Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the recent UK proposal on space security governance.  That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important.  It is a critical first step.  

Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure, or guaranteed. 

For the full post, click here.  

Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. 

All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion.  

The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence.  

The United Kingdom has also made a recent proposal — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:

encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.

It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” 

One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. 

Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. 

A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. 

While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.

Russian ASAT Test: More Trouble for Space Security - The Diplomat, 31 July 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the recent Russian ASAT test and what it means for space security. I argue that even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space.

On July 23, the U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) released a statement saying that Russia had “conducted a non-destructive test of a space-based anti-satellite weapon.” According to the statement, Russia, on July 15 “injected a new object into orbit from Cosmos 2543” in close proximity to another Russia satellite. This reportedly is similar to a prior Russian in-orbit activity undertaken in 2017. The latest Russian action also comes against the backdrop of a Russian anti-satellite test in April, when it fired a missile into space. Although Russia did not destroy any target during this test, the April test along with the July one raises doubts about Russia’s rhetoric of non-weaponization of space.

If these activities continue unabated, it will only further intensify competition among the major space players, potentially leading to weaponizing space. The space security regime is already in trouble; the Russian test creates additional problems. The experience of the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is a reflection of the current poor state of dealing with issues of global space governance. The failure of the major space powers to address space security challenges and agree upon a future path will be detrimental to maintaining space as a safe, secure, and sustainable domain.

For the full essay, click here.



This is not the first time that Russia has undertaken such an action. In 2017, the Russian “inspector” satellite Cosmos 2519 released a subsatellite, Cosmos 2521. The United States has been direct and harsh in its criticism of Russia. Well before the July tests, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Ford categorically characterized Russian actions thus: “Not to put too fine a point on it, but Cosmos 2521 demonstrated the ability to position itself near another satellite and fire a projectile” (italics in original). Quoting Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, commander of USSPACECOM, Ford explained that the U.S. has specific concerns because Russia has repeatedly demonstrated its capabilities in this regard. Apparently, there were two other Russian satellites, Cosmos 2542 and 2543, that were launched by Russia in November and December 2019 and these have undertaken maneuvers close to a U.S. satellite in low earth orbit. The United States views these actions, Ford said, as “highly provocative.”

U.S. criticism became even sharper after the July 23 Russian test. Raymond noted that “the United States, in coordination with our allies, is ready and committed to deterring aggression and defending the nation, our allies and vital U.S. interests from hostile acts in space.” Ford said that this action “highlights Russia’s hypocritical advocacy of outer space arms control, with which Moscow aims to restrict the capabilities of the United States while clearly having no intention of halting its own counterspace program — both ground-based anti-satellite capabilities and what would appear to be actual in-orbit anti-satellite weaponry.”

Meanwhile, Russia has rejected the U.S. claims as “propaganda.” The Russian Foreign Ministry argued that the test “did not create a threat for other space equipment and most importantly, did not breach any norms or principles of international law.” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov also dismissed the U.S. claims, saying that “Russia has always been and remains a country that is committed to the goal of fully demilitarizing outer space and non-deployment of any kinds of arms in outer space.”

It has to be noted that Russia has been trying to push initiatives to prevent weaponization of space for some time. Russia, along with China, has been calling for a treaty banning the placement of weapons in outer space. In 2008, the two together submitted a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). A revised text was submitted in the summer of 2014. A second Russian proposal is that of the “No First Placement” initiative, in which countries are expected to voluntarily agree not to be the first to place weapons in outer space.

Neither of these proposals have found many takers for a number of reasons. First, many countries argue against a treaty-based mechanism in the current international political climate. They would instead prefer political instruments such as transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) or a code of conduct, all of which are non-legal instruments. But other countries argue that while non-legal measures can be useful, they cannot be a substitute for legal instruments. Second, there are also practical issues such as the definition of a “weapon” in space. In the absence of definitional clarity, it is likely to be difficult to come up with a mechanism to prevent the placement of weapon in outer space.

While there is merit to both these arguments, the reality is also that unless steps are taken to improve transparency and predictability with regard to outer space activities, states will likely find themselves spiraling toward weaponizing outer space.

Even as the war of words continues, there will need to be practical measures to deal with the increasing threats to space. We are witnessing a number of escalatory actions including ASAT tests, cyber and electronic warfare targeted at space assets, and now what appears to be an actual kinetic weapon in space. Unless decisive steps are agreed upon by the major space players, access to space for civil and peaceful as well as security requirements will be harmed. While formal treaty mechanisms have been favored previously, today’s contentious global politics may not allow for such measures in the near term. These trends are of course dictated by global power transition leading to a new and competitive geopolitics. Therefore, expecting to develop a legal measure in the near term will remain difficult. Finding alternate approaches, such as developing norms of responsible behavior, may be a better path.

It Is Time for Space Governance Talks - The Diplomat, 21 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the urgent need for space governance talks. I argue that the window of opportunity for such talks is shrinking, and delay could see space emerge as an active domain for conflict.

Recent developments in outer space activities point to the urgent need to get global space governance talks back on track. Japan’s launch of a new defense space unit within the Air Self-Defense Force, Russia’s ASAT test last month, and the announcement by France of its new defense space strategy are indicators of rapidly change space security dynamics. The absence of successful multilateral discussions could accentuate security concerns and force states to rely on deterrence in space as a state policy, with negative consequences for all. While this is yet to happen, there are signs of states beginning to act as if they are not left with any choice but to develop deterrence strategies for space. It is also to be noted that the window of opportunity for states to engage in talks is already quite small and any delay holds out the possibility that outer space could emerge as an active domain for conflict.

For the full essay, click here.



This week, Japan launched a new defense space unit, the Space Operations Squadron, to track space debris and suspicious satellites in an effort to prevent satellite collisions. The squadron will be part of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF), and will be based in the ASDF’s Fuchu base in Tokyo. It is initially planned to be a small unit with 20 personnel, to be gradually increased to around 100. Despite the small size, experts suggest that the establishment of the new unit is a recognition of Japan’s greater reliance on space As noted in the December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines, the newly-formed division is meant “To ensure superiority in use of space at all stages from peacetime to armed contingencies.” But given the contested and competitive nature of space including deployment and use of counter-space capabilities, the guidelines also seek to “to strengthen capabilities including mission assurance capability and capability to disrupt opponent’s command, control, communications and information.” Reports suggest that the new unit will also be engaged in Japan’s satellite-based navigation and communication for the troops in the field. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono said that the new squadron will collaborate with the United States, especially the U.S. Space Command that was set up last year. On the domestic front, the squadron will cooperate with the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) with the goal of establishing a space monitoring system by 2023. Japan plans to launch its own space surveillance satellite by 2026. Meanwhile, in August 2019, Japan announced plans to develop a satellite interceptor by the mid-2020s in order to have the option to counter attack satellites if Japanese assets in space are targeted. There will be a formal decision on it by the end of March 2021. This development rises again from Japan’s concerns about how certain countries could use counter-space capabilities to disrupt, disable or destroy satellite networks.

Japan’s move comes against the backdrop of increasing space security competition among the major space powers. There are also growing concerns in Japan about security threats from China and Russia, which have been developing counter-space capabilities to interfere, deny, disable or even destroy satellites. China’s development of a robotic arm and ASAT missile capabilities has been referred to in this context in Japanese writings. Similarly, Russia’s multiple anti-satellite tests remain a concern. Even though Japan has maintained a peaceful space program, there are compelling security factors that are beginning to impact Tokyo’s future space orientation. This is also in line with the National Defense Program Guidelines of December 2018, which seek to augment Japan’s military capabilities as far as outer space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum are concerned. The guidelines for FY19 and beyond noted that “rapid expansion in the use of new domains, which are space, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum is poised to fundamentally change the existing paradigm of national security.”

Similarly, France undertook some significant changes to its space policy, driven by what it sees as developments “threatening our freedom of access and action in space.” Accordingly, France in July 2019 introduced certain institutional changes, with national space governance being reviewed and placed within a Space Command, which remains under the Air Force. India, too, has been making gradual changes to its approach toward space. Even as it continues reiterating that it is for peaceful use of space, there are significant changes on the ground including its anti-satellite (ASAT) test in March 2019. India’s main concern in the space domain, as in many other areas, comes from China. China’s ASAT test in January 2007 led to new domestic debates on how India must protect its own assets. The debate included whether India should have a demonstrated capability or not. Certainly, India wanted to avoid what happened in the nuclear domain, where non-testing left it outside the emerging nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Meanwhile, Russia conducted an ASAT test just last month, which received prompt attention from the strategic and national security communities in major capitals. While the test of the Russian Nudol interceptor did not create any cloud of orbital debris, it did raise concerns since it can destroy satellites in low earth orbit. Gen. John W. “Jay” Raymond, USSPACECOM commander and U.S. Space Force Chief of Space Operations said on Twitter: “Russia’s DA-ASAT test, capable of destroying #sats in Low Earth Orbit, is an example of growing threats to U.S. & Allied #Space systems. U.S. is ready, committed to #deter aggression & #defend the Nation & our Allies from hostile acts in space.”

The renewed Russian interest in developing and testing ASAT and co-orbital ASATs will continue to create more tensions and frictions among the major space players. The range of Russia’s counter-space capabilities is impressive and alarming. As far as its low Earth orbit (LEO) direct ascent capabilities are concerned, they have already crossed the R&D phase and moved to the testing phase whereas direct ascent in MEO/GEO (medium Earth orbit/geostationary Earth orbit) are believed to be in the R&D stage. Similarly, LEO co-orbital capabilities have crossed R&D and is in the testing stages. They have some significant capability on the electronic warfare means and space situational awareness.

There is clearly a spurt in activities as far as space and national security dynamics are concerned. The return to ASAT testing to the establishment of specialized military space units such as China’s PLA Strategic Support Force and the U.S. Space Force are a demonstration of the deteriorating space security environment. Development of counter-space capabilities is not new but states are showing greater willingness to develop and test such capabilities. In the absence of effective multilateral discussions, it is difficult to halt these disruptive and destabilizing trends. All of this indicates that there is a new normal emerging with regard to outer space activities. Prof. Chris Newman of Northumbria University in a presentation recently argued that a “normative behaviour is emerging and ASAT tests are a part of that normative framework.”

Unfortunately, a new treaty-like mechanism is hard to come by for a number of different reasons. The most significant challenge is the lack of political will and the inability to develop consensus among major space powers. Equally challenging are definitional issues and the dual-use nature of outer space which makes it difficult to frame appropriate rules. Finding a middle ground between legally-binding and voluntary measures is the only possible pathway in the immediate future.

Iran Successfully Launches Military Satellite - The Diplomat, 23 April 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Iranian military satellite launch. I believe the launch this week is likely to increase not just regional tensions but deepen existing difficulties with the United States.

On Wednesday, Iran successfully launched a military satellite into space. Though it enhances Iran’s space and rocketry capabilities, it is also likely to increase competition between Iran and its neighbors, as well as between Iran and the United States. Coming on top of existing tensions in the region, it is likely that this launch will only further increase anxieties in the region.

For the full post, click here.



Although Iran has been one of the worst-hit countries by the coronavirus pandemic, Tehran’s behavior in the region has increased tensions in the Middle East. A number of military activities undertaken by Iran in recent days suggest that Tehran is relentless in upping the ante and creating strategic frictions with the U.S. as well as others in the region. These developments come against the backdrop of growing tensions between Iran and the United States after Washington walked out of the 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1. As tensions with the U.S. increase, Iran has been growing closer to China and Russia.

Just this past week, the U.S. criticized Iran for its “provocative maneuvers” in the Persian Gulf. A press release from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command said 11 small vessels of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy engaged in “dangerous and harassing approaches” on American ships including the USS Lewis B. Puller (ESB 3), USS Paul Hamilton (DDG 60), USS Firebolt (PC 10), USS Sirocco (PC 6), USCGC Wrangell (WPB 1332) and USCGC Maui (WPB 1304) during their joint integration exercises with U.S. Army AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in the north Arabian Gulf. It should be noted that the U.S. forces claim that they were conducting their military exercise in international waters.

The statement added that the Iranian vessels “repeatedly crossed the bows and sterns of the US vessels at extremely close range and high speeds, including multiple crossings of the Puller with a 50 yard closest point of approach (CPA) and within 10 yards of Maui’s bow.”

U.S. Naval Forces Central Command also said that this is not in line with the internationally acclaimed Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) or other international customary practices that obligate states to act with due regard for the safety of other vessels operating in the area.

Earlier in March, Gen. Kenneth F. McKenzie, Jr., the commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that “tensions with Tehran have not come down and may be exacerbated” due to the large number of infections and casualty in Iran from the coronavirus. This could very well be the case but U.S. President Trump has responded to Iran’s aggressive moves by saying that “I have instructed the United States Navy to shoot down and destroy any and all Iranian gunboats if they harass our ships at sea.”

All of this makes the situation quite precarious in the Persian Gulf. These kinds of naval incidents could turn quickly into major mishaps. Iran’s behavior also calls into question its adherence to internationally recognized rules of the road in the naval domain.

It was in the middle of these tensions that the IRGC announced that Iran launched its first military satellite, the Nour 1, into orbit at an altitude of 425 kilometers (264 miles). Iran has had a number of failures prior to this week’s successful launch. Most recently in February, its launch of the Zafar 1, a communications satellite, failed. Similarly, in 2019, Iran saw two launch failures, a launchpad rocket explosion and a separate fire incident at the Imam Khomeini Space Center, which killed three researchers. Thus, the success of this week’s launch is a big moment for Iran’s scientific community and the political and military leadership.

The launch was timed well – the fact that Iran has been able to undertake a successful launch of a military satellite on the 41st anniversary of the establishment of the IRGC is politically and militarily an important milestone for the country and, of course, Tehran is using the opportunity to send a strategic message to other powers in the region and beyond. IRGC Commander Major General Hossein Salami congratulated the Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and lauded the “new dimensions of the defence power of the Islamic Republic of Iran,” citing it as a “strategic achievement” for Tehran.

Given the growing reliance on outer space by a large number of developed and developing countries, Tehran’s launch is no surprise. In fact, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, the commander of the IRGC Aerospace Force, stated that “access to the space is not a choice but an inevitable necessity and we should find our place in the space.”

Boasting about the rocket, Brigadier General Hajizadeh said that Iran is now part of the club of superpowers that have rockets combining solid and liquid fuel. He added that the rocket – Qassed – that was used for today’s launch “is different from the previous ones as its propulsion system is a combination of liquid and solid fuel. The propulsion system has the same non-metal and composite body which was unveiled a while ago.”

Iran was also proud of the fact that all components of the satellite and the rocket were indigenously developed by Iranian scientists and consider it a proud achievement, especially since Tehran has been under sanctions.

This week’s satellite launch will prompt both regional and global responses. At the regional level, it could trigger reactions from Israel and major Persian Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia. The UAE has had a focused approach to its space program and is far ahead of other regional players; their plans include a Mars mission in 2020. But Iran’s military satellite launch could open some exciting tie-ups and collaborations in the region that may not have been foreseen otherwise. But in the immediate term, it is likely to do little to reduce tensions in the region.

#SpaceWatchGL Op’ed: My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance - SpaceWatch Global, 30 December 2019

I contributed an OpEd to SpaceWatch Global - My 2019 in a review – Great Power Politics and Global Governance, where I focused on two major developments - the Indian ASAT test and the end of the INF Treaty. SpaceWatch.Global had reached out to its staff and contributors to review 2019 and provide an outlook into 2020.

This has been an exciting year for me in a number of ways but also an increasingly worrying one, especially when we consider the growing threats to peace and the difficulties in getting the world’s nations to deal with them cooperatively.

Developments in the space domain and in the broader strategic realm have kept me engaged through the year. The latter provided the setting, in many ways, for many of the developments in the former, but has also been important by itself.

For the full OpEd, click here.



The developments in the broader strategic setting essentially refers to developments in the Indo-Pacific region, especially politics between the US, China, Japan and India. The region is also home to some of the fastest growing economies, which has translated to acquisition of major hard power capabilities. Competition with China has continued to tick upwards. Sino-Indian competition, in particular, is picking up. Two rounds of informal summits have not been helpful in mitigating the competition and tension in the relationship. China’s growing influence and penetration in southern Asia and Indian Ocean has led to a pushback, including the quadrilateral (Quad) arrangement, which gained further traction in 2019. Bilateral relations — such as the India-Japan, India-Australia, and India-US — and trilaterals including the India-US-Japan have become stronger for the same reason.

But one of my main focus has been on Sino-Indian competition, which is picking up, including in outer space.

The Indian anti-satellite (ASAT) in March 2019 was one consequence, a clear deterrence signal to China, which had already tested its ASAT a decade earlier. The test did raise some concern about debris in outer space. On the flip side, there were fears in India that it would yet again sit on the fence and miss an opportunity to develop a critical defense technology, as it had done in the nuclear arena. The debate on an Indian ASAT had become loud after the first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007. There has been consensus among all the different Indian stakeholders – the civilian, scientific and military bureaucracies – on the need to demonstrate India’s capability.

India’s newly-acquired capability has raised many questions but Prime Minister Modi argued that the test was a “defensive” move to protect India’s own space assets. Like India, most countries use space for a number of civilian applications including in areas like agriculture, disaster management, weather forecasting and communication, and there is a strong global interest to preserve outer space as a public good. Now that India has acquired an ASAT capability, New Delhi must take earnest efforts at preventing trends towards space weaponisation.

Another important issue has been the end of the INF Treaty and what it means for global security. The treaty led Washington and Moscow to destroy a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by 1991. The treaty was seen as particularly important as it is the only nuclear arms control measure that abolished an entire class of weapons. Important questions have been raised as to whether the end of the INF would have strategic implications in the Indo-Pacific. Many in the US Congress as well as arms control advocates have lamented that walking out of a treaty without an alternative one in place as a recipe for an arms race.

Now that the treaty has ended, Russia could possibly build develop a series of INF-category missiles but the real concerns have been about China. Both the Obama and Trump administrations had accused Russia of violating its INF commitments, one of the reasons for the US to end the treaty. In addition to the Russian breaches, the Trump Administration was particularly worried about the Chinese inventory of around 2,000-odd ballistic and cruise missiles, a significant majority of which would be in violation of the INF if China was a party to the treaty. But now that the shackles of the INF are gone, Beijing argues that Washington could deploy conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia that could possibly tilt the military balance in the region. This could of course legitimize all of the missiles that China has already deployed, which are threatening to its neighbours as well as the US. There has been talk about a possible multilateral arrangement as a successor to the INF but China has remained categorically opposed to such ideas.

Unfortunately, global governance mechanisms are not keeping up with the increasing threats that international peace and stability are facing. The failure was most evident at the 2018-2019 United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (GGE)

on PAROS (Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space). The failure in developing consensus among great powers has been an issue for more than two decades now. The state of the play within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) is illustrative of this paralysed nature of inter-state relations, especially among the great powers. I was associated with the UN GGE on PAROS as a Technical Advisor to the Group, which deliberated on PAROS over two two-week long sessions but at the end, the divisions within the Group was so stark that it could not agree upon a commonly-agreed upon text to be released as a consensus report.

As the year ends, therefore, it is clear that there is a lot of work to be done if we have to maintain a stable international order. But there is also growing worry that we are running out of time.

How India is catching up with China with the launch of Chandrayaan-2 - Daily'O, 22 July 2019

On the day of India's Chandrayaan 2 mission, I published a short essay on the mission and what it means for India's own space aspirations as well as the larger strategic dynamics in the region and beyond.

India is launching Chandrayaan-2 on July 22. This represents a major milestone for India’s space programme. India has previously sent orbiters around the moon (Chandrayaan-1) and around mars (Mangalyaan) but this will be the first time that the country will be touching down on any non-terrestrial surface.

Landing on any such surface brings with it difficulties of a magnitude larger than the missions that India has conducted so far. This mission requires India to not only send an orbiter around the moon but also carry a separate vehicle that will touch down on the moon’s surface while the orbiter stays circling above. Adding to further complexities is the fact that India will be landing on an unmapped section of the lunar surface.

Indeed, the exact spot where the probe will land will be decided just before the landing actually takes place, which makes this an extremely difficult mission. It says something about the complexity of the mission that even China, whose space programme is somewhat more advanced than India’s, did it first lunar landing three years back and their first mission was a lot less complicated because it was on the near side of the moon. China, however, did land a second mission on the far side of the moon earlier this year. Other than China, only Soviet Union/Russia and the United States have done it.

For the full essay, click here.



This will be a major achievement for India; this is also a necessary step in the evolution of India’s space programme. After the initial space race between the United States and the Soviet Union, the pursuit of such accomplishments was considered unnecessary because outside of the bragging rights, these kinds of missions were not seen to have much scientific or any other value.

Even the bragging rights lost some of its value once the US landed Neil Armstrong on the moon, the 50th of that happy coincidence is also this weekend. But these pursuits have become important for a few reasons.

One is that the practical value of these missions has grown. There is increasing interest in space mining, with many countries now seeing that as potentially viable, and putting a lot of investments into exploring this possibility.

A tiny city state like Luxembourg has made significant investment into this. Advances in space technology as well as the growing need to explore the space has pushed these new ventures. While space mining has not commenced yet, India cannot afford to be left behind if this turns out to be something actually viable.

The other reason is the renewed space race. Though the US-Soviet space race petered out well before the end of the Cold War, there is a new space race that is accompanying China’s rise. China is keen on matching American and Russian accomplishments in space but some of its activities in space have also caused security concerns.

That is, much like, its behaviour in its neighbourhood. Its behaviour in outer space is also forcing others into greater competition. For example, when China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007, that was the first such test in more than two decades. Thus, other states feel that they need to match or keep pace with China’s space activities.

China’s undeniable accomplishments in space also add to its status. This represents another incentive for the Indian space programme because India as a rising power also needs to keep pace with China. Indeed, the competition between China and others in Asia, particularly India, has been growing for the last decade. China is, of course, well ahead but India has scored some achievements including being the first Asian power to carry out a successful mars mission.

China had earlier partnered with Russia to send a mars-orbiting satellite called Yinghuo-1 but the Russian mission, Fobos-Grunt, in 2011 became a failure. On the other hand, China has a much better, well-rounded space programme. So, India will have to play catch-up for a while. Chandrayaan-2, if it is successfully accomplished, would represent a significant step in this regard. But the race will continue.

Here's some exclusive, behind-the-scenes footage of the mission's various components coming together - https://t.co/baOMowvWHaTell us what you think about it in the comments below. #Chandrayaan2 #GSLVMkIII #ISRO pic.twitter.com/Kguy33p2C1

— ISRO (@isro) July 14, 2019

Neither India nor China are presently thinking of replicating the American achievement in sending humans to the moon but that would appear to be the logical next step and the race will go on.

Significance of the changing space security landscape for India - The Financial Express, June 18, 2019

In yesterday's Financial Express, I have a piece looking at the significance of the changing space security landscape for India.

Asian space landscape is changing. China’s recent launch of a rocket from a ship, India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test and the establishment of a tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA) are quite significant. But even accounting for this, India’s plans appears to be quite dramatic. Last week, India announced that it will be conducting a table-top war game called the “IndSpaceEx” with all the stakeholders including its scientific establishment and the military.



The war game, according to reports, is meant to give a better understanding of the new and emerging space security challenges in outer space which will aid India in developing appropriate capabilities to protect its interests. India has been concerned about the worsening space security scenario for a while now. The first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007, an inherently destabilising act, and with the growing sophistication of the Chinese military space capabilities are serious concerns.

India’s framing of its policy since 2007, whether by the scientific, military and even the political establishment, has been ambiguous. Even as there are concerns around space militarisation and the increasing trends towards weaponisation of space, India has come to appreciate the need for a more nuanced approach to space security in recent years. This recognition pushed India to conduct the ASAT test in March. Subsequently, India has taken the final steps to establish the DSA.

This new approach has not been easy for India. India has always maintained that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes alone. But the changing nature of warfare, with the increasing integration of outer space into conventional military operations, has proved to be a critical impetus for India to change its tack. Traditionally, the use of space assets for passive military applications such as surveillance and intelligence has been considered acceptable but given the networked nature of warfare, there is an increasing reliance on space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Given this growing dependence on space for such functions, there are similarly growing vulnerabilities, with some states developing assets to interfere with, disrupt or damage space assets. In this context, while ASATs are destabilising, the development of counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare means to target space assets are worrisome. Also, terrestrial geopolitics is beginning to have an important bearing on how outer space affairs are conducted. A domain that remained relatively peaceful for decades is seeing greater competition and there are signs of a budding arms race in outer space, which India cannot afford to ignore.

After sitting on the margins for long, India has now begun to respond to these new realities in space security. India’s ASAT test, for instance, was an effort to establish credible space deterrence. But states have still not adopted deterrence within the space domain and there is time to prevent it from happening. The three other states that have demonstrated ASAT capabilities have not operationalised them yet. This offers states an opportunity to change course before it’s too late.

Nevertheless, as Ashley Tellis has argued, it was evident that the Indian ASAT test was aimed at China, which also means that it is likely to accelerate the pace of competition between the two and India needs to prepare for the long haul. India will need to improve its institutional architecture in order to have better coordination among the Department of Space, Ministry of Defence and the military. The first step in this regard was the creation of the Integrated Space Cell within the Integrated Defence Headquarters a decade ago but the establishment of the DSA is more welcome. Additionally, the government will be putting in place a Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), akin to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The DSRO is meant to be doing the research and development in terms of the capability requirement on the space security side, whereas the DSA will be responsible for the policy and strategy affecting the space security dynamics. Another important step for the government to do is to declare a space policy in the open domain. This cannot be a sector-specific, like the SATCOM policy, but it has to be an all-encompassing one, issued possibly by the Prime Minister’s Office.

While these internal steps are much needed, India should play an active role and grab the opportunity to shape the global rules of the road for two reasons. One, this will strengthen India’s global governance credentials in the outer space domain. As a spacefaring state with growing reliance on outer space for a number of different functions, it makes both economic and strategic sense. Two, with India taking the lead, it can ensure that the rules that get formulated are comprehensive and inclusive to include the interests of India and other developing states. India championing the case of other developing states’ interests will also have multitude indirect benefits.

A First: India to Launch First Simulated Space Warfare Exercise - The Diplomat, 12 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian government's plans to conduct the first simulated space warfare exercise called the IndSpaceEx in July. Reports of a tabletop wargame speak to India’s ongoing efforts to develop its space policy.

The Indian government appears to be getting ready to conduct a table-top war game called “IndSpaceEx” involving all stakeholders including the military and the scientific establishment. The reports of such a development, which come against the backdrop of other key developments pertaining to outer space including the demonstration of India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), bear careful watching within the broader perspective of India’s space policy.



For India, space is a domain that has remained relatively peaceful for close to three decades, but is now changing because the nature of politics and competition in outer space is much more contested today. Terrestrial politics is casting a long and heavy shadow on outer space, and India could not have ignored these developments, of which China is just a part.

Along with the growing relevance of space to national security and conventional military operations, counter-space capabilities are also being developed in an effort to deny an adversary advantages by the use of space assets. The growth of counter-space capabilities including kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber means has sparked a fresh competition in outer space.

The increasingly contested nature of space has been an impetus to India’s changing approach to outer space, moving from a purely civilian and peaceful approach to one where certain military characteristics are evident, conditioned by changing security realities. Militaries around the world have been emphasizing network centricity which in turn brings out the salience of space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR), and as they have become more networked, they are also opening themselves up to more and more vulnerabilities, while anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have also added to the prospects for destabilizing scenarios in outer space.

India’s ASAT demonstration earlier this year was important in validating its deterrence capability. Meanwhile, the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), based in Bangalore, is an important institutional initiative that combines two key functions performed by the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre in Bhopal, representing the growing integration of India’s space capabilities.

Reports of the new wargame IndSpaceEx should be read as part of these wider developments. One of the reported goals of the IndSpaceEx, to be held towards the end of July under the Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence, is to gain a better understanding of the current and emerging challenges in the space security domain.

Another reason the wargame is also being undertaken to have a better appreciation of the capabilities that India must develop in order to protect its assets and secure its national interests. India has been growing mindful of the growing number of threats in outer space, both natural and man-made ones. While the global space competition between the key spacefaring powers is a well-known reality, New Delhi has worries about the counter-space capabilities in China’s inventory.

Such wargames are not uncommon. Indeed, think-tanks and governments in all the major spacefaring countries have conducted table-top and simulation exercises to understand space security crisis dynamics, major vulnerabilities and capability gaps during conflict. These could then feed into policy making. For instance, among the think-tank community in the outer space domain, the Secure World Foundation and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (both based in the United States) as well as the Observer Research Foundation have engaged in several such exercises.

These exercises were done to understand crisis dynamics including decision-making processes, the attainment of national objectives, the changing nature of warfare, and the influence and impact of emerging technologies. Even when these exercises were played with a space security focus, the results have been revealing. For instance, the ORF simulation exercise (SIMEX) conducted over three years has seen remarkable conclusions. Still, states have resisted carrying out attacks on outer space assets due to the fear of escalation.

The Indian government’s proposed war gaming exercise appears to have a slightly narrower agenda in terms of understanding the vulnerabilities and the gaps in India’s space security and identifying areas for India to develop and strengthen in terms of technological capabilities in order to establish effective deterrence capabilities. China has been the single most important factor shaping India’s approach to space. The growing sophistication of its military space program, including the recent launch of a rocket from a ship, is significant.

Clearly, efforts like the IndSpaceEx are important to determine the degree of the space security challenges India faces and to develop appropriate measures for effective deterrence. But India must step up its efforts to develop global rules and norms about such challenges and threats. While India must continue working towards all-encompassing legally-binding instruments such as the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the rising specter of threats means that more pragmatic and feasible measures should also be attempted because these could see more broad-based support among states. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India is in an ideal place to demonstrate its global governance credentials.

What Does the Rise of Asia’s Space Forces Mean? - The Diplomat, June 4, 2019

A few days ago, I published a piece in The Diplomat understanding the implications of new space commands being established by key space powers.

While U.S. President Donald Trump’s release of Space Policy Directive-4 in February that enables the establishment of the U.S. Space Force received much focus in the way of headlines, this was hardly the first time that a military has set up a special branch for space operations. Indeed, there is a need to focus much more on what the significance of these moves means for Asian security and the implications of efforts to create space commands and forces.

For the full essay, click here.



First, the place to start is to acknowledge that several countries are establishing such special units. The U.S. space force is only the latest and so others are doing it as well. China established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, integrating the PLA space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, a key institutional innovation. Russia made similar institutional innovations with the Russian Space Forces in 2011 as part of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces meant for military space-related activities. India, similarly, appears also to be on the way to creating such a special space command.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that even though it sounds like a fighting force, the space force is mostly aimed to bring about greater integration of functions and the better coordination among different agencies involved. There is a need to pay greater attention to the details of these bureaucratic changes and innovations.

Third, it is necessary to be clear about what the details are in public policy discourse because alarmism can be negative too. The creation of space forces and commands does not necessarily mean we are on the cusp of states engaging in combat in outer space. We should be realistic about the limited nature of these efforts to date, even though we should not ignore development possibilities that may be more oriented toward actual combat in the future. The point is that we still have time to head off such dangerous developments.

Fourth, it is important to understand the varying rationales behind decisions to create these forces. For instance, the U.S. Space Force can be seen as a result of the increasingly worsening security situation and a consequence of the great power politics. Outer space was largely unaffected by terrestrial geopolitics for the first several decades of the space age, but in the last decade, this has changed. There are greater insecurities today and this has an impact on outer space too. We cannot ignore the political realities that are driving these developments, because they partly influence what we can do about it.

Fifth, we need to be clear about the dangers that stem from these developments. One danger is that more and more countries will follow this path and establish specialized space commands. As space begins to assume a more active role in the security and military operations including conventional ones, countries would seek greater coordination of their efforts and will end up establishing these specialized commands. The need for greater synergy in space activities is understandable, especially as outer space exploitation gets more important to welfare on the ground. But such coordination can also be possibly done by civilian agencies rather than military ones. We need to develop alternate models that do not ignore the need for greater coordination and synergy within governments, but without suggesting it can only be done under military commands.

A real danger is if this were to lead to a security dilemma between countries in outer space that spurs further development of space commands and forces. This is a danger especially because these new efforts are being led by military forces. The demonstration effect of some powers doing it, and the uncertainty of why they are doing it, will force others to imitate them. Even if no side wants it, we could end up having an arms race in outer space because of this. We should examine how this outcome can be prevented.

Sixth, we then need to look at a range of measures that can help us address these dangers. Greater dialogue and transparency can help, especially since these efforts are being driven by the need for greater coordination rather than the need to engage in military combat. Greater transparency and openness are the only possible solutions given the overall international security scenario and the nature of great power politics. Especially given that there might be an actual, understandable reason for setting up specialized coordination agencies, greater transparency might help avoid misunderstanding between the great powers.

Also, early effort is necessary to prevent more states from creating such space forces. It may still be possible to get some basic understanding between powers about what are the do’s and don’ts in creating such forces and commands. For example, to the extent that these are being driven by the need for greater national coordination, states could agree to put these efforts under civilian rather than military agencies. This could ensure that this effort at greater coordination does not get militarized.

All this is not to minimize the challenges posed by the growing security attention to outer space. But it is to suggest that for all the alarmism we have seen, there might still be time to head off a new security problem related to outer space. That requires greater attention to this problem, avoiding alarmism about space forces, and understanding and accepting the need for greater coordination within state agencies while at the same time creating some rules and norms to ensure that these efforts do not become militarized. Such a balanced approach can help us maximize the opportunities and minimize the challenges in this area in the coming years.

Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge - The Diplomat, May 24, 2019

In the last week's column for The Diplomat, "Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge", I examined the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear risks that need to be addressed much more directly.

Conversations around nuclear risks and the need for strategic stability have picked up momentum in the run up to the 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Nuclear risks are changing for the worse because of geopolitical and technological changes, but the latter, in particular, needs to be addressed much more directly.

As far as the geopolitical dynamics are concerned, the shift in the global balance of power equations has meant that rulemaking and enforcement have become the victims of great power politics because both rulemaking and enforcement require some consensus among powers. But a second significant factor should be noted that could also lead to possible breakdown in nuclear deterrence: The impact of new technologies.

Emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons, among others, are posing new questions to the traditional understanding of stability and deterrence. These emerging technologies are unfortunately not being discussed enough within Track 1 NPT platforms as directly as they should be. It can, however, be argued that these new technologies could increase regional and global nuclear insecurities and therefore it is necessary to discuss this more seriously in order to manage the risks associated with nuclear weapons.

For the full article, click here.



The development of hypersonic weapons could potentially have a big impact on nuclear stability. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the possibility of surprise attacks because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. They thus present the possibility of offering a temptation to attack first in the hope of decapitating the enemy leadership or even destroying second-strike nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Even if states do not plan such attacks, the fear that they may do so could drive potential targets to develop riskier nuclear operational plans, such as launch on warning.

Alternatively, it could also spur nations with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as China, to increase the size of their nuclear forces so that at least some survive such a first strike. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers, all of whom are working on developing these weapons.

An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability because of the discrimination problem. It is more stable if early warning systems can clearly distinguish between a nuclear attack and a conventional one. If the same system can undertake both conventional strikes and nuclear attacks, a prudent defense system will have to assume that any attack it detects is a nuclear attack because the risks of assuming the alternative will be too high. Though this is a problem that is not confined to hypersonic weapons, the combination of the risk of a first strike combined with the discrimination problem makes the danger particularly acute.

Another evolving technology is Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which also has similar problems. Nuclear deterrence and stability are based on mutual vulnerability, and BMDs threaten to undo this key source of stability, with unpredictable consequences. This is not a new problem of course: the fear that one side might develop a strategic technological advantage was one reason for the Cold War U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. It might be time to revisit the possibility of developing a wider ABM treaty-like instrument in order to avoid a larger technology arms race as ballistic missile defense technologies slowly improve.

A third area is outer space, which Russia has been raising repeatedly in the NPT platforms. The increasing use of and reliance on space for national security missions has led states to develop counter-space capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy space systems. These include both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

Counter-space capabilities such as anti-satellites (ASAT) add an inherently destabilizing dimension to outer space security. But these are also a problem for nuclear stability because nuclear early warning as well as command and control systems depend on space-based assets far more today than a few decades ago. While these are not new capabilities – the United States and Soviet Union had conducted several ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s – the greater reliance on space assets increases nuclear vulnerabilities.

The NPT faces myriad problems, of course, and many will be discussed in the coming deliberations. But these emerging technologies represent a danger that should not be minimized in the debates about how much has been achieved, whether all sides have lived up to their end of the NPT bargain (especially nuclear weapons states), and how to proceed forward.

Proliferation of Space Technology and Its Impact on Space Security, my presentation at the recent UNIDIR conference held in Kazakhstan

Here's my presentation on space technology proliferation and how it might impact on space security as also what might be done to stem the dangers of such proliferation, at the recent UNIDIR conference held in Kazakhstan on October 4-5, 2013.

For the presentation, click here.




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UNIDIR annual space conference, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability" in Geneva, April 02-03, 2013

Recently, I was at the UNIDIR's annual space security conference titled, "Space Security Conference 2013: Enhancing confidence, securing space stability,"held at UN Headquarters, Geneva, on April 02-03, 2013. The annual space conference of the UNIDIR has become a signature event given the high level participation of all the different stakeholders. I was speaking on space security dialogues and how to ensure widespread representation.

My talk and the PPT are available online now.



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India's Policy Approach to Space Security and Cyber Security, my presentation at the Chatham House conference on cyber and space security....

Last week, Chatham House organised a one-day conference, "Making the Connection: The Future of Cyber and Space," identifying trends and developments in cyber and space technology, weigh the risks posed by
dependence with the broader social benefits, assess implications for national and international security, examine the role of the public and private sector in mitigating threats and building resilience, and finally, discuss national and international policy approaches.

I was also speaking at the workshop addressing India's approach to both outer space and cyber space security. Brief outline of my presentation is given below.

Space and cyber security challenges are generally considered the emerging frontiers in our security discourse although the reality is that they present clear and present danger to India and the rest of the world already. While the challenges are known and acknowledged by states, the difficulty has been the lack of an agreed approach in addressing these challenges. Therefore, unlike in the nuclear arena, space and cyber continue to be driven by certain broad definitional understanding without specific guidelines and norms on permissible activities or capabilities that will ensure the long-term sustainability of outer and cyber space. Therefore, the need to define and communicate clear boundaries at all the different levels while developing certain norms of responsible behavior are essential steps in securing the both the outer space and cyber domain.

On the outer space domain, even as India continues with the official stance of non-weaponisation of outer space, the fact remains that China’s ASAT test has upped the ante and stirred a new debate in the Indian establishment about the need for ASAT capabilities as well as other potential applications in the military domain. However, there is continuity in the official policy of India, which is prevention of weaponisation of outer space while strengthening arms control measures in space.

On cyber security, India’s policy approach is guided by two drivers of national security and social harmony. Although India’s policy approach used to be driven primarily by the former concern, given the large number of hacking and jamming-related incidents in India or Indian missions abroad. Lately, the debate has shifted to one with a greater emphasis on social cohesion, which has resulted in stricter monitoring and surveillance of internet and social media activities.

Meanwhile, India has not yet given serious attention to the issue of cyber-linked attack on outer space. Given that satellite communication networks are connected to the internet, the vulnerabilities of the space sector using cyber means have increased exponentially. Under this scenario, the theatre of conflict, means and impact are going to be felt across the domains. What was once possible by states that had hi-tech capabilities, today this is in the realm of possibilities to any cyber-savvy hacker. The threat is not simply destruction or damage of satellites but much beyond including deny or counterfeit satellite transmissions, access and leak data collected by sensors, send in wrong data among other things.

The convergence of space and cyber domains present a complex challenge. Given this cross-domain nature of challenges in the space and cyber domains, states have to invest in regional and global efforts to understand these environments on a real time basis.



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UNIDIR Conference on Space Security, March 29-30, 2012 ... my presentation on space security and the need for a code of conduct

I was recently invited for the UNIDIR conference on space security held in Geneva on March 29-30, 2012. I was on a panel on international perspectives; Peter Marquez, Former Director of Space Policy, National Security Council, The
White House, USA and Vladimir Yermakov, Deputy-Director, Arms Control Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation, were my co-panelists. My presentation was on space security and giving an Indian perspective. I touched upon the orientation of India's space programme, which is peaceful and civilian, second i looked at the challenges and concerns to India; and lastly the way forward, looking the need to institute a code of conduct in particular. I also spent couple of slides on the current debates on the EU Code and how we could take that forward.

Rest of the discussions (in my panel) focused a lot on placement of weapons in the outer space, the need to institute a code of conduct for space activities, among other issues. The audio presentations and the powerpoint slides have been uploaded onto the UNIDIR site.

For the presentations, click here.


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India, CD and Space Security

Here's the summary of my recent paper presentation on "India, Conference on Disarmament and Space Security" at the IDSA-MEA Conference on Space and International Security (March 30-31, 2011).

India has been active at the multilateral fora on disarmament as well as on narrower issues such as the prevention of weaponisation of outer space. Its active involvement in negotiations of treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is testimony of its commitment to limiting the use of space for peaceful purposes. India, however, has been less than satisfied with the role of major powers in reaching a consensus on these critical issues and there is now a momentum toward weaponisation of outer space, which have serious implications for India’s security.

My paper looked at India’s experience at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in general and its views on PAROS (Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space) in particular. Divided into three sections – the first section of the paper looked at India’s general experience within the CD on a number of treaties; the second section looked at India’s growing challenges in the arena of space and the final section looks at developments relating to OST and PAROS and how these can tackle the challenges in space. In conclusion, the paper analyses the status and ability of arms control regimes to tackle the current challenges. Because this is a major crisis facing the multilateral regime, be it about the fissile materials or outer space weaponization. The paper finally made a few recommendations to improve the functioning of the CD as well as on the need for India to become proactive in shaping the regime that it may have to be part of.

If anyone is interested, I can send the full paper.