Assessing the British Proposal on Space Security - The Diplomat, 10 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the recent UK proposal on space security governance.  That the UK proposal emphasizes a bottom-up approach and stresses trust-building are important.  It is a critical first step.  

Space security issues have potentially serious consequences. The consequences of either a deliberate or even an accidental conflict in space are too horrible to contemplate. A day without the utility provided by outer space is difficult to even conceive and yet the actions of states might lead the world in that direction sooner than later. Unless states take measures to restrain some kinds of activities in space, access to space will not be safe, secure, or guaranteed. 

For the full post, click here.  

Because of the highly competitive and contested nature of major power relations today, even peaceful applications and technological developments such as On-Orbit Satellite Servicing or technologies to tackle space debris are viewed with much suspicion. There are also more specific space security threats – the return of anti-satellite (ASAT) testing, and cyber and electronic warfare in space, for example. Any satellite service disruption or damage will have a wide-ranging impact, one that cannot be contained to the security or economic sectors alone, and one that cannot be limited geographically either given the significant global dependence on space. Space is truly a global commons. 

All of this suggests we need new rules of the road. There have been recent efforts including the Russia-China sponsored draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), originally proposed in 2008 (with a revised text introduced in 2014); the 2010 EU-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (ICoC), the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) in 2013, and the 2018-19 GGE on further practical measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS). None of these have led to a favorable conclusion.  

The biggest challenge facing the development of an outer space regime is a lack of consensus among major powers. These are essentially political impediments and therefore that much harder to overcome than practical issues. Major power relations are characterized by a serious lack of trust and confidence in each other. And therefore, what we need in the first instance are measures that would strengthen confidence.  

The United Kingdom has also made a recent proposal — “Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviors” — aimed at looking at problems in space through a bottom-up approach. The proposal, in one of its operational clauses:

encourages Member States to study existing and potential threats and security risks to space systems, including those arising from actions, activities or systems in outer space or on Earth, characterize actions and activities that could be considered responsible, irresponsible or threatening and their potential impact on international security, and share their ideas on the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors and on the reduction of the risks of misunderstanding and miscalculations with respect to outer space.

It further calls on the U.N. secretary general to get views from member states in a substantive report to be submitted to the General Assembly at the 76th session scheduled for September 2021 for additional discussion. The plan is to include this in the provisional agenda of the General Assembly’s session, under the item, “Prevention of an arms race in outer space,” with a sub-item entitled, “Reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors.” 

One of the key features of the U.K. proposal is to focus on a behavior-based approach, since debates focused on an object-based approach have not gone very far. The U.K. proposal is not prescriptive in suggesting a particular type of outcome or a particular format. Thus, this proposal provides room for greater flexibility and certain amount of maneuvering among member states as they debate the threats and challenges and possible ways forward. 

Even though there is no particular preference for a specific format as an outcome, it is important to look at this as a process that would lay stress on trust-building as a key driver. Given the high level of disagreements among major space powers, this is a sensible approach. In this regard, transparency and confidence building measures (TCBMs) offer a good first step between recognizing the functional need of regulating space and the negotiation of a binding instrument. There has been any number of debates on the need for and effectiveness of binding and non-binding instruments, but these discussions have not led to any meaningful outcome. TCBMs are certainly not a substitute for legal measures but they can be effective tools in bringing about openness, transparency, and information sharing, which are badly required to raise the level of political confidence between key great powers. TCBMs are essentially a bridge that can provide opportunities for countries to talk to each other and work on building greater trust in each other. This is a recognition that political issues have become the biggest hindrance in developing new rules of the road for outer space activities. 

A few measures that could be considered in this regard include pre-launch notifications (already contained in the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation) and ASAT test guidelines and rules for intentional orbital breakups. Others include the UNIDIR proposal (no debris, low debris, and notification) and pledges like “Not the First to Act beyond the scope of Article 51” because many developing countries worry that the right to self-defense under U.N. Charter Article 51 may be used as an excuse for space weaponization. 

While an end goal of developing more binding agreements for space security must be pursued, reaching a political consensus to commit to legal instruments appears to be difficult in today’s political and security environment. Revising or reforming the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is problematic precisely due to the current political impediments. Therefore, states need to first invest a great deal in developing mutual trust. The U.K. proposal provides an alternative to the PPWT or the EU ICoC, both of which have run into their own problems. The bottom-up approach emphasized in the U.K. proposal, letting member states to identify threats and challenges from their national security perspectives, is a welcome step.

Space Security and Sustainability.... UNIDIR Regional Conference in Addis Ababa

I was recently in Addis Ababa for the UNIDIR Regional Conference (Africa) on space security and sustainability. The conference held on March 06-07 brought together all the major African, particularly from a space security point of view. Interesting discussions, particularly the reaction from the region on the EU-proposed International Code of Conduct for outer space activities. This was one of the four regional discussions funded by the EU, in an effort to garner greater support for the code of conduct on outer space activities.

I had made two presentations, addressing the issue of space security regime and the essential elements of a potential code; and a second one on the role of TCBMs in space security.



Type rest of the post here

Decoding the International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, collection of short essays on the debate ...

Recently, IDSA put together a collection of short essays on the international code of conduct on space debate, wherein I had provided one from an Indian perspective. The chapter looked at some of the broad Indian positions including on a code of conduct on space to some of the specific concerns on the EU-initiated code of conduct.

The idea of establishing a set of rules on space that will guide the behaviour
of states has been gaining momentum in recent years. This has gained
particular relevance in the backdrop of the European Union (EU) making
last-minute efforts to muster support for the code of conduct on space initiated
by it. The EU decision of 29 May 2012 to sign the document officially and
strengthen bilateral and multilateral negotiations will bring pressure on India
and other space-faring nations to sign it also.

For the chapter, click here.



In this regard, the EU has set out three specific initiatives: outreach
activities in order to promote the proposal for an international code of
conduct; holding up to three multilateral experts meetings to discuss the
proposal; and the coordination of a consortium of non-governmental experts.
Technical implementation of the three initiatives will be undertaken by the
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).
The EU’s decision to bring UNIDIR into the picture seeks to give the
EU initiative a larger support base beyond Europe. This does not, however,
yet ensure support from a majority of the space-faring powers, who have
already raised serious objections, particularly about the code-formulating
procedure.

India is all for institutionalizing a set of norms on space. But it also has
interests in being acknowledged as one of the major space-faring powers, with
an important voice in their formation. India has a particular interest in this
normative exercise if it will put certain restraints on China’s otherwise
unrestrained space activities. India’s interests have also to do with the fact
that it has made significant investment in a predominantly civilian space
programme that now seems to be under threat due to issues such as space
debris and potential weaponisation in space. Given the expanding nature of
space utilities, India’s interests would also be to curb some of the potential
norms that may become counterproductive to its objectives in exploiting
Outer Space.

India has been debating this issue at Track II levels with several objectives.
Such engagement can generate an internal debate on these issues, both about
the utility of a code and to help identify the principles that should guide the
new rules. India could then become a full partner rather than coming to the
international negotiations with reactive positions to others’ proposals. India
clearly does not want to free-ride on its major-space-faring-nation status
without taking on the additional responsibilities that come along with the
status. The internal debates and the objections raised in this debate to others’
proposals should not be seen as a spoiler but of an engaged nation that wants
to frame rules that are comprehensive, inclusive and durable. As India’s
geopolitical weight increases and its reach goes beyond Asia, it cannot afford
to be simply a naysayer. It wants to play the role of a constructive actor in
the international norm creation exercises.

Having discussed the Indian interests in a code, it is also important to
understand the importance of the politics of international norm creation.
India sees a huge geopolitical mileage in this exercise. While a code goes
through several stages, including technical, legal and political clearances before
it gets institutionalized, the political exercise is critical for several reasons.
An ideal instrument should be as broad-based as possible to include issues
of concern to multiple parties and stakeholders, including space debris, arms
race in space and space weaponisation. The political support that such an
instrument musters will have a huge impact on the longevity and effectiveness
of the instrument.

As in other arenas such as nuclear, the biggest challenge in the space
domain is the crisis of decision-making among the major powers. Even while
they understand and acknowledge, to some extent, the current and potential
challenges, the failure to reach a consensus is a big handicap. Therefore, it is
of utmost importance for the EU to adopt a more flexible and inclusive
approach if it seeks a universally acceptable code. In the absence of such an
approach, one could potentially see a repeat of the H-COC experience, which
has 128 countries as signatories, but these do not include some of the critical
players in Asia such as China, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea. It is not only
important to have numerous countries as signatories, but equally important
to have the critical actors on board. In sum, the new instrument should look
for both “critical mass and critical actors”.

If India were to formulate a code of conduct, it may not be significantly
different in its content from the EU initiative. But India attaches importance
to laying out concrete action plans, including a verification mechanism and
legal obligations. While the current EU code is voluntary, states that become
party to it are expected to institute certain measures at the domestic level,
which in a sense binds them to the global rules. In other words, under the
EU code, one is talking about a loose set of rules at the global level with
stringent legislation at the country level. This approach may run into
problems, given that there exists no mechanism to verify adherence to the
rules laid out in the code. Lack of clarity as to who would administer these
rules creates both ambiguity and wariness. The question whether Europe has
the ability to push such measures, given the new geopolitical realities, also
needs to be considered. However, if the EU were to institute consultative
mechanisms in the coming months, particularly with the major space-faring
countries, it might be in a position to fix some of the gaps that exist in its
current approach.

In conclusion, the EU should address some of these issues, including the
need for an inclusive approach and the need for a legally binding verification
mechanism. It might also be important for the EU to consider a grouping
of major space-faring countries similar to the P5 nuclear weapon countries,
such as that recognised by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as
nuclear weapon states. Such a group of countries may actually be keen on
addressing these issues and pushing for an actionable agenda, given the
vulnerabilities that they face. Lastly, if space traffic management is a critical
issue, one could consider newer initiatives and organisations along the lines
of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Also, establishing
a panel of experts on the model of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change), given that space debris and arms race in space are problems
that are global in nature, might be worth the effort.