Sri Lanka: A Center for Sino-Indian Strategic Competition - The Diplomat, July 11, 2019

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the Sino-Indian strategic competition in the Indian neighbourhood, specifically focusing on Sri Lanka. The delivery of a Chinese frigate to the South Asian nation reinforces its role within competition between the two Asian giants.

Last week, China donated a frigate to the Sri Lankan Navy. While the development itself was hardly surprising, it nonetheless highlighted the continuing contest between India and China in India’s neighborhood in spite of ongoing efforts by both sides to manage their wider relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



The frigate arrived in Colombo Port earlier this week. The Commander of the Sri Lankan Navy, Vice Admiral Piyal De Silva, thanked China for the gift and said that this reflected the “good friendship between the two countries.” Commander De Silva went on to add that Sri Lanka faces many maritime challenges and that the frigate, now designated ‘P 625’, will be mainly used for offshore patrol, environment monitoring and anti-piracy efforts.

The vessel reportedly comes with a main turret holding dual Type 79 100 mm cannons and two Type 76A dual-37 mm Anti-Aircraft Guns at the aft. It also has a helipad and hangar to store and operate a medium-size helicopter. A statement from the Chinese Embassy in Sri Lanka said that in addition to the donation, the PLA Navy had also conducted a two-month professional training for more than 110 Sri Lankan naval officers and sailors in Shanghai, China.

The donation of the frigate comes against the backdrop of a major Chinese aid to Sri Lanka to fight terrorism. In May, China decided to provide Sri Lanka with aid to the tune of $14 million for Colombo to procure China-made counterinsurgency equipment. The decision was taken during President Maithripala Sirisena’s visit to Beijing in mid-May, and the president’s office stated that this will be important in enhancing the wherewithal of the Sri Lankan security forces. Reports suggest that China will also be providing the Sri Lankan police with 150 vehicles.

Much like Beijing’s interest in other Indian neighbors, including the Maldives, China’s interests in Sri Lanka are more strategic than economic. Developments such as the visit of a Chinese nuclear submarine to Colombo during the Rajapaksa tenure were a wake up call as well as a reminder to India of the extent of China’s strategic in roads in Sri Lanka. The China-Sri Lanka relationship reached a peak during the final phase of the Sri Lankan war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The political and defense support extended by China to Colombo, in the face of international condemnation on account of the extensive human rights abuses, was significant.

New Delhi has not been sitting still, however. Indeed, the fact that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi began his second tenure in office with a stop in Sri Lanka on his way back from a visit to the Maldives was no coincidence. New Delhi has no doubt been aware that domestic political shifts in Sri Lanka have continued to put it in the balance, with Colombo perceived to have moved toward China under former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and, after the election of Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, shifting back toward India. New Delhi has also been aware of the risks of Sri Lanka getting entangled in the risks of Chinese engagement, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with the example of the Hambantota port.

This continues to play out even today. Even though the Sirisena-Wickremasinghe political dispensation has been quite favorable to India, the internal squabble between the two leaders has cast a shadow in its dealings with India. This has affected the manner in which even terrorism issues were dealt with by the two leaders. Despite the fact that India had provided intelligence on the Easter terror attacks in Sri Lanka, it was not given adequate credit due to the continuing row between Sirisena and Wickremasinghe.

The India-China competition in Sri Lanka is quite evident more broadly. India had earlier given Sri Lanka advanced off-shore patrol vessels (AOPVs) – SLNS Sayurala (P623) and SLNS Sindurala (P624) in 2017 and 2018 respectively. But India’s overall capacity to deliver what Sri Lanka needs is questionable. This has been the case even during the war against the LTTE (though that was at least partly because New Delhi was hobbled by the needs of domestic politics) to the extent where China emerged as one of the key trading partners, even setting up a NORINCO small arms factory in Kandy.

The delivery of a Chinese frigate to Sri Lanka is nonetheless evidence that strategic competition in India’s neighborhood will only continue to intensify. Unless India does more for its neighbors and enlists other partners as well, China will continue to present a significant strategic challenge for New Delhi in this regard in the coming years.

Does eliminating the LTTE solve the problem?

This analysis on the Sri Lankan situation appeared first on the ORF website.

Sri Lanka is on the verge of defeating the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), or so the Rajapakse Government claims. The key question, however, is whether militarily crushing the LTTE solves the island-nation’s ethnic conflict. The Rajapakse government has so far not proposed any political package in dealing with the problem. Military victory, not backed by political package for Tamils, can prove disastrous for Sri Lanka. Such a situation could in fact lead to the birth of many more LTTEs in the future.



While majority of Sri Lankan Tamils may not want a separate state of Eelam, they do want to live well and live with dignity. How can this be assured by the Rajapakse government? While it is clear that there will not be a separate state of Tamil Eelam, the existing unitary set up also remains unacceptable. From the time he took over power in 2005, Rajapakse has been of the view that he is for maximum devolution of power within a unitary state. But it is not clear what that means. There has to be dramatic changes made in the political architecture of Sri Lanka in which the Tamils are able to find a political space for themselves. The aspect that needs to be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic problem is the Sinhalese allergy to the word “federalism.” One must though admit that the Sinhala government has come a long way, when in December 2002, the Joint Communiqué after the end of the bilateral talks with India, noted that the idea of federal structures would be examined. This was again reiterated in the Tokyo meeting. During Rajapakse’s visit to India in December 2005, the Joint Statement said that more devolution of powers would be undertaken. However, President Mahinda Rajapakse is yet to do anything to live up to this commitment.
In today’s situation, there is only a small miniscule representation of Tamils in various bodies, including in the Sri Lankan Army, where Sinhalas represent 99.4% of total strength and the Sri Lankan Police, where the figure is 96%. In the case of civil administration, one or two Tamils are selected each year. The government will have to undertake to undo several of its legislative measures of the past that established the discrimination and alienation of the Tamils. In fact, successive legislations brought upon the Tamils by the Sinhala governments, including the enactment of “Sinhala Only language policy” in 1961, brought down Tamil representation in civil administration, armed forces and police services. Similarly, the government will have to revisit the 13th amendment (which established Provincial Councils) and bring all Tamils under a permanent merger of the North and East Provinces, done originally under the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987. India, however, having burnt its finger once, remains wary of getting involved in the conflict. In such a scenario, India’s recent actions appear designed more to soothe the anger of the regional parties in Tamil Nadu than a genuine expression of concern.
What are India’s challenges? India, being a neighbour, should keep in mind that unity of Sri Lanka is of utmost importance to India in the sense that any disintegration of the country can create problems for India. In that sense, it is in India’s interest to ensure that Sri Lanka remains united. India, entrenched in coalition politics, is tied down by several constraints. However, India can contribute significantly in ensuring a political package for the Tamils. India needs to start talking to the major parties -- SLFP, UNP -- on a political package. After reaching a consensus with these two major parties, they can convince JVP and other democratic Tamil parties and thereby start a political process and see how best to implement the 13th amendment. The 13th amendment is critical since it devolves some authority to the provinces and in essence, the provincial councils will enjoy statute power with regard to items in the provincial list, including local infrastructure (roads and bridges), education, health, land, irrigation, agriculture.
Military solution unaccompanied by a political package will give birth to new problems.

Sri Lanka Presents India Five Challenges

This analysis on Indian Challenges vis a vis Sri Lanka appeared first on the ORF website.

While most people in India would not be unhappy to see the Tamil Tigers, and particularly their boss, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, get their comeuppance, the situation does present some complications. New Delhi’s boilerplate declarations about a ‘peaceful solution acceptable to all’ mask the serious challenges that India faces as Colombo prepares for the final push against the Tigers.



New Delhi faces five challenges. First, it is deeply concerned over the spill over effects of the ethnic conflict in terms of the refugee inflow into the Indian mainland and the political ramifications in Tamil Nadu and other parts of India. Escalation of the conflict has resulted in the exodus of more than 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees into India in the last two years. But this has tapered off over the last few months. It appears for the time being that Tamil civilians who are caught in the conflict are staying put in Sri Lanka as they are in restricted camps set up by the Sri Lankan government. Increased vigil on the India-Sri Lanka coastlines is also dissuading some. However, this situation may change if Colombo does not come out with a political solution once the military operations are over.
The second serious challenge is LTTE operations in and around India. LTTE activities in the Palk Bay are one cause for concern for India as Indian fishermen are often caught in the crossfire between the Sri Lankan Navy and the Sea Tigers. Another issue is that of LTTE sleeper cells in Tamil Nadu and possibly elsewhere. Most importantly, if the LTTE is defeated in Sri Lanka’s North East, they might want to continue the fight from Tamil Nadu, where they have a support base. This could, without doubt, have spillover effects on nascent Tamil nationalist movements in Tamil Nadu.
Third, the impact on Tamil Nadu politics could be significant. LTTE sympathisers, especially those active in Tamil Nadu politics, have already exploited the situation. Fear of agitation by these groups has meant that the Indian government has so far sent only relief and medical supplies to Sri Lanka. Despite requests from the Sri Lankan government for defense items, India has not supplied anything, though the Indian position has been to quietly support the Rajapakse Government. While it may be too early to say what effect the anger and resentment in Tamil Nadu will have on New Delhi, it could affect the formation of the next coalition government in Delhi. The loser in such coalition-building exercise would have an interest in stoking tensions.
The fourth challenge is of other countries meddling in Sri Lanka. India’s refusal to supply defence items to Colombo has forced it to look to Pakistan and China. Increasing defence cooperation between these countries would have adverse security implications for India. Pakistan has emerged as a major supplier of defence items, including tanks and light weapons. Additionally, Pakistani pilots are thought to have flown some of the precision strikes against the LTTE leadership. Pakistan has also been seeking to exploit the presence of the Muslim population in Sri Lanka’s East, building mosques in the region and activating fundamentalist groups there.
The increasing Chinese links with Sri Lanka are also not in Indian security interests. China is engaged in a series of infrastructure and port development projects in Sri Lanka. Of most consequence is the development of the Hambantota port, where China could possibly set up listening-posts that could be activated in times of conflict in the future. The second aspect relates to China’s defence cooperation with Sri Lanka. The warehouse of the Chinese arms supplier, Norinco, in Galle is a case in point. Sri Lanka has a credit line and its forces are permitted to take items from the warehouse as and when they need it. Lastly, there is a trilateral partnership between Sri Lanka, Pakistan and China, which is detrimental to Indian interests. The commonality of defence equipment among them has increased defence interaction between them.
Because of the election season in India, it is unlikely that New Delhi will take major initiatives. Post-election coalition politics is also likely to affect Indian options. However things turn out in New Delhi, the next Indian administration will have some serious challenges to face in Sri Lanka.