Mangalyaan Mission Plays Vital Role in New Delhi’s Development Plans, my OpEd on India's Mars mission published in yesterday's Global Times

Here's my OpEd on India's Mars mission published by Global Times (China) yesterday.

My core argument is that India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

Should India Declare a Space Policy?, my short essay published by the Diplomat

Here's the link to an essay of mine published by The Diplomat on whether India should declare a space policy or not.

A low-intensity debate has been taking place in India as to whether India should have a declared space policy or not. The general consensus appears to be that there is no need. But there are several arguments to make in favor of outlining a policy in the open. In today’s world, the advantages of a declared policy far outweigh the disadvantages. A declared policy calls for a clear understanding of how it should be tailored, what it should contain and what should be left out.

For the full essay, click here.

First, open policy statements and declared policies have remained the best means to assuage fears, build confidence and avoid ambiguities. These are important measures for building transparency and reducing tensions in regional and global contexts. Since the Asian context is characterized by growing competition and rivalry and the potential for conflict, even relative openness and transparency will go a long way in diluting the levels of regional insecurities.

A declared space policy would be an effective tool of communication for both internal and external audiences. For both audiences, it will set limits as well as open up opportunities as the number of states engaged in space exploration and utilization continue to grow. The value of communication through such an exercise, with both internal and external communities, is important. However, it is worth remembering that as a policy is prepared and articulated, while an internal audience is important, the policy will also send a message to external audiences. As such, it must be written in a manner that does not aggravate insecurities. Fail to do that, and external audiences could be left with the wrong impressions about India’s space program and policy, further raising the risk of misperception and miscommunication. How external audiences will read the policy statement and what they perceive about India’s needs, objectives and plans for the future, therefore, must be an important consideration as New Delhi readies a space policy document.

Second, India should have a clear picture of its long-term objectives and these should become guiding factors for a good space policy. The long-term objectives should consider both where India wants to be in a 25-year framework, and the perspective of outer space itself. A long-term vision should be followed by prioritization of important capabilities (political, diplomatic, military and economic) and partnerships that will help India reach its destination. This should translate into national security strategies articulated by the political leadership and then national military strategies derived from the national security strategy.

The second set of objectives will come from a debate on what sort of future India wants to achieve in space and accordingly what sort of behavior will be counter-productive to achieving those goals. Once there is clarity on these issues, India should adjust the orientation of its own space program and its priorities while working towards a favorable framework that would allow it to meet those goals. India should also steer its efforts in developing rules that would affect and curtail certain space programs and activities that may potentially be destabilizing and irresponsible. In addition to creating a framework that will protect its own interests, the political impact of this exercise is important. India should also strengthen its ability to maneuver at the global high table by prioritizing and fostering partnerships with countries that might share India’s vision in space.

Third, India should articulate its interests and policies in the broader context of the region and beyond, rather than talk about its interests in a narrow sense. This will have multiple benefits. For one, India’s policy articulation will be perceived as less threatening to the region. There are apprehensions particularly in the immediate neighborhood because of India’s dominant presence in South Asia. India’s growing capabilities in the space arena as in several other areas has the potential to heighten insecurities among these smaller neighbors. It will benefit India in the longer run if it were to showcase its interests and benefits in the regional context. Moreover, India should be able to cultivate regional interests that are akin to its own interests. It should be articulated in a manner wherein the region is able to transpose its interests and ideals with that of India’s. India should be able to convey to the region as to how such a policy might be in the interests of regional peace and stability.

Fourth, the domestic debate on India’s space policy has tended to highlight the utility of being ambiguous about policy. However, it should be understood that ambiguity has its limits. Bringing clarity to India’s policy and program will have multiple benefits. Despite the fact that India’s space program has been predominantly civilian in focus, the rising trend towards militarization in the region and beyond is influencing India’s orientation as well. Categorization of India’s space program into civilian and military components followed by clear-cut departmental structures would allow for greater focus, clarity and better financial outlays. Currently, institutional and budgetary resources are stretched across different programs. Devising a military space program will cater for better budget allocations as well as dedicated human resources.

Fifth, articulating an open policy would also add to the credibility of India as a major spacefaring nation. It would be a major transparency and confidence building measure, which is particularly important in the Asian context. Apart from its value in that regard, the policy should also articulate in clear terms redlines and limits that should not be crossed. This should be in terms of both capabilities and activities that may be considered irresponsible and contributing to regional and global uncertainties. Indicating such boundaries is important both for national security and deterrence as well as an international rule-making perspective. A national policy that would categorize certain activities as irresponsible and destabilizing will be in a position to determine when defensive responses can be activated and justified.

Similarly, defining what may be considered a space weapon or how one may define peaceful or defensive use of space will be significant in deterring accidents in outer space. This may be truer in the case of Asia, but space being a truly global commons, it has the potential to trigger conflicts even among the larger community of spacefaring powers. Being ambiguous about these boundaries and redlines undermines deterrence and increases the potential for accidental conflict. From an international framework perspective, a code of conduct that would set restrictions and limits and categorize certain capabilities as irresponsible or unacceptable might deter such actions. India should take a lead role while framing these restrictions at the global level in order to have its own interests protected.

Apart from the Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., space was seen as a benign domain with great utility in the civilian and developmental sectors. However, growing space capabilities are increasingly part of comprehensive national power. Growing facets of space use from space exploration to a quest for resources, including minerals, exploitation for energy resources (space-based solar power), operational response to natural disasters, and military use are changing the nature of our engagement with outer space. The technological spin-offs of ambitious projects such as space-based solar power have tremendous potential to bolster the science and technology base of any country.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) should be commended for its achievements, particularly given its modest budget. However, as recently noted by the ISRO Chairman, private sector involvement will inject a much-needed stimulus to India’s program. India must aim at creating a strategic space industry if it is to keep pace with growing commercialization. Launching satellites is becoming a lucrative business and India should not lose opportunities in this regard. Also, the number and types of players have undergone a major change in the last few years. India needs to respond to these changes and become a leading figure by articulating its needs and objectives for the future. As in many other areas, articulating a policy along with its broad orientations would also bring much-needed clarity internally within the space sector. Additionally, partners that look to India for collaboration across fields including the use of space-based assets and space situational awareness will only benefit India’s capabilities.

Finally, India’s space policy should also outline its efforts in the area of international rule-making. Given the potential for space exploitation to affect every aspect of our daily lives, actions could have serious consequences. Therefore, laying down the rules of the road is a task that should not be left until space is highly weaponized. Aside from the political and strategic value, India has a huge financial stake given its investments and reliance in this regard.

Story on China's missile defense test in the March issue of Arms Control Today... quotes mua too....

Here's a story on China's missile defense test by Timothy Farnsworth in the March issue of Arms Control Today. quotes mua too....

China successfully launched a land-based missile interceptor Jan. 28, according to Xinhua, the country’s official news agency.

In a statement released after the test, a Chinese Defense Ministry official said it had accomplished “the pre-set goal,” but did not say what the goal was. The test was “defensive in nature and target[ed] no other country,” he said.

It was not clear from the Chinese statement whether the test involved a target for the interceptor to hit. China’s only previous missile interceptor test, on Jan. 11, 2010, did involve a target.



In 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite (ASAT) test, destroying one of its own satellites instead of a test warhead. (See ACT, March 2007.) That test prompted objections from numerous countries, in part because of the debris it created. The two later tests took place at a lower altitude and created no debris.

In a Feb. 12 interview, Li Bin, a senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University in Beijing, said the latter two tests were focused on developing and understanding missile-intercept technology rather than assessing the performance of a deployable missile defense system.

According to Li, the Chinese versions of the statements released after each of those tests were identical. Li said, however, that the official English translation of the Jan. 28 statement omitted the word “technology” from the phrase “land-based mid-course missile interception technology test,” the term that China used in 2010. He said the use of the word “technology” indicates that China was trying to better understand missile defense capabilities and was not testing in order to deploy a national missile defense system.

Li said Beijing has three options: keeping the technology in reserve, deploying a regional missile defense system around major cities, and deploying a national system. Li said the first two options are more likely because it would be too costly to create a national system that could defend against an adversary that has a large number of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Experts disagree on whether the main goal of the Chinese program is to develop a national missile defense system or an ASAT system. In a Feb. 20 e-mail to Arms Control Today, David Shlapak, a senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, said that there are differences in the development paths for the two systems. The numbers of interceptors and the “engagement dynamics”—the way the interceptors strike the target object—associated with targeting an enemy’s satellites “are much easier to manage than those associated with large-scale missile defense,” he said.

“I don’t think that the testing we’ve seen to date reveals much about China’s intentions. China could be experimenting with technology, seeking to develop a real capability, or sending a message,” he said. “Unless and until we see more activity, it’s going to be hard to make a conclusive determination.”

Previous Tests

In 2007, China destroyed an aging weather satellite with a hit-to-kill interceptor approximately 850 kilometers above the earth. According to NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office, the tally of space debris created by the test had reached 3,037 pieces as of September 2010, of which 97 percent remained in orbit. Much of the international community, including the United States, condemned the test, which U.S. officials often cite as an example of how space has become more “congested, contested, and competitive.”

According to a January 2010 State Department cable obtained by WikiLeaks, the target of the 2010 test was a CSS-X011 medium-range ballistic missile rather than a satellite and took place at an altitude of 250 kilometers, much lower than the 2007 test. But the two tests used the same interceptor vehicle, the SC-19, the cable said. The cable also said that U.S. missile-warning satellites detected the launch of the interceptor and the target missile, as well as the actual interception.

International Reaction

The United States and other countries have expressed concerns about China’s ASAT and missile defense tests. In a Jan. 29 e-mail to Arms Control Today, a State Department official said, in regard to the 2007 ASAT test, “the United States has consistently urged Beijing through diplomatic, military-to-military, and scientific channels not to conduct further anti-satellite weapons testing in space.”

India, another country that has nuclear weapons and a growing space program, recently increased its own missile defense testing and closely watches China’s ASAT and missile defense tests. (See ACT, January/February 2013.)

According to Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, a senior fellow at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation, the 2007 Chinese ASAT test sparked a debate within and outside India’s government, “forcing a re-evaluation of India’s policy against militarization of space.” In a Feb. 20 e-mail to Arms Control Today, Rajagopalan, a former assistant director of India’s National Security Council Secretariat, said that since the 2007 test, “there has been fresh pressure brought about for an Indian ASAT system” and “a need for India to have demonstrated ASAT capability.” Although the Indian government has not made a total shift in its policy, “[t]he growing Chinese capabilities (be it ASAT or missile defense capabilities) have clearly upped the ante in the region,” Rajagopalan said.

She questioned the effectiveness of the “space security regime” and the ability “of the major global powers to respond [to] and affect” China’s behavior. “India has continued to argue for [a] legally binding mechanism to deal with the myriad challenges [of the] space domain,” Rajagopalan said.

Will China Conduct Another ASAT Test? ... a short essay on the recent speculation about a Chinese anti-satellite test

Here's an article of mine on the recent speculation about a Chinese ASAT test ....

Six years ago, China conducted its first anti-satellite (ASAT) test -- on January 11, 2007. Exactly three years later, China conducted a second ASAT test, which Beijing referred to as a missile defence test, on January 11, 2010. Three years from then, whether China plans to do another ASAT test is the rumour that is doing the rounds in global circles.

For the full article, click here.



One of the first reports in October said that China will conduct a test targeting satellites at higher orbits, potentially hitting at reconnaissance and navigation satellites. Some of the US intelligence sources had suggested in that report that Beijing was delaying the test until the US elections were over because they did not want to spoil Oabam's chances for a second term. The Chinese may not have been excited about a Republican Administration that could have been far more conservative on space security and arms control issues than Obama. Meanwhile, the Chinese Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun played down the speculation and made a short comment at one of the regular news briefings to say that "such reports did not conform to the fact."

However, the Chinese Global Times editorial of January 06 was much more upbeat and jingoistic about the rumours, saying, "hopefully, the speculation about China's anti-satellite tests is true." The same editorial also highlighted that China's "public policy is peaceful use of space," which raises questions about the real intentions of its space programme. The editorial went on to suggest that Beijing is against any kind of arms race in space, evident in the Russia-China proposal submitted in 2008. As per the editorial, the Chinese seemed to have planned it all well as to how they should respond to the international hue and cry when they do the test. Even as they claimed to be unclear about the Chinese plans to do the test, the editorial notes, "China should continue substantive research on striking satellites. It can avoid the controversy of whether this action violates peaceful use of space by doing so under the aegis of developing anti-missile defense systems."

Citing government and intelligence sources, some of the international media reports suggest that China may be using a Dong-Ning-2 (DN-2) direct ascent anti-satellite missile. DN-2, the latest anti-satellite missile developed by the PLA, scheduled for testing originally in October/ November 2012 is considered to be a high-earth orbit interceptor capable of destroying satellites by colliding at high-speed, in other words with kinetic impact. A report in Taipei Times raised concerns about the missile test as it can target US spy satellites providing early warning message to Taiwan of any imminent attack, as well as other satellites that would be used in conducting military operations in the theatre. Most reconnaissance and navigation satellites fly at high-earth orbit or geosynchronous orbit, at a distance of around 35,000 km from Earth. If the missile test is done successfully, it will be a major advancement as far as Chinese satellite strike capabilities are concerned, with some calling it a major "counterspace" weapon.

Meanwhile, there were a few reports in the international media which said that China may not actually do a test because it will produce a large amount of debris which will hurt China too, given their greater reliance on space assets today. Particularly with their navigation system Beidou operationalised, Beijing may not continue with more such destructive tests, creating additional debris and increasing the chances of collisions. However, if the editorial were anything to go by, it indicates a totally different orientation to China's space programme.

Fresh anticipation of the Chinese ASAT came about after a report from the Union of Concerned Scientists last month, which talked about an announcement within the Chinese government circles about a planned ASAT test. However, questions as to when, how and whether China will actually conduct a test or not is a matter of speculation with no Chinese open source talking about the test.

As mentioned in the Global Times editorial as well as other official statements, China's emphasis has been on space arms race. No doubt, arms race in space will be an issue in the future. However, there are more pressing challenges that face the space domain today which do not get the same attention in Chinese plans. Worse, some of China's space activities are contributing to worsening of the space environment. Space debris, which is a bigger issue today is often underplayed by China. If Beijing were to conduct another ASAT test there will be a significant increase in the space debris that has already reached dangerous levels. Space debris is an issue that China refuses to take up in any international code of conduct, neither is it a subject addressed in the draft proposal that China and Russia have submitted. PAROS has also remained on the Chinese agenda, again with the focus on arms race and with no mention of the debris issue.

Along with arms race, the China-Russia emphasis has been on placement of weapons in outer space. But the bigger challenge today is ground-based weapons that can target assets in outer space, which has heightened the fears about weaponisation of outer space. The Chinese testing of DN-2 could up the ante in Asia, which is already witnessing a heightened phase of military modernization and could possibly spark an arms race in space. Given the history of the region, such developments are ominous.

All of these point out to the need to draw certain red lines in the outer space domain that would bring about restraint in such activities and capabilities. Future normative exercise in an effort to establish a space code of conduct or a more binding mechanism should pay attention to defining activities and capabilities that will be construed as irresponsible behavior. Such codification would go a long way in establishing deterrence in outer space. The need for dialogue at bilateral, regional and global levels as channels of communication and as CBM initiatives is real and should be pursued keeping in view the myriad of challenges facing the outer space domain.

Drawing the Boundaries: Ideal Ingredients of a Space Code

Here's a short essay on an international code of conduct on space and what are the few issues it must contain and clarify.

The idea of establishing a space code of conduct has been gaining ground in the last few years. The recent steps by the European Union (EU) towards institutionalising a set of rules on outer space affairs is a welcome step although it has been met with some criticism, mostly on the process but in part on

the content of the code as well. However, given the enormity of challenges, there is a need for all the spacefaring powers to unite in this exercise, especially as the EU evolves a more inclusive process in galvanising support for the code. In turn, the EU must be sufficiently open-minded to have an inclusive agenda in order to ensure greater support from other regions. There is clearly a need to ensure critical mass if a space code is to become effective.

Given the number of multiple actors and new technologies, there are likely to be several issues driving the agenda. However, there has to be greater clarity on the key points of disagreement that must be addressed in a code.

For the full essay, click here.



It is important for India and others to debate and decide on two aspects: what it thinks the norms should be and what sort of future it wants to achieve in space. Obviously, long-term sustainability of outer space and ensuring space security remain major driving factors. A large number of countries and not just the major space powers are dependent on outer space one way or the other. Therefore, it is important that we define, categorise and regulate what activities are permissible and what needs to be restricted. Also defining certain limits on activities by states or non-state parties has become essential for ensuring the security of outer space.

While many states are dependent on space assets for societal and developmental utilities, there has also been the growing trend of militarization with states using space assets for a variety of military missions including surveillance and reconnaissance, signals intelligence and early warning. However, the more recent trend towards weaponisation of outer space with some states making investments in their military space programmes is worrying. The advance nature of military space programmes in Asia, for example, poses major challenges. New capabilities being developed such as anti-satellite missiles (ASAT) are potentially destabilizing. With ASAT capabilities, the concern is not just about additional debris creation but more importantly that the threat perception about space weaponisation could become real. This could lead to a regional arms race, including in the space domain.

Meanwhile, space debris has become a larger challenge requiring immediate attention. Much of the space debris was created between the 1960s and mid-1990s. After this, for a decade the debris growth line had flattened out. However, the Chinese shooting down of an old weather satellite in January 2007 created more than 2,500 pieces of debris. In addition, the 2009 collision between the Russian Cosmos and US Iridium satellites resulted in a debris of more than 2,000 pieces. These two incidents have changed the situation for the worse. The rapid growth of space junk has meant devastating impact on civilian space assets calling for immediate attention.

While these are some of the broad issues that should become part of any code that might come into existence, there is a need to address several definitional issues. The lack of definitional clarity of many space security-related terms has provided ample scope for mischief. Terms and concepts such as ’peaceful activity’, ’space weapon’, ’defensive actions in space’, and ’space weaponisation’, among others, need to be clarified.

Additionally it is also of importance to codify activities that may need to be restrained. While it is not logistically possible to list all activities that are acceptable, it will be of great value if the code is in a position to outline the kind of actions that may fall outside of the category of "responsible behaviour." This should be within the realm of possibility.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, for instance, laid out some of the basic tenets although the treaty has become quite open-ended in its understanding and explanation of the uses of outer space. An excellent analysis by Gopal Raj on the loopholes of the outer space treaty, raises questions about the definition of air space and outer space. This is particularly relevant as the treaty prohibits the placement of weapons in orbit around the Earth, in outer space, or on celestial bodies. Unless there is clarity on where ’outer space’, which is part of the global commons, begin going beyond the national boundaries and sovereignty, one is bound to see competing definitions leading to potentially dangerous situations.

Similarly, how do we define space weapons? Any weapon used in space warfare can be technically called a space weapon. It could include anything from anti-satellite missiles to the old Soviet Almaz military space station which carried a fixed 23 mm cannon for preventing hostile interception and a lot more. The fact that none of the current treaties address this definitional gap needs to be corrected.

The current treaties and agreements also do not take a categorical stand on what construes peaceful activity. Today, peaceful has come to be narrowly defined as "non-aggressive" in intent, which is quite broad considering the array of activities possible in outer space.

Lastly, the current treaties only address the issue of placement of weapons in outer space, which is seen as the biggest threat, leaving outside its ambit the entire range of ground-based weapons that are bigger challenges.

China's Advances in Space: Taking Stock of the Recent Developments

Here's a recent publication on China's outer space activities both from a technological and diplomacy point of view. The issue brief, published by the Observer Research Foundation, has been co-authored with my colleague, Rahul Prakash.

China conducted its first manual space docking in June 2012, a feat so far achieved by only two other countries: the US and Russia. This particular achievement, along with several others in the Crecent years, highlights the importance attached by China to building its expertise and assets in outer space. China has emphasised that these are for 'peaceful purposes'; still, it might be naïve to accept such declarations at face value. China's increasing advances in space technology under the direction of the PLA are likely to have serious military implications. There is no denying the fact that these applications have economic and commercial value but the military utility should not be ignored.

For the full issue brief, click here.



An interesting aspect of China's programme is that it is promoting commercial initiatives within scientific laboratories in a big way. While on the one hand China's aerospace industry is expanding, Beijing has also frequently emphasised the national security dimensions of space. In one of his more recent statements, General Xu Qiliang, Commander of the PLA Air Force, reiterated the critical role played by space exploration in furthering China's national security interests. Earlier, the space White Paper of 2011 had also elucidated this stand: “The purposes of China's space industry are: to explore outer space and to enhance understanding of the Earth and the cosmos; to utilize outer space for peaceful purposes, promote human civilization and social progress, and to benefit the whole of mankind; to meet the demands of economic development, scientific and technological development, national security and social progress; and to improve the scientific and cultural knowledge of the Chinese people, protect China's national rights and interests, and build up its national comprehensive strength.”

This Issue Brief examines the major achievements of China in outer space in recent years, both from a technological as well as an arms-control perspective. The paper concludes by looking at the implications for India, both in the domain and in the broader regional security context.

China's Vision in Space
Since 1949, Chinese leaders have paid close attention and given importance to the utilisation of space for the country's overall development. While China began its space programme as early as in 1956, the intellectual foundations were laid with the establishment of research centres such as the Beijing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics in October 1952. Beihang University, as it is currently known, is closely linked with the various arms of the government; engineers associated with the recent Shenzhou space project, Qi Faran and Wang Yongzhi, are products of Beihang. These efforts continued well into the 1960s, with China making significant investments in research and development (R&D) and also establishing important institutions such as the Academy of Satellite Spaceship, today known as the China
Academy of Space Technology (CAST), responsible for spacecraft design and abrication. China also started launching sounding rockets into space for suborbital flights. However, the space programme could not really pick up pace due to economic and political turmoil in the country following the Cultural Revolution.

It was in 1970 that China achieved a major success by launching its first satellite, the “Dongfanghong-I.” China's space programme has come a long way since then. Major highlights of the 1970s and 1980s include: launching of the first recoverable satellite in 1975; development of geo-stationary satellites in 1984; and becoming a big player in the commercial satellite launching area with the launch of AsiaSAT-I in
1990. The 1990s saw a major push, with China launching the Long March series of rockets under “Project 921”. This project has assumed special status in China's space programme as it was the beginning of its manned space exploration programme. The aim of the Long March series has been to develop bigger and more powerful rockets required for a manned space programme. Earlier, China had also initiated a few other programmes such as Project 863, which identified key hightechnology sectors from nanotechnology and biotechnology to develop a sound biotechnological R & D
level indigenously. This was followed by Project 973, a continuation of the Project 863, outlining technological needs for improving competencies. Project 211 was initiated to set up national universities and colleges with an intent to study and research technologies for future development. China has around 2,000 institutions of higher education of which about 100 are categorised under Project 211; these
contribute 85 per cent of the state's key subjects in the technological arena, have 96 per cent of the state's key laboratories, and utilise 70 per cent of scientific research funding.

Having made heavy investments in space, China carried out the first space flight of Shenzhou in 1999. In 2003, China achieved a bigger feat as it carried out its first human space flight mission and became only the third country to do so after the Soviet Union and the US. Another achievement for China came in February 2004 when it began implementing the non-manned lunar exploration project. The first phase of
the project––orbiting the moon––has been completed. The second phase saw landing on the moon in October 2010. The mission was highly successful and produced some of the best resolution pictures ever taken.

Today, China has made significant progress in the technological realm and is on its way to developing its indigenous satellite navigation system–Beidou––and a space station by 2020. It has also entered in a big way the global satellite launch market and is likely to become an important player with a significant market share in the space industry. A major development which clearly indicated Chinese intent to use space for military purposes was the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapon test in February 2007 when China shot down its Feng Yun-1C meteorological satellite with a DF-21/KT-1 missile. The test generated large-scale debris in the orbit which provoked heavy criticism from the international community.

The next section will look at the recent developments in China's space programme, including the manned space docking and operationalisation of the Beidou satellite navigation system.

Recent Developments

Manned Space Docking
One of the most significant achievements in space for China so far has been the manual docking conducted in June 2012 when the spacecraft Shenzhou-9 was docked with the space lab Tiangong-1. Earlier in 2011, China successfully completed automated docking of Shenzhou-8 with the space lab. The astronauts of Shenzhou-9 conducted experiments during their mission, findings of which would contribute to future long duration missions. In a follow-up to this mission, Shenzhou-10 will be launched
in 2013. The Tiangong-1, in orbit since 2011, is part of a larger plan to build a space station by the year 2020, under an initiative known as Project 921. The space station, which was approved in 1992, will be the only one left in space by 2020, as the International Space Station is due to retire in the same year. However, it is argued that the success of the Chinese space station will depend on the successful development of the Long March-5 rocket, which is likely to make its first flight in 2014.

Beidou Satellite Navigation System
The Beidou (also known as Compass) satellite navigation system is one of
China's most ambitious missions in space. According to China's plans for Beidou, a
total of 35 satellites will be launched in orbit which would cover the entire Earth
by 2020 and send navigation data for users. As of April 2012, China had set 13
satellites into orbit. By the end of 2012, China will add three more satellites into
the constellation, making a total of 16 satellites and covering the entire Asia-Pacific, both for real-time navigation and weather monitoring purposes.

Some countries in the region such as Mongolia and Pakistan have already expressed interest in using Beidou's services. Beidou, which is aiming to achieve a positioning accuracy of 10 meters, will make China the third country to possess its very own satellite navigation system after the US and Russia. With an operational navigation system of its own, China will not have to depend on the US to provide these services––a vulnerability that China has been keen to avoid. Beijing feels that during a crisis, the US could deny the services provided by its Global Positioning System (GPS). An article in the China Daily said, “There have long been concerns that the US might take its dominant GPS offline in certain international emergencies.”

Satellite Launches and Launch Vehicles
China's satellite series today conduct a variety of functions including earth observation, communication, and broadcasting, as well as navigation and positioning. China's communication and broadcasting satellites have become successful in space-based data relays, tracking, telemetry and command (TT&C). These satellites today have substantially improved China's radio, television, data and voice communications. China's family of observation satellites consists of Fengyun (Wind and Cloud), Haiyang (Ocean), Ziyuan (Resources), Yaogan (Remote-Sensing) and Tianhui (Space Mapping) satellites. These are capable of providing global, three-dimensional and multispectral quantitative observation. The image
resolution and coverage capacity of these satellites has also improved significantly over the years.

As far as China's satellite launch vehicles are concerned, the 'Long March' rocket series forms the backbone of the launching technology. From 2006 to 2011, the Long March rockets conducted 67 launches and sent 79 spacecrafts into space. In 2011, China conducted 20 rocket launches successfully which in itself is commendable; the country is developing an entire series––L5, L6, and L7––in the coming years. The payload capability of these launch vehicles has progressed to an extent that for the first time China was able to launch two navigational satellites on one rocket on April 30, 2012. China's recent advances suggest that they may be in a position to have launch vehicles capable of carrying up to four satellites on one rocket. Additionally, they plan to conduct up to 100 satellite launches between 2010 and
2015, or an average of 20 launches per year.

Commercial Launching
While China entered the international satellite launch market in 1985, it has gone far ahead in the last three decades. Today, China is launching satellites for countries in Latin America, Africa, as well as Pakistan. Experts believe that given China's increasing expertise in commercial launching, it will most likely acquire a
large share of the commercial satellite launch market in the future. It is reported that Beijing seeksto gain 10 per cent of the world's commercial satellite market and 15 per cent of commercial launch business by 2015.

Space-based Solar Power
Given its growing economy and the rising hunger for energy resources, China has plans to develop clean energy options in space such as utilising space-based solar power (SBSP). By August 2011, China had completed the initial study for the project which aims to begin commercial use of the solar space station by 2040. China's plan, drawn by one of its space pioneers Wang Xiji, aims to look at various aspects of spacebased solar power applications, designs and key technologies that would make the option economically feasible in the first instance and sustainable by 2020. Highlighting the importance of exploring the spacebased solar power options, Wang said, “whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space aviation industry will be the world leader.” While India and the US have been talking about SBSP, China has actually made the pioneering moves. While utilisation of space assets for energy purposes should be seen as environment friendly and therefore a positive step, the spin-off benefits of technological development and their utility in the military domain cannot be overlooked.

Chinese Lunar Exploration Project
Since 2007, China has been engaged in moon missions probing the lunar surface for scientific data. In 2007, the Chang'e-1 lunar probe mapped the entire surface of the moon. The Chang'e-2 launched in October 2010 provided high-resolution maps of the moon's surface. China claims that these pictures are the highest resolution images of the moon captured so far. Meanwhile, the Chang'e-3 lunar probe is undergoing preparations and is scheduled for launch in 2013. The device is designed to conduct land surveys, living conditions assessment and space observations over the moon for three months and will be equipped with advanced recognition and navigation systems. Additionally, China plans to do a moon walk some time between 2020 and 2030.
China's interest in the lunar mission is also related to exploration of natural resources. It plans to bring back soil and rock samples from the moon. Apart from other potential use, including exploration of the known mineral reserves such as iron, China has done considerable research on exploration of Helium-3, a source for nuclear fusion. Ouyang Ziyuan, head of the first phase of lunar exploration, has said: “There are altogether 15 tons of helium-3 on Earth, while on the Moon, the total amount of helium-3 can reach one to five million tons … If we human beings can finally use such energy material to generate electricity, then China might need 10 tons of helium-3 every year.” Meanwhile, China also has plans for a Mars mission. It had originally planned for a mission in collaboration with Russia. However, after the failure of the first mission that was also carrying the Russian Mars Orbiter, China has decided to go solo on the next mission, possibly in 2013.

China's Space Diplomacy
China is party to several international agreements on outer space, including: the Outer Space Treaty; Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched in Outer Space (Launched Registration Convention); Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (Rescue Agreement); Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention); Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisations (ITSU); and International Telecommunications Constitution and Convention (ITU). Additionally, China is a member of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) since 1981. Being a space-faring nation, China has been active in the international debate on issues concerning space. In one of Beijing's recent official statements, Chinese Ambassador Cheng Jingye, at the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS, reiterated China's policy of using outer space for peaceful purposes and against weaponisation. The latest space White Paper has also emphasised on the “peaceful development and peaceful exploration, exploitation and use of outer space.” Cheng reiterated that the Chinese government opposes “weaponization and arms race in outer space and dedicates itself actively to the effort of maintaining peace and security in outer space. China continues to believe that elaborating relevant international legal instruments through negotiation is still the best option to preserve long lasting peace and security in outer space.”

While in certain international fora, China officially maintains a policy of peaceful use of outer space, it has sent an entirely different message in other quarters. For instance, as the European Union began bilateral dialogues with different countries on universalising a space code, China made it clear that space debris cannot be a major item in any normative exercise. Such a posturing on the part of China results in wariness among its neighbours as well as other global space powers.

While China has articulated a policy of non-weaponisation, it is a fact that there are military spin-off benefits from the advancements it has made in space because of the dual-use nature of the technology, as well as the fact that its space programme is almost entirely run by the PLA. While non-weaponisation is a point of emphasis in the Russia-China co-sponsored “Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of
Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT) at the Conference on Disarmament, there exists a huge lacunae given that the treaty mentions only the placement of weapons in outer space. Not mentioning the use of ground-based weapons for operations in space is significant, potentially suggesting that China wants to keep open the option of using ASAT weapons.

While China has been active on space debris mitigation efforts within the UN COPUOS and the Conference on Disarmament, it has been resistant to making debris a major issue even in a non-legally binding code of conduct on space. For instance, Ambassador Tang Guoqiang at the 46th session of COPUOS said: “As a responsible space-faring country, China supports the SDMG [Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines] recently adopted by the STSC [Scientific and Technical Subcommittee] and stands ready to continue exploring and promoting ways and means of sustainable development in the peaceful uses of OS (Outer Space).” Four years later and after the missile defence test in January 2010, China has continued to argue on similar lines. For instance, Wang Qun, the Chinese Ambassador for disarmament affairs said at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly: “The outer space is a common wealth of
mankind as the global public space. The permanent peace of outer space is correlated to all nations' security, development and prosperity. Safeguarding the peaceful use of outer space and preventing the weaponisation of and an arms race in outer space are common interests and obligations of all countries.”

However, activities of the PLA have gone on undeterred and recent advances are a reflection of this. The stated official policy continues to be one that supports the space debris mitigation guidelines and peaceful uses of outer space; however, Chinese opposition to space debris which comes out in unofficial parleys such as the EU negotiations on the Code, as mentioned earlier, reflects a different reality.

Implications for India
Technologically, China may be far behind the US and Russia; the fact is, however, that Beijing has been making steady progress in recent years. The development of the indigenous satellite navigation system, space lab module, and the manned space docking experiments, are only some examples that highlight Beijing's continued progress in this area. These developments also highlight the growing gap between
India and China, with Beijing moving closer to becoming a top-tier space power. This could have a significant impact on the balance of power between the two Asian giants.

China's growing capabilities have military and security implications for India. For instance, the Beidou navigation system is being used by the PLA to conduct operations such as border and coastal control, wherein Beidou data is being used by the troops. This could further transform into becoming the backbone of Chinese military operations at a future date. The Beidou will be in a position to provide detailed coordinates and other data of troops on the ground, significantly improving operational efficiency. India should also be mindful of China's advancements in the field of satellite imagery that may be able to provide better, real-time data on Indian military installations and positioning. India should also consider that China may provide such data to Pakistan, which might prove particularly relevant during
times of conflict.

China's advancement in commercial satellite launching capability is something that India should be concerned about and take corrective steps. China's ability to conduct nearly 20 launches per year, as against India's low number of four, requires focussed attention. Cost is an additional factor in which China has clear advantage.
While SBSP has remained a dream project for several countries including India and the US, China has made fast progress with plans to establish the first commercial solar power station by 2040. This will ensure China not only secure and reliable sources of energy but also technological spin-offs which would be significant. China's initiatives in this regard should be a wakeup call for many countries, including India. India should also take note of the geostrategic implications of China's space programme.

While Pakistan's space capabilities are nowhere comparable to that of India's, the fact that the former is receiving assistance from China is of immediate consequence. A repeat of what China did in the nuclear arena, providing Pakistan with assistance in nuclear design and technology, cannot be ignored.

As evident in several statements by Chinese leaders and the development plans announced periodically, China is likely to invest more resources to develop capabilities in outer space, both civilian and military. The increasing militarisation of political issues would provide Beijing a justification for its growing military space programme. An arms control measure that would bring about restraint on China, in the form of a code or a legally binding mechanism, will be in the interest of India. India as an established space power should take the lead in Asia and abroad in developing a consensus on this issue.

While India has many programmes similar to those of China, including military communications and manned space flights, its programmes continue to be subcritical in nature and the resources are spread too thin to be effective. Instead of adopting a knee-jerk reaction to developments on the Chinese side and attempting to catch up with China, India needs to prioritise and develop capabilities from a commercial
and national security perspective. As noted recently by former President and former scientific advisor to the Prime Minister, Dr. A.P.J. Adbul Kalam, India has to shed the “fifth nation” syndrome and aim for the number one slot in selective fields including space.

India also needs to be mindful of the benefits of issuing a white paper on space outlining its long-term aims and objectives, in both commercial and military space domains. This would bring about the much-needed clarity and prioritization in the space domain and additionally open up avenues for international cooperation.

Lastly, while India's space programme has come a long way in terms of its technological prowess, with its utilities applicable including in the military domain, the priorities and directions have been so far set forth largely by the scientific bureaucracy. Neither the UPA nor its predecessor, the NDA government, had lent political leadership to India's space programme. This approach needs to change if India has to develop a vibrant programme that best secures its national interests in the backdrop of newer challenges.

Endnotes:
1. Chinese Government's Official Web Portal, “Full Text: China's Space Activities in 2011,” available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2011-
12/29/content_2033200_2.htm.
2. China National Space Administration, “China's Space Activities (White Paper),” December 15, 2003, available at
http://www.cnsa.gov.cn/n615709/n620681/n771967/69198.html.
3. “Over 10 Billion Yuan to be Invested in 211 Project,” People's Daily Online, March 26, 2008, available at
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/6381319.html
4. Brian Spegele, “Chinese Hit New Space Heights,” The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2012, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303703004577473850707372174.html.
5. Ibid.
6. “Beidou Satellite Navigation System Launched,” China.org website, December 28, 2011, available at http://www.china.org.cn/china/2011-
12/28/content_24266178.htm.
7. In comparison, India and other major space faring countries do two to three launches per year.
8. Xin Dingding, “China to Build Satellite for Belarus,” China Daily, September 20, 2011, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-
09/20/content_13737510.htm.
9. “China Unveils Plan for Solar Power Station in Space,” Want China Times, September 02, 2011, available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/newssubclass-cnt.aspx?id=20110902000023&cid=1105.
10. “China Launches Second Moon Mission: Is Mining Rare Helium 3 an Ultimate Goal?” The Daily Galaxy, October 03, 2010, available at
http://www.dailygalaxy.com/my_weblog/2010/10/china-launches-second-moon-mission-is-mining-helium-3-an-ultimate-goal.html.
11. “General Statement by Ambassador CHENG Jingye, Head of the Chinese delegation to the 51st Session of the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS,”
March 19, 2012, available at http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/dbtyw/hplywk/t915383.htm.
12. “Statement by Ambassador Tang Guoqiang at 46th Session of COPUOS LSC Under the Item of General Exchange of Views,” April 04, 2007, available
at http://www.chinesemission-vienna.at/eng/xw/t308746.htm.
13. “Statement by H. E. Mr. Wang Qun, Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs of China, at the Thematic Debate on Outer Space at the First Committee of
the UNGA,” October 17, 2011, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t869579.htm.
14. JiTianxiang and LuoWenyi, “Frontier Defense Regiment's Information-Based New Equipment Aids, Border and Coastal Control,” People's Daily Online,
June 26, 2012, available at http://english.people.com.cn/90786/7856116.html

Establishing the Rules of the Road in Space: Issues & Challenges

Here's the link to an article of mine on the Code of Conduct on Space published by ORF.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.



Establishing the rules of the road on space seems to be gaining a "top-down" push and momentum as though acceptance of these rules will amount to solving all the concerns about outer space activities. Currently, there are two Code of Conduct (CoC) that are doing the rounds for universalisation of certain norms that might strengthen the legitimacy and credibility of the Code. The two codes are the EU Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities (hereafter EU Code) and the Model Code of Conduct, prepared by the Stimson Center. Here, I look only at the EU Code: can it become a universal space code of conduct?

Some of the salient provisions of the EU Code are:

• The Code will codify new best practices while contributing to transparency and confidence-building measures and will be complimentary to the existing arrangements on outer space activities.

• The Code is a voluntary measure open to all States.

• The "inherent right or collective self-defense in accordance with the United Nations Charter" will be observed.

• States becoming parties to the Code will also be guided by the existing legal framework while "making programme towards adherence to, and implementation of:" among other treaties, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967); the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968), the Constitution and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union and its Radio Regulations (2002).

• States that become party to the Code "will establish and implement national policies and procedures to minimise the possibility of accidents in space, collisions between space objects or any form of harmful interference with other States’ right to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space."

• States that become parties are also obliged to provide "information on national space policies and strategies, including basic objectives for security and defence related activities."

• State parties engaged "in the consultations shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests."

Safety and security of space assets have so far been ensured through bilateral and regional agreements. But three incidents in the recent past ? the Chinese ASAT test of January 2007, the US shooting down of a satellite in February 2008 and the collision of a US Iridium satellite with a defunct Russian satellite in 2009 ? have triggered concerns of new dangers in space that is becoming crowded, raising the potentials for accidents. These concerns have fuelled the developments of these CoC.

On the surface of it, the EU Code appears to be an innocuous document. But not many non-EU States have accepted the EU code. Why?

For States to be party to global mechanisms, few questions need to be answered. What does the Code seek to do that is not achievable through other bilateral or regional means? Does the Code enhance a state’s security significantly or will it be an obstacle to carrying out some of its legitimate activities in space? Lastly, is the Code an inclusive framework?

The EU Code has already generated official reservations around the world, particularly in Asia. Europe has to make genuine efforts to reach across to Asia and facilitate a consensus with Asian powers if the Code has to be endorsed and universalised.

To start with, some of the simpler objections: the fact that the European governments have formulated the Code without consulting any of the Asian space powers is an issue. It is in Asia that one is going to witness heightened space activities and potentially the challenges are also going to come from Asia. Therefore this was not a smart move on the part of the EU.

However, fresh efforts can be made to limit the damage if the EU is open to understanding what the Indian and broader Asian concerns are, how they can be accommodated. Alternatively, more problematically, the Asian countries might insist on developing a space CoC on their own. Europe has to consider the impact of changing geopolitics and the increasing importance of Asia, particularly in the space domain.

Clearly, space is once again becoming the sphere of rivalry and potential conflicts and the EU has admirably taken the lead in establishing the rules of the road to avoid intended or unintended consequences of any action in space. However, the CoC does not move towards a legally binding mechanism that has been the demand from the Asian countries at various multilateral forums. In the absence of the fact that it does not meet this basic demand, it is unclear if Asian powers will become party to it. India has consistently pointed out the need for a legally binding mechanism to be put in place to prevent weaponization of outer space. India as part of the Group of 21 (Non-Aligned Nations in the Conference on Disarmament)has argued that global and inclusive transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs), which are supported by the West, could be important complementary measures but there is need for legally binding measures.

Though the EU CoC is voluntary, it expects States to "establish and implement national policies and procedures" to tackle issues such as the increasing traffic in space and thereafter the potential for accidents up in the orbit. This may be seen as binding the States and "intrusive" although in an indirect manner. On the other hand, the CoC being voluntary means it defeats its purpose as it would imply that there is no penalty on States / entities violating certain norms that might get institutionalised with the adoption of the CoC.

Therefore, why should States adopt, institutionalise and internationalise a CoC? The general set of principles enumerated in the EU CoC already exist in different forms in various countries ? in the national space policies of countries like the US or policy statements by various leaders in the Parliament and at multilateral fora the case of countries like India which does not articulate policies in one single policy document.

Similarly, the loose and vague manner in which the CoC is worded could lead to misinterpretations. Operationalising the CoC will become that much more difficult. Phrases like "to promoting the common and precise understandings" and "shall seek solutions based on an equitable balance of interests" are cases in point. These objectives are idealistic but vague and can be quite subjective. And then there’s ’equitable balance of interests’ ? whose interests are we talking about? Therefore the more difficult issue will be that different countries will interpret this differently, affecting the Asian interests adversely. This has fuelled more suspicion than confidence.

Next, who will enforce the CoC? The CoC is enforceable when the enforcing power has significant amount of hard power and clout. The credibility of the EU in this regard is questionable. Take for instance the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (H-COC). While 128 countries have accepted H-COC, the Code is yet to have many of the Asian countries ? China, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea ? as endorsed parties, which makes it an unsuccessful attempt at tackling missile proliferation.

Should India endorse the CoC? Does it advance India’s interests? An arrangement that focuses on a broad set of principles, without any concrete action plans, without any in-built verification mechanism and no legal obligations, helps India little. The EU Code remains a highly idealistic one with no practical utility in tackling three important concerns ? space debris, space overcrowding and avoidance of collision. For instance, it is highly ambitious to assume that the US or China are going to do prior notifications of an ASAT test. Similarly, States reporting on their national policies, including the intent for defensive uses of space assets, can be interpreted in an adverse manner. These are concerns that cannot be pushed under the carpet.

Lastly, codes cannot establish responsible conduct. In fact, geopolitics will facilitate or block the implementation of the CoC. The more powerful will dictate the terms. Even if the US as the most powerful country on earth decides to become a party to the CoC, the numerical superiority of Asian countries could push the wind in the other direction. The fact that the code does not provide an inclusive framework makes it even harder to implement. European States have established a set of ideals without consultation of Asian countries, without the understanding the Asian ground realities and such a mechanism is not going to be accepted that easily in Asia. For Europe to unilaterally decide what is good for the world does not augur well. It appears like they are making yet another mistake like the H-COC.

China's Missile Defence Test: Yet Another Milestone?

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent Chinese missile defence test, published by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA).

On January 11, 2007, China shocked the world by conducting an anti-satellite (ASAT) test. On January 11, 2010, they did it again, this time, with a missile defence test. Has China made some technological breakthrough here?

The Chinese appear to have used essentially the same technology as in the ASAT test – “hit-to-kill” technologies. The missile defence test is seen as an expansion of its ASAT technology.



On January 11, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said that China had conducted a test of a ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory. She added, “The test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country.”1 [1] In order to substantiate the public support for the tests, Xinhua News brought out a web survey from Global Times (China) that showed that about 98.8 per cent voters supported China’s self-developed anti-missile system, with only 0.4 per cent voting against it.2 [2] In fact, Global Times cited senior military strategist Yang Chengjun saying that “China needs an improved capability and more means of military defence as the country faces increasing security threats.”3 [3] Jin Canrong of the School of International Studies at Renmin University of China, in an interview with the Global Times, noted that China has always followed a defensive strategy and that the missile defence test has not changed that strategy, but only “reinforced” it.4 [4]
China’s missile defence test has come against the backdrop of the US sale of weapons to Taiwan, including PAC-3 air defence missiles.5 [5] US weapon sales to Taiwan in turn are driven by the confrontation across the Taiwan Straits, and the 1,300 ballistic missile stationed by Beijing in its missile brigades opposite Taiwan. Beijing had repeatedly raised objections to the weapons sales and asked Washington to cancel the deal. The Chinese Defence Ministry warned over the weekend that it reserved the right to take unspecified action if Washington followed through with the sale, which it called a ‘severe obstacle’ to China-US military ties.6 [6] However, the tests cannot be seen as a response to US weapon sales alone because the decision to test was not an overnight one. The test was rather a display of the rising profile of Chinese PLA and its increasing technological prowess.
What was particularly striking was the way China managed post-test reactions from around the world. Unlike in January 2007 when China conducted the ASAT test,7 [7] this time around, the Chinese foreign ministry was most forthcoming in announcing that China has conducted such a test and that the test would “neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft.”8 [8] However, reading the statement carefully, nothing much has been actually said in terms of the purpose of the test or details of interceptors and so on. In the absence of any concrete information coming from Chinese government sources, one has to rely on the writings of some of the well-known China-watchers who note that it may have been the same sort of interceptor as used in the 2007 ASAT test. Based on a particular image (file photo) on Xinhua News, several commentators agreed that it was the air defence missile, HQ-9.9 [9] However, there were several other pictures (file photos) available on the Xinhua News, and one of the posts by Jeffrey G. Lewis on the blog ArmsControlWonk suggests that it could have been a HQ-9, or a HQ-12 or even a DF-21C.10 [10]
The Chinese appear to have used essentially the same technology as in the ASAT test – “hit-to-kill” technologies. The missile defence test is seen as an expansion of its ASAT technology. In the case of India, it has been the reverse – the anti-ballistic missile programme (ABM) is believed to have been expanded to include anti-satellite programmes. China appears to have focused on the development of kinetic energy interceptors for this purpose.
In the absence of any substantial information available from Chinese officialdom, it is hard to derive firm conclusions. However, one can draw out a few implications of the test. For one, this will sharpen the security dilemma that already exists in Asia. China’s missile defence test could possibly up the ante in the region, with other regional powers considering measures in reaction. India had already announced that its ABM programme will be expanded to include anti-satellite programmes (a reaction that came about post-Chinese ASAT test). In addition, these technologies are becoming more popular and could spread widely around the world if no global mechanism is established to control them. One possibility is the spread of these technologies from China to possibly Iran, Pakistan and North Korea, which would exacerbate regional crises.
1. 1. [11] “China Conducts Test on Ground-based Midcourse Missile Interception,” Xinhua News, January 11, 2010, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/11/content_12792329.htm [12]
2. 2. [13] “China Reaffirms that Its Missile Interception Test Defensive,” Xinhua News, January 12, 2010, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/12/content_12797459.htm [14].
3. 3. [15] “China Successfully Tests Missile Defence System,” The Dawn, January 12, 2010, available at http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/14-china-says-successfully-tests-missile-defence-system-zj-07 [16].
4. 4. [17] “China Reaffirms that Its Missile Interception Test Defensive,” Xinhua News, January 12, 2010, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/12/content_12797459.htm [14].
5. 5. [18] The PAC-3 systems seem to be the last component that a US $6.5 billion weapons deal approved towards the end of the Bush administration’s term. The weapons package from the 2008 deal include: 330 PAC-3 missiles ($ 3.1 b) and the current deal is part of the larger missile package. These systems could possibly provide Taiwan the ability to eliminate short- and medium-range missiles launched from China. See, “US Missile Defense Deal with Taiwan Ok’d,” Global Security Newswire, Nuclear Threat Initiative, January 07, 2010, available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100107_8249.php [19].
6. 6. [20] “China Tests Missile Defence,” The Straits Times, January 12, 2010, available at http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Asia/Story/STIStory_476280.html [21].
7. 7. [22] In January 2007, following the ASAT test, there was no announcement or clarification from the Chinese government for about two weeks, until the Aviation Week and Space Technology brought it out. China came under sharp criticism for not informing other governments in advance, dismissing the potential impact on the peaceful use of the space among others.
8. 8. [23] Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Chinese Missile Defense Test,” ArmsControlWonk.com, January 12, 2010, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2588/chinese-missile-defense-test [24].
9. 9. [25] Reports suggest that the Russian surface-to-air missiles purchased by China in the 1990s were further improvised to develop their own version of interceptors such as HQ-9, along with a significant number of missile systems with better range and accuracy. Also, media reports in 2006 noted that Beijing had conducted a surface-to-air missile test in the north-west China, which was believed to be similar in specifications and capabilities to that of the US Patriot system. South Korean newspaper, Dong a il bo had reported that the test involved detection and downing of both a reconnaissance drone and an incoming ballistic missile by an interceptor. See, “China Says Missile Defense Test Successful,” Associated Press, azcentral.com, January 11, 2010, available at http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2010/01/11/20100111china-missile0111.html [26]. In fact, GlobalSecurity notes that HQ-9 may have been developed “based on a Chinese-designed missile motor, search and guidance hardware which in turn is based on the Russian S-300PMU, and guidance technology from the American Patriot. China procured from Russia four to six S-300PMU batteries (48 to 72 missiles) in 1991 and purchased an additional 120 missiles in 1994.” Additionally, there were reports that in 1993 Israel had transferred a Patriot missile or missile technology to China, although Israel has denied those reports. Further, in 1997, the US Office of Naval Intelligence suggested that “technology from advanced Western systems may be incorporated into the HQ-9.” See, “HQ-9,” GlobalSecurity, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/hq-9.htm [27]
10. 10. [28] Jeffrey G. Lewis, “Chinese Missile Defense Test,” ArmsControlWonk.com, January 12, 2010, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2588/chinese-missile-defense-test [24].

China Conducts Missile Defence Test

In January 2007, China shocked the world by conducting anti-satellite (ASAT) test and in January 2010, they have done it again, this time, a missile defence test.

Xinhua News reported, "On January 11, 2010, China conducted a test on ground-based midcourse missile interception technology within its territory. The test has achieved the expected objective. The test is defensive in nature and is not targeted at any country." Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu said the test is in tune with their defensive strategy that China has always pursued and not targeted at any country.

Chinese approach to finding techno-military solutions to geopolitical problems can be a dangerous trend.



Xinhua News also brought out the results of a web-bsed survey that the Global Times conducted and the results are: about 98.8 percent voters supported China's self-developed anti-missile system, with only 0.4 percent voting against it.

Jeffrey, in a post in ArmsControlWonk, notes that it may have been the same sort of interceptor as used in the 2007 ASAT test. Based on one particular image (file photo) on the Xinhua, several commentators agreed that it was the air defence missile, HQ-9. However, there were several other pictures (file photos) available on the Xinhua, and Jeffrey's post says that it could have been HQ-9, an HQ-12 or a DF-21C.

While China claims that they have been open about their missile defence test, unlike during the ASAT test, not much has been actually said, in terms of the purpose of the test or details of interceptors and so on.

Rising Chinese Power: A Common Agenda in India-Australia Dialogue?

While the recent attacks against Indian students in Australia will top Indian External Affairs Minister SM Krishna’s agenda in Canberra, India should not lose sight of certain strategic imperatives that could potentially drive the two countries to a closer partnership. Can a rising Chinese power emerge as a striking imperative between New Delhi and Canberra in the coming years?



Joel Fitzgibbon, in the preface to the 2009 Defence White Paper titled, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030, noted that the “biggest changes to our outlook … have been the rise of China, the emergence of India and the beginning of the end of the so-called unipolar movement.”
The white paper added that Chinese rise in the economic, political and military spheres and the resultant regional military modernisation have triggered significant concerns in Australia. More specifically, the defence white paper noted that the Chinese military modernisation could “affect the strategic reach and global postures of the major powers.” It added that the Chinese military will also be the strongest in Asia, with significant margin and will have power projection as one of its major features. The “pace, scope and structure” of such modernisation, the white paper notes, can trigger concern among the Asian neighbours, unless China undertakes some serious confidence building measures among these neighbours. The more serious worry for Australia is the implication of a reduced US strategic presence in the Asia-Pacific that would trigger regional powers to shoulder their own security. These concerns are reflected in a series of research essays and analyses in Australia looking carefully at the growing Chinese power and more importantly at how that power will be used or what kind of an international player would China turn out to be.
The 2007 Australian National Security Report had also highlighted concerns about China. It stated that “the pace and scope of China’s military modernisation, particularly the development of new and disruptive capabilities such as the anti-satellite (ASAT) missile, could create misunderstandings and instability in the region.” However Australian Defence Minister Brendan Nelson, during his recent visit to Beijing, backtracked a bit, saying that Chinese military modernisation programme was not a threat and that Australia’s support of an anti-ballistic missile defence system being developed by the US and Japan was directed at “rogue states” such as North Korea and non-state actors and not at China. He also had to reassure his hosts that India was not being included in any emerging coalition, something that appears to be particularly bothering Beijing.
In the case of Australia, there appears to be significant difference between the intelligence agencies and the policy makers, particularly the defence department. The intelligence agencies appear to be going along with a more benign China (“the growth of an ‘engaged’ China”) as opposed to the defence department that visualizes “inevitable collisions” as China becomes more powerful.
India also has concerns about China. Although economic ties between the two countries have improved significantly, there is a significant gap between the two countries on politico-strategic affairs and the evolving Asian security framework. While the rise of China has created ripples in India, the most worrying has been the pace of its military modernisation and the secrecy that shrouds it. There have been concerns also about the decision-making process in China. The military leadership in China sometimes appears to have an agenda of its own as was witnessed in a few cases in the recent past. More importantly, decision-making during crises is almost a prerogative of the military leadership. This will have adverse implications particularly for countries like India, US, Japan, Australia and Russia.
Another concern stems from the uncertainty of a more powerful China It is not certain whether the China’s rise would lead to a period of stability or be one with destabilising consequences for the region and the world at large. This fear arises from the fact that China has pursued an aggressive military modernisation, much beyond its stated objective of defending against external intervention in Taiwan. While China has continued to argue that its military modernisation and capability building are geared towards a crisis on the Taiwan Straits, its ambitions could go well beyond that, as several recent reports show, including the Australian defence White Paper. There have been many reports of China developing an aircraft carrier. Reports also show that China has deployed new missile units outfitted with conventional theatre-range missiles at various locations in China that could be operationalised in a variety of non-Taiwan contingencies, which has implications for India. Similarly, the missile re-organisation that China undertook in July 2007 is noteworthy. According to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), satellite photographs reveal the deployment of the DF-21 medium-range missiles at Delingha, which could put at risk all of northern India, including New Delhi. These missiles could potentially target Russian ICBM fields, although it is reasonably certain that China does not intend to target Russia. There have also been significant improvements in China’s AWACS capabilities (Air-borne Early Warning and Control) and aerial-refuelling programmes.
In the long-term, the increasing Chinese defence expenditure and its military modernization could give China arena capacity to dominate Asia. These trends also suggest that other powers need to be cautious in estimating the consequences of China’s rise. Rise of new powers have altered the security milieu historically. However, if the rising power indicates that its intentions are peaceful and defensive, essentially through its defence/military postures, this could reduce the suspicion and thereby help create a peaceful region. This has not been the case with China. China has exhibited ambitions to form a Greater China comprising of the Mainland, a politically and economically integrated Taiwan, and Hong Kong and Macau.
If these trends continue, rising Chinese power could possibly become the biggest strategic imperative for both India and Australia to strengthen their strategic partnership. Although the earlier efforts in terms of quadrilateral initiative have died, it might be in the interest of like-minded countries to join their hands together in cementing a stable and peaceful order in Asia. It may also be worth the effort to see how China can be brought into the camp through CBMs, particularly in the military-security arena.

Mixed signals over Chinese missiles

Here's a link to a story on the recent NASIC report and Chinese missiles by Peter Brown that has quoted me extensively. The story appeared in today's Asia Times Online.

As defense analysts and experts in the United States, Japan and India digest the recent "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat" report by the US Air Force (USAF) National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) - particularly any elements pertaining to China - important gaps or omissions are surfacing.

The bottom line is that these gaps, along with differences between the NASIC report [1] and a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-authored report on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) released earlier this year, are making the overall US analysis of the situation unfolding in China involving missiles and military space matters increasingly hard to gauge.

An admission by the commander of the USAF Space Command

(AFSPC), General Robert Kehler, made in a written response to questions submitted to him during a Congressional sub-committee hearing in March and just recently published, underscores the fact that the US recognizes that it has to do a much better job when it comes to the broad topic of space intelligence.

"Several initiatives have been taken to address the need for more and better qualified space intelligence analysts. Recent billet additions at AFSPC, NASIC, DIA and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] have taken place through internal reallocations and external over guidance approval. NSA [National Security Agency] has reprioritized for better space analysis and USSTRATCOM J2 [US Strategic Command - Intelligence] is reestablishing space analysis.

Overall analytic resources will remain insufficient, despite the improvement cited above, and will require active efforts to increase efficiency and collaboration. AFSPC is hosting an interagency forum to review/refine intelligence shortfalls and to seek interagency solutions," said General Kehler.

"The Defense Intelligence Space Threat Committee under NASIC leadership has been established to oversee and coordinate a wide variety of complex space/ counterspace analytical activities. Space/counterspace intelligence requirements have been revaluated and are now being reprioritized and rewritten to more clearly focus the intelligence community."

As the world adjusts to China's overt display of anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare in 2007 - satellites like the inactive Chinese weather satellite it destroyed that year represent a critical component in almost all ballistic missile defense systems - and as the line which separates conventional ballistic missiles from small satellite launchers becomes blurred due to advances in satellite design and complexity, the task at hand does not get any easier. Witness the launches undertaken since last year both by Iran and North Korea, for example. China's decision to use its latest manned space flight in 2008 as an opportunity to launch a small satellite from the manned spacecraft may not fall into the same category as these launches, but it does not make matters less complicated either.

"Training is also a critical element of USAF efforts to address adversary space threat. AFSPC recently expanded the Space Professional Development Program to include the USAF intelligence community. The National Space Security Institute has begun a comprehensive review and expansion of AFSPC's space professional training courses in close cooperation with the (AFSPC Directorate of Intelligence) and the intelligence community at large," said General Kehler.

His response speaks to the process and not the results. Still, it is quite unlikely that a Chinese military commander would make any admission in public view.

Dr Gregory Kulacki, China project manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists, identifies the lack of analysts with meaningful proficiency in the Chinese language as one of the most important gaps in US space intelligence capabilities.

"The mistaken characterization by US experts of the BX-1 satellite released from the Shenzhou VII [last year] is a good example of how insufficient or non-existent language skills can weaken analysis," said Dr Kulacki. "The BX-1 mission was highly publicized and discussed in detail in the Chinese media, but because [many US experts were] unable to understand that material, [they] created yet another tempest in a teapot over the BX-1."

In Asia, important gaps in the NASIC report have generated questions in India in particular. Specifically, two important omissions involve China's activities in Tibet, and a reorganization of its missile facilities at a base near Tibet that started two years ago, according to Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

"China's positioning of its intermediate range missiles such as DF-4s and DF-21s in Tibet, and reports which suggest that China could also deploy DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs at bases such as Delingha near Tibet, raise serious concerns. Both the DF-31s and DF-31As are road mobile and use solid propellant engines. Placing medium-range ballistic missiles in Delingha which can hit targets approximately 2,500 kilometers away can put all of northern India at risk, including New Delhi," said Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

On page 3 of the NASIC report, it is reported that, "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world ... China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles. New theater missiles continue to be deployed in the vicinity of Taiwan, while the ICBM force is adding the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A) ICBMs. The new JL-2 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) is also under development. Future ICBMs probably will include some with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the number of ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years."

Richard Fisher, a Chinese military expert at the Washington DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, told the Washington Times in early June that, "in just over two months, US intelligence community estimates have China's ICBMs increasing by 25%. That's a formidable rate of growth." [2]

For Fisher, this sharp increase signals a need for more in-depth analysis, and for more players to become involved.

"This year's dual assessments have been produced by two US intelligence community teams: the DIA is largely responsible for the annual PLA report to the Congress [released in March], and a USAF team produces the NASIC report," said Fisher. "We should not be surprised that they produce differing results, but the fact that we have benefited slightly in terms of new ICBM number assessments to me proves that there should be much more competition in the production of such assessments. Democracies require more facts, not less."

Rahul Bhonsle, a South Asian defense analyst based in New Delhi, finds Fisher's statement quite alarming.

"However, this does not denote the trends of developments in the past which have been more conservative. For China to suddenly attain a leap does not appear to be practical. My reading is that China is more focused today on improving its internal information and logistics management systems so as to enhance response times rather than develop and or induct additional systems," said Bhonsle.

Otherwise, despite the fact that the NASIC report specifically mentions Taiwan in three different sections, he is not concerned about the omission of China's activities in or near Tibet in the report which, "appears to be more of a capability-based rather than a threat-based analysis".

"There are some indications of the Chinese preparing some advanced launch positions in Tibet which is of concern to us. These locations remain unidentified so far, so building up information on these is a priority," said Bhonsle.

Brian Weeden, technical advisor at the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation, sees the NASIC assessment as warranting further clarification. He describes what is underway in China as "actually fairly slow growth compared to what the US and Soviet Union did starting in the 1950s".

"Right now, it is clear that China has no intention of matching the US or Russia warhead for warhead, and it has no plans to achieve the same level of overwhelming nuclear force. They are still sticking to the philosophy of limited deterrence, ie having just enough," said Weeden. "And if having 'just enough' is your goal, then it is obvious that you would want to have those few nuclear weapons as survivable as possible. Road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs are exactly that."

Weeden finds that talk about percentages is a way to overemphasize or perhaps even conceal real numbers.

"Going from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons is a 100% increase, but so is going from 1,000 to 2,000, and adding 1,000 more warheads is much more of a problem than adding 10," said Weeden.

According to Rajagopalan, China's growing missile capabilities - both in actual numbers and the types of missiles - and the proliferation of those missiles have triggered regional insecurity and resulted in a spiraling arms race in the region.

"If China increases the number of ICBMs from even 20 to 25 in a year, this small growth is something that India, US, and Japan might watch out for. It may not have reached any dangerous proportion, but this is something that needs close monitoring," said Rajagopalan. "Development of these missile forces and the ever-growing submarine force indicate that China prefers to implement an area denial strategy. Such a capability will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for others to operate close to the Chinese mainland."

Weeden is also eager to examine several recent projections of Chinese submarine-launched nuclear warheads in greater detail, too.

"Recent predictions that China could have upwards of 400 sub-launched nuclear warheads within the decade are absurd. The newest class of [Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear] SSBN (JL-2) has 12 launch tubes, each of which can hold a missile with one warhead. There is no way that China is going to be able to roll out 30-plus SSBNs in a decade."

For Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Vice Admiral and former Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commander, who is the director of the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo, the debate over numbers does not tell the whole story. While he agrees with Fisher's assessment, he finds China's persistent lack of transparency involving its overall nuclear strategy, not to mention its entire military strategy, unsettling given the steady increase in Chinese defense budgets since the mid-1980's. China's focus on ASATs, and other countermeasures intended to disable otherwise effective missile defense systems, and China's efforts to secure its position as a third nuclear superpower, while "anticipating the trend of global nuclear reduction" are important developments that Kaneda elects to highlight.

When asked which specific Chinese missile-related trends disturb him, he responded simply - "Every trend."

"The Japanese government will review its "National Defense Program Guidelines [NDPG]" by the end of this year. I hope the revised NDPG would effectively address all my concerns as expressed here. Though it depends on which parties [achieve] political dominance in the next general election," said Kaneda.

Certainly, the recent debate over Japan's possible adoption of a preemptive strike capability as a reasonable measure has cast the emerging NDPG in a different light.

Kaneda would not comment on how open he felt the Japanese people are today to his point of view. A longtime and somewhat hawkish advocate for a greater emphasis on ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Japan, he also would not comment on the BMD efforts now underway in Japan involving all the existing branches of the JSDF. He also did not comment on whether or not he would prefer to consolidate BMD developmental and testing activities under one command or under a single agency in a manner similar to what is now in place in the US under the Missile Defense Agency.

No matter how you interpret the numbers or what upward curve you select, Fisher finds them disturbing.

"PLA nuclear missile numbers are growing to a point to which we can drop this notion they have a 'minimum' nuclear deterrent force. An early nuclear missile force in excess of 120 is plausible, and they could be divided roughly evenly between land and sea-based platforms," said Fisher. "This means that all PLA nuclear missiles will be harder to find, and that China will become increasingly aggressive toward the US and other navies operating in the South China Sea, the best place for their SSBN operations."

As for the PLA Navy's (PLAN) development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) capabilities, Weeden emphasizes that the real story is not what PLAN is doing, but what the US Navy is not doing.

"The Chinese are not doing anything new with ASBMs. The concept dates back to 1955 and was pioneered by the US. The main issue is that the US Navy has not really been paying attention to the threat and is not really prepared to defend against it," said Weeden. "There are multiple technologies that can defend against it, but right now the navy is not really tackling it seriously."

At the same time, Weeden cautions that any description of China's missiles as "being technologically advanced is true when compared to the likes of Iran and North Korea, but China's ICBMs and SLBMs are still decades behind that of the US, Russia, France, and Great Britain".

"China's sole SSBN has never done a deterrence patrol. China has still yet to MIRV any of its nuclear delivery vehicles, something that the other powers did a long time ago. The significance of MIRVing cannot be understated," said Weeden.

"In the NASIC report, [it states] that 'the number of ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years'. So the growth is 'considerable' compared to how many warheads China has capable of reaching the US now, but negligible compared to what Russia already has deployed and historically had deployed."

Fisher, on the other hand, wants readers to understand that the number of Chinese nuclear missile warheads could grow more quickly than has been suggested by recent US open or unclassified intelligence reports.

"My sources suggest the DF-5A already carries up to six warheads, and that future versions of the DF-31A and JL-2 could carry three to four warheads. If true, then it is plausible to consider future PLA nuclear warhead counts that reach 500, again, no longer a 'minimum' force," said Fisher.

Fisher like Kaneda wants to firmly establish the links between Chinese ASAT and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) components in a broader public debate about US and Japanese defense policies.

"Even though the PLA has conducted multiple ASAT tests leading up to its success in 2007, no unclassified [US intelligence] report since has commented on how the PLA ASAT program may also indicate the existence of a larger PLA ABM program. The PLA's first ABM program took place from 1963 to 1980. If you can shoot down a satellite then you can shoot down a missile warhead," said Fisher. "The potential for the PLA's future no-longer-minimum nuclear force also being defended by an ABM system should be causing the Obama Administration to halt its nuclear disarmament plans. Such may also help explain why the Russians do not want to go below 1,500 deployed warheads, a reduction that I think would still be foolish for Washington and Moscow."

According to Fisher, while experts in Japan, India and the US may disagree at times over what is going on and why, "Americans are quite fortunate to have access to any level of [US intelligence] assessment of the PLA, which is issued at a level of detail that would put any Chinese commentator in jail."

Notes
1. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC (June 2009)
2. Missile threats - Bill Gertz (June 4, 2009)

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

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