Implications of the US Withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty - The Diplomat, 29 May 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote about implications of the US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty. It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations.

Last week, the Trump administration announced that the US will be pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty (OST), a major arms control measure that aided transparency and confidence-building among 34 participating states. In a press statement on May 21, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the U.S. will send its six-month notice to all the state parties to this effect. Justifying the move, Pompeo said, “Russia has been a serial violator of many of its arms control obligations and commitments,” and not just the OST. The treaty allows member countries to fly unarmed surveillance planes over each other’s territory with a 72-hour notice. The participating states, under the treaty commitments, fly fixed wing planes, equipped with agreed sensors.

The U.S. decision to walk out of the OST comes against the backdrop of the U.S. walking out of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in August 2019, and much earlier in 2001, the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) Treaty. Global arms control arrangements were in a state of disarray in any case and this adds to the problem. While many of the recent developments have been due to Russia’s apparent violation of its commitments, at least as the US maintains, the real reason is more likely the intensifying Sino-U.S. competition and Washington’s determination not to tie its own hands.

For the full essay, click here.



Nevertheless, the U.S. does have some complaints about Russian behavior. Washington has cited instances where Russia has breached its OST commitments, particularly on U.S. flights over Russia. Pompeo’s press note last week alleged that Russia had denied permission to U.S. observation flights “within a 10-kilometer corridor along its border with the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thereby attempting to advance false Russian claims that these occupied territories are independent states.” Russia has apparently placed restriction on flight distance over Kaliningrad, and this has been particularly concerning because the enclave has seen significant military build-up in recent years.

Such actions have fueled opposition to the treaty, especially from the right wing of the U.S. political spectrum. In an op-ed in the Washington Post in December 2019, Tom Cotton, a Republican Senator from Arkansas, made a case for the U.S. withdrawal by saying, “Russia has breached the treaty for years by imposing limits on U.S. flights while suffering no such restrictions itself. In other words, “open skies for me, closed skies for thee.”

There were other problems too, because the U.S. fears that Russia has gained an unfair technical advantage under the OST. In 2016, Russia reportedly decided to introduce a new digital electro-optical sensor to its Tupolev Tu-154 aircraft used for Open Skies flights. Both the Pentagon and the U.S. Congress raised alarms over this, though it had more to do with the technological advantage Russia gained rather than being a technical violation of the treaty itself. One senior U.S. intelligence official apparently warned that the introduction of new sophisticated planes over the U.S. would provide Russia with “a significant advantage.” In 2019, Russia introduced the Tu-214ON aircraft OST missions over the United States, raising further concerns.

Russia has its own complaints: Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused the U.S. of imposing “more sweeping restrictions on observation flights over Alaska.” However, the grievances on the U.S. side have been much more intense.

The treaty came about with good intentions. A hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1992 on the Open Skies Treaty noted that the treaty was not framed as an arms control measure, but as a measure that calls for higher levels of openness and transparency leading to better predictability and stability, thus lessening tensions among the participating states. The initial idea of the OST came from President Dwight Eisenhower in 1955 although it led to nothing since it was rejected by the Soviet Union, which said it was a means for spying. Following the end of the Cold War, in May 1989, U.S. President George H. W. Bush once again broached the idea. After a meeting between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, along with additional negotiations supported by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the OST was signed in March 1992.

Trump’s decision to withdraw from the treaty could be seen as a prelude to what might happen with regard to another arms control measure that will be up for renewal soon. The bilateral START agreement with Russia ,which puts a cap on the number of deployed nuclear missiles to 1,550 on each side, will come up for renewal in February 2021. Given the recent U.S. attitude toward global arms control measures, it is possible that the U.S. will not renew the agreement.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a keen desire for China to join these arms control arrangements. The feeling appears to be that these various U.S.-Russia treaties serve to limit U.S. ability to compete effectively with China because China is not bound by the same agreements. This was definitely true of the INF treaty. But China has been clear in saying that it has no plans to join any future arms control measure involving the U.S. and Russia.

It is difficult to say what the future of arms control might be given the increasingly contentious nature of major power relations. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has been in a state of limbo for more than two decades and it is unlikely that any serious discussions will happen at the CD in the near future. While the U.S. move does not help matters, it is also yet another indication that the intensifying international competition is shifting to the Indo-Pacific. This means that the U.S. and China will need to engage directly for a new era in arms control.

India's Policy Approach to Space Security and Cyber Security, my presentation at the Chatham House conference on cyber and space security....

Last week, Chatham House organised a one-day conference, "Making the Connection: The Future of Cyber and Space," identifying trends and developments in cyber and space technology, weigh the risks posed by
dependence with the broader social benefits, assess implications for national and international security, examine the role of the public and private sector in mitigating threats and building resilience, and finally, discuss national and international policy approaches.

I was also speaking at the workshop addressing India's approach to both outer space and cyber space security. Brief outline of my presentation is given below.

Space and cyber security challenges are generally considered the emerging frontiers in our security discourse although the reality is that they present clear and present danger to India and the rest of the world already. While the challenges are known and acknowledged by states, the difficulty has been the lack of an agreed approach in addressing these challenges. Therefore, unlike in the nuclear arena, space and cyber continue to be driven by certain broad definitional understanding without specific guidelines and norms on permissible activities or capabilities that will ensure the long-term sustainability of outer and cyber space. Therefore, the need to define and communicate clear boundaries at all the different levels while developing certain norms of responsible behavior are essential steps in securing the both the outer space and cyber domain.

On the outer space domain, even as India continues with the official stance of non-weaponisation of outer space, the fact remains that China’s ASAT test has upped the ante and stirred a new debate in the Indian establishment about the need for ASAT capabilities as well as other potential applications in the military domain. However, there is continuity in the official policy of India, which is prevention of weaponisation of outer space while strengthening arms control measures in space.

On cyber security, India’s policy approach is guided by two drivers of national security and social harmony. Although India’s policy approach used to be driven primarily by the former concern, given the large number of hacking and jamming-related incidents in India or Indian missions abroad. Lately, the debate has shifted to one with a greater emphasis on social cohesion, which has resulted in stricter monitoring and surveillance of internet and social media activities.

Meanwhile, India has not yet given serious attention to the issue of cyber-linked attack on outer space. Given that satellite communication networks are connected to the internet, the vulnerabilities of the space sector using cyber means have increased exponentially. Under this scenario, the theatre of conflict, means and impact are going to be felt across the domains. What was once possible by states that had hi-tech capabilities, today this is in the realm of possibilities to any cyber-savvy hacker. The threat is not simply destruction or damage of satellites but much beyond including deny or counterfeit satellite transmissions, access and leak data collected by sensors, send in wrong data among other things.

The convergence of space and cyber domains present a complex challenge. Given this cross-domain nature of challenges in the space and cyber domains, states have to invest in regional and global efforts to understand these environments on a real time basis.



Type rest of the post here

Drawing the Boundaries: Ideal Ingredients of a Space Code

Here's a short essay on an international code of conduct on space and what are the few issues it must contain and clarify.

The idea of establishing a space code of conduct has been gaining ground in the last few years. The recent steps by the European Union (EU) towards institutionalising a set of rules on outer space affairs is a welcome step although it has been met with some criticism, mostly on the process but in part on

the content of the code as well. However, given the enormity of challenges, there is a need for all the spacefaring powers to unite in this exercise, especially as the EU evolves a more inclusive process in galvanising support for the code. In turn, the EU must be sufficiently open-minded to have an inclusive agenda in order to ensure greater support from other regions. There is clearly a need to ensure critical mass if a space code is to become effective.

Given the number of multiple actors and new technologies, there are likely to be several issues driving the agenda. However, there has to be greater clarity on the key points of disagreement that must be addressed in a code.

For the full essay, click here.



It is important for India and others to debate and decide on two aspects: what it thinks the norms should be and what sort of future it wants to achieve in space. Obviously, long-term sustainability of outer space and ensuring space security remain major driving factors. A large number of countries and not just the major space powers are dependent on outer space one way or the other. Therefore, it is important that we define, categorise and regulate what activities are permissible and what needs to be restricted. Also defining certain limits on activities by states or non-state parties has become essential for ensuring the security of outer space.

While many states are dependent on space assets for societal and developmental utilities, there has also been the growing trend of militarization with states using space assets for a variety of military missions including surveillance and reconnaissance, signals intelligence and early warning. However, the more recent trend towards weaponisation of outer space with some states making investments in their military space programmes is worrying. The advance nature of military space programmes in Asia, for example, poses major challenges. New capabilities being developed such as anti-satellite missiles (ASAT) are potentially destabilizing. With ASAT capabilities, the concern is not just about additional debris creation but more importantly that the threat perception about space weaponisation could become real. This could lead to a regional arms race, including in the space domain.

Meanwhile, space debris has become a larger challenge requiring immediate attention. Much of the space debris was created between the 1960s and mid-1990s. After this, for a decade the debris growth line had flattened out. However, the Chinese shooting down of an old weather satellite in January 2007 created more than 2,500 pieces of debris. In addition, the 2009 collision between the Russian Cosmos and US Iridium satellites resulted in a debris of more than 2,000 pieces. These two incidents have changed the situation for the worse. The rapid growth of space junk has meant devastating impact on civilian space assets calling for immediate attention.

While these are some of the broad issues that should become part of any code that might come into existence, there is a need to address several definitional issues. The lack of definitional clarity of many space security-related terms has provided ample scope for mischief. Terms and concepts such as ’peaceful activity’, ’space weapon’, ’defensive actions in space’, and ’space weaponisation’, among others, need to be clarified.

Additionally it is also of importance to codify activities that may need to be restrained. While it is not logistically possible to list all activities that are acceptable, it will be of great value if the code is in a position to outline the kind of actions that may fall outside of the category of "responsible behaviour." This should be within the realm of possibility.

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967, for instance, laid out some of the basic tenets although the treaty has become quite open-ended in its understanding and explanation of the uses of outer space. An excellent analysis by Gopal Raj on the loopholes of the outer space treaty, raises questions about the definition of air space and outer space. This is particularly relevant as the treaty prohibits the placement of weapons in orbit around the Earth, in outer space, or on celestial bodies. Unless there is clarity on where ’outer space’, which is part of the global commons, begin going beyond the national boundaries and sovereignty, one is bound to see competing definitions leading to potentially dangerous situations.

Similarly, how do we define space weapons? Any weapon used in space warfare can be technically called a space weapon. It could include anything from anti-satellite missiles to the old Soviet Almaz military space station which carried a fixed 23 mm cannon for preventing hostile interception and a lot more. The fact that none of the current treaties address this definitional gap needs to be corrected.

The current treaties and agreements also do not take a categorical stand on what construes peaceful activity. Today, peaceful has come to be narrowly defined as "non-aggressive" in intent, which is quite broad considering the array of activities possible in outer space.

Lastly, the current treaties only address the issue of placement of weapons in outer space, which is seen as the biggest threat, leaving outside its ambit the entire range of ground-based weapons that are bigger challenges.

India, CD and Space Security

Here's the summary of my recent paper presentation on "India, Conference on Disarmament and Space Security" at the IDSA-MEA Conference on Space and International Security (March 30-31, 2011).

India has been active at the multilateral fora on disarmament as well as on narrower issues such as the prevention of weaponisation of outer space. Its active involvement in negotiations of treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is testimony of its commitment to limiting the use of space for peaceful purposes. India, however, has been less than satisfied with the role of major powers in reaching a consensus on these critical issues and there is now a momentum toward weaponisation of outer space, which have serious implications for India’s security.

My paper looked at India’s experience at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in general and its views on PAROS (Prevention of An Arms Race in Outer Space) in particular. Divided into three sections – the first section of the paper looked at India’s general experience within the CD on a number of treaties; the second section looked at India’s growing challenges in the arena of space and the final section looks at developments relating to OST and PAROS and how these can tackle the challenges in space. In conclusion, the paper analyses the status and ability of arms control regimes to tackle the current challenges. Because this is a major crisis facing the multilateral regime, be it about the fissile materials or outer space weaponization. The paper finally made a few recommendations to improve the functioning of the CD as well as on the need for India to become proactive in shaping the regime that it may have to be part of.

If anyone is interested, I can send the full paper.