Mangalyaan Mission Plays Vital Role in New Delhi’s Development Plans, my OpEd on India's Mars mission published in yesterday's Global Times

Here's my OpEd on India's Mars mission published by Global Times (China) yesterday.

My core argument is that India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

No, China Is Not About to Overtake the US in Space

Here's an essay written by my colleague Arvind and I on China's growth particularly in the space domain, published by the Diplomat on October 02, 2013.

China’s growth trajectory overall and more particularly in the space domain has been impressive. However, John Hickman’s categorical assertions in a recent Foreign Policy article that China is catching up and “may surpass the United States… to become the world’s preeminent spacefaring power” seems to us a touch far-fetched.

For the full essay, click here.

Certainly Hickman is right about Chinese determination and the “unquantifiable” factor of “an extraordinary sense of historical grievance” being a major driver of Chinese space dreams. China attributes its “military technological backwardness” to its past national humiliation at the hands of other major powers. Indeed, this is an important part of the national psyche and helps drives the Chinese space programs.

The problem lies in the tools needed to turn determination into material outcomes. The most important: China has nothing near the commercial space sector that the U.S. boasts. Sure, NASA now gets less than 1 percent of the U.S. federal budget, but much of America’s true capabilities are embedded in its private sector, which plays a much larger role than its equivalent does in China’s space sector and gives the U.S. a major advantage in space technology innovation. Not to mention the fact that the high-tech and defense sectors also contribute and the U.S. lead there is not going to disappear anytime in the next several decades.

China is taking steps to beef up its own commercial space sector (read: state-owned enterprises) but it still lacks the massive private-sector investment in R&D that will be vital to sustaining the success of any space program. For now, China must rely on public investment to advance its space program.

A Need for Innovation

More importantly, China does not innovate, it copies. That helps it catch up, but without innovation China will have difficulty taking over the top spot. Its growth looks like a parabola, approaching the number one spot before falling away.

Although China’s space program has come a long way since its launch failures in 1995 and 1996, that dramatic rise has been aided by the reverse engineering of Russian technology. For instance, many observers believe that the Shenzhou space capsule that heralded China’s manned space flight was based largely on the Russian Soyuz capsule. However, China’s ability to catch up with the other space superpowers by copying alone is fast approaching its limits. This is not helped by U.S. moves to isolate China with regard to international cooperation in space. The latter’s access to the latest technologies has consequently been restricted, a fact that even the Chinese are realizing, reflected in their recent drive to focus more on innovation.

Moreover, China lags significantly behind the U.S. generally in scientific innovation. Consider, as an example, that the U.S. is at the vanguard of revolutionizing manufacturing techniques with the use of 3D printing, which it intends to utilize in the International Space Station, or the involvement of NASA scientists in experiments that could bring them closer to the development of a warp-speed engine.

If ambition is cited as a factor for the possibility of Chinese dominance in space, then surely one must consider the U.S. aspiration to explore the far reaches of space. Even if China is quickly catching up with U.S. dominance in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), its program is largely restricted to that realm. The U.S. meanwhile has set its sights beyond our planet’s periphery.

While American satellites are exploring the far reaches of our solar system, with the Voyager 1 having reached interstellar space, closer to Earth satellites belonging to the U.S. and its partners outmatch Chinese satellites in number and scope. The former owns more than half of all satellites currently orbiting our planet. In terms of their capabilities, American satellites are still far superior to their Chinese counterparts.

Concerns regarding the decommissioning of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program may also be unfounded. NASA has already tapped the commercial sector to fill the gap in its human spaceflight capability. In the final phase of the Commercial Crew integrated Capability program (CCiCap), NASA signed an agreement with the Sierra Nevada Corporation, Space Exploration Technologies and the Boeing Company to develop commercial spaceships to launch American astronauts into orbit by 2015. This is not a sign of weakness; it is an indicator that U.S. national interests are closely aligned with the interests of the country’s commercial space sector.

In contrast, China’s commercial space sector is still very much nascent. In fact, China’s space sector is comparable to the Russian model: state sponsorship and commensurate state interference. Even though Russia continues to be one of the foremost space powers, it has experienced a sustained decline owing to financial constraints and manpower concerns. For China, the PLA’s stakes in aerospace companies are likely to encourage protectionist tendencies, which in turn block the emergence of other innovative thinkers. An underdeveloped private industry will limit the potential for innovation.

China’s impressive ascent in space capability has been driven by massive state financing. While this has undeniably worked well to date, the sustainability of this model as the Chinese economy rebalances is questionable. If state support is capped, or tapers, then with only a modest private sector to fill the gap it is difficult to see how China will sustain the extraordinary progress it has made over the past 15 years.

And finally another factor that must not be discounted is experience. American astronauts have logged thousands of hours of space flight. That gives them long experience dealing with issues China is just beginning to encounter.

Future Potential – With Reforms

Yet despite these limitations, China’s space program could continue to impress given sufficient time and patience. Maintaining the growth trajectory will, however, require reform. More opportunities and incentives for private-sector participation will encourage innovation, while reducing the burden on the public purse. While a political mandate has been issued for innovative thinking, Beijing needs to make the requisite institutional and structural changes that will allow that to happen. Those changes may also help protect the Chinese space program from economic vicissitudes.

In fact, China has shown it understands the importance of commercializing its space efforts. Fortunately, it does enjoy some tremendous commercial opportunities. In Latin America, countries like Venezuela are looking to the Chinese to supply space technology and launch services. There is also demand in Africa, which has already developed strong economic ties with the Chinese. Given that China also has the fastest-growing market for commercial space services on its doorstep, namely in Southeast Asia, there is ample potential to generate revenue to fund R&D. China should aggressively seek potential clients around the world and invest heavily in education.

Meanwhile, China could try to attract technical talent from abroad. This will, however, require more than generous remuneration, since it will be tough to match the American private sector in that regard. For China, this should be a long-term plan for educating the next generation of engineers. If the Chinese are willing to invest time and resources, a new generation could innovate and develop new technology, instead of reverse engineering, creating a slow but more certain path to preeminence.

Finally, dominance in space requires more than just technology. China will need to become a persuasive force in the making of space policy, and this in turn will require that it demonstrate an ability to act responsibly. Beijing’s 2007 anti-satellite test and the resulting space debris was an example of what not to do, especially as the U.S. managed to shoot down a satellite with minimal residual space debris.

So, yes, China has clearly made very significant strides in its space capability. However, it is still a long way short of matching U.S. capabilities and alarm bells need not ring just yet. China’s rise is a function of heavy state investment based on a model that is unlikely to be sustainable. The American model of public-private partnership is more innovative and less of a taxpayer burden. China will need to undertake significant reforms before it supplants the U.S. as the world’s leading space power.

WPS on the US-India Strategic Dialogue, citing me ....

Here's the OpEd written by Dr. WP Sidhu on the recently concluded second US-India Strategic Dialogue, citing me. Space is a relatively non-controversial area for the two countries to step up their cooperation .... However, despite the intent on both sides, space remains an area of promises and no hard decisions.



The recently concluded Indo-US dialogue—only the second—reflects both a deepening and widening of the bilateral engagement. What used to be rare high level visits have now become routine and, to a degree, predictable. At the same time the range of issues being discussed have enlarged to include cooperation on counterterrorism, cyber security, open government, space, peacekeeping, food security in Africa and even women’s empowerment.

Predictably, there has been a focus on the most contentious issues, notably over the differences related to the Indo-US nuclear cooperation and the troublesome state of Pakistan. However, it is important to note that in the absence of such a dialogue these difficult issues would have continued to fester; the regular meetings provides a forum to at least talk through these. Indeed, it is inevitable that even a strategic dialogue is likely to focus on immediate issues of concern partly because they are unavoidable and partly because they have strategic implications. To that extent, because the dialogue focused on the most immediate concerns it was to a degree successful at least at the tactical level.

At the strategic level, however, neither New Delhi nor Washington appears to be any closer to answering the critical question: where would they like to see this strategic partnership 50 years from now? Once the two sides have reached a common understanding a related question would be: how to get there? Given the ongoing internal, regional and international transformation these are difficult questions for either India or the US to answer, although Washington might have a better sense of its objective.

Clearly, to be truly effective a strategic dialogue must focus on at least one or two grand long-term ideas which are mutually beneficial, along with the other issues that now make up the agenda. The nuclear deal was the big idea of the previous decade. However, the growing obsession by both sides over the divergences on this issue has the potential to weaken if not derail the strategic dialogue.

Today, with the last flight of the US space shuttle, which coincided with the strategic dialogue, there is a real opportunity to develop an ambitious Indo-US civil space cooperation programme; an idea first floated by Indian and American scholars a few years ago and further developed by Indian expert Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan recently. Although the space shuttle was a technical marvel —losing only two ships in its 30-year and 135-flight history—it was also incredibly expensive. According to one estimate, while each flight was advertised to cost around $10 million, in reality it worked out to about $1.2 billion per flight. In contrast, the Indian space programme despite being far more frugal has also notched up some incredible achievements. The discovery of water on the moon by the Indian spacecraft Chandrayaan-1 is one such accomplishment. It also underlines that unmanned missions are probably a more efficient (if less glamorous) way to explore and develop space. Interestingly, Hillary Clinton’s last stop in Chennai, where she exhorted India to be more ambitious and assertive, is also the source of some of Nasa’s best scientists and technicians. It would have provided the ideal setting to announce a commercial space initiative, similar to the agricultural knowledge initiative.

Indeed, of the various joint working groups that make up the Indo-US strategic dialogue, the joint space working group has probably been the least ambitious. Instead of a bold cooperative initiative it merely agreed to sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns; explore the possibilities of joint experiments on the International Space Station; and discuss potential cooperation between Nasa and Isro on human spaceflight activities.

It is imperative for both sides to seize the opportunity to make the dialogue truly strategic and space may prove to be the final frontier.

W. Pal Sidhu is senior fellow, Centre on International Cooperation at New York University. He writes on strategic affairs every fortnight.

India-US display space blindness

Here's the link to an article of mine on the US-India Strategic Dialogue, looking at a space angle, published in today's Pioneer.

Substantive issues were evidently avoided at the Clinton-Krishna talks, otherwise what could explain the lack of interest on both sides to take forward the old idea of cooperation in space? Wasn't it less controversial than the nuclear deal?



The US-India Joint Space Working Group (JWG) on civil space cooperation concluded their talks in Bangalore last week. In terms of concrete steps, the two sides have agreed to work together for sharing information on monsoon forecasting by exchanging and using satellite-based scientific data. This, along with other areas highlighted during the JWG meeting, has been included in the Joint Statement at the end of the second US-India Strategic Dialogue.

But, in most other respects, the US-India Strategic Dialogue, appears to have produced no big ideas for carrying forward the relationship. The joint statement issued at the end of the dialogue focuses on, among other things, the new US-India Dialogue on Central Asia, acknowledging particularly the importance of it in the context of better trade and transit linkages that might contribute to the long-term well-being of Afghanistan; strengthening of defence ties through transfer of technology, joint research, development and production of defence items; US' support for India's membership into the four technology export control regimes - Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement; and the bilateral initiatives on clean energy options including solar energy, energy-efficient buildings and advanced bio-fuels.

The Joint Statement also included a paragraph on space, with the two sides agreeing to cooperate on a number of areas such as sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns, joint experiments, earth observation, space exploration and so on.

The statement has been along expected lines. Despite its huge potential and almost no controversy, Indo-US space cooperation has not moved to concrete actionable agenda yet. The need of the hour was to introduce a bilateral 21st century commercial space initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, thereby making space an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs. Such an initiative would have made space a commercially and strategically sustainable area in India-US relations. The two sides should have had a clear goal along with bilateral funding. Subsequently, it could have been made into a good case for public-private partnership. The Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is often cited as a good example of public-private partnership.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, etc. This would have several spin-off effects in terms of creating a human resource pool well-versed in dealing with future challenges. The spin-off benefits in terms of job creation would have become an attractive proposition for the two countries given the domestic pressure.

India and the US should have ideally produced a joint statement that would have laid out a long-term plan with near and mid-term milestones -- such as monitoring non-traditional security threats including human security issues by studying the environment and oceans, with a roadmap for constructing a space-based sensors constellation. They could have considered a technology demonstration programme for making space-based solar power a technologically viable option or endorsed the goals of the Kalam-NSS initiative and IAA study, calling for the establishment of a working group toward an on-orbit demo of an international space-solar power demonstrator satellite within 10 years, with both Delhi and Washington pledging $1bn over the next 10 years towards. Lastly, the two sides could have established a US-India Space Knowledge / Commercial Initiative. This would have required the two governments making an investment of about $40-50mn over a five-year period while identifying specific projects for this time span.

Lastly, Indo-US relations have been drifting along for sometime now and it is time that the two sides identified another big idea to steer the relationship and take it to the next level. Space cooperation clearly has the potential to play this role. But clearly, its potential has yet to be recognized on either side.

US-India Strategic Dialogue: Lack of Vision in Space

Here's an analysis of mine, published by ORF, on the recent US-India Strategic Dialogue, more from a space point of view.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary, and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, in addition to developing new markets such as space tourism, on-orbit construction and manufacture, terrestrial resource mapping, space resource and energy utilization, space traffic management and active debris mitigation, to name a few.



The US-India Joint Space Working Group (JWG) on civil space cooperation concluded their talks in Bangalore last week. In terms of concrete steps, the two sides have agreed to work together for sharing information on tropical weather, monsoon forecasting by exchanging and using satellite-based scientific data about the Earth, weather, geophysical features. These are by no means the most exciting areas of cooperation on space. This as well as other areas highlighted during the JWG meeting have been included in the Joint Statement at the end of the second US-India Strategic Dialogue which ended on Tuesday evening.

The Strategic Dialogue appears to have produced no big ideas for carrying forward the relationship. The Joint Statement focuses on, among other things, the new US-India Dialogue on Central Asia, acknowledging particularly the importance of it in the context of better trade and transit linkages that might contribute to the long-term well-being of Afghanistan; strengthening of defence ties through transfer of technology, joint research, development and production of defence items; US' support for India's membership into the four technology export control regimes - Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group and the Wassennaar Arrangement; and the bilateral initiatives on clean energy options including solar energy, energy-efficient buildings and advanced bio-fuels.

The statement has been along expected lines. Despite huge potentiality and almost no controversy -- unlike in the nuclear area -- Indo-US space cooperation has not moved to concrete actionable agenda yet. The statement clearly lacks much vision. It included a paragraph on space, with the two sides agreeing to cooperate on a number of areas such as sharing satellite data on oceans and global weather patterns, joint experiments, earth observation, space exploration and so on.

The need of the hour was to introduce a US-India 21st Century Commercial Space Initiative or a Space Knowledge Initiative, along the lines of the US-India Agricultural Knowledge Initiative and the US-India Clean Energy Initiative, making space an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs besides the strategic entities on either sides. Such an initiative would have made space a commercially and strategically sustainable area in India-US relations. The two sides should have had a clear goal along with bilateral funding. Subsequently, it could have been made into a good case for public-private partnership. The Agricultural Knowledge Initiative is often cited as a good example of public-private partnership.

India and the US need to be more innovative and visionary, and identify cutting edge areas to cooperate. There are plenty of candidates: areas like space access, in-space maneuver, space logistics, space infrastructure, in addition to developing new markets such as space tourism, on-orbit construction and manufacture, terrestrial resource mapping, space resource and energy utilization, space traffic management and active debris mitigation, to name a few. The two sides ought to make this into an economically sustainable option, and create a strategic industry around space to make it sustainable in the long-term. This would have several spin-off effects in terms of creating a pool of human and scientific resources, well-versed in dealing with future challenges. The spin-off benefits in terms of job creation would have become an attractive proposition for the two countries, given the domestic pressure.

India and the US should have ideally produced a joint statement that would have laid out a long-term plan with near and mid-term milestones -- such as monitoring non-traditional security threats, including human security issues by studying the environment and oceans, with a roadmap for constructing a space-based sensors constellation. They could have considered a technology demonstration programme for making space-based solar power a technologically viable option or endorsed the goals of the Kalam-NSS initiative and IAA study, calling for the establishment of a working group toward an on-orbit demo of an international space-solar power demonstrator satellite within 10 years, with both Delhi and Washington pledging $1bn over the next 10 years towards such a programme. Lastly, the two sides could have established a US-India Space Knowledge/Commercial Initiative. This would have required the two governments making an investment of about $40-50mn for a five-year period, while identifying specific projects for this time span.

Lastly, Indo-US relations have been drifting along for sometime now and it is time that the two sides identified another big idea to steer the relationship and take it to the next level. Space cooperation clearly has the potential to play this role. But clearly, its potential is yet to be recognized by either side.

Establishing the Rules of the Road in Space: Issues & Challenges

Here's the link to an article of mine on the Code of Conduct on Space published by ORF.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.



Establishing the rules of the road on space seems to be gaining a "top-down" push and momentum as though acceptance of these rules will amount to solving all the concerns about outer space activities. Currently, there are two Code of Conduct (CoC) that are doing the rounds for universalisation of certain norms that might strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of the Code. The two codes are the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (hereafter EU Code) and the Model Code of Conduct, prepared by the Stimson Center. Here, I look only at the EU Code: can it become a universal space code of conduct?

Some of the salient provisions of the EU Code are:

• The Code will codify new best practices while contributing to transparency and confidence-building measures and will be complimentary to the existing arrangements on outer space activities.

• The Code is a voluntary measure open to all States.

• The "inherent right or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter" will be observed.

• States becoming parties to the Code will also be guided by the existing legal framework while "making programme towards adherence to, and implementation of:" among other treaties, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union and its Radio Regulations (2002).

• States that become party to the Code "will establish and implement national policies and procedures to minimise the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."

• States that become parties are also obliged to provide "information on national space policies and strategies, including basic objectives for security and defence related activities."

• State parties engaged "in the consultations shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests."

Safety and security of space assets have so far been ensured through bilateral and regional agreements. But three incidents in the recent past ? the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, the US shooting down of a satellite in February 2008 and the collision of a US Iridium satellite with a defunct Russian satellite in 2009 ? have triggered concerns of new dangers in space that is becoming crowded, raising the potentials for accidents. These concerns have fuelled the developments of these CoC.

On the surface of it, the EU Code appears to be an innocuous document. But not many non-EU States have accepted the EU code. Why?

For States to be party to global mechanisms, few questions need to be answered. What does the Code seek to do that is not achievable through other bilateral or regional means? Does the Code enhance a state’s security significantly or will it be an obstacle to carrying out some of its legitimate activities in space? Lastly, is the Code an inclusive framework?

The EU Code has already generated official reservations around the world, particularly in Asia. Europe has to make genuine efforts to reach across to Asia and facilitate a consensus with Asian powers if the Code has to be endorsed and universalised.

To start with, some of the simpler objections: the fact that the European governments have formulated the Code without consulting any of the Asian space powers is an issue. It is in Asia that one is going to witness heightened space activities and potentially the challenges are also going to come from Asia. Therefore this was not a smart move on the part of the EU.

However, fresh efforts can be made to limit the damage if the EU is open to understanding what the Indian and broader Asian concerns are, how they can be accommodated. Alternatively, more problematically, the Asian countries might insist on developing a space CoC on their own. Europe has to consider the impact of changing geopolitics and the increasing importance of Asia, particularly in the space domain.

Clearly, space is once again becoming the sphere of rivalry and potential conflicts and the EU has admirably taken the lead in establishing the rules of the road to avoid intended or unintended consequences of any action in space. However, the CoC does not move towards a legally binding mechanism that has been the demand from the Asian countries at various multilateral forums. In the absence of the fact that it does not meet this basic demand, it is unclear if Asian powers will become party to it. India has consistently pointed out the need for a legally binding mechanism to be put in place to prevent weaponization of outer space. India as part of the Group of 21 (Non-Aligned Nations in the Conference on Disarmament)has argued that global and inclusive transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), which are supported by the West, could be important complementary measures but there is need for legally binding measures.

Though the EU CoC is voluntary, it expects States to "establish and implement national policies and procedures" to tackle issues such as the increasing traffic in space and thereafter the potential for accidents up in the orbit. This may be seen as binding the States and "intrusive" although in an indirect manner. On the other hand, the CoC being voluntary means it defeats its purpose as it would imply that there is no penalty on States / entities violating certain norms that might get institutionalised with the adoption of the CoC.

Therefore, why should States adopt, institutionalise and internationalise a CoC? The general set of principles enumerated in the EU CoC already exist in different forms in various countries ? in the national space policies of countries like the US or policy statements by various leaders in the Parliament and at multilateral fora the case of countries like India which does not articulate policies in one single policy document.

Similarly, the loose and vague manner in which the CoC is worded could lead to misinterpretations. Operationalising the CoC will become that much more difficult. Phrases like "to promoting the common and precise understandings" and "shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests" are cases in point. These objectives are idealistic but vague and can be quite subjective. And then there’s ’equitable balance of interests’ ? whose interests are we talking about? Therefore the more difficult issue will be that different countries will interpret this differently, affecting the Asian interests adversely. This has fuelled more suspicion than confidence.

Next, who will enforce the CoC? The CoC is enforceable when the enforcing power has significant amount of hard power and clout. The credibility of the EU in this regard is questionable. Take for instance the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (H-COC). While 128 countries have accepted H-COC, the Code is yet to have many of the Asian countries ? China, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea ? as endorsed parties, which makes it an unsuccessful attempt at tackling missile proliferation.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.

Lastly, codes cannot establish responsible conduct. In fact, geopolitics will facilitate or block the implementation of the CoC. The more powerful will dictate the terms. Even if the US as the most powerful country on earth decides to become a party to the CoC, the numerical superiority of Asian countries could push the wind in the other direction. The fact that the code does not provide an inclusive framework makes it even harder to implement. European States have established a set of ideals without consultation of Asian countries, without the understanding the Asian ground realities and such a mechanism is not going to be accepted that easily in Asia. For Europe to unilaterally decide what is good for the world does not augur well. It appears like they are making yet another mistake like the H-COC.

India and US build stronger ties in space

Here's a story on Indo-US space cooperation by Peter Brown that has qouted me extensively. The story appeared in (August 06, '09) the Asia Times Online.



Peter J Brown

New rules for India's space program are now in effect with respect to India's access to United States space technology and components - thanks to a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) signed on July 20 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna.

However, many are misreading the full scope and impact of this TSA. Yes, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is now considerably closer to launching US commercial satellites - as well as European commercial satellites with US components - but ISRO still has a long way to go.

According to a US State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) notice last month entitled, "Licensing

Satellite Components for Launch from India," this new TSA, "effectively changes US Government policy to permit the launch of civil or non-commercial satellites containing US ITAR [International Traffic In Arms]-controlled components on Indian space launch vehicles.

"For the purposes of this policy, 'civil or non-commercial satellites' does not include commercial satellites [communications or otherwise]. Commercial satellites will continue to be subject to a presumption of denial," the DDTC notice stated.

"Presumption of denial" simply means go ahead and submit a license application for export of a commercial satellite with ITAR content, but do not hold your breath because without a high priority US foreign policy interest - ie, extraordinary circumstances - this application is dead on arrival.

"The export from the US of ITAR parts and components to India for incorporation by India into an Indian space vehicle was permitted prior to execution of the TSA," said John Ordway, a partner at Berliner, Corcoran and Rowe, LLP in Washington, DC.

"If misunderstandings were to arise in the DDTC licensing process following execution of the TSA, they would probably arise over what is civil or non-commercial use of a satellite."

An attempt to clarify matters with Anthony Dearth, the DDTC's chief of the Space and Missile Technology Division, was unsuccessful.

"The TSA will ensure monitoring by the US side against any diversion or misuse of equipment or technology," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.

"Negotiations on a possible Indo-US TSA have been underway for the last few years. The US has been insisting on restrictive movement of the payload, constant overseeing and monitoring by the US, and solid firewalls separating civil and military payloads. However, the current agreement is [identical] with what the US has with other countries, [and] is essentially driven by US laws. India did not have much maneuverability in negotiating the details."

According to Rajagopalan, even with this TSA, the profitable market for the launch of US commercial satellites or even third-country commercial satellites with US components remains off limits to India until a separate Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) is signed. Negotiations continue, but serious differences are not being successfully resolved.

"US communications satellites are part of the US Munitions List [USML], and a separate certification from the US State Department will be required to enable ISRO to launch [them]. The CSLA is still insufficient for some purposes because there is another layer of clearance and certification required," said Rajagopalan.

As David Karl observed in his recent Asia Times Online commentary, "The Clinton trip underscored how the secretary has taken ownership of the India portfolio in the Barack Obama administration, filling an important void at the top levels of the US government that has existed for several years." (See Clinton's India visit a low-key success Asia Times Online, August 5, 2009.)
However, regardless of who owns the India portfolio, many US space companies want the US State Department to be replaced by the US Commerce Department, as they view the latter as more supportive when it comes to commercial satellite exports. These companies also want many existing rules revised if not eliminated entirely, including the removal of commercial satellites from the USML, a measure which is now under consideration by the US Senate after being recently approved by the US House of Representatives.

The new TSA, "represents positive progress in reversing the US's obsolete, arrogant, and counterproductive export control regime. However, much remains to be done, particularly in regard to re-evaluating the classification of space hardware in the context of an overall review of the USML," said Mike Gold, the director of Nevada-based Bigelow Aerospace's Washington DC office and chair of the US Federal Aviation Administration's Export Controls Working Group under the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. [1]

However, while India would benefit immensely from this regulatory change, the current legislation on Capitol Hill would still prevent any changes to the USML affecting China.

"Although I understand the politics of the situation, I question the policy of isolation that we are practicing vis-a-vis China, and believe, if nothing else, we need to have a robust discussion as to if this policy is really helping us to achieve our legitimate foreign policy goals," said Gold.

"The legislation does not provide for an ongoing review of the USML or establishing a standing entity to conduct such work. Technology is not static, and, after five years, we will find ourselves with the same problems in terms of the obsolescence of the USML that we are facing today. We must provide for an ongoing review process. Technology will not stop changing, and therefore any finite attempt to review and revise a list like the USML is destined to fail."

Regardless of what happens to the USML, the US government is being constantly pushed and pulled in various directions by different departments which tend to disagree more often than agree on which is the best approach to take in South Asia.

"There has always been internal bickering between various governmental departments - the departments of Defense, Commerce, State, Energy and the National Security Agency - along with big defense [contractors]," said Rajagopalan. "In fact, the Pentagon maintained that the State Department still had a Cold War approach as it relates to its policies to South Asia. On the other hand, the State Department often argued that any arms transfers to India would adversely impact the military balance of the region. Cooperation on space technology could potentially create similar concerns."

According to Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Washington, DC-based Samuels International Associates Inc, readers should not underestimate the significance of what took place on July 20.

"Clearly the exchanges between the two countries, rather than the TSA itself, is the more significant factor. The TSA is just an umbrella arrangement that simply opens the door to a host of more specific, contentious but rewarding arrangements," said Gupta. "The exchanges [in the] meantime help build a culture of trust that's value exceeds any one agreement - and can in fact be leveraged across the spectrum of bilateral relations."

"Getting beyond the technology denial regime, imposed by the West ever since [India's] nuclear test in 1974, has been a touchstone of Indian governments ever since - and not merely for enhancing technological competencies," added Gupta.

For one of Ordway's clients based in the United Kingdom, the TSA opens the door to an enticing possibility.

"It means that my UK client that builds remote-sensing satellites that contain ITAR content now can apply for a license from the US State Department to 're-export' such satellites to India for launch on ISRO launch vehicles - again, if the remote-sensing satellites are for civil or non-commercial uses," said Ordway.

"On the other hand, the TSA and DDTC's implementation of the TSA would not permit the launch on an ISRO launch vehicle of a commercial non-US remote-imaging satellite that contains ITAR content."

Besides ISRO, beneficiaries of the TSA might also include any foreign universities that build very small, so-called "pico" satellites with ITAR content, although this is a rare event indeed it would provide an alternative to Russian launch vehicles. It is possible, for example, that the TSA could speed India's deployment of a constellation of small, formation-flying earth observation satellites which would mirror what a few other countries have already placed in orbit.
Still, it is unlikely that US and European commercial satellites will be launched atop ISRO rockets until well into the next decade. Among other things, another potentially enormous political obstacle exists in the form of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).

Despite the fact that none of the 17 large commercial communications satellites which were launched in 2008 flew aboard a US-built rocket - France-based Arianespace accounted for almost half the payloads placed successfully in orbit last year - one cannot rule out the possibility that USTR may intercede on behalf of some US-based launch service providers. So, in addition to the tension between the State and Commerce departments over who might become the primary overseer of US satellite exports, one must also be aware that USTR could erect an unwelcome roadblock in the future, too.

Gupta wants to see more details related to liability, insurance, pricing and intrusive monitoring requirements for space launches.

"[When these details] become more widely known, and very difficult political decisions have to be taken in this regard, a more sobering understanding of what high-technology cooperation entails will likely take hold," said Gupta. "We are already seeing some of these issues rearing themselves in New Delhi by way of the recently signed End-User Monitoring Agreement [EUMA] which is small beer compared to the intrusiveness of a CSLA."

Fireworks apparently erupted in the Indian parliament after the EUMA was signed by India and the US at the same time as the TSA. The opposition walked out after asserting that the EUMA which attempts to address sensitive and potentially defense-related high technology transfers in particular was placing Indian sovereignty in jeopardy. (See, For New Delhi, a week that wasn't, Asia Times Online, July 23)

The opposition argued, among other things, that by granting US inspectors unprecedented authority via the EUMA verification process, that a door was perhaps opening for other governments to possibly pursue the same intrusive approach. Foreign Minister Krishna attempted to assure the opposition that their concerns were off target and not supported by the facts.

Ordway views the process underway as eventually placing India in the same boat as Russia and France (Arianespace), assuming that approval of the CSLA takes place.

"But that will just mean that satellites exported to India will be 'normal' and will have the same rules as satellites exported to Russia and France," said Ordway.

Rajagopalan points out that although ISRO represents the civilian side of Indian space research, the level of advancement has created a certain amount of wariness, and raised potential fears of a possible shift underway at ISRO involving its role in direct support of military space programs. And while China has not responded to the signing of the TSA - or the EUMA - per se, any strengthening or streamlining of relations between India and the US will not be taken lightly.

"Beijing will maintain a strict watch on India's advancing defense/space technological ties with the US, Israel or the European countries. As one of the Chinese internal studies brought out, China will continue to undertake various measures to maintain its current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership [the United Nations Security Council], and [participation in] the nuclear club, [while retaining] its important diplomatic advantages through its special relationships with India's neighboring countries," said Rajagopalan.

Greater India-US cooperation in space will likely intensify the competition between India and China over the coming years. If India's space sector suddenly surges ahead as a result, this will do more than lightly annoy Beijing.

"[While] high-technology trade and interaction with the US has an inherent sensitivity and strategic component built into it, it [also] signals that Washington is keen to expand and deepen its strategic ties with India," said Gupta. "And further, to the extent that Beijing remains under de facto high-technology embargoes initiated by the West, [US space cooperation with India] signals that strategic cooperation in highly sensitive sectors continues, at minimum, to remain weighted against Chinese interests."

After all, the TSA has emerged at a time when Japan may soon be making significant adjustments to its military space policies, such as becoming more firmly attached to the East Asian US anti-missile network. The fact that a US company is picking up the pace of its launch activities using a remote launch site on an atoll in the western Pacific cannot go unnoticed either. All of this recent activity must have been assessed carefully by Beijing. Finally, the TSA and the atmosphere surrounding it may also bear directly upon the direction and scope of India-Israel joint operations in space.

"[Although] it might be a bit premature to speak definitively about it, much of recent cooperation has been in the defense and military technologies area - both in platforms and sub-systems. And much of it has been a one-way flow, ie from Jerusalem to New Delhi," said Gupta. "The TSA potentially opens the door to endowing greater depth to India's high-technology sector which, in time, could entail spillover effects in the area of cooperative Israel-India ventures in space. To the extent that TSA also binds the US-India relationship in a greater bond of trust, Washington might also take a more forthcoming view to Indo-Israeli technology-sharing in more sensitive sub-system areas. This will have beneficial implications both on the commercial and military side for India."

Rajagopalan agrees that the TSA will further strengthen and seed India-Israel initiatives, too.

"The two countries have been cooperating in the space sector and in 2008, ISRO launched an Israeli spy satellite. The TSA can establish trilateral cooperation in this arena," said Rajagopalan.

Still, Gupta points to an important domestic dimension to all of this space-related activity in India. One possible snag lurks beneath the surface.

"[The vague sense/hope in India is that] high-technology cooperation will inevitably and tacitly translate on the military side too, particularly on the missile development and space side," said Gupta, who went on to emphasize a possible misunderstanding that looms large here in terms of any ongoing cooperation.

"Washington and the Democratic [Obama] administration are likely to be ultra-careful this time after the experience of the late-1990s vis-a-vis China. There is always the danger that demands for intrusiveness [stemming from] such cooperation with India will be hard to stomach domestically in the rabble that is New Delhi politics."

Note
1. Mike Gold's comments are his own and do not reflect that of the working group.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the state of Maine, USA, who specializes in the global satellite arena.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online)