Seeking Nuclear Legitimacy, my article on India's nuclear security policy...

Here's my short essay on India's nuclear security policy, particularly in the backdrop of India's NSG membership talks... I make two points here: one, even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. two, for many of the NSG members, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

The annual meeting of the 48-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was recently concluded in Buenos Aires, where India's membership issue was discussed with no clear answer. Several countries, including the US, UK, France have remained supportive of India's membership although countries such as China, among a few others, have remained opposed to the Indian membership issue. It is in the interests of India to be part of the NSG if it has to be able to shape the new non-proliferation architecture and exercise a greater say in how the global rules are played. For the international community as well, it is beneficial to have India inside the tent than outside.

Nuclear security has become an important concern for the global community. The threat of nuclear terrorism, including the so-called 'dirty bomb', has continued to increase over the last decade. The need for strengthening the current international mechanisms and establishing new rules if necessary is growing. Recognising the importance of the problem, the global community has held three 'nuclear security summits' which focused just on this problem. India has a lot to contribute to this effort, but we are being stymied by misperception about our own efforts in the nuclear security arena.

For India too, this is an important issue. The fact that the Indian Prime Minister participated in the first two nuclear security summits indicates the importance of this issue to India. New Delhi worries that one of the various terrorists groups in the region, especially those in Pakistan, might acquire some type of nuclear capacity.

While acquisition of nuclear materials and capabilities is not easy given the tight security around facilities and installations, the potential for such should not be ruled out. Accordingly, India has instituted strong measures around nuclear safety and security, which is at par with some of the other major nuclear powers. Analysts have been critical of India's policies and practices, but the reality is that India put in place both its institutional and legal architecture way back in the 1960s and 1970s. Obviously, there have been structural changes as well as amendments brought to these instruments in recognition of new threats and risks. In the backdrop of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks, the potential to carry out commando style attack or a sabotage by Pakistan-based terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba is very real and India has to gear up its response mechanisms in a focused manner. Therefore, while terrorism is not a new phenomenon to India given its geographical proximity to global terrorism, it has to plan its response and contingency measures well. The ability to respond quickly and effectively, bringing together all the different agencies involved, will be a major challenge. While various agencies do periodic scenario building and exercises to test their response capabilities, mock drills involving all agencies are done very rarely.

International cooperation is particularly important given the nature of new challenges facing India in this regard. Even as India has instituted rigorous measures to secure its nuclear installations, it had done poorly in advertising what it has done. To a great extent, the consensus has been that we need not be so open in the area of nuclear safety and security. This may have served India's interests to a limited extent so far.

However, as India's interests grow and it makes efforts to integrate with the international nuclear community, its ability to shape the new non-proliferation architecture will depend to a large extent how open it is about its policies and postures. No one is arguing for total transparency wherein our security may be put to risk, but a more pro-active engagement and outlining of our broad approach might do India some good. Having said that, it should also be acknowledged that there has been some effort recently to outline India's nuclear security approach and what different measures India has taken to secure its nuclear facilities and installations. For instance, a report authored by the Ministry of External Affairs lays out in detail the structures and practices that India has adopted in the area of nuclear security.

Despite India having an elaborate system in place, the Nuclear Threat Initiative's (NTI) Nuclear Security Index 2014 has clubbed India along with countries that have extremely poor track record in nuclear security. How seriously should this be taken up? Should an attempt by a think tank to quantify this issue be accorded any importance? This question pops up in the backdrop of India trying to garner support for membership into major technology export control regimes including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). It should be important that other countries know what we do, in terms of our internal practices but also what we do in the international realm, particularly with bodies such the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

There is little that one could do if groups such as the NTI come with a pre-judged position on India's nuclear security policies and practices. To counter such perceptions, not only must India put in place a lot of institutions and practices but also advertise to the world what it is doing. This is important when we are seeking membership of various nuclear clubs and because we need others' cooperation on a number of nuclear-related issues. Having said that, for many, it is India not signing the NPT, which is at the heart of their lack of support for India's NSG membership, for instance. The sanctity of "NPT-signatory" is laughable because that is a crude way of assessing a country's nuclear non-proliferation record. China has signed the NPT but has flouted every single idea behind the treaty. On the other hand, while India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has upheld all the principles that are enshrined in the global non-proliferation regime.

India can consider a few steps that might strengthen its image on this issue among the larger nuclear community. One, India's nuclear doctrine could be elucidated further and updated as a means of bringing about more clarity. This may be something that the Modi government could contemplate upon. Such measures could also be used as important tools of international messaging. Two, India could issue detailed position papers and statement at important forums like the Nuclear Security Summit and such other platforms. Three, India should communicate to the international community by using different platforms to share its perspectives and concerns. For instance, participation in international conferences, which are many a time effectively Track 1.5 platforms, are a way to garner greater support while pro-actively shaping the global discourse. India on many occasions does not appreciate the significance of such platforms and whether intended or not, it has lost out on several opportunities to effect impact. India must take corrective steps in this regard sooner than later. India's establishment of the GCNEP has gone a long way to strengthen its credibility in the area of nuclear security. India could consider additional steps, including possibly establishing a CTBT Monitoring Station, which would be seen as a positive contribution to monitoring non-proliferation challenges in the region and beyond. All this could go a long way in correcting international misperception of India in the nuclear non-proliferation and security arena.

Iraq's deepening crisis and India's interests, my analysis on the Iraqi crisis following the abduction of 490 Indian nurses in Mosul...

I had published another essay on the Iraq crisis following the abduction of 40 nurses and how it impacted directly India's security in Iraq and beyond. The original Indian reaction was that "the violence there is not targeted at Indian nationals. We are just caught in the cross-fire." Whatever be the rationale, whether we were purposely targeted or caught in between, this new development has changed the dynamics for India.

Thereafter, even as India was concerned about the worsening situation in Iraq, New Delhi could afford to ignore it as an internal Iraqi issue between the Sunnis and Shiites, despite the glaring fact that the atrocities committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an off-shoot of Al Qaeda, amounted to "war crimes," as the UN human rights head noted two days ago. But for several reasons, this is no longer the case.

For the full article, click here.



India's interests in Iraq and the region should be seen in the larger context of the seven million Indians working in West Asia, of which nearly 18,000 are in Iraq. Safety and security of this population should dominate the Indian policy. The foreign exchange earned by India through this population is also a significant factor. Therefore, any unrest in the region will have an impact on India.

Two, the fallout of any crisis in West Asia on India's energy security needs to be kept in mind. The current crisis could lead to spiralling global oil prices, but in addition, safe access to energy resources also becomes an important consideration.

Three, even though the current crisis in Iraq is often seen through a Sunni-Shia prism in the local context, the issue has a wider regional consonance. The issue needs to be seen in the context of the Shia-dominated Iran and the Sunni-dominated Saudi Arabia and how they see the current crisis as a reflection of the larger regional dynamics.

Four, the takeover by the ISIS of several Iraqi towns reflects a lack of capacity on the part of the Iraqi government and its security forces to handle the situation. In such a scenario, it is meaningless to assume that India and Iraq have excellent relations and therefore India is not a target. It may well have been that the 40 Indians were caught in between and not necessarily targeted by the ISIS, but the reality is that there is a monster in the country, who is notorious for their extreme brutality. India should consider cooperating with other States to undertake capacity building of the Iraqi security forces in order for these forces to fight terrorists more effectively in the future.

India should also consider coordinating with other major regional or extra-regional powers in determining the next course of action. To arrest the current pace of ISIS advance, there is clearly a need for military action. There has to be a simultaneous pursuit of two approaches: military strikes in the areas captured by the ISIS, and a political approach from the Iraqi government side to bring about some sort of rapprochement between the Sunni, Shia and the Kurd population. After an initial agreement among these communities, these have to be followed by a larger political accommodation wherein the other groups are brought in as part of the mainstream. This is critical because the ISIS gains, to a large extent, have been driven by Sunni bitterness at the current Iraqi political leadership.

Five, India needs to see the ISIS advance as part of the phenomena of global terrorism. India should pursue the fight against terror in a more focused manner to effect impact on the ISIS funding and terror activities.

To tackle India's current hostage crisis, India has to obviously work with the Maliki leadership but New Delhi also has to engage other regional players in bringing out a favourable outcome.

Dangers of the ISIS Push in Iraq... my take on the Iraq situation and what it means for the region and the US...

Last month, I wrote a short essay on the dangers of the ISIS push into Iraq and what could India and others do to bring the situation under control. ISIS' capture of most of the western and northern cities of Iraq was quick and the Iraqi armed forces abandoned their weapons and ran, leaving the ISIS to gain in military terms as well.

There have been debates whether the US should get involved and the debate is wide open. There are arguments on both sides, bringing out the pros and cons. Secretary of State John Kerry in a statement said that the President has every option including airstrikes on the table. It has also been reported that diplomats from both Iran and the US have had discussions regarding possible options in order to arrest the ISIS’ advance. Sections of the US Congress and the retired military officials have underlined the importance for the US to get involved in Iraq in order to bring about a semblance of stability in Iraq. General Paul Eaton, who was responsible for training Iraqi security forces, went to the extent of saying that Iran would be a "natural ally" in the campaign against the ISIS. Characterising the current crisis in Iraq as possibly the worst national security that the US has faced since the 9/11 attacks, Senator Lindsey Graham argued that the US must engage Iran in developing coordinated options in dealing with the situation. However, he made a distinction to say, "I don’t want Iran to dominate Iraq. And that’s where they’re headed. ... Don’t have the Iranians save Baghdad. Let us save Baghdad, so there will be a chance at a second government."

These are clearly no easy options for the US. However, the US should not look at staying in Iraq for a long haul. The US must go in with a limited military mission to arrest the spread of ISIS, thus aiding the process of bringing stability in Iraq and the region at large.


For the full article, click here.



Even though Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of ISIS, was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, the movement appears to have gained a great deal recently after establishing control over much of eastern Syria and now moving at a frightening pace into Iraq. Latest reports talked about the ISIS advancing to the outskirts of Baghdad, barely 45 minutes away from the capital. The UN human rights head Navi Pillay characterized the ISIS’ "apparently systematic series of cold-blooded executions" as near "war crimes."

ISIS is primarily a Sunni radical group that took its birth in the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. At the time of the invasion, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the founder of the ISIS, an Arab from Jordan, had landed on the outskirts of Baghdad with some weapons, bags full of money and a bold idea of uniting Sunni Muslims of the region through war.1 In a limited span of time, he was able to build a support base among Iraqis and then started a spate of suicide bombings and brutal execution of anyone (predominantly Shiites and Americans) he saw as a hindrance in his pursuit of establishing an Islamic Caliphate. Driven by Zarqawi’s dream of an extremist Sunni commune across the region, the ISIS believes in establishing an Islamic Caliphate across Syria, Iraq and much of the region.

Though it managed to build some local support within Iraq, the level of ISIS brutality caused backlash within the Sunni community, which led to what was called the Anbar Awakening in 2006-2007. With Anbar Awakening in motion, the Sunni tribal leaders stopped their support for Zarqawi and instead gave full backing to the US forces in an effort to wipe out the Zarqawi operatives. ISIS puts al Qaeda to shame when it comes to their extreme way of interpreting Quran and propounding a far more brutal manner of implementing Islamic law. However, the sense of alienation that exists among the Sunnis today is driving the community into the hands of the ISIS yet again. Even the veterans who were part of the Awakening movement are now extending support to the ISIS with the hope that the regime in Baghdad that is "corrupt" and "repressive" is defeated.

A major chunk of ISIS funding appears to have come from wealthy private donors in Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, who are supposedly US allies. It is reported that the ISIS has been able to take advantage of loopholes that exist in the anti-money laundering policies in these countries.2 In the recent years, Kuwait appears to have become the financing hub for many anti-Shiite groups. Despite the US Treasury Department being in the know-how of such developments, there has been very little that has been done to deal with this situation. The US has not been particularly successful in impressing upon the Gulf leaders on this point. Meanwhile, the US has lost its credibility to some extent with President Obama not able to carry through the red line that he had set on the issue of Syrian use of chemical weapons.

Many regional experts and officials claim that the ISIS has been able to take full advantage of the worsening Sunni-Shia relations, having been able to win the support of Sunni tribal leaders. The anger and bitterness among the Sunni population towards the Shiite government in Baghdad is something that has worked in favour of the ISIS. Whether and how long this tactical deal between the ISIS and the Sunni tribes will last is a question, though. The brutality and the future plans of the ISIS may not be palatable to the Sunni tribes in the long term.

There are doubts amongst American analysts about the US role in the current crisis. Daniel Pipes, a prominent US scholar and analyst, was categorical (back in 2006) in saying that the West, including the US "cannot be tasked with resolving Sunni-Shiite differences, an abiding Iraqi problem that only Iraqis themselves can address." While this makes sense as a general sentiment, the situation is significantly different today. However, Pipes’ advice against any intervention by the West may not hold today. He had argued that "This is basically a Middle Eastern problem, and outside powers should aim to protect their own interests, not solve the Middle East’s crises. Tehran, not we, should fight ISIS." While Iran may have a more direct interest in the affairs of Iraq, particularly in the current crisis, the West cannot shun the thousands of foreigners fighting alongside the ISIS. More than 2000 Europeans are reportedly fighting in Syria and at least some are returning to Europe to take up fight against the West. The instance of a Frenchman involved in the shooting at the Brussels Jewish museum in May 2014 is a case in point. The suspect, Mehdi Nemmouche, is believed to have been trained in Syria for over a year and had joined many jihadist terrorist groups there. There are also several Americans fighting alongside the ISIS. A Forbes report highlighting this aspect said, "At least 15 Somali-American men from Minnesota have traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The group not only fights in Syria, but also recently captured the Iraqi cities of Mosul (115 km from the border between Iraq and Syria) and Tikrit (323 km from the border). The group does not recognize international borders and has a presence ranging from Syria’s Mediterranean coast to south of Baghdad."

GSLV success: A major technology boost

Here's an analysis of India's successful GSLV launch conducted on January 05, 2014. This puts India in an exclusive club of five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China. Given the complex nature of this technology - the use of rocket propellants at extremely low temperatures, as the ISRO Chairman Dr. Radhakrishnan remarked, "only a few in the world have mastered it."

For the full article, click here.



With the launch of GSLV-D5, India’s indigenously developed cryogenic engine upper stage technology has been proven for the first time, a major feat of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). The proven technology demonstrates India’s ability to launch heavier payloads into geostationary orbit. Cryogenic technology is significant due to the thrust gained through burning every kg of propellant that is far higher in a cryogenic engine, which gives the thrust to carry heavier satellites into orbit. In the flight of GSLV-D5, the ISRO also launched a communication satellite GSAT-14 into the Geosynchronous Transfer Orbit (GTO). The test was a make or break situation for the ISRO after two successive failures in 2010 and a mission cancelled in 2013.

India had undertaken so far seven GSLV launches, including three failures and one mission cancelled hours before the launch. Previous failures included problems such as fuel tank leakage, the mission centre losing control of the rocket with it deviating from predicted flight path, among others. Therefore, the January 5 successful launch is a matter of technology demonstration and a major boost for the Indian space community.

India’s cryogenic journey has been a long one, going back to the 1980s. In December 1982, a Cryogenic Study Team was established that studied all aspects of the technology and questions such as whether India should develop or buy the technology from outside were examined. In 1983, the team submitted a report that recommended developing the engine capable of generating about 10 tonnes of thrust indigenously as against procuring it off the shelf. In addition to the exorbitant cost to buying from elsewhere, export control mechanisms such as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) that denies transfer of such technologies were also contextualising factors in India’s decision. However, in 1991 after a great deal of indecision, Government of India entered into a deal with the Soviet Union for procuring two cryogenic flight stages and the technology to make them in India. The sale of such technology was seen as a violation of the MTCR commitments made by the Soviet Union and thus the deal was scrapped.

In addition to the prestige factor of being part of an exclusive club of countries that have the proven cryogenic engine technology, the GSLV-D5 launch is important from a commercial and strategic perspective. The growing satellite launch market has a huge commercial angle. So far, this market is dominated by the French and the Chinese to an extent. Given the growing number of countries entering the space domain for a variety of missions from socio-economic and development to military functions, the number of satellite launches is likely to go up significantly in the coming years. India should not lose out opportunities in this ever-growing lucrative foreign satellite launch market.

From a strategic perspective, the successful launch of the GSLV means it is self-reliant in the area of satellite launching, including heavier satellites. This also means that India will not have to depend on foreign agencies to carry their heavier payloads. Without a successfully tested indigenous cryogenic engine GSLV, many of India’s future missions would have been affected by delays. India already has a series of satellites including include GSAT-6A and 7A, two remote sensing satellites, GISATs and the GSAT series including GSAT-9 ready for launch in the near future. Chandrayaan-2 and India’s interplanetary and manned moon missions will also have a huge boost. While India has not faced any serious issue of reliability as far as foreign launchers are concerned, being self-sufficient in this area is significant in addition to having more cost-effective, cheaper options at home.

So far India has used its tried and tested Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) although these do have a weight limitation of just over one tonne. A PSLV can carry 1600 kg satellites in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). On the other hand, a GSLV offers India the ability to launch satellites weighing 3.5-5 tonnes.


1. N. Gopal Raj, "The Long Road to Cryogenic Technology," OpEd, The Hindu, April 21, 2011, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/the-long-road-to-cryogenic-technology/article397441.ece

India's GSLV Launch: A Major Milestone for ISRO...

India's GSLV launch in January 2014 has been watched with a lot of interest as well as apprehension given what happened in 2010 and 2013. However, it is clear that s successful launch of GSLV will place India in the same league as a handful of countries as far as the technological sophistication is concerned. Currently, there are five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China - that have demonstrated the cryogenic engine upper stage technology in order to launch heavier satellites in geostationary orbit. India will become the sixth nation to design and develop this sophisticated and complex technology.

For the full article, click here.



After two successive failures of its Geostationary Launch Vehicle (GSLV) launches in 2006 and 2010 and an aborted mission in 2013, India's endeavour to launch another GSLV on January 5 is being watched with both hope and apprehension. Though the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has done several trial tests for the launch of GSLV-D5, there is apprehension because of what happened in 2010 and 2013.

A successful launch of GSLV will place India in the same league as a handful of countries as far as the technological sophistication is concerned. Currently, there are five countries - the United States, Russia, France, Japan, and China - that have demonstrated the cryogenic engine upper stage technology in order to launch heavier satellites in geostationary orbit. India will become the sixth nation to design and develop this sophisticated and complex technology. The GSLV-D5 rocket will carry on board the 2-tonne GSAT-14 satellite capable of delivering communication services in the area of tele-medicine and tele-education. On December 28, 2013, the Mission Readiness Review (MRR) team and the Launch Authorisation Board (LAB) cleared the GSLV-D5/GSAT 14 launch for January 5 and thereafter the rocket was shifted to the launch pad.

The three-stage rocket, with solid, liquid and cryogenic stages, is "a very complex system compared with solid or earth-storable liquid propellant stages due to its use of propellants at extremely low temperatures and the associated thermal and structural problems", according to the ISRO. Cryogenic technology is significant because the thrust gained through burning every kg of propellant is far higher in a cryogenic engine, which gives the thrust to carry heavier payloads into orbit.

Starting in April 2001, India has so far carried out seven GSLV launches, including three failures and one aborted launch. Past failures have included problems such as deviation from the predicted flight paths soon after the lift-off. The attempt in 2013 had to be called off hours before the lift-off as they detected a leak in the fuel tank of the liquid second-stage in pre-launch pressurisation phase of the vehicle.

This time around, ISRO Chairman Dr. S Radhakrishnan and the engineers appear confident of having rectified many of the problems faced in the previous missions. There have been several committees set up to study in detail the cause of failures and accordingly remedial measures have been taken. For instance, they have used an entirely new fuel tank. Apparently, the earlier leaked-prone fuel tank was an old stock, procured four years ago and also the aluminium alloy, Afnor 7020 that was used in the making of the tank tends to develop cracks over a period of time. The booster turbo pump, that ran into problem twice previously, had used different materials that contracted differently at low temperatures, which has been rectified now by using a single material. Similarly, the issues of contamination with the propellant acquisition device procured from Russia have been addressed and this time around, the device is manufactured in India. There has been refurbishing of the casing of the rocket as well.

Tomorrow's attempt will be significant both from the commercial and strategic perspectives. In addition to the large number of domestic satellites ready to be launched using the heavier launch vehicle, a successful launch will also mean India's ability to cash in on the large lucrative foreign satellite launch market.

Given the ever-increasing reliance on space assets for a variety of missions from socio-economic and development to military functions, the number of satellite launches will spike significantly in the coming years. China has already captured a sizeable chunk of this market even though India offers much more cost-effective launches, which in fact have been its strength.

India's tried and tested Polar Satellite Launch Vehicles (PSLV) have a weight limitation of just over one tonne. A PSLV is capable of carrying 1600 kg satellites in 620 km sun-synchronous polar orbit and 1050 kg satellite in geo-synchronous transfer orbit (GTO). A GSLV on the other hand will offer India ability to launch satellites weighing 3.5-5 tonnes.

A successful launch with the indigenous cryogenic engine will go a long way in making India self-sufficient in the area of satellite launching. Large tonnage carrying capability is important in the domestic context since it will no longer have to depend on foreign rockets to carry their large satellites. Chandrayaan-2 is a case in point. Other satellite launches planned include GSAT-6A and 7A, two remote sensing satellites, GISATs and the GSAT series including GSAT-9. Relying on foreign carriers has had reliability issues in addition to the cost factor as these have proven to be more expensive options.

India's Mars Mission: A Mere Show of Capabilities?, my OpEd in the Global Times...

Here's another OpEd I wrote on India's Mars mission and this was published in the Global Times (China). Despite the cost-effectiveness of India's Mars mission, there have been several questions raised on whether this was necessary given that India has several challenges in the developmental domain. It is indeed true that India has serious issues nevertheless there are several important reasons for conducting such missions.

For one, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved. Two, space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs. Three, given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

For the full article, click here.



India successfully launched a Mars mission, the Mangalyaan, on November 5. The mission is a major demonstration of India's technological capabilities, and a reflection of the growing competition in the Asian space race.

At $73 million, this is one of the most cost-effective Mars missions. But the political and security considerations are also important. Being the first Asian country to conduct such a mission must also have been an important factor in India's calculations.

Despite being one of the most cost-effective missions yet, questions have been raised as to why India spends money on such efforts when it is faced with dire poverty and developmental issues at home.

There has been criticism, both in India and outside, about the waste of resources on spectacle while developmental needs remain unmet.

It is undoubtedly true that India has significant developmental challenges on which it needs to spend money and effort. Nevertheless, there are at least three important reasons for conducting such missions.

First, while India has poverty and developmental issues, it also has to develop its scientific and technological base. It would be foolish to suggest that India should ignore scientific and technological advances until all developmental issues are resolved.

High technology projects such as the moon mission in 2008 and now its Mars mission are important both for technology development as well as to motivate the scientific community and the general populace.

Space technology and assets are needed for everything from communications to weather forecasting. No nation, especially a developing one, can ignore such technologies. But such technologies and capacities cannot be developed without also developing India's space capabilities in general, which is why the Mangalyaan is important.

Space is a vital aspect of India's security. India does not live in a benign neighborhood and it has had to balance between its development and security needs. No major power can afford to ignore the importance of space technology for its military needs.

India has launched its first dedicated military satellite for the Indian navy, in recognition of the increasing geopolitical and military rivalry in the Indian Ocean. Staying in the space race is thus an important consideration for India because it affects other aspects of India's security.

There are increasing worries that space itself might become a direct security threat. The threat of the militarization of space is gaining greater momentum. And the idea of establishing an Indian aerospace command has been gaining greater traction.

Given its experience in the nuclear arms control area, India has to come to understand the importance of crossing a certain technological threshold if it wants to sit at the high table.

In the nuclear arena, India did not conduct an atomic test in the 1960s even though it had the capacity to do so and therefore found itself left out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and various other aspects of the NPT regime.

Today, world powers are debating a regime to regulate outer space activities. India cannot let itself be left out of any space regime as happened over nuclear weapons.

But in order to be heard in the discussions of any new rule-making effort, India needs to demonstrate its capabilities in space research and technology, something that the Mangalyaan amply did.

India's space program was not originally driven by big ambitions. As noted by Vikram Sarabhai, one of India's space pioneers, India did "not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight."

But this has changed. India is no longer as poor and backward as it was in the 1960s when Sarabhai spoke. The increasing intensity of international competition means that India needs to show off its abilities once in a while.

Geopolitics of India's Mars mission, my OpEd in The Wall Street Journal....

It has been more than six months since I updated my blog. I thought I will get serious with my blog at least from the beginning of a new year but it has been more hectic than before. There have been couple of different projects that I have been part of as well as coordinating, which have been exciting and challenging but they clearly took a lot of my time as they involved a lot of travelling, meeting and interactions with experts, key stakeholders. Now that I am done with most of the travel for these projects, I hope I will have more time at hand at my blog back on track.

November 2013 was big for India. India's Mars mission undertaken on November 05 was a matter of pride, in terms of technology demonstration. But the Mars mission, called Mangalyaan, was also a reflection of the growing competition in the space domain, especially in Asia. Also to be the first Asian country to conduct such a complex mission must have been an important factor in India's calculation. The fact that India managed to do this mission in a cost-effective manner at around $ 75 million, a fraction of the cost incurred by other spacefaring powers, added to the pride factor.

Here is an OpEd that I wrote in November, one for the Wall Street Journal.

In the Asian Wall Street Journal OpEd, I argue that India did not enter the space domain with big dream projects but the key objective was to bring about change in the socio-economic and development domains through greater utilisation of science in particular, and space utilisation in particular. However, as things have progressed over the decades, there have been challenges, new compulsions which have necessitated India to focus on showcasing of its abilities every now and then.

Full article is given below.




India’s space program did not begin with big ambitions. Vikram Sarabhai, one of the original leaders of the Indian space program in the early 1960s, said that India did “not have the fantasy of competing with the economically advanced nations in the exploration of the moon or the planets or manned space-flight.”

Even if we take Mr. Sarabhai at his word, India’s maiden mission to Mars, set for lift off today, shows that things have changed.

Firstly, it provides an indication of a growing space race between India and China. Fielding its Mars mission before China has reached the Red Planet is clearly a big factor in Delhi’s calculations. China attempted a Mars orbiter mission in 2011, piggybacking it on a Russian Mars spacecraft, but that failed to leave Earth’s orbit.

Setting off to Mars is a demonstration of India’s technological capabilities and an attempt to join the US, Russia and the European Union in successful interplanetary exploration before China.

The mission is not without its critics, including some former officials of Indian Space Research Organisation, India’s space agency, who argue that it is a waste of money, especially in a country where so many live in poverty. It is unlikely that critics will get much of a hearing.

India claims that its missions are much cheaper than similar ones elsewhere, with this attempt costing $73 million, about a tenth as much as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration spends on comparable programs.

The bread or gun argument is real for India, but the country doesn’t live in a benign neighborhood and the security imperative also requires it to focus on those capabilities which can prepare it for the challenge presented by its location.

India’s security compulsions are becoming a more compelling driver for its space program. Countries around the world have so far used space for so-called passive military applications such as communications and reconnaissance but there is a growing trend towards ‘weaponizing’ outer space.

The U.S.’s Prompt Global Strike program, which includes using long-range missiles and hypersonic vehicles that will transit through space, has created the impression that it plans to weaponize space. This could provoke reactions from Russia and China and set off a broader arms race in space.

China’s anti-satellite test in January 2007 served as a wake-up call to India about the challenges that exist in its neighborhood. The test sparked a new debate, both within the Indian security establishment and the larger Indian strategic community about the country’s traditional policy against the militarization of space and put pressure to develop its own anti-satellite system. While India is yet to demonstrate such capability, the scientific establishment has made it amply clear that they have the technological blocks ready should there be a political decision to do so.

One indicator of Indian concerns about the nature of the space race, is the likely establishment of an Indian aerospace command. Many of the key global powers such as the U.S. and Russia have such commands, India does not. While the Indian government has been debating the issue for close to a decade, there are indications that it is moving forward with the proposal. In 2008, India established an Integrated Space Cell under the aegis of the Integrated Defence Staff. The cell has functioned well in coordinating between the military, the Department of Space and ISRO.

India also launched the first dedicated military satellite this August for its navy, reflecting a gradual shift in the country’s approach to security. The maritime communications satellite is a necessary tool for the marine force as the competition for the Indian Ocean, particularly with China, gradually gathers pace.

From the outset of its space program, demonstrating technological pride and capability has always been an important consideration for India. No less so today. But the Mars mission is as much about demonstrating India’s capabilities as a force in space, as it is about scientific skill.

EU’s New Space Code: A Significant Improvement, my OpEd on the EU's new space code, published in this week's Space News....

Here's an OpEd of mine on the EU's new Space Code published in this week's Space News.

A new draft of the European Union (EU)-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is out. The text of this draft is a huge progress from the previous versions, incorporating many of the comments and suggestions from countries around the world. The language of the new document is tighter and avoids some of the vagueness of the earlier drafts, which had been a cause for concern.

For the full essay, click here.






A new draft of the European Union (EU)-initiated International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is out. The text of this draft is a huge progress from the previous versions, incorporating many of the comments and suggestions from countries around the world. The language of the new document is tighter and avoids some of the vagueness of the earlier drafts, which had been a cause for concern.

One of the key changes is that the new draft has made it amply clear that it is not in conflict with any of the existing treaties and conventions and that it is fully consistent with other U.N. instruments, including previous international legal instruments, declarations, principles and guidelines.

Starting with the Preamble, the new draft makes explicit the objectives of the code, highlighting “greater international cooperation, collaboration, openness and transparency.” More importantly, the new text omits the reference to the “legitimate defence interests of States.” This clause was seen as particularly troublesome by many states given that it could be interpreted subjectively, favoring certain states to potentially weaponize their space capabilities.

Under General Principles, the new draft clarifies the right to individual or collective self-defense in the face of vehement criticism that the right may be pursued by states to legitimize acts of weaponization. While the reference to the right to self-defense has been retained, it has been balanced with the principle of refraining “from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations” in an effort to reflect customary international law, as enshrined in the U.N. Charter. Oddly, this clause generated no debate in the Asian context or even among the major spacefaring powers. The principle is also mentioned in the draft treaty proposed by Russia and China (Article 5) — a fact that could infuse confidence among a large number of developing countries.

In the section on Safety, Security and Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, clause 4.2 avoids a troubling qualification (contained in the 2012 version) that in conducting outer space activities, states will “refrain from any action which brings about ... damage, or destruction, of space objects unless such action is conducted to reduce the creation of outer space debris” (emphasis added). The new version has removed this qualification. The earlier version raised problems because of the subjective manner in which actions could be justified as legitimate and also who determines what actions can be deemed legitimate and that a particular activity has been undertaken to reduce creation of outer space debris.

The one area where some concerns continue is the distinction made between countries that sign the code and those that do not.

Section 5 of the new version, Cooperation Mechanisms, is a good example. Clause 5.1 of the new text says that subscribing states “resolve to notify, in a timely manner, to the greatest extent practicable, all potentially affected Subscribing States of any event related to the outer space activities they are conducting which are relevant for the purposes of this Code, including: scheduled manoeuvres that could pose a risk to the safety of flight of the space objects of other Subscribing States.” Similarly, clause 5.2 says, “The Subscribing States resolve to provide the notifications on any event related to the outer space activities described above to all potentially affected Subscribing States.”

This distinction continues in Section 6, on Information on Outer Space Activities, which also calls for sharing information only among subscribing states. Indeed, the new text actually omits the reference in the previous text to sharing information with nonsubscribing states. Clause 6.2, for instance, states that subscribing states may provide “timely information on outer space environmental conditions and forecasts ... to relevant governmental and non-governmental entities of other Subscribing States.”

Such distinctions between subscribing and nonsubscribing states may have been included in order to create pressure on states to endorse and become parties to the code, but there are two problems, especially when it comes to information sharing:

n It goes against many of the U.N. and other multilateral instruments on space that encourage sharing of information among all states.

n Outer space being truly global commons, any threat to space assets that could cause damage or destruction through collision or other means needs to be shared irrespective of whether a particular state is a party to the code. Space debris does not make a distinction between subscribing and nonsubscribing states, and a collision will result in polluting the outer space environment further. Sharing information with nonsubscribing states might create free-rider problems, but is it really in the interest of any state, including those that accept the code, to not share information when all states could be potentially affected?

The second area of concern is with regard to the terms and conditions for international cooperation, which the new code leaves to individual states to determine. While the code should not be restraining those that are aspiring to emerge as spacefaring nations, leaving it to individual countries to formulate rules of engagement and cooperation could make the situation far more dangerous. Cooperation between states could be seen as positive, as a means of building greater confidence. But unregulated cooperation could increase regional or international insecurities, affect regional military balance, and even contribute to an arms race in space. Therefore, cooperation in space needs some regulation, and regimes need to spell out rules of the game for such cooperation.

Of course, this should not be in the form of technology controls and arms control in space, which are unlikely to work. What needs to be pursued is regulation in terms of how space technology is used, which would involve establishing rules for operations and activities rather than control of technology.

Thus, the new draft is a significant step forward. The language has been tightened to make it more precise and thereby avoid ambiguity and loopholes. The document is particularly mindful of the interests of emerging space actors and instituting measures for greater international cooperation. There have also been several practical measures suggested for more transparency (influenced by the language of existing instruments such as the Report of the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities) that could instill greater confidence among states, which also could address the political difficulties among major powers.

Given the growing number of challenges to safe and sustainable exploitation of outer space, it is time for concerted action by the global community. Outer space is truly a global commons and the responsibility for its safety and sustainability needs to be shared. One state’s action in this domain can affect a large number of states and their assets, which also suggests the need for greater cooperation and mutual consideration. Space is also a limited commodity and therefore measures to strengthen sustainable use of outer space should be actively pursued.

No, China Is Not About to Overtake the US in Space

Here's an essay written by my colleague Arvind and I on China's growth particularly in the space domain, published by the Diplomat on October 02, 2013.

China’s growth trajectory overall and more particularly in the space domain has been impressive. However, John Hickman’s categorical assertions in a recent Foreign Policy article that China is catching up and “may surpass the United States… to become the world’s preeminent spacefaring power” seems to us a touch far-fetched.

For the full essay, click here.

Certainly Hickman is right about Chinese determination and the “unquantifiable” factor of “an extraordinary sense of historical grievance” being a major driver of Chinese space dreams. China attributes its “military technological backwardness” to its past national humiliation at the hands of other major powers. Indeed, this is an important part of the national psyche and helps drives the Chinese space programs.

The problem lies in the tools needed to turn determination into material outcomes. The most important: China has nothing near the commercial space sector that the U.S. boasts. Sure, NASA now gets less than 1 percent of the U.S. federal budget, but much of America’s true capabilities are embedded in its private sector, which plays a much larger role than its equivalent does in China’s space sector and gives the U.S. a major advantage in space technology innovation. Not to mention the fact that the high-tech and defense sectors also contribute and the U.S. lead there is not going to disappear anytime in the next several decades.

China is taking steps to beef up its own commercial space sector (read: state-owned enterprises) but it still lacks the massive private-sector investment in R&D that will be vital to sustaining the success of any space program. For now, China must rely on public investment to advance its space program.

A Need for Innovation

More importantly, China does not innovate, it copies. That helps it catch up, but without innovation China will have difficulty taking over the top spot. Its growth looks like a parabola, approaching the number one spot before falling away.

Although China’s space program has come a long way since its launch failures in 1995 and 1996, that dramatic rise has been aided by the reverse engineering of Russian technology. For instance, many observers believe that the Shenzhou space capsule that heralded China’s manned space flight was based largely on the Russian Soyuz capsule. However, China’s ability to catch up with the other space superpowers by copying alone is fast approaching its limits. This is not helped by U.S. moves to isolate China with regard to international cooperation in space. The latter’s access to the latest technologies has consequently been restricted, a fact that even the Chinese are realizing, reflected in their recent drive to focus more on innovation.

Moreover, China lags significantly behind the U.S. generally in scientific innovation. Consider, as an example, that the U.S. is at the vanguard of revolutionizing manufacturing techniques with the use of 3D printing, which it intends to utilize in the International Space Station, or the involvement of NASA scientists in experiments that could bring them closer to the development of a warp-speed engine.

If ambition is cited as a factor for the possibility of Chinese dominance in space, then surely one must consider the U.S. aspiration to explore the far reaches of space. Even if China is quickly catching up with U.S. dominance in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), its program is largely restricted to that realm. The U.S. meanwhile has set its sights beyond our planet’s periphery.

While American satellites are exploring the far reaches of our solar system, with the Voyager 1 having reached interstellar space, closer to Earth satellites belonging to the U.S. and its partners outmatch Chinese satellites in number and scope. The former owns more than half of all satellites currently orbiting our planet. In terms of their capabilities, American satellites are still far superior to their Chinese counterparts.

Concerns regarding the decommissioning of the U.S. Space Shuttle Program may also be unfounded. NASA has already tapped the commercial sector to fill the gap in its human spaceflight capability. In the final phase of the Commercial Crew integrated Capability program (CCiCap), NASA signed an agreement with the Sierra Nevada Corporation, Space Exploration Technologies and the Boeing Company to develop commercial spaceships to launch American astronauts into orbit by 2015. This is not a sign of weakness; it is an indicator that U.S. national interests are closely aligned with the interests of the country’s commercial space sector.

In contrast, China’s commercial space sector is still very much nascent. In fact, China’s space sector is comparable to the Russian model: state sponsorship and commensurate state interference. Even though Russia continues to be one of the foremost space powers, it has experienced a sustained decline owing to financial constraints and manpower concerns. For China, the PLA’s stakes in aerospace companies are likely to encourage protectionist tendencies, which in turn block the emergence of other innovative thinkers. An underdeveloped private industry will limit the potential for innovation.

China’s impressive ascent in space capability has been driven by massive state financing. While this has undeniably worked well to date, the sustainability of this model as the Chinese economy rebalances is questionable. If state support is capped, or tapers, then with only a modest private sector to fill the gap it is difficult to see how China will sustain the extraordinary progress it has made over the past 15 years.

And finally another factor that must not be discounted is experience. American astronauts have logged thousands of hours of space flight. That gives them long experience dealing with issues China is just beginning to encounter.

Future Potential – With Reforms

Yet despite these limitations, China’s space program could continue to impress given sufficient time and patience. Maintaining the growth trajectory will, however, require reform. More opportunities and incentives for private-sector participation will encourage innovation, while reducing the burden on the public purse. While a political mandate has been issued for innovative thinking, Beijing needs to make the requisite institutional and structural changes that will allow that to happen. Those changes may also help protect the Chinese space program from economic vicissitudes.

In fact, China has shown it understands the importance of commercializing its space efforts. Fortunately, it does enjoy some tremendous commercial opportunities. In Latin America, countries like Venezuela are looking to the Chinese to supply space technology and launch services. There is also demand in Africa, which has already developed strong economic ties with the Chinese. Given that China also has the fastest-growing market for commercial space services on its doorstep, namely in Southeast Asia, there is ample potential to generate revenue to fund R&D. China should aggressively seek potential clients around the world and invest heavily in education.

Meanwhile, China could try to attract technical talent from abroad. This will, however, require more than generous remuneration, since it will be tough to match the American private sector in that regard. For China, this should be a long-term plan for educating the next generation of engineers. If the Chinese are willing to invest time and resources, a new generation could innovate and develop new technology, instead of reverse engineering, creating a slow but more certain path to preeminence.

Finally, dominance in space requires more than just technology. China will need to become a persuasive force in the making of space policy, and this in turn will require that it demonstrate an ability to act responsibly. Beijing’s 2007 anti-satellite test and the resulting space debris was an example of what not to do, especially as the U.S. managed to shoot down a satellite with minimal residual space debris.

So, yes, China has clearly made very significant strides in its space capability. However, it is still a long way short of matching U.S. capabilities and alarm bells need not ring just yet. China’s rise is a function of heavy state investment based on a model that is unlikely to be sustainable. The American model of public-private partnership is more innovative and less of a taxpayer burden. China will need to undertake significant reforms before it supplants the U.S. as the world’s leading space power.

Space Fence Solution: International Collaboration... an analysis written by my colleague and I on possible ways to keep the programme running....

Here's an analysis written by Rahul and I on the proposed shut down of the U.S. Space Fence programme and what could be done keep it running until a replacement is ready. This is important given the vulnerabilities in the absence of such a programme. The essay was published in the Space News yesterday.

The proposed shutdown of the U.S. Space Fence programme or what is formally called the U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System (AFSSS) does highlight the increasing trend of budget cuts’ constraining the ability of nations to utilize their capabilities in critical areas. The absence of such programs leaves all of us vulnerable. Given such trends, states have to think of international collaboration to get things going. How this should be worked out is something for all the major spacefaring states to consider.

Should there be a consortium of countries to keep the Space Fence up and running under an international agreement? In the face of divisive politics, it might be more appealing if such an arrangement were routed through a dedicated U.N.-affiliated agency for space traffic, like the International Civil Aviation Organization for air traffic.

For the full post, click here.

U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System
The Space Fence, or what is formally called the U.S. Air Force Space Situational Surveillance System (AFSSS), operational since 1961, is being shut down. AFSSS, consisting of three transmitters and six receivers placed across the southern U.S. and using radio waves, has kept a watch on what is going on in outer space. Many may consider outer space to be uninhabited and empty, but the reality is that over the decades it has been filled with millions of pieces of man-made junk that could cause huge harm to functioning assets. We need several systems to have a comprehensive coverage of the space environment. The United States has the largest network, even though its coverage of the Southern Hemisphere is not adequate. Russia has the second-largest network, followed by the European Union.

With the U.S. having shut down one of its major space situational awareness networks, major spacefaring powers need to make it a priority to contemplate possible solutions to track satellites and orbital debris on a continued basis.

The United States plans to set up a new Space Fence, which is to enter service in 2018. It has the potential to track much smaller objects than its predecessor and is also believed to be more accurate.

Until the replacement is ready, the duties of the AFSSS will be distributed to other branches; U.S. Air Force Space Command says it has “devised modified operating modes for the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Characterization System at Cavalier Air Force Station, N.D., and for the space surveillance radar at Eglin Air Force Base, Fla., which allows the discontinuation of AFSSS operations while still maintaining solid space situational awareness.”

However, the shutdown does highlight the increasing trend of budget cuts’ constraining the ability of nations to utilize their capabilities in such critical areas. The absence of such programs leaves all of us vulnerable. Given such trends, states have to think of international collaboration to get things going. How this should be worked out is something for all the major spacefaring states to consider.

Should there be a consortium of countries to keep the Space Fence up and running under an international agreement? In the face of divisive politics, it might be more appealing if such an arrangement were routed through a dedicated U.N.-affiliated agency for space traffic, like the International Civil Aviation Organization for air traffic.

Even as it sounds clichéd, outer space is becoming more crowded, congested and contested. With new players still emerging in the space domain, and newer and smaller satellites entering into service, the challenges of tracking are significant. Given the potential for damage that could be done if satellites or other objects sent into space collide with each other and the numerous challenges triggered by natural causes, there is a need to build a space monitoring mechanism. Due to the costs and technology involved in creating such a mechanism, international cooperation will be crucial.

So far there have been a total of nine accidents that involved accidental collisions in outer space. Out of these, the collision of the Russian Cosmos satellite with the U.S. Iridium 33 satellite was the only incident where two satellites directly collided. All other collisions involved debris from different activities in outer space. According to NASA’s Orbital Debris Program Office, “More than 21,000 orbital debris larger than 10 cm are known to exist. The estimated population of particles between 1 and 10 cm in diameter is approximately 500,000. The number of particles smaller than 1 cm exceeds 100 million.” These objects travel at a very high velocity and inflict significant damage on satellites if they collide. A Chinese anti-satellite test in 2007 created more than 3,000 pieces of space debris, further aggravating the problem. Space weather, caused by charged particles created by the sun and Earth’s magnetic field, also creates disturbing conditions for space objects. Given the dependence of military as well as civilian infrastructures on assets in outer space, these threats are likely to create enormous damage if they are able to disrupt the functioning of these assets. Therefore, maintaining a steady monitoring system such as the AFSSS is vital.

The concept of space situational awareness (SSA), which includes predicting collisions in orbit, detecting launches of new space objects, predicting re-entry of space objects into the atmosphere and detecting threats and attacks on spacecraft, is crucial in predicting and preventing such events. This can be done with the use of radars, optical telescopes, electronic signal sensors, infrared sensors and spacecraft that are in orbit between Earth and the sun.

With the shutdown of the old Space Fence program, Air Force Space Command said it would save about $14 million annually. However, the huge amount of data on space objects around the Earth made available through this program was significant. More importantly, as Brian Weeden of the Secure World Foundation writes, “The U.S. military also uses the data to offer a close approach warning service for owner-operators of the more than 1,000 active satellites in orbit.” Using this data, more than 10,000 warnings of potential collisions were issued, and 75 “avoidance maneuvers” were supported. This highlights the extent of vulnerabilities without a continuing tracking system.

Several established space powers, including India, have a range of technologies set in place to detect and trace objects in space. Russia has the second-largest network of radars and sensors, providing a catalog of space objects. As of now, Russia, through bilateral agreements, collaborates with some of the Central Asian countries where it has located its space surveillance systems. The Russian Space Surveillance System comprises mostly phased array radars and some dedicated radars and optical telescopes.

Europe has sufficient numbers of radars and networks to monitor space objects although they are not nearly as comprehensive as the U.S. or Russian systems. The European effort is also not a coordinated one at this instance given that it is run and operated by only a few countries, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Norway. In 2008, Europe initiated the SSA Preparatory Programme for creating a European Space Surveillance Network, and it has received support from a number of European countries. Most recently, in March, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union (EU), launched a new initiative to track and monitor space debris. While many European countries have national systems, radars or telescopes for tracking satellites and space debris, most of the European satellite operators have been relying on the U.S. space surveillance and tracking information. With this new initiative, the EU plans to combine all the different networks to track satellites and debris.

Another example of international cooperation in creating SSA is the International Scientific Optical Network — a collaboration between scientific and academic institutions with 20 observatories in 10 countries for tracking objects in space, instituted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow. The Space Data Association, a grouping of commercial entities, also has a good network in this regard. It operates an automated SSA system that aims to reduce the risk of collisions and radio frequency interference. Its members currently include government and private satellite operators such as NASA, Avanti Communications, Arabsat and Telesat. The costs incurred are shared by participants and therefore reduce individual costs; this particularly could be useful given the tight budgets under which most agencies are operating.

India too possesses a wide array of ground-based tracking facilities. The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Tracking and Command Network of ground stations across India offers critical support for India’s space missions and operations. Additionally, the Indian Deep Space Network provides operational assistance to ISRO and other space agencies, and India’s two Swordfish tracking radars have the ability to track activities in space.

All of these cooperative arrangements increase security in space, but a global network for monitoring space would only contribute more toward this goal. It is beyond a single state’s capacity to monitor all activities that could threaten assets in outer space. This is why international cooperation will be crucial to prevent accidental collisions and to predict events such as the recent Chelyabinsk incident. There is a need for countries to come together and create a mechanism for sharing the information they collect about the space environment for improving security and minimizing threats in outer space.

There are several different issues in the shutdown of the Space Fence. SSA and space debris are important, but the larger and longer-term problem is space traffic control or management and safety of navigation in outer space. One could potentially look at strengthening the Space Fence in the first instance, but this has to grow into something bigger like an international space traffic management center. Such a center might come to work as a traffic controller for outer space and at a later stage could be tasked to move or remove space debris. But investment in technologies for removal of space debris is expensive. Given these realities, collaboration in technology development may be the only way to go. It may also be looked at as an incentive to secure greater support for an international code of conduct for space. Any technology developed under such a program should be freely available to all countries.

Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. She served in India’s National Security Council Secretariat from 2003 to 2007. Rahul Prakash is a Junior Fellow at the Foundation.

Should India Declare a Space Policy?, my short essay published by the Diplomat

Here's the link to an essay of mine published by The Diplomat on whether India should declare a space policy or not.

A low-intensity debate has been taking place in India as to whether India should have a declared space policy or not. The general consensus appears to be that there is no need. But there are several arguments to make in favor of outlining a policy in the open. In today’s world, the advantages of a declared policy far outweigh the disadvantages. A declared policy calls for a clear understanding of how it should be tailored, what it should contain and what should be left out.

For the full essay, click here.

First, open policy statements and declared policies have remained the best means to assuage fears, build confidence and avoid ambiguities. These are important measures for building transparency and reducing tensions in regional and global contexts. Since the Asian context is characterized by growing competition and rivalry and the potential for conflict, even relative openness and transparency will go a long way in diluting the levels of regional insecurities.

A declared space policy would be an effective tool of communication for both internal and external audiences. For both audiences, it will set limits as well as open up opportunities as the number of states engaged in space exploration and utilization continue to grow. The value of communication through such an exercise, with both internal and external communities, is important. However, it is worth remembering that as a policy is prepared and articulated, while an internal audience is important, the policy will also send a message to external audiences. As such, it must be written in a manner that does not aggravate insecurities. Fail to do that, and external audiences could be left with the wrong impressions about India’s space program and policy, further raising the risk of misperception and miscommunication. How external audiences will read the policy statement and what they perceive about India’s needs, objectives and plans for the future, therefore, must be an important consideration as New Delhi readies a space policy document.

Second, India should have a clear picture of its long-term objectives and these should become guiding factors for a good space policy. The long-term objectives should consider both where India wants to be in a 25-year framework, and the perspective of outer space itself. A long-term vision should be followed by prioritization of important capabilities (political, diplomatic, military and economic) and partnerships that will help India reach its destination. This should translate into national security strategies articulated by the political leadership and then national military strategies derived from the national security strategy.

The second set of objectives will come from a debate on what sort of future India wants to achieve in space and accordingly what sort of behavior will be counter-productive to achieving those goals. Once there is clarity on these issues, India should adjust the orientation of its own space program and its priorities while working towards a favorable framework that would allow it to meet those goals. India should also steer its efforts in developing rules that would affect and curtail certain space programs and activities that may potentially be destabilizing and irresponsible. In addition to creating a framework that will protect its own interests, the political impact of this exercise is important. India should also strengthen its ability to maneuver at the global high table by prioritizing and fostering partnerships with countries that might share India’s vision in space.

Third, India should articulate its interests and policies in the broader context of the region and beyond, rather than talk about its interests in a narrow sense. This will have multiple benefits. For one, India’s policy articulation will be perceived as less threatening to the region. There are apprehensions particularly in the immediate neighborhood because of India’s dominant presence in South Asia. India’s growing capabilities in the space arena as in several other areas has the potential to heighten insecurities among these smaller neighbors. It will benefit India in the longer run if it were to showcase its interests and benefits in the regional context. Moreover, India should be able to cultivate regional interests that are akin to its own interests. It should be articulated in a manner wherein the region is able to transpose its interests and ideals with that of India’s. India should be able to convey to the region as to how such a policy might be in the interests of regional peace and stability.

Fourth, the domestic debate on India’s space policy has tended to highlight the utility of being ambiguous about policy. However, it should be understood that ambiguity has its limits. Bringing clarity to India’s policy and program will have multiple benefits. Despite the fact that India’s space program has been predominantly civilian in focus, the rising trend towards militarization in the region and beyond is influencing India’s orientation as well. Categorization of India’s space program into civilian and military components followed by clear-cut departmental structures would allow for greater focus, clarity and better financial outlays. Currently, institutional and budgetary resources are stretched across different programs. Devising a military space program will cater for better budget allocations as well as dedicated human resources.

Fifth, articulating an open policy would also add to the credibility of India as a major spacefaring nation. It would be a major transparency and confidence building measure, which is particularly important in the Asian context. Apart from its value in that regard, the policy should also articulate in clear terms redlines and limits that should not be crossed. This should be in terms of both capabilities and activities that may be considered irresponsible and contributing to regional and global uncertainties. Indicating such boundaries is important both for national security and deterrence as well as an international rule-making perspective. A national policy that would categorize certain activities as irresponsible and destabilizing will be in a position to determine when defensive responses can be activated and justified.

Similarly, defining what may be considered a space weapon or how one may define peaceful or defensive use of space will be significant in deterring accidents in outer space. This may be truer in the case of Asia, but space being a truly global commons, it has the potential to trigger conflicts even among the larger community of spacefaring powers. Being ambiguous about these boundaries and redlines undermines deterrence and increases the potential for accidental conflict. From an international framework perspective, a code of conduct that would set restrictions and limits and categorize certain capabilities as irresponsible or unacceptable might deter such actions. India should take a lead role while framing these restrictions at the global level in order to have its own interests protected.

Apart from the Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., space was seen as a benign domain with great utility in the civilian and developmental sectors. However, growing space capabilities are increasingly part of comprehensive national power. Growing facets of space use from space exploration to a quest for resources, including minerals, exploitation for energy resources (space-based solar power), operational response to natural disasters, and military use are changing the nature of our engagement with outer space. The technological spin-offs of ambitious projects such as space-based solar power have tremendous potential to bolster the science and technology base of any country.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) should be commended for its achievements, particularly given its modest budget. However, as recently noted by the ISRO Chairman, private sector involvement will inject a much-needed stimulus to India’s program. India must aim at creating a strategic space industry if it is to keep pace with growing commercialization. Launching satellites is becoming a lucrative business and India should not lose opportunities in this regard. Also, the number and types of players have undergone a major change in the last few years. India needs to respond to these changes and become a leading figure by articulating its needs and objectives for the future. As in many other areas, articulating a policy along with its broad orientations would also bring much-needed clarity internally within the space sector. Additionally, partners that look to India for collaboration across fields including the use of space-based assets and space situational awareness will only benefit India’s capabilities.

Finally, India’s space policy should also outline its efforts in the area of international rule-making. Given the potential for space exploitation to affect every aspect of our daily lives, actions could have serious consequences. Therefore, laying down the rules of the road is a task that should not be left until space is highly weaponized. Aside from the political and strategic value, India has a huge financial stake given its investments and reliance in this regard.

China, a major factor pushing changes in Japan's security narrative. a short essay on the Japanese defence White Paper....

Here's a short essay of mine on the China factor in Japan's defense White Paper. The White Paper that was released in June highlights important issues facing regional and international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. In terms of the regional threat perception, North Korea and China figure prominently in the paper. Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh."

For full essay, click here.

Japan's new White Paper on defence was released on 25 June, 2013. A comprehensive document, the first part deals with the security environment both at the regional and global levels and then it looks at the defence policies of important countries and regions - the US, Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia and Europe - and important issues facing the international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. However, the most interesting and pertinent one is the section on developing Japan's Dynamic Defence Force1.

Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh." The major emphasis on Japan's regional threat perception was on North Korea and China. North Korea's continuing nuclear and missile development efforts - including the recent missile test that Pyongyong called as a "satellite" test - was particularly highlighted. In addition to the three rounds of nuclear tests, Tokyo is worried that North Korea could be "developing nuclear weapons using highly-enriched uranium." Pyongyang's continuing development of delivery mechanisms, including the long-range ballistic missiles, also pose "a significant threat to Japan's security, and are absolutely unacceptable as they are significantly detrimental to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community."

Next, the White Paper focuses on China's military modernisation along with its rising defence budget. Even though China justifies Taiwan as the main driver of its modernisation, the report notes that China's rise as a major economic and political power will dictate it to expand its military capabilities and also that the global community will pay greater attention to China. However, the report notes that China's rapid expansion and modernisation of its military and the enhancement of its power projection capabilities, along with lack of transparency, are alarming not only to Japan and the region but also to the larger global community. While the report acknowledged that the publication of Chinese defence white papers since 1998 is a means to address the transparency issue, the document also notes that "China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society."

The document noted that the Chinese strategy "emphasize(s) not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporated the concept of "Three Warfares"-"Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare," and "Legal Warfare"-into the tasks of the political work by military, and declared a policy of "close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors."

As for the long-term plans and objectives, the White Paper said that China will want to reach "basic mechanization and achieve a major progress in construction of informatization by 2020." This is expected to be done with the long-standing primary objective of developing capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions, while beefing up to undertake multiple and diverse military missions and "complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century."

The rising Chinese defence budget is a key issue. The paper says the nominal size of China's announced national defence budget has more than doubled in the past five years and has grown nearly 30-fold in the last 24 years. The paper noted that the announced figures are only a part of the actual military spending, pointing out that "equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses" are not part of the budget.

The paper, in addition, goes into great detail about the growing size of the Chinese inventory - various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) - and what it might mean for Japan and the region. In addition to procurement that goes unabated, the paper notes with alarm China's ability to serial production of missiles in large numbers for domestic as well as export purposes.

Increasing number of Chinese vessels in close proximity to Japanese waters engaged in information gathering activities and training exercises has also been highlighted in the White Paper. There have also been Chinese government ships "engaged in monitoring activities for protection of its maritime rights and interests" in addition to advancements by Chinese naval surface vessels to the Pacific Ocean since 2008.

China has criticised the new White Paper in harsh terms and has called on Japan to "conduct some introspection and do more to facilitate regional peace and stability." The criticism has been along expected lines, with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying arguing that "China adheres to a road of peaceful development and pursues a national defense policy with a defensive nature," while dismissing the issue of opaqueness about the military and saying that it does not pose threat to any country. On the Senkaku islands, the spokeswoman said that China will "not change its position and determination" and that it will take any additional measure that is necessary to protect its sovereignty.

Given the growing number of challenges, Japan foresees development of defensive capability in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, despite difficult economic scenario. This defensive capability will involve development of the Dynamic Defense Force on a priority basis. The paper notes that in the backdrop of heightened military modernisation in the region, "not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also "dynamic deterrence", which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation's will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions, is important."2

Japan has been changing in its security posture over the last several years. Its attempts to become a "normal" nation by assuming greater security responsibilities have been driven more by necessity than choice. While the US-Japan security alliance is key to Japan's security, the US distraction over the last few years in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Japan to re-examine its own security options. Also Japan has been assuming more security responsibilities in the international arena which became evident in the deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq and its naval vessels in the Arabian Sea in support of the US military operations in Afghanistan.

Also the growing partnership between the US and China has cast doubts in Tokyo about the credibility of the US-Japan alliance. Given such apprehensions, Japan has been developing new partnerships and strengthening old ones. The newer and enhanced role of the Self Defence Forces (SDFs) appears to have domestic support; a recent public survey showed a 91.7% approval for the SDFs. Thus, there is a high likelihood of a more "normal" and muscular Japan emerging in the coming years.

1. "Dynamic Defense Force" was first referred to in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, with "response to large-scale disasters and various other situations" as one of the key roles assigned for this force. Maritime security and protection of the sea lanes are also highlighted as important roles.

2. Additionally, the paper said, "warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important."