Implications of the US Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty - The Diplomat, 29 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote about implications of the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations.

Last week, the Trump administration announced that the US will be pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), a major arms control measure that aided transparency and confidence-building among 34 participating states. In a press statement on May 21, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. will send its six-month notice to all the state parties to this effect. Justifying the move, Pompeo said, “Russia has been a serial violator of many of its arms control obligations and commitments,” and not just the OST. The treaty allows member countries to fly unarmed surveillance planes over each other’s territory with a 72-hour notice. The participating states, under the treaty commitments, fly fixed wing planes, equipped with agreed sensors.

The U.S. decision to walk out of the OST comes against the backdrop of the U.S. walking out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, and much earlier in 2001, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. Global arms control arrangements were in a state of disarray in any case and this adds to the problem. While many of the recent developments have been due to Russia’s apparent violation of its commitments, at least as the US maintains, the real reason is more likely the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition and Washington’s determination not to tie its own hands.

For the full essay, click here.



Nevertheless, the U.S. does have some complaints about Russian behavior. Washington has cited instances where Russia has breached its OST commitments, particularly on U.S. flights over Russia. Pompeo’s press note last week alleged that Russia had denied permission to U.S. observation flights “within a 10-kilometer corridor along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby attempting to advance false Russian claims that these occupied territories are independent states.” Russia has apparently placed restriction on flight distance over Kaliningrad, and this has been particularly concerning because the enclave has seen significant military build-up in recent years.

Such actions have fueled opposition to the treaty, especially from the right wing of the U.S. political spectrum. In an op-ed in the Washington Post in December 2019, Tom Cotton, a Republican Senator from Arkansas, made a case for the U.S. withdrawal by saying, “Russia has breached the treaty for years by imposing limits on U.S. flights while suffering no such restrictions itself. In other words, “open skies for me, closed skies for thee.”

There were other problems too, because the U.S. fears that Russia has gained an unfair technical advantage under the OST. In 2016, Russia reportedly decided to introduce a new digital electro-optical sensor to its Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft used for Open Skies flights. Both the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress raised alarms over this, though it had more to do with the technological advantage Russia gained rather than being a technical violation of the treaty itself. One senior U.S. intelligence official apparently warned that the introduction of new sophisticated planes over the U.S. would provide Russia with “a significant advantage.” In 2019, Russia introduced the Tu-214ON aircraft OST missions over the United States, raising further concerns.

Russia has its own complaints: Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the U.S. of imposing “more sweeping restrictions on observation flights over Alaska.” However, the grievances on the U.S. side have been much more intense.

The treaty came about with good intentions. A hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1992 on the Open Skies Treaty noted that the treaty was not framed as an arms control measure, but as a measure that calls for higher levels of openness and transparency leading to better predictability and stability, thus lessening tensions among the participating states. The initial idea of the OST came from President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 although it led to nothing since it was rejected by the Soviet Union, which said it was a means for spying. Following the end of the Cold War, in May 1989, U.S. President George H. W. Bush once again broached the idea. After a meeting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along with additional negotiations supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OST was signed in March 1992.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from the treaty could be seen as a prelude to what might happen with regard to another arms control measure that will be up for renewal soon. The bilateral START agreement with Russia ,which puts a cap on the number of deployed nuclear missiles to 1,550 on each side, will come up for renewal in February 2021. Given the recent U.S. attitude toward global arms control measures, it is possible that the U.S. will not renew the agreement.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a keen desire for China to join these arms control arrangements. The feeling appears to be that these various U.S.-Russia treaties serve to limit U.S. ability to compete effectively with China because China is not bound by the same agreements. This was definitely true of the INF treaty. But China has been clear in saying that it has no plans to join any future arms control measure involving the U.S. and Russia.

It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been in a state of limbo for more than two decades and it is unlikely that any serious discussions will happen at the CD in the near future. While the U.S. move does not help matters, it is also yet another indication that the intensifying international competition is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. This means that the U.S. and China will need to engage directly for a new era in arms control.

Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race? - The Diplomat, 1 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the global impact of the end of the INF Treaty, "Will the End of the INF Treaty Start an Arms Race?." I argue that the end of INF will have strategic implications well beyond Russia and the United States.

On August 2, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), a bilateral arms control treaty originally signed between the United States and the Soviet Union (now Russia), will end. U.S. President Donald Trump had announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty six months back, and the withdrawal period is about to end.

While the focus of the INF Treaty itself was on the United States and Russia, is likely to have a much broader impact than just between the two countries. The INF Treaty was seen as having the ability to bring about a semblance of stability much beyond Washington and Moscow. Now there are growing concerns that this will give rise to a new arms race.

For the full essay, click here.



The 1987 INF Treaty saw the United States and the Soviet Union agree to remove an entire class of weapons – nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, including Soviet SS-20s and the U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and Pershing II ballistic missiles. Based on the commitments made in the treaty, the two countries destroyed a total of 2,692 short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles by June 1, 1991, the treaty implementation deadline. This is the only nuclear arms control treaty that eliminated an entire class of existing weapons.

The Trump announcement of the U.S. intent to leave the treaty came about after repeated reports of Russian breaches of its INF commitments. The Russian breaches are not new. The complaints had been around under the Obama administration, for instance, when Russia developed a new cruise missile, the 9M729 (NATO name: SSC-8). NATO has also remained concerned about the treaty breaches. In fact, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg stated that “the ‘ongoing Russian violation’ was the only reason the 1987 treaty was under threat.”

Russia of course denied that they were violating any commitment made under the INF Treaty. A senior Russian official is reported to have said that it is not in violation of any commitment and that the missile 9M729 is within the INF range limit of 500 kilometers. In fact, a Russian commander, General Mikhail Matveyevsky has reportedly stated that its maximum flight range is 480 km.

There are concerns within the United States and outside about the impact of the treaty withdrawal. U.S. Senator Bob Menendez (a Democrat from New Jersey), the ranking member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said that withdrawing without a follow-on treaty taking the place of the INF is a recipe for an arms race. Menendez argues that “Russia will clearly spend money on updating and amplifying its weapons systems.”

Yes, Russia might respond by building more INF-range missiles. But it is important to identify another key reason for the U.S. walkout from the treaty — China. One key problem facing the INF Treaty has been the development and deployment of a large number of missiles by China, which is not a member of the treaty and therefore not bound by its terms. That has had the effect of changing the military balance in East Asia and beyond. In fact, in October last year, Trump had said, “We’ll have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us, and China comes to us, and they all come to us and they say ‘let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.’ If Russia’s doing it, and if China’s doing it, and we’re adhering to the agreement, that’s unacceptable.”

There is substance to all of this. A recent U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Report detailing the Chinese missile inventory highlights that it has “more than 2,000 ballistic and cruise missiles, approximately 95 percent of which, according to US officials, would violate the INF Treaty if China were a signatory.” So, there are genuine security concerns that have driven the U.S. withdrawal, which will also mean that any future arms control initiative can get off the ground under the Trump administration only if China actively participates in it.

China remains concerned about the ending of the INF Treaty. Their worries stem from the fact that this could lead to the United States deploying conventional ground-launched missiles in East Asia, which could further force China to increase its own inventory. Experts warn that with the United States becoming free to now deploy INF-range missiles in Asia, “the development of Chinese missiles is likely to rapidly accelerate.” But as long as China continues its unimpeded development of missiles, the United States, Russia, and even India might be compelled to build up their own inventories, which points to the possibility of a budding arms race.

Japan, which will also be affected by such an arms race, had suggested a multilateral successor to the INF, but China is categorical that it will not be party to such initiatives. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying, said that the INF “is a bilateral deal between Russia and the United States. If the agreement becomes multilateral, this will influence a whole range of complex political, military, and legal issues…. The Chinese side does not give its consent.” As for suggestions on a possible trilateral agreement involving the U.S., Russia and China, Beijing was once again firm in saying no. China is reported to have said that “the premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations do not exist at all, and China will never participate in them.”

To be sure, this might just be an initial bargaining tactic. But if not, a new post-INF arms race may be in the offing, this time encompassing Asia too. That will have implications for the wider Indo-Pacific region, and developments in this regard will be critical to watch.

Not So Fast..., my third essay for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on societal verification in arms control....

My third essay for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists on societal verification in arms control was published in the latest issue.

As this Roundtable nears its conclusion, I continue to believe that the success of societal verification will depend above all on arms control itself gaining greater acceptance in developing countries. A useful first step would be to make arms control processes more transparent and inclusive. Societal verification itself can follow at a later stage -- once arms control has gained more acceptance, developing countries have achieved greater freedom and established less dangerous security environments, and states themselves feel ready to implement and encourage societal verification measures. This is a long list of conditions. So though I believe that societal verification might one day make a meaningful contribution to treaty verification, I don't believe that its widespread use is imminent in most of the developing world.

For the full article, click here.

I accept Jamal Khaer Ibrahim's argument that informal, person-to-person approaches, in the vein of track 3 diplomacy, seem to be among the most promising ways for societal verification to gain acceptance in the developing world. But at the same time, I agree with Ibrahim Said Ibrahim's assertion that societal verification can't truly thrive in places where sustainable development, good governance, and the like have yet to take hold. Jamal Khaer Ibrahim speaks of support for societal verification bubbling up from the business community to high levels of government -- but this will only happen in nations that are reasonably open to begin with. Elsewhere, societal verification will have to gain acceptance in bureaucracies and the political class before it can percolate down to the public level.

But even in countries with open forms of government, dangerous regional security environments will often pose obstacles for societal verification. India's neighborhood, for example, is not benign, and it is not perceived as benign either in official circles or among the public. And in a nationalistic environment such as that which exists in South Asia, security concerns are intensified and real threats are sometimes exaggerated. So India's public discussions of security issues focus on issues such as military modernization, offensive capabilities, force multipliers, and strategies allowing vigorous responses to regional security realities. Societal verification is not close in spirit to any of these topics, and it is unlikely to enter public discussion any time soon.

External threats can be major obstacles to societal verification; in a nation like India, so can internal pressures. India faces internal security threats from religious fundamentalists, ethnic secessionists, and a rural Maoist movement that aims to overthrow the state. When a nation faces such menaces within its own borders, the last thing on decision makers' minds will be societal verification. Indeed, societal verification might strike leaders primarily as a threat to the state: The same techniques that could promote treaty verification efforts could also be used for harm if they were taken up by terrorists and other radical elements.

As this Roundtable nears its conclusion, I continue to believe that the success of societal verification will depend above all on arms control itself gaining greater acceptance in developing countries. A useful first step would be to make arms control processes more transparent and inclusive. Societal verification itself can follow at a later stage -- once arms control has gained more acceptance, developing countries have achieved greater freedom and established less dangerous security environments, and states themselves feel ready to implement and encourage societal verification measures. This is a long list of conditions. So though I believe that societal verification might one day make a meaningful contribution to treaty verification, I don't believe that its widespread use is imminent in most of the developing world.

Incentives and Limits, my second essay in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists

My second essay for Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was published yesterday... In this piece, I look at ways to incentivize good behaviour and what the limits are....

Until leaders believe that societal verification serves the national interest, ordinary people will be in no position to become educated practitioners....

For the full essay, click here.





In his second Roundtable essay, Jamal Khaer Ibrahim argued that professionals in industries associated with the nuclear supply chain might embrace societal verification out of a desire to "protect their professional reputations and avoid criminal or civil penalties associated with wrongdoing." But that may tell only part of the story. In my own nation, India, security at firms involved with sensitive materials is often lax. In some cases these firms do not even comply with the law, much less display concern about their professional reputations.

I recently co-authored a study on security risks related to chemical, biological, and radiological materials PDF. The study, which entailed field visits to several of India's major industry clusters, revealed significant variations in companies' compliance with the law and their implementation of security standards. Firms that see themselves as part of a globalized world and whose commercial interests extend internationally -- for instance, large pharmaceutical and petrochemical firms -- tend to perform well. But at small and medium-sized firms that operate more locally, the short-term profit motive tends to outweigh safety and security concerns. It is difficult to imagine that firms such as these, which often fail to comply with existing laws and best practices, will demonstrate much interest in participating in societal verification initiatives. And if this is true in India, it is likely to be true across much of the developing world.

Ibrahim also writes that nations might support societal verification efforts out of a desire "to gain trust as economic partners." This strikes me as more valid, and it raises the larger question of how best to incentivize compliance with verification arrangements, including but not limited to societal verification. Incentives could include the prospect of earning economic trust, as Ibrahim suggests, and of gaining greater integration into the world's political and security architectures. Indeed, the best incentive may be to create a more dynamic global political order in which a broader range of nations have a realistic chance of playing an important role.

The principle point of Ibrahim Said Ibrahim's first Roundtable essay is that educated practitioners are key to societal verification's success, and I broadly agree. But I don't believe that many educated practitioners will soon emerge in the developing world. As Ibrahim suggests, only a limited number of people in developing countries understand and appreciate arms control arrangements themselves. Moreover, as I argued in my first essay and as Ibrahim acknowledges, citizens who participate in societal verification efforts might put themselves at personal risk because bureaucratic and political elites could perceive these activities as illegitimate. And particularly in countries where sovereignty, security, and the state's control of sensitive technologies are very closely tied together -- China and India, for example -- states will not embrace societal verification until they perceive substantial benefit in doing so. Until leaders believe that societal verification serves the national interest, ordinary people will be in no position to become educated practitioners.

Potential and pitfalls of societal verification in the area of arms control, my essay in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists....

Here's my short essay published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. The essay looks at the potential and pitfalls of societal verification in arms control.

In the West, handheld devices are attracting considerable attention these days because of their potential to aid in the verification of multilateral arms control arrangements. With penetration of handheld devices nearly total in the West and continuing to increase in the developing world -- Asia, Africa, and Latin America are expected to account for a majority of the growth in mobile subscriptions over the coming years -- opportunities are indeed emerging for technologies such as mobile phones and tablet computers to play a role in verifying compliance with agreements on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Societal verification measures are yet to take strong roots in the developing and non-western world, and there are reasons why they have not. This is not to suggest that it will not. But societal verification's success probably depends on arms control itself becoming much more politically palatable. Resistance to arms control measures across the developing world stems in part from developing countries' not having been fully involved in the development of treaties and regimes. Making arms control processes more transparent, and involving as many developing countries as possible in those processes, especially in the drafting stages of arms control agreements, would provide the developing world with a worthwhile sense of ownership about those initiatives. A more inclusive process would also encourage treaty compliance and, ultimately, result in greater effectiveness for arms control regimes. In my view, societal verification can contribute to nonproliferation efforts and treaty compliance, but only after arms control itself becomes more widely accepted.

For the full essay, click here.



In the West, handheld devices are attracting considerable attention these days because of their potential to aid in the verification of multilateral arms control arrangements. With penetration of handheld devices nearly total in the West and continuing to increase in the developing world -- Asia, Africa, and Latin America are expected to account for a majority of the growth in mobile subscriptions over the coming years -- opportunities are indeed emerging for technologies such as mobile phones and tablet computers to play a role in verifying compliance with agreements on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Many of the key verification problems associated with arms control arrangements are centered in developing countries. Anything that can contribute to nonproliferation in these nations should be welcomed. But it is not clear that people in the developing world will regard handheld devices and their potential verification uses in the same way that many in the West do. Three reasons for skepticism in this regard stand out.

First, in India and many other developing countries, individuals who participate in societal verification efforts might put themselves at considerable personal risk. They might find themselves viewed in the way that human rights activists are sometimes viewed -- as less than patriotic, or as dangers to national security. And even if they do not violate any laws, they might nonetheless become targets of bureaucratic and political ire. In India, even a technology like Google Maps has faced significant opposition because it shows the locations of sensitive sites, and Google Earth has encountered official resistance in many countries. Taking all this into account, it may simply be irresponsible to encourage citizens of certain countries to participate in societal verification.

Second, the idea that ordinary people can contribute to treaty verification, whether by carrying out crowdsourcing projects or by gathering information with handheld devices, is based on the assumption that ordinary people will wish to become active partners in arms control arrangements. Even putting aside the negative repercussion that participants in societal verification might suffer, this assumption seems dubious in the developing world. Citizens of developing countries simply do not view arms control in the same way that it is viewed by arms control advocates in the West.

Many people in developing countries tend to be highly nationalistic, and their nationalism is often bound up with a certain amount of anti-Westernism -- which is unsurprising, considering that many developing countries are former colonies of Western nations or have otherwise been dominated by the West. Arms control in particular is often regarded as an instrument of Western domination, and significant opposition to arms control measures can exist at the popular level. This popular distrust of arms control efforts is exacerbated by the West's perceived lack of credibility -- often, the West is accused of treating arms control as a matter of convenience, something to be discarded when it conflicts with other, more pressing interests. These views are unfortunate, and perhaps not valid, but they are deeply held. Therefore, it is probably not safe to assume that ordinary people in developing countries will choose to participate in societal verification efforts.

Third, verification efforts of any kind can provoke discomfort in developing countries. As an example, though many developing nations have negotiated Additional Protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency, sympathy still exists for a country like Iran, which has signed but not ratified an Additional Protocol. To many people in developing countries, the Additional Protocol seems to allow foreign inspectors to enter national territory at will and inspect any location they please. This recalls the colonial era, when developing countries lacked control over their own territory. And though some verification measures, such as those included in the Chemical Weapons Convention, have gained wide acceptance, this acceptance is rarely accompanied by any real sense of comfort.

Another example of developing nations' discomfort with verification procedures is provided by the confidence-building measures that countries like India, China, and Pakistan have put in place to reduce bilateral tensions. These measures build on a model established during the Cold War by the United States and the Soviet Union. But though the Cold War superpowers included arms control verification as a significant element of their confidence-building measures, nations like India, China, and Pakistan have not even considered doing so.

Given such sensitivities, seeking to involve ordinary citizens in verification arrangements might only heighten the discomfort that developing countries feel about multilateral arms control measures. Indeed, the bureaucratic and political elites in developing countries would likely regard as illegitimate any effort to involve citizens in monitoring the behavior of states on behalf of an extraterritorial agency. And any arms control initiative that contained arrangements for societal verification might likewise be seen as illegitimate.

Does all this mean that societal verification is a nonstarter in the developing world? Not necessarily. But societal verification's success probably depends on arms control itself becoming much more politically palatable. Resistance to arms control measures across the developing world stems in part from developing countries' not having been fully involved in the development of treaties and regimes. Making arms control processes more transparent, and involving as many developing countries as possible in those processes, especially in the drafting stages of arms control agreements, would provide the developing world with a worthwhile sense of ownership about those initiatives. A more inclusive process would also encourage treaty compliance and, ultimately, result in greater effectiveness for arms control regimes. In my view, societal verification can contribute to nonproliferation efforts and treaty compliance, but only after arms control itself becomes more widely accepted.

Future of U.S.-India Relations: Beyond the Plateau, report authored by scholars from the Heritage Foundation and Observer Research Foundation....

Here's a new report on the future of US-India relations, authored by scholars from the Heritage Foundation and the Observer Research Foundation. I have contributed one chapter to the report.

The report looks at India-US relations through five key drivers: economy, defense, regional security in East and Southwest Asia, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism.

The report is going to be launched in Washington DC on April 29, 2013.

To read full report, click here.




Type rest of the post here