Prince Salman Tour Spotlights Saudi Arabia Variable in India-Pakistan-China Relations - The Diplomat, 28 February 2019

I had not updated my blog for a few days amidst some travel and other commitments. A few days ago, I wrote a piece for the Diplomat on the Saudi Crown Prince's visit to India, looking at the larger dynamics of MBS/ Saudi Arabia in India-Pakistan-China relations. The voyage highlighted Riyadh’s role in the balance of ties between the three states and India’s continued concerns on that front.

Last week, in the midst of India-Pakistan tensions which show few signs of ebbing, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, popularly known as MBS, kicked off a pre-planned regional trip that included stops in India, Pakistan, and China. Though the coincidence in timing was accidental, his voyage nonetheless spotlighted the Saudi factor in India-Pakistan relations.

In a reflection of how sensitive MBS’s trip was, he paid a trip to Pakistan but then, in order to “de-hyphenate” the visit, he returned to Saudi Arabia and traveled back to the region a second time for the India visit before moving on to China. That spotlighted the effort Saudi Arabia continues to make to not unnecessarily alienate either New Delhi or Islamabad.

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More substantively, in terms of the legs of the visit, the Pakistan trip produced little for India to cheer about. The two sides expressed appreciation for efforts made by them in the “war on terrorism” despite Islamabad’s complicity with some terror groups, and there was a reference in the joint statement to “avoiding politicization of UN listing regime” although Saudi Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir has come out clarifying that this was not a reference to Masood Azhar, the head of the Jaish-e-Muhammad (the terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for the Pulwama terror attack) that India had been trying to put under this list. In an indication of continued Saudi Arabia-Pakistan ties, the two countries signed deals worth $20 billion which comes in addition to $6 billion loan that Riyadh had given to Islamabad in October 2018, with Saudi Arabia also planning to invest $10 billion in a refinery and petrochemical complex in Gwadar.

The India part of the trip was also hardly a win for New Delhi. MBS’s visit to India, which came nearly three years after Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia when leaders from both countries took a decision to diversify and expand their relationship to include trade, investment and counterterrorism, came under greater scrutiny this time around. For instance, at a more symbolic level, Modi has come under sharp criticism domestically for breaking with protocol and doing his usual bear hug with the Saudi Crown Prince. On a more substantive note, there has also been criticism that Modi did not use the occasion to extract some strong commitment from Saudi Arabia on Pakistan and terrorism. Though he had said that there will be strong reference to countering terrorism, the fact that MBS did not mention Pulwama is seen in India as a big failure.

Of course, the expectation that India could extract certain concessions from Saudi Arabia may seem far-fetched because a leader of the Islamic world like Saudi Arabia will always be in a tight spot in managing relations with both secular India and Islamic Pakistan. There was also a clear effort to forge greater cooperation. As a senior Indian official TS Tirumurti emphasized, for Saudi Arabia, India is one of the eight strategic partners and Riyadh plans to “deepen partnership” with India in the areas of security, trade, investment and culture. During the visit, MBS committed to invest $100 billion over the next few years in areas like energy, refining, petrochemicals, infrastructure, agriculture, and manufacturing, and the two sides also plan to deepen the bilateral defence and security engagements, with a special focus on joint naval exercises between the two militaries.

In sum, New Delhi should be happy with Saudi promises of trade and investment. But from the perspective of the fight against terror or on Indian objective of “isolating Pakistan,” it will be seen rather disappointing. For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan offers important security benefits, including a potential nuclear cover, which India simply cannot match.

After finishing his India visit, the crown prince traveled to China. China is important to Riyadh on its own terms – it is its largest trading partner and MBS sees an opportunity to further his Vision 2030 plan. But the focus was also on what if any additional cooperation both sides would forge during the visit, given that Saudi Arabia is one of Pakistan’s strongest friends and strategic partners.

On this part of the voyage, there were few surprises for India. The trip saw China and Saudi Arabia forge greater economic ties and also reinforce their shared cooperation on counterterrorism, with the international headlines focused on how Riyadh, the center of the Muslim world, seemed to basically sweep aside China’s poor treatment of its own Muslim Uyghurs. There were also references made to China’s interest in Saudi Arabia in terms of its grander designs with respect to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Maritime Silk Road, as a lot of the Chinese trade will go through the Red Sea, bordering Saudi Arabia.

All in all, unfortunately for New Delhi, if anything this leg, as with MBS’s trip more generally, amounted to largely more of the same in terms of both the concerns India has long had and the limits to further altering the Saudi Arabia variable in the India-Pakistan relationship to its advantage.

New Terror Attack Exposes India’s Limited Options - The Diplomat, 15 February 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the horrific terrorist attack in Pulwama yesterday and what India's options may be in response to it. In the piece, "New Terror Attack Exposes India’s Limited Options," I argue that despite the severity of the attack and the pressure for action, New Delhi’s choices are much more limited than they may initially appear.

A major terrorist attack in Awantipora area of Pulwama district in south Kashmir has killed dozens of Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, and the casualties are likely to go up. But despite the severity of the attack and growing pressure for action, New Delhi’s choices are much more limited than they may initially appear.

The Pulwama terrorist attack is one of the worst in recent years. The death toll is still climbing, but recent reports indicated over 40 people had been killed. In the 2016 attack on an Indian Army base in Uri, 16 personnel had died. The 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly in Srinagar had killed 38 people. For the CRPF in particular, this is the second worst attack in its history. The last time it suffered such casualties was in Dantewada when Maoists insurgents ambushed and killed 75 CRPF personnel in April 2010.

The CRPF is the largest of the central paramilitary forces that come under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has been carrying out law and order as well as counterinsurgency duties in Jammu and Kashmir and India’s northeast for several decades. The CRPF is generally less well trained and less well armed than the Indian Army, but it is usually used to bolster local police forces around the country in various contingencies including for counterinsurgency duties.

Reacting to the attack, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted, “Attack on CRPF personnel in Pulwama is despicable. I strongly condemn this dastardly attack. The sacrifices of our brave security personnel shall not go in vain. The entire nation stands shoulder to shoulder with the families of the brave martyrs.” Union Minister VK Singh responded by saying, “As a soldier and a citizen of India, my blood boils at the spineless and cowardly attacks. 18 brave hearts from the @crpfindia laid down their lives in #Pulwama. I salute their selfless sacrifice & promise that every drop of our soldier’s blood will be avenged. #JaiHind.”

These statements are understandable and fairly routine, and the government will be under great pressure to do something. One reason is the scale of the attack and the open claim of responsibility by Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group. Another reason is that the Modi government claims to be tough on national security matters and its supporters will expect it to act forcefully. Moreover, India’s so-called surgical strikes in 2016 will lead to expectations that India will act this time also. Finally, national elections are due to take place in the next few months which adds domestic political pressure on the government.

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On the other hand, India’s options to respond are fairly limited. On the diplomatic side, while we have seen Indian officials speak about isolating Pakistan and some steps may be taken in this direction, they are likely to have little substantive impact considering that the level of diplomatic intercourse with Pakistan is already quite minimal and no major negotiations or talks are underway. While India could downgrade diplomatic relations even further, it is unlikely that it could do very much to assuage the anger in the country.

India could also try to generate diplomatic pressure on Pakistan through its friends in the international community and through multilateral fora such as the United Nations. But these have so far proved of little value and they are unlikely to bear much fruit.

This attack also raises questions about the Modi government’s Wuhan initiative to smooth ties with China. Despite Modi’s efforts to mollify China, there is little indication that Beijing has stopped providing cover to Pakistan, especially on the Masood Azhar issue. In fact, any Indian effort to once again list JeM founder Masood Azhar as a global terrorist is likely to be blocked by China.

India’s military options are equally constrained. If past crises are any indication, it is unlikely that there are any well-planned and prepared contingency options that have been decided in consultation between the political leadership and the Indian military. Thus, any response will have to wait until plans are drawn up, forces prepared, and equipment deployed. This is likely to take time, possibly several weeks.

It is also unclear that the Indian military has sufficient superiority over Pakistani forces to even consider any full-scale military retaliation. The Indian military has been starved of funds in the last several years, with very little capital acquisition and significant weaknesses in critical areas. The Indian Air Force, for example, is down to about 30 squadrons and it will be years before India is able to field the full 42 squadrons that has been sanctioned for the Air Force.

It is also unclear that India will respond with a full-scale conventional assault as envisaged under the Cold Start doctrine. With elections looming, such a venture may be considered too risky. While it is possible that India could conduct a somewhat enhanced version of the 2016 surgical strikes, that may not be seen as sufficient.

The Modi government is thus likely to find itself facing a series of bad choices. But it has only itself to blame for the poor planning and preparation to meet a contingency that was easily predictable. The greatest danger is that under pressure to do something, Delhi will launch a military assault with inadequate forethought that will likely make the situation worse.