Beyond Rajapaksa’s Visit, Are India and Sri Lanka Really on the Same Page? - The Diplomat, 13 February 2020

Once again, I am running behind in updating my blog. In February, on the occasion of the Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa's visit, I examined the relationship in detail to see if India and Sri Lanka are really on the same page, for The Diplomat. While the trip offered a chance to build on cooperation, it also reinforced existing differences between the two countries.

For the full essay, click here.



Sri Lankan Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa just completed a five-day trip to India, making it his first foreign trip since his appointment as prime minister in late November 2019. While the trip highlighted some areas for collaboration between the two sides, it also left broader questions lingering about the future direction of ties.

By all accounts, Rajapaksa’s visit appears to have been a successful one. For instance, Mahinda touched the right cords in New Delhi even on sensitive issues by stating that developments relating to Jammu and Kashmir and Article 370 were India’s internal affairs. Prime Minister Narendra Modi, for his part, said in his press statement that he appreciated Sri Lanka’s importance not only to India but to the entire Indian Ocean Region. He added that “stability, security and prosperity in Sri Lanka” is an essential element in ushering peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

In line with the “Neighborhood First” approach and the “Sagar” doctrine, Modi went on to say that New Delhi attaches “a special priority” to its relations with Colombo, which will no doubt be welcome. Sri Lanka also appears to be satisfied with the comfort level that exists between Modi and Rajapaksa and the pace of the relationship.

But there may be some disagreements that remain. For instance, according to reports citing diplomatic sources, Sri Lanka wants to see “cooperation and progress in SAARC,” whereas India believes that all efforts to strengthen regional cooperation should be channeled to the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC). Even though Rajapaksa is not thought to have raised the SAARC issue with Modi, he made a case for the regional body in an interview with The Hindu, saying “we have already gone a considerable distance with building SAARC and that should be continued.”

Sri Lanka pushing the SAARC is understandable – a Sri Lankan diplomat, Esala Weerakoon, has been appointed to be the next Secretary General of the SAARC Secretariat, and Sri Lanka would like to show some progress in the association. On March 1, 2020, Weerakoon will be taking charge of SAARC from Amjad Hussain B. Sial, his Pakistani predecessor, who has held the post since 2017. Given this development, Sri Lanka is believed to have urged the Indian leadership to “at least restart the process of discussion on SAARC” but clearly it will be difficult getting India on board.

In addition to official meetings, Rajapaksa also reached out to the media and aired the Sri Lankan interest in some of the infrastructure projects on the bilateral agenda. Rajapaksa was categorical that Sri Lanka will no longer grant important projects such as the Mattala airport to other countries. Mahinda added that projects already approved by former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe will be stopped. He also said that “his government has a firm policy on not allowing any national resources to be given to foreign control.” However, at the same time, Rajapaksa seemed upbeat about the LNG project as well as the Eastern Container Terminal in Colombo, which will see joint investment by India and Japan.

On the debt repayment issue with China, Rajapaksa defended the Chinese by saying Beijing helped Colombo in Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction and development efforts. He went on to note that the debt toward China is only 12 percent of the overall external debt and that the funds from China were used for developing infrastructure. He faulted the previous government for giving away strategic real estate in the Indian Ocean such as Hambantota port to ease the debt. Defending China of course probably earned Rajapaksa some brownie points with Beijing and gave some balance to Sri Lanka’s external alignments.

To be sure, Rajapaksa also stated India is a “relation” whereas others are friends. But he was uncomfortable with concepts like the “Indo-Pacific,” which he did not use though it was used by Modi, as well as with groupings like the Quad. Colombo clearly does not want to takes sides against China.

Of course, the thorny Tamil issue was also highlighted during Rajapaksa’s visit. In fact, Modi in his press statement said, “I am confident that the Government of Sri Lanka will realize the expectations of the Tamil people for equality, justice, peace, and respect within a united Sri Lanka. For this, it will be necessary to carry forward the process of reconciliation with the implementation of the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka.”

However, during the media interview with the Hindu, Rajapaksa made no commitment on how the 13th amendment will be implemented, except to say no solution to the problem will happen without it being acceptable to the majority community. He elaborated on the point, saying, “We want to go forward, but we need to have someone to discuss, who can take responsibility for the [Tamil] areas. So the best thing is to hold elections, and then ask for their representatives to come and discuss the future with us.” Rajapaksa is hoping for a win in the upcoming parliamentary elections in April and thereafter to hold provincial elections that could pave the way for greater engagement with the Tamil population.

While the Rajapaksa visit has ended successfully, among the tricky issues, one that New Delhi needs to focus on is to find a balance between Sri Lanka’s interest in SAARC and the Indian preference for BIMSTEC. Given India’s larger strategic footprint across the Indo-Pacific and India’s Act East policy, BIMSTEC makes sense. But Sri Lanka is not keen. India needs to work on building support for it in other capitals in South Asia. Also, New Delhi has to be able to offer economic opportunities for these countries to make BIMSTEC attractive. Otherwise it will be seen as just empty anti-Pakistan rhetoric with no real worth for the small countries in the region. More generally, India should also be careful not to alienate the smaller countries who might not want to antagonize China.

Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy - September 17, 2018

Earlier this week, I wrote for the Diplomat exploring the role of Southeast Asia in India's idea of the Indo-Pacific construct. In "Minding the Gaps in India’s Act East Policy," I argue that New Delhi’s approach to Southeast Asia within the wider Indo-Pacific region is strategically sound but has limits.



India’s approach to Southeast Asia has been lately shifting from one dominated by trade and development to one in which strategic considerations play an important complementary role. This has taken a new form, and is now called the “Act East” Policy, marking also an expansion to include other Indo-Pacific countries.

But there are some doubts about whether the ASEAN countries are entirely comfortable with the idea of the “Indo-Pacific.” Several ASEAN states have been lukewarm to the idea, worried about having to take sides between the United States and China. This raises questions about the viability of India’s new “ASEAN-centric” approach to the Indo-Pacific.

ASEAN’s weaknesses in managing China is becoming more evident every day. While its success in regional economic integration is undeniable, on more fractious political issues, ASEAN was always less effective. These divisions have become far deeper when it comes to China. It is not clear that ASEAN will be able to act in a united manner when it comes to the South China Sea or on matters relating to China.

Smaller ASEAN countries are still wary of inviting China’s wrath by an open embrace of the Indo-Pacific concept. This is, paradoxically, a consequence of ASEAN’s success in integrating economically with China, making it hard for these countries to break with Beijing. This is particularly so for smaller countries like Cambodia, though several bigger players like Malaysia and Singapore have been resistant as well. ASEAN, therefore, is a divided house.

For the full article, click here.



New Delhi has no good options to deal with this problem. It is probably this recognition that has led India to stress additional platforms like the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) which includes Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Bhutan, and Nepal.

There has also been some suggestion from experts that BIMSTEC could be expanded to include countries such as Indonesia. On the other hand, BIMSTEC has also so far been less than a grand success. Though India has recently attempted to revive BIMSTEC – partly to sideline the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which includes Pakistan – New Delhi’s efforts have sometimes fallen flat. An effort to expand the scope of BIMSTEC by conducting its first-ever military exercise saw two countries, Nepal and Thailand, refusing to join.

India and other countries are also stepping up efforts to chip away at one source of ASEAN’s dependence on China – infrastructural aid. India and Japan, along with the United States, have already started doing this. The private sector in India and Japan are also joining the United States under the Indo-Pacific Business Forum to promote infrastructure.

Such measures would provide real choices to countries in ASEAN and elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific that are otherwise stuck with China. India and its partners have had some success in pointing out the flaws in China’s model of infrastructure “aid,” which has at times led to debt traps that forced countries to give up valuable assets to China. This new form of neocolonialism is now well recognized. But without alternatives, the temptations of China’s checkbook diplomacy are hard to resist for many smaller countries. Thus, infrastructural assistance has to be an integral part of any strategy to counter China’s efforts in this direction.

The downside here is that India does not enjoy a very good track record in this regard. Despite the rhetoric of a strengthened outreach, the capacity to extend regional connectivity and infrastructure building has been insufficient. The Modi government too appears to have laid more emphasis in its official statements, with very little to show on the ground. The trilateral highway with Myanmar and Thailand is a case in point: though Thailand has completed its part of the highway, India has yet to do so on the Indian side of the border.

India’s poor track record in its infrastructure building in India’s Northeast is yet another indicator. If India cannot develop even its own connectivity with ASEAN, its pledges to help others in ASEAN with infrastructure are bound to sound hollow. India needs to do more to convert its rhetoric into reality.

India clearly wants to help ASEAN stand up to China because it is in New Delhi’s interest. But while there is little doubt about New Delhi’s desires, ASEAN countries are likely to look for actual deliveries rather than promises. India’s repeated assertion of ASEAN-centrality has so far not given ASEAN countries – especially the smaller ones – sufficient reason to hope that India can be an effective substitute for China. This will only deepen the existing divisions within ASEAN and make India’s ASEAN-centrality strategy that much more difficult to accomplish.