceful use of space, there are significant changes on the ground including its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. India’s main concern in the space domain, as in many other areas, comes from China. China’s ASAT test in January 2007 led to new domestic debates on how India must protect its own assets. The debate included whether India should have a demonstrated capability or not. Certainly, India wanted to avoid what happened in the nuclear domain, where non-testing left it outside the emerging nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Meanwhile, Russia conducted an ASAT test just last month, which received prompt attention from the strategic and national security communities in major capitals. While the test of the Russian Nudol interceptor did not create any cloud of orbital debris, it did raise concerns since it can destroy satellites in low earth orbit. Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, USSPACECOM commander and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations said on Twitter: “Russia’s DA-ASAT test, capable of destroying #sats in Low Earth Orbit, is an example of growing threats to U.S. & Allied #Space systems. U.S. is ready, committed to #deter aggression & #defend the Nation & our Allies from hostile acts in space.”

The renewed Russian interest in developing and testing ASAT and co-orbital ASATs will continue to create more tensions and frictions among the major space players. The range of Russia’s counter-space capabilities is impressive and alarming. As far as its low Earth orbit (LEO) direct ascent capabilities are concerned, they have already crossed the R&D phase and moved to the testing phase whereas direct ascent in MEO/GEO (medium Earth orbit/geostationary Earth orbit) are believed to be in the R&D stage. Similarly, LEO co-orbital capabilities have crossed R&D and is in the testing stages. They have some significant capability on the electronic warfare means and space situational awareness.

There is clearly a spurt in activities as far as space and national security dynamics are concerned. The return to ASAT testing to the establishment of specialized military space units such as China’s PLA Strategic Support Force and the U.S. Space Force are a demonstration of the deteriorating space security environment. Development of counter-space capabilities is not new but states are showing greater willingness to develop and test such capabilities. In the absence of effective multilateral discussions, it is difficult to halt these disruptive and destabilizing trends. All of this indicates that there is a new normal emerging with regard to outer space activities. Prof. Chris Newman of Northumbria University in a presentation recently argued that a “normative behaviour is emerging and ASAT tests are a part of that normative framework.”

Unfortunately, a new treaty-like mechanism is hard to come by for a number of different reasons. The most significant challenge is the lack of political will and the inability to develop consensus among major space powers. Equally challenging are definitional issues and the dual-use nature of outer space which makes it difficult to frame appropriate rules. Finding a middle ground between legally-binding and voluntary measures is the only possible pathway in the immediate future.

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities - my essay in the latest Nonproliferation Review

In the latest issue of The Nonproliferation Review (Volume 26, 2019 - Issue 5-6), I published an essay examining the linkages between India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities. This is a special issue on South Asia, The Shifting South Asian Nuclear Landscape, put together by Prof. Sumit Ganguly and has several other interesting essays including one on future of deterrence in South Asia, Pakistan's nuclear future and the Sino-Indian nuclear dynamics.

In this essay, I argue that the relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes has waxed and waned. Three phases can be identified that the relationship went through. There was a period in the early days of both the programmes when the relationship was close, signified by the fact that they were even headed by the same leadership, Dr. Vikram Sarabhai. For a variety of reasons that included growing maturity of both programmes but also political decisions about the need to separate the two programmes to reduce international concerns, the programmes became autonomous of each other for a period of time. More recently, over the last two decades, there has been greater collaboration between the two programmes though the nature of the cooperation is very different from what it was in the first phase. In this essay, I outline these three stages chronologically and conclude with some thoughts about how the relationship is likely to evolve.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long essay and I concluded with the following:

Evolution of the relationship between India’s nuclear and space sectors has gone through multiple stages, partly as a consequence of domestic factors such as bureaucratic politics, technology development as well as due to international conditions such as the state of India’s relations with the global nuclear regime. In the current space, both the maturing of India’s technological capabilities in both the nuclear and space sectors and the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programmes as well as the changed relationship between India and the global regime has led to a synergistic relationship in which India’s space programme provides significant support to India’s nuclear weapons programme. This is likely to continue for a period of time because India’s nuclear programme is still growing and it has not reached completion. For example, India still does not have a fully developed deterrence capability against China because it does not have any delivery system that can cover all of China. Moreover, the growing Chinese nuclear and space capabilities will require India to undertake further efforts before India can have a satisfactory deterrence relationship with China.

At the same time, the evolution of India’s nuclear weapons programme has changed the relationship between the nuclear and space programmes in at least two ways. First, the development of India’s missile systems outside the ISRO means that the Indian nuclear programme no longer has to depend on the space programme for this particular requirement. The DRDO has come a long way from its early efforts and is now fully capable of developing the delivery vehicles that India’s nuclear weapons programme needs. Second, the growth and complexity of India’s nuclear weapons establishment means that it needs other service support to fully exploit the delivery capability that India has developed. For example, it makes little sense to have delivery capabilities without advanced command and control systems to manage the delivery capability and ensure that it is used appropriately, which requires support from space-based communication and command systems. Similar reasons apply for intelligence and target acquisition, which are also space-based. Therefore, as the Indian nuclear weapons programme becomes more sophisticated, it also requires additional support from India’s space capabilities. What this suggests is that as India’s nuclear weapons programme continues to develop, we should expect a closer and more synergistic relationship between India’s nuclear and space programmes.

#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.

Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.

The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

Chandrayaan 2 Moon Landing: The sign of a mature space mission - The Hindustan Times, 6 September 2019

In today's Hindustan Times, I write on India's Chandrayaan 2 mission. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. The fact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India.

If all goes as planned, India’s Chandrayaan 2 will become the first Indian space craft to land on a non-terrestrial surface. Others such as the US, Soviet Union/ Russia and China have done human and rover landings on the Moon previously. India has previously undertaken orbital missions around the Moon and Mars, the Chandrayaan 1 and Mangalyaan respectively. The fact that the Chandrayaan spacecraft will be landing on the south pole, a region that has been unexplored before makes it even more special. Thefact that the exact spot for landing will be determined right before the landing makes it an extremely complex mission for India. Even China, which has built sophisticated space capabilities, made its first attempt to land on the near side of the Moon, although it did land on the far side of the lunar surface earlier this year.

For the full piece, click here.



While ISRO traditionally did not look at interplanetary or complex missions such as the Chandrayaan or Mangalyaan, this has become necessary as India’s space programme evolves into a more mature programme. This is also a reflection of the growing geopolitical competition that is now beginning to play out in space. The space competition that one saw during the Cold War had somewhat faded by the early 1980s, after both the US and Soviet Union demonstrated their own “firsts” in various accomplishments. In fact, the bragging rights also began to lose their value after a point of time because such endeavours were not seen as having much scientific or technological value-addition. But these have begun to make a comeback, except that the main actors are primarily in Asia with China leading in some of the endeavours, quickly followed by other players like India and Japan as well. There are also newer activities in outer space that is sparking the competition. For instance, space mining is beginning to gain a lot of interest in both the West and in Asia. Even the small city state, Luxembourg, is making significant investments in this regard. Asteroid mining, lunar mining and general advances in technology that aid in-situ resource utilization is pushing the countries to explore the practical value of space exploration.

There is also the security driven push to this competition. The US and Soviet Union were locked in major space competition for a couple of decades but the end of the Cold War had slowed down the pace to a large extent. The renewed space competition has China at the centre of it and Beijing has ambitions to catch up with both the US and Russia. But Beijing’s own actions have sparked major reactions in Asia and beyond. For instance, the first successful Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 sparked a new competition, pushing India to finally demonstrate its own capability earlier this year. This parallels other types of aggressive behaviour by China in its neighbourhood that has triggered new cooperation between those threatened by such actions and further competition with China. For instance, China’s behaviour has made the India-Japan strategic partnership a lot stronger in recent years, including in outer space. China’s actions have led to competition with the US, India and Japan, to a limited extent too. Because of the growing sophistication of China’s space programme, especially with regard to counter-space capabilities, other states have been driven to try and play catch-up with China. Of course, given the growing penetration of space for security and military purposes by all the major powers, India cannot afford to ignore these developments. China has marched ahead in many areas but India has to develop its own deterrent capabilities in space to remove some of the vulnerabilities that may persist in the bilateral and regional context. So, India will have to do a bit of catching-up with China for a while. While the Chandrayaan 2 mission may not have a direct social or economic benefit, demonstration of the growing sophistication of India’s space capabilities is much required for strengthening its credentials when it comes to debates about global governance of space. Moreover, highlighting India as a major space player makes it an attractive destination for launching satellites for a number of emerging players. All of these benefits and necessities makes India’s space ventures such as this worthwhile.

China extends terrestrial rivalries into orbit with new space race - The Nikkei Asian Review, 23 August 2019

On this Friday, I published a short essay on the emerging Asian space race in The Nikkei Asian Review. I believe that the emerging space dynamics especially in Asia will spur new competition as well as cooperation. For example, India and Japan unite over Beijing's moon landings and anti-satellite weapons and find new avenues to collaborate including in joint lunar missions in the future.

On September 7, India will attempt to land an unmanned mission on the moon. If it is successful, it will join China as the second Asian power that has landed on the lunar surface -- its efforts driven by China's achievements.

While such peaceful rivalry can spur countries to greater feats, unfortunately competition between Asian nations is now having more hostile effects: earlier in the year, India tested an antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, in space, trying to match a capability that China had demonstrated earlier.

These are two facets of the space race in Asia and it now looks like both will be determined by terrestrial power tussles more than anything else.

For the full essay, click here.



Asian powers have made significant advances in developing their capacities in outer space in the past couple of decades. China landed a rover on the far side of the moon earlier this year, an impressive feat that no other country has achieved, three years after landing on the near side.

While China has not officially commented on plans for a manned mission to the moon yet, many believe that will be the next step. In fact, Beijing has disclosed that its future lunar missions will set the foundation for a potential research base there.

Further, China's plans to construct and operate its own space station in low-earth orbit sometime around 2022 are impressive, but also add to space competition. By the time China's space station is established, it will probably be the only one operating. The current International Space Station is likely to wind up by 2024.

Similarly, India became the first Asian country to send an orbiter around Mars, called the Mangalyaan. ISRO, India's space agency, has an ambitious agenda, including a mission to study the sun in 2019-20, a second mission to Mars around 2022-23 and a Venus mission around 2023. Like China, India also plans manned space missions.

Japan, the other Asian power, has focused more on commercially viable projects but it has impressive achievements including a lunar orbiter mission in 2007 as well as the Hayabusa mission, the first time that a spacecraft landed on an asteroid and brought back samples.

While these achievements are commendable, there is a darker side; tense international relations in Asia are being felt in outer space.

In 2007, when China tested its ASAT weapon, it was the first such test since the 1980s. China's decision to demonstrate that capability meant that every power which had a reasonable level of dependence on outer space, not just military but also civilian, through such uses as GPS and telecommunication satellites, was now suddenly vulnerable.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. immediately followed with its own ASAT test the next year, and India began its own program. Now it appears that Japan may be on its way to developing an ASAT capability.

ASATs are only the visible element of this competition. There is also a less well known race to develop other capabilities that can damage the outer-space assets of potential adversaries. These include everything from cyber attacks to electronic warfare and spectrum interference, deliberate attempts to jam or otherwise impede radio signals.

The problem is of course a global one. But it is also specifically Asian because most of the key players are the rising powers in this region. Growing national wealth and technological capabilities have made these countries more dependent on space -- and hence more vulnerable.

The difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of international rules or norms. Existing treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 have proved to be outdated and inadequate to meet these challenges. The problem is well recognized and there have been recent international efforts to address it, though these have gone nowhere.

The consequence is that deterrence appears to be the only real safeguard to protecting national assets in space. Simply put, the absence of strong rules and norms means countries must implicitly threaten retaliation by developing their aggressive capabilities.

This competition is spurring cooperation of a sort, however. China's enormous capacity means that no other Asian power can counter it alone. Just as this is encouraging new terrestrial alignments between India, Japan, Australia and others, it is also leading to cooperation in outer space by a number of countries, all whom have common concerns about China's capabilities and behavior in space.

Thus India and Japan, despite having highly nationalistic space programs, are cooperating more. In 2017, the two countries formally recognized the importance of deeper cooperation, and the space agencies of the two countries plan to conduct a joint lunar mission. More significantly, the two countries have just started a space security dialogue.

The first space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union petered out without too much damage. With only two players in the game and a far simpler outer-space environment, management of that competition was relatively easy.

Asia may not be so lucky unless wiser counsel prevails. Asian powers have made significant advances and accomplished much they can be proud of, but unless they can either manage their terrestrial power politics or at least isolate outer space from those politics, it is likely that all of Asia could suffer.

India's strategy in space is changing. Here's why - The World Economic Forum, 14 August 2019

After a gap of more than a year, I wrote a short essay for The World Economic Forum. In this essay, I focused on India's geopolitical strategy in space.

Half a century after humans first walked on the Moon, space is still as much about scientific discovery as it is about strategic competition.

As was the case during the Cold War, outer space is an arena of terrestrial geopolitics. We can see this in the increased impetus for competition in various achievements in outer space, such as Moon landings, Mars exploration and, more directly, in the creation of space forces in various countries – France being the latest to announce it intends to establish a space command to improve defence capabilities.

For the full essay, click here.



Yet, despite outer space being once again a field of power competition, there are also some differences from the Cold War years. First, and most significantly, there are many more countries and actors involved: in Asia itself, China, Japan and India are major spacefaring nations, and smaller players such as South Korea, Australia and Singapore are developing their own space programmes.

Added to the increase in countries is the entry of the private sector into space. A key difference in the new geopolitics of space is that both terrestrial competition – and its reflection in outer space – is now along multiple axes, rather than just the single U.S.-Soviet one.

Today, there is increasing power competition in Asia, particularly between China and its neighbours - India, Japan and Australia. Some of this is also reflected in outer space. As a corollary, we are also beginning to see greater cooperation between some countries in outer space, including India and Japan, both of which are concerned about the rise of China.

India also cooperates in space with the US, Russia and France. Much of the competition India has on land, on the other hand, is with China. Therefore, India has negligible cooperation with China in space, and equally, little competition with the other space actors.

A competitive chain reaction that (sometimes) reaches space

What occurs in space can be the result of a geopolitical chain reaction. For instance, consider the US-China-India relationship: China often takes action because of its strategic competition with the United States.

This has an impact on India, forcing India to respond. But India’s response to China has an effect on Pakistan, which then responds to India. This cascade can be seen on land, and at times, in space. For example, China’s first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test in January 2007 was to demonstrate a catch-up effort with the United States. But once China tested its ASAT in 2007, India had little choice but to develop its own ASAT because of the need of deterrence.

But in the space arena, the competitive cascade does not travel all the way to Pakistan because Pakistan’s space programme is underdeveloped. While Pakistan has expended considerable national wealth in keeping pace with India in its nuclear and missile capabilities, it has not done so with regard to outer space.

On the other hand, there might be a security incentive for Pakistan to demonstrate that it also has an ASAT capability.

Pakistan could also develop other counterspace capabilities, including cyber and electronic means to target India’s space assets. While this remains speculative so far, the history of India-Pakistan competition suggests that this remains a possibility.

Evolution of strategy

India had long maintained a rather doctrinaire approach toward space security, emphasising the peaceful uses of outer space and opposing the weaponization and militarization of space. Thus, India had opposed the US Strategic Defense Initiative programme and other efforts to build ballistic missile defences, let alone deploying ASAT systems. The reasons for such an approach was fairly clear: India did not house these capabilities.

But by the early 2000s, India’s position had begun to change as Pakistan began acquiring long-range missiles. India felt the need to build ballistic missile defences, leading New Delhi to take a sympathetic view of the George W. Bush administration’s decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in late 2001. By the end of the decade, as India’s own capabilities increased, it was clear that India was becoming more discriminating in its attitude towards space security.

China’s ASAT test in 2007 helped advance India’s process of revaluating its space strategy. India realised that its growing investments in outer space - until then largely civilian in nature - were now under threat from China’s new security capabilities. India also started thinking more about how to manage outer space for security purposes. As a result, India established a space cell under its Integrated Defence Headquarters shortly after China’s ASAT test.

In April 2019, India established the Defence Space Agency (DSA) as an interim measure to command the military’s space capabilities. All of this meant that India had to have a much more nuanced position than a blanket approach that opposed any militarization or weaponization of outer space.

However, the consequences of unbridled militarization and the weaponization of outer space has negative implications for India. Therefore, while India is pursuing a strategy that satisfies its own security interests, it still wants some international control on the militarization and weaponization of outer space.

Managing New Actors in the Space Domain - The Diplomat, June 29, 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the new actors in outer space and what it means for the global governance and space sustainability issues. I argue new entrants in the Indo-Pacific offer both opportunities and challenges for the outer space realm.

New actors in space is a tricky idea to define. Is it determined by the number of years a player has been in the space business, or something more nuanced? If one is talking about industry and the commercial sector, it is relatively easy to categorize and identify who is a new actor in space. But when it comes to states, what determines who is a new space actor is slightly more problematic.

Surely, those emerging states that are pursuing space programs can be called new actors in space. Nevertheless, one must push the envelope further to look at who the traditional players are, and these are the United States, Russia, and Europe. Therefore, even countries like India and China and others who have pursued space programs for a few decades now can be called new actors in space. This is the case because one is beginning to see new facets of their space programs which are affecting space security and sustainability dynamics.

For the full post, click here.



But the space domain is changing. It is not just the presence of new start-up companies that are altering the space landscape, but there are any number of new state actors that are pursuing space programs for a number of different functions and utilities. This has been possible because there has been certain amount of democratization of space with access to space becoming a lot more affordable. Costs are coming down, technological hurdles are lower, and new space collaboration and partnerships driven by geopolitical goals are introducing new players in space. These make it possible for a growing number of actors to pursue space programs. Many states in Africa, Latin America, and particularly Asia are pursuing space programs for a variety of different utilities including for national security applications.

Entry of new actors in space bring both opportunities and challenges. On the opportunity side, space has become more accessible to a large number of states due to innovation in technology and dilution of certain global export control regulations. The development benefits alone of this are huge. There is a great opportunity here, for both private sector and for others, to collaborate with these new actors because they are looking for efficient, cheap, flexible solutions (such as in communications, or in weather forecasting or in remote-sensing applications for land use etc) rather than simply prestige projects.

New private actors bring new energy, new ideas, possibly a more efficient way of doing things. Of course, when private corporations get involved, some part of the social needs that governments focus on can be lost, obviously, since private actors are less likely to focus on development issues or on non-profit ventures. Even here, though, we need to acknowledge the general contribution made by these new entities in terms of the technologies they develop, which will have a broader impact, and make space more accessible.

Also, it is important to see what kind of partnerships can be fostered to make space accessible to all. Partnerships between private sector and national programs will be a good burden-sharing arrangement. This kind of public-private sector partnership has worked in the Western context with a lot more ease, but in the Asian context, it has not been easy. We see a bit of it, but established government space agencies tend to be suspicious of new private actors, such as in India. Another problem might be the kind of areas that private sector is involved, whether there are only areas servicing expensive, well-heeled customers (such as space tourism) or whether they are also looking at things that benefit smaller, poorer countries.

The entry of new actors in space has brought certain risks as well. One major risk is related to the impact on norms of behavior. With more actors in space, there has been a dilution of some of the existing norms and the new players appear to be less willing to play by rules developed by others. For instance, the norm of not testing anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles that prevailed for decades appear to be weakening. More importantly, the norm of not interfering in each other’s space assets appear to be getting diluted even further with the growth in cyber and electronic warfare in outer space.

The established players who have shaped these norms appear less likely to break those norms as compared to new players who are less bound by them. Newer players possibly assume that these norms are a way of restricting their growth and therefore they are less likely to play by them. Additionally, the spread of technology and geopolitical competition have aided this dilution of norms.

Therefore, as new players emerge in space, one of the critical areas to focus on is to strengthen the rules of the road, in a number of different ways. These could include establishing or reinforcing norms of responsible behavior, developing TCBMs and codes of conduct. These are the required first steps before establishing legal mechanisms because of the political difficulties that have come in the way of making new legal frameworks for outer space.

Rule-making was an easier exercise when there were fewer actors, obviously. Today, with close to 80 actors including non-state and new actors in space, finding an agreement and developing consensus has become a significant challenge. Finding an avenue to bring in the commercial voice is also important but traditional venues such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), where space security and arms control issues are debated, are opposed to the introduction of commercial players as a stakeholder in their debates. This is not to suggest that commercial perspectives cannot be brought in through governments. But involving commercial players as independent actors in CD-like venues is not likely to happen in the near future.

Clearly, politics in outer space is getting complicated. It needs far more concerted attention than it has received. It may not be too late yet, but time is running out.

Significance of the changing space security landscape for India - The Financial Express, June 18, 2019

In yesterday's Financial Express, I have a piece looking at the significance of the changing space security landscape for India.

Asian space landscape is changing. China’s recent launch of a rocket from a ship, India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test and the establishment of a tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA) are quite significant. But even accounting for this, India’s plans appears to be quite dramatic. Last week, India announced that it will be conducting a table-top war game called the “IndSpaceEx” with all the stakeholders including its scientific establishment and the military.



The war game, according to reports, is meant to give a better understanding of the new and emerging space security challenges in outer space which will aid India in developing appropriate capabilities to protect its interests. India has been concerned about the worsening space security scenario for a while now. The first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007, an inherently destabilising act, and with the growing sophistication of the Chinese military space capabilities are serious concerns.

India’s framing of its policy since 2007, whether by the scientific, military and even the political establishment, has been ambiguous. Even as there are concerns around space militarisation and the increasing trends towards weaponisation of space, India has come to appreciate the need for a more nuanced approach to space security in recent years. This recognition pushed India to conduct the ASAT test in March. Subsequently, India has taken the final steps to establish the DSA.

This new approach has not been easy for India. India has always maintained that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes alone. But the changing nature of warfare, with the increasing integration of outer space into conventional military operations, has proved to be a critical impetus for India to change its tack. Traditionally, the use of space assets for passive military applications such as surveillance and intelligence has been considered acceptable but given the networked nature of warfare, there is an increasing reliance on space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Given this growing dependence on space for such functions, there are similarly growing vulnerabilities, with some states developing assets to interfere with, disrupt or damage space assets. In this context, while ASATs are destabilising, the development of counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare means to target space assets are worrisome. Also, terrestrial geopolitics is beginning to have an important bearing on how outer space affairs are conducted. A domain that remained relatively peaceful for decades is seeing greater competition and there are signs of a budding arms race in outer space, which India cannot afford to ignore.

After sitting on the margins for long, India has now begun to respond to these new realities in space security. India’s ASAT test, for instance, was an effort to establish credible space deterrence. But states have still not adopted deterrence within the space domain and there is time to prevent it from happening. The three other states that have demonstrated ASAT capabilities have not operationalised them yet. This offers states an opportunity to change course before it’s too late.

Nevertheless, as Ashley Tellis has argued, it was evident that the Indian ASAT test was aimed at China, which also means that it is likely to accelerate the pace of competition between the two and India needs to prepare for the long haul. India will need to improve its institutional architecture in order to have better coordination among the Department of Space, Ministry of Defence and the military. The first step in this regard was the creation of the Integrated Space Cell within the Integrated Defence Headquarters a decade ago but the establishment of the DSA is more welcome. Additionally, the government will be putting in place a Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), akin to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The DSRO is meant to be doing the research and development in terms of the capability requirement on the space security side, whereas the DSA will be responsible for the policy and strategy affecting the space security dynamics. Another important step for the government to do is to declare a space policy in the open domain. This cannot be a sector-specific, like the SATCOM policy, but it has to be an all-encompassing one, issued possibly by the Prime Minister’s Office.

While these internal steps are much needed, India should play an active role and grab the opportunity to shape the global rules of the road for two reasons. One, this will strengthen India’s global governance credentials in the outer space domain. As a spacefaring state with growing reliance on outer space for a number of different functions, it makes both economic and strategic sense. Two, with India taking the lead, it can ensure that the rules that get formulated are comprehensive and inclusive to include the interests of India and other developing states. India championing the case of other developing states’ interests will also have multitude indirect benefits.

Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge - The Diplomat, May 24, 2019

In the last week's column for The Diplomat, "Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge", I examined the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear risks that need to be addressed much more directly.

Conversations around nuclear risks and the need for strategic stability have picked up momentum in the run up to the 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Nuclear risks are changing for the worse because of geopolitical and technological changes, but the latter, in particular, needs to be addressed much more directly.

As far as the geopolitical dynamics are concerned, the shift in the global balance of power equations has meant that rulemaking and enforcement have become the victims of great power politics because both rulemaking and enforcement require some consensus among powers. But a second significant factor should be noted that could also lead to possible breakdown in nuclear deterrence: The impact of new technologies.

Emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons, among others, are posing new questions to the traditional understanding of stability and deterrence. These emerging technologies are unfortunately not being discussed enough within Track 1 NPT platforms as directly as they should be. It can, however, be argued that these new technologies could increase regional and global nuclear insecurities and therefore it is necessary to discuss this more seriously in order to manage the risks associated with nuclear weapons.

For the full article, click here.



The development of hypersonic weapons could potentially have a big impact on nuclear stability. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the possibility of surprise attacks because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. They thus present the possibility of offering a temptation to attack first in the hope of decapitating the enemy leadership or even destroying second-strike nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Even if states do not plan such attacks, the fear that they may do so could drive potential targets to develop riskier nuclear operational plans, such as launch on warning.

Alternatively, it could also spur nations with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as China, to increase the size of their nuclear forces so that at least some survive such a first strike. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers, all of whom are working on developing these weapons.

An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability because of the discrimination problem. It is more stable if early warning systems can clearly distinguish between a nuclear attack and a conventional one. If the same system can undertake both conventional strikes and nuclear attacks, a prudent defense system will have to assume that any attack it detects is a nuclear attack because the risks of assuming the alternative will be too high. Though this is a problem that is not confined to hypersonic weapons, the combination of the risk of a first strike combined with the discrimination problem makes the danger particularly acute.

Another evolving technology is Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which also has similar problems. Nuclear deterrence and stability are based on mutual vulnerability, and BMDs threaten to undo this key source of stability, with unpredictable consequences. This is not a new problem of course: the fear that one side might develop a strategic technological advantage was one reason for the Cold War U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. It might be time to revisit the possibility of developing a wider ABM treaty-like instrument in order to avoid a larger technology arms race as ballistic missile defense technologies slowly improve.

A third area is outer space, which Russia has been raising repeatedly in the NPT platforms. The increasing use of and reliance on space for national security missions has led states to develop counter-space capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy space systems. These include both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

Counter-space capabilities such as anti-satellites (ASAT) add an inherently destabilizing dimension to outer space security. But these are also a problem for nuclear stability because nuclear early warning as well as command and control systems depend on space-based assets far more today than a few decades ago. While these are not new capabilities – the United States and Soviet Union had conducted several ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s – the greater reliance on space assets increases nuclear vulnerabilities.

The NPT faces myriad problems, of course, and many will be discussed in the coming deliberations. But these emerging technologies represent a danger that should not be minimized in the debates about how much has been achieved, whether all sides have lived up to their end of the NPT bargain (especially nuclear weapons states), and how to proceed forward.