Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh.

Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020.

Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing.

For the full essay, click here.



Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted.

After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York tweeted, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said:

We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.

Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well.

Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.”

Despite that slightly gentler tone, India responded harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent interview, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship.

This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi said publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation.

India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar stated that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual meeting with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.

There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time.

Is the Washington Consensus on US-India Relations Fraying? - The Diplomat, 1 January 2020

In my first column for The Diplomat for 2020, I looked at the U.S.-India relations, and I argue that recent developments (within India) have raised questions about the future of bipartisan support for U.S.-India relations.

U.S.-India relations have improved over the last two decades, partly due to the strong political consensus in Washington supporting this trend. Both Democrats and Republicans have put aside other differences when it came to India, and, even when different parties controlled them, both the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. government have supported strengthening the relationship.

Recent developments, however, have cast a shadow on the extent of that support and how it might shape up moving forward. Scrutiny on some domestic developments in India has raised some questions about U.S. support for India and the future shape of the bilateral relationship.

Of particular note are the recent Indian actions regarding Indian citizenship and identity issues, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC), which have not gone down well, either in India or in the United States.

For the full essay, click here.



The negative Western media attention on India has been generally dismissed by senior Indian officials as biased. The home minister, Amit Shah, blamed Indian opposition parties for raising human rights concerns. Commenting on the human rights situation in Jammu and Kashmir in September, Shah said, “To those who are asking questions about human rights, I want to ask have they ever thought about the human rights of the widows or children of the 41,800 people killed in J&K so far.” Ashok Malik, a respected journalist and former media advisor to the Indian president, categorized the negative publicity as “a familiar assortment of New York/London-based know-alls, fringe left activists, Pakistani state agents masquerading as aggrieved neutrals, and freelance self-determinists representing nothing but their bylines.”

The CAA and NRC, against the backdrop of the Article 370 developments, have compounded the negative international perception of India. The Indian foreign minister’s decision to cancel an important interaction at the U.S. Capitol may create new problems. Jaishankar had requested a meeting with the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) on the sidelines of the second India-U.S. two-plus-two dialogue in Washington. But upon learning that Congresswoman Pramila Jayapal, who is not a member of the Committee, would also be present at the HFAC meeting, Jaishankar cancelled the interaction, saying “I have no interest in meeting” the Indian-American congresswoman. Instead, he insisted he would only meet with “people who are objective and open to discussion but not the people who already made up their minds.”

Jayapal, a Democrat, has been an outspoken critic of India’s actions in Kashmir. More importantly, she was introducing a resolution on Kashmir in the House of Representatives, calling for all the communications restrictions imposed by the Indian government to be removed at the earliest. By cancelling the meeting, India appears to have made the issue worse for itself because the resolution saw 10 additional sponsors right after the minister’s snub to Jayapal.

A wiser decision would have been for India to have proceeded with the meeting and explain the situation, even if it was a difficult case to make. This was what Jaishankar had done while on a visit to Washington after the Article 370 developments, by which India managed to pacify at least some of the critics. Cancelling the meeting, on the other hand, clearly created the impression that India did not have a convincing story to tell.

This action has upped the ante and possibly angered Democratic lawmakers in the United States. Should a Democratic candidate win in the 2020 US presidential election, India may have a lot of making-up to do. Even if a Democrat does not win the presidency and Trump gets a second term, India will still need support from Democratic lawmakers on Capitol Hill.

In the last couple of decades, India has generally enjoyed bipartisan support in Washington, D.C., and this was most evident during the U.S-India nuclear deal. Despite a few nonproliferation hardliners in the U.S. Congress, President George W. Bush was able to muster sufficient support for India because both Democrats and Republicans wanted to build a closer strategic partnership. Since then, India has worked hard to keep its support bipartisan. Doing so ensured that even in the very difficult and partisan political environment in Washington, relations with India was one of the few issues on which there was a broad consensus in the U.S. Congress, making for steady legislative support to executive efforts deepen the relationship.

It would be a shame if India managed to fritter away that bipartisan support. India will have to work much harder in Washington if it can count on only the support of one party or smaller segments of both.