Why the 2018 US-India Air Force Exercises Matter - 11 December 2018

I wrote for the Diplomat on the ongoing US-India Air Force Exercises that will be wrapped up in a few days. I argue that the ‘Cope India’ military exercise holds broader significance for the bilateral relationship.

In June 2017, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump underlined the central role of India and the United States in maintaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Recalling the tenets of the UN Charter, the two leaders emphasized the underlying importance of sovereignty and international law which should be universally respected in order for every nation to prosper.

This emphasis on strategic alignment has continued onto 2018 and its principles were reiterated again during the first U.S.-India 2+2 Strategic Dialogue held in September 2018. These principles and commitments have also formed the substantial basis for Washington and New Delhi to firm up their strategic and military engagements for the last several years.

In accordance with the bilateral commitments to a free and open Indo-Pacific, the Indian and the U.S. Air Forces have come together for a 12-day joint exercise dubbed “Cope India 2019” to be held through the end of this week (December 3 to 14).

This is the fourth iteration of the exercise conducted by the two militaries. The previous editions of the Cope India Exercise were held in 2004, 2008 and 2009 respectively. But none have been held since then, making the current exercise an indicator of the renewed mutual U.S.-Indian interest in deepening their military engagement.

For the full post, click here.



Colonel Darryl Insley, the commander of the 13th Air Expeditionary Group-Cope India 2019 (AEG-CI19) said, “We are excited and grateful for the opportunity to fly and train with our Indian air force counterparts within their home country.” The Indian Air Force Chief noted during his visit to the exercise that the significance of the joint exercises was in “create[ing] an environment of camaraderie and an opportunity to learn from each other’s best practices in enhancing operational synergy.”

The exercises are being hosted at two air force bases in India – Air Force Station Kalaikunda in Midnapore and Air Force Station Arjan Singh at Panagarh, both located in the eastern Indian state of West Bengal, not too far from the Sino-Indian border where Indian and Chinese forces were locked in a confrontation in 2017. It should be noted that the second hub of the U.S.-supplied C-130J Super Hercules transport aircrafts of the (IAF) is also hosted at the Arjan Singh Station.

The U.S. complement includes 200 U.S. Airmen with 15 aircraft from the 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan, and 182nd Airlift Wing, Illinois Air National Guard. The Indian side is being represented by Su-30MKI, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, C-130J, as well as AWACS. The Special Forces from the both the USAF and IAF are also taking part in the exercise.

The restarting of the Cope India exercises appears to be yet another indicator of the slow but growing comfort level in India about military engagement with the United States. Despite concerns by some in the Indian strategic community, India has signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (or what is now called the Logistics Services Agreement) and the Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (or what is now called the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement). These agreements are further boosting the U.S.-India military relationship. But India has yet to sign the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement, another of the foundational agreements that the United States has been pushing. India had early on signed the General Security of Military Information Agreement.

These agreements and military exercises tie India and the United States closer militarily. This also suggests that U.S.-India military exercises are likely to increase in scope and intensity in the coming years. Notably, India is also stepping up military exercises with other countries in the Indo-Pacific that may be considered like-minded and also have close ties with the United States. For example, India is also conducting a joint air force exercise with Japan, at the same time as the Cope India exercise with the United States.

While India’s bilateral military exercises are increasing with many countries, there are not as many multilateral joint exercises, even though the logic of carrying them out is quite clear. In some cases, such the Malabar exercise, there appears to be concern about the kind of message being sent with such exercises, especially to China. On the other hand, it is unclear why New Delhi feels that large numbers of bilateral military exercises will be more acceptable to China.

What this suggests is that India continues to want to both build up its military ties with like-minded countries, but also assuage any concerns in Beijing about India forging closer ties with potential adversaries. Whether this delicate balancing act will work remains to be seen.

India: Diversifying Arms Purchases

Here's an essay that I co-authored with Siddharth Sivaraman on India's exercise at diversifying arms purchases and how India might maximize its strategic gains and opportunities by making the right choices... The essay published in the Diplomat on August 13, 2014, additionally makes an argument on India should increase its military imports from the U.S., particularly drones.

India needs to diversify its arms imports. Although it is one of the world’s largest arms importers, most of India’s weapons come from Russia. Over the last five years, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia accounted for about $15 billion of the $20 billion in arms that India imported, or about three-quarters. That level of dependence is unhealthy: One of the reasons why India bought the Jaguar Bomber from a European consortium in the 1970s was the concern that India was becoming dependent on Soviet weapons.

India began diversifying when it awarded a contract for advanced air force fighters to France, though negotiations for the Rafale have dragged on interminably and have yet to be completed. India also buys some significant quantities of Israeli weapons.

But New Delhi has not sufficiently tapped the U.S., without question the country with the most advanced military technology in the world. Although the U.S. is India’s second largest source of weapons, it accounted for less than seven percent of India’s arms imports in value terms over the last five years. It is time that India diversified its arms sources by getting more of its weapons from the U.S., especially when cutting-edge technology is involved, as in advanced drones.

There are multiple advantages for India in making better use of U.S. weapons options. First, New Delhi could negotiate the development of state-of-the-art drone technologies, in which the U.S. has the most experience, with drones – or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) – such as the MQ-8 Fire Scout and/or long-range drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper or even the older Predator B. This would add a new dimension to UAVs with persistent capabilities for India, and it would also help kick start investments in this sector.

A U.S. senator recently proposed the joint manufacturing of weapons system, including drones. As the Indian military moves towards network-centric warfare, the importance of UAV technology will increase as it forms an important nodal center for intelligence gathering and dissemination. Currently the fleet of Searcher and long-range Heron drones is a good one, but there are operational limitations because of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, which restrict the sale of unmanned systems that fly more than 300 km and can carry payloads more than or equal to 500 kg.

The drone’s sensor intelligence gathering also requires capabilities in analysis and advanced software for interpreting data. The addition of this capability will also be important for the overall drone and imagery analysis architecture. Indeed, full-fledged UAV systems would give a tremendous boost to India’s surveillance capabilities. This will require bold thinking by policymakers to launch India into the select group of countries that can field long-range UAVs at short notice. However, such cutting edge technologies are shared, they are not given away.

For advanced technologies such as the MQ-9 Reaper, India will have to give ground, as such technologies cannot be readily obtained, even with a 100 percent FDI policy in the defense manufacturing sector.

Low observable technologies, under which the most modern UAVs fall, are heavily restricted for export by the U.S. government. Long-range drone operations in international waters require interoperability and information sharing, which can be a complicated endeavor involving a Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) with the U.S., but the advantages of learning long-range drone operations could be enormous. International search and rescue operations have increasingly involved the use of drones. Drones, along with air assets such as maritime patrol aircraft (MPA), would be help fill the large surveillance gaps in India’s vast ocean territories, which it must safeguard. Surveillance and around-the-clock monitoring of activities in the Indian Ocean, where traffic has seen a manifold increase, is significant. This fits well with the 2006 U.S.-India Framework for Maritime Security Cooperation that emphasizes cooperation in areas including piracy, smuggling, and WMD proliferation through maritime routes. The procurement of drones on a strategic level is paramount, so why should India not do all it can to acquire this surveillance capability?

Could the sale of such systems mean that the two countries can finally bury antique agreements such as the CISMOA and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-spatial Cooperation (BECA)? Much remains to be said about how the U.S. government would view such an interest by India. U.S. aircraft have already given an edge to the strategic airlift capability; can they do the same with respect to India’s strategic surveillance capability?

Technology is important, but who you get it from is even more important. U.S. drones in the Indian inventory would have a huge value in terms of messaging, to friends and foes alike. Strategic partnerships are among the best force multiplier options in an uncertain Asia, and India should leave no stone unturned.