The Galwan Valley India-China Skirmish Is a Gamechanger for New Delhi - The Diplomat, 18 June 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the continuing border crisis between India and China in Galwaan, in Ladakh in the western sector of the border. Given the significant violence and brutality of the clash in Galwan including the killing of 20 Indian army personnel, I argue that this time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

The killing of 20 Indian army men at the Galwan river confrontation on June 16 is a gamechanger in India’s national security and foreign policy strategy. For more than a month now, Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a border stand-off in Ladakh on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border. For 45 years, India and China took pride in the fact that there had been no fatalities on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and that there had been peace and tranquility to a reasonable extent, despite occasional flare ups. That changed with this violent clash in which the dead included the commanding officer of the battalion. This changes the dynamics in India-China relations for the worse. As Ashley Tellis commented perceptively: “Sino-Indian relations can never go back to the old normal. They will reset with greater competitiveness and in ways that neither country had actually intended at the beginning of this crisis.”

There will be pressure on the Indian government to not go back to business as usual after this. New Delhi may also not be able to afford to continue its ambivalent and uncommitted foreign policy approach, generally characterized as “hedging.” India’s attempts at straddling multiple camps is likely to come under pressure. India has shown growing commitment to groupings such as the Quad, which has now been upgraded to ministerial level engagements. At the same time though, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also made efforts to engage again with the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), attending a virtual summit in early May. This was the first time he attended a NAM summit, a group he has largely ignored for years. Although India has emphasized its role in the Russia-India-China (RIC) and the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) groupings, there are likely to be questions raised about the utility of groups that are largely run according to Beijing’s wishes and which are unlikely to contribute much value to New Delhi.

For the full essay, click here.



On the clashes itself, there is still confusion about what happened over the last couple of days, except about the fatalities on the Indian side. There is an even a bigger question about the rationale behind China’s provocative actions. Both the Indian Army and the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) have issued statements. The MEA stated that subsequent to “a productive meeting on 6th June 2020” wherein a process for de-escalation was agreed upon by the two sides, there were additional meetings of ground commanders “to implement consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control in the Galwan Valley.” The MEA spokesperson also added that “our expectation [was] that this [the de-escalation process] would unfold smoothly, [but] the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Galwan Valley.” On a phone call with the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi this afternoon, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar claimed to have categorically stated that “this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship.” He further called on China “to reassess its actions and take corrective steps.”

The Chinese readout was very different, with Wang reportedly telling Jaishankar that India must investigate and “severely” punish those responsible and ensure that such incidents do not happen again. “The Indian side must not misjudge the current situation and must not underestimate China’s firm will to safeguard territorial sovereignty.”

India-China flare ups have seen an uptick since Xi Jinping came into office in 2012. Repeated border incidents – Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014), and Doklam (2017) – had already strained the relationship, but they pale in comparison to the current border crisis. Following the downturn after the Doklam, the two sides attempted to build greater confidence in each other and build a certain amount of predictability in order to manage crises through informal summits like the ones in Wuhan and Mamallapuram. This time around, it is probably fair to say that no “Wuhan spirit” can salvage bilateral relations.

There has not been much cooperation in bilateral security relations to start with (except for some limited-scale military-to-military exercises) but economic relations between India and China are deep. Driven by market factors, China had made some gains in the power, infrastructure and telecom sector but that could come to a grinding halt. However, the biggest loser is possibly China’s Huawei in its efforts to enter the Indian 5G market. Even as there was skepticism about the company and its links to Chinese intelligence, there was a chance that China would be given a fair opportunity in the Indian 5G market, but Beijing has most likely dashed that hope. India could also impose additional economic costs that will further limit China’s entry into the Indian market, though this will hurt both sides.

There will be pressure on India to recalibrate its strategic engagements. If China thought that putting pressure on India for building closer ties with the United States, Australia and Japan was going to work, it has rebounded badly. The Galwan crisis will likely push India to build much closer strategic ties with the Quad and the Quad Plus and with the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.

BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA: DOES INDIA FACE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? - 9DashLine, 26 May 2020

Last week, I published a short essay for the 9DashLine.com on the current India-China border standoff.

There is still a lot of difficulty in understanding what is happening on the Sino-Indian border because of patchy and contradictory reporting, mostly based on sources in New Delhi Thus any analysis has necessarily to be quite preliminary and tentative. As of today, citing government sources, one media report said, “there are close to 10,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian territory.” It should be noted though that other reports have suggested fewer numbers.

For the full essay, click here.



The current series of incidents started on 5 May, when around 250 Indian and Chinese military personnel clashed at Pangong Tso, a large lake in eastern Ladakh region. These were reportedly violent clashes, injuring several soldiers on both sides. Quoting a senior bureaucrat, one Indian media report said that some Indian troops were detained, but then released. But the Indian Army promptly denied this, though the detention story has continued.

In addition to Pangong Tso, there is also reported to be Chinese forces crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) further to the north, near the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, though there have been no reports of confrontations here. A newly constructed Indian road runs along the Shyok river to the north, a critical supply line for Indian forces. Quoting an unnamed military source, China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, said that it was India who crossed the boundary in Galwan and entered Chinese territory. Meanwhile, on 9 May, clashes also reportedly took place at Naku La Pass in North Sikkim, much farther to the east.

If China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground.

Initially, even the government assumed that these were merely fisticuffs and that the two sides were possibly engaged in the usual stand-offs that happen between these forces every summer. The Indian Army Chief even said, possibly to reduce tensions, that “aggressive behaviour by both sides resulted in minor injuries to troops post which both sides disengaged.” But it seems clear now that three different confrontations, hundreds of kilometres apart, is unlikely to be an accident. The large number of Chinese forces included also suggest some prior planning. In fact, a knowledgeable former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, referred to these “incursions at multiple locations” as “worrisome.” He argued that China appears “to be physically changing the ground situation.”

Indian analysts are at a loss to understand China’s behaviour. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, suggests that China was warning India about its policies on COVID, Taiwan and foreign investment (India had recently changed foreign investment rules that may affect Chinese investments). Ambassador Gautam Bambawale, who was formerly Indian ambassador in Beijing, meanwhile argued that the current incidents could be related to India’s actions with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, when India split the Jammu and Kashmir state to form a new province for the Ladakh region, administered directly from Delhi. Ambassadors Saran, Bambawale and Kantha appear to also suggest the closer India-US strategic engagement as a factor. Most Indian analysts also suggest that China’s response was at least partly a response to India’s faster infrastructure building along the LAC. China has already built excellent infrastructure on its side, and India’s is still wanting, though it has dramatically improved in the recent past.

There have not been much of an formal response from India to the ongoing crisis. Commenting on the situation, on 14 May, India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that both countries see enormous importance in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the entire border. The spokesperson added that the problem is the difference in perception of the alignment of the LAC, suggesting that this “could have been avoided if we had a common perception of the LAC.” India has long suggested this, but China has balked, apparently fearing that this could lead to additional problems. What is worrying is that existing mechanisms to resolve such disputes do not appear to be working.

India and China have signed several agreements, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (September 1993), the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (November 1996), and most recently, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013), none of which appear so far to have helped in the current tensions. Even though these agreements are significant, there have also been problems with their implementation because many clauses in these agreements require both sides to limit their activities in reference to the LAC. In the absence of clarity on where the LAC is, it is very difficult to execute these agreements, even in the best of times.

India’s options are also severely constrained in dealing with this crisis. In the Doklam crisis, India moved to block China’s actions, forcing China to choose to either escalate or back down. China backed down, helped by India also backing away on the promise that China would desist from continuing with its road-building. This time, the shoe is on the other foot: if China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground, or possibly offering concessions (halting infrastructure development in the region, for example) in order to get China to recall its forces. New Delhi is not going to be happy with any of these choices. Irrespective of how this plays out, one thing is certain: India’s attitude towards China will only harden.

PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India - ORF Occasional Paper, February 2020

Pulkit Mohan and I published our co-authored Occasional Paper, PLA Joint Exercises in Tibet: Implications for India, in February 2020. This is a paper that I have wanted to do for a very long time and am glad it is done, finally.

Since President Xi Jinping’s ascendency to power in 2012, China has had a more assertive foreign policy, aiming to increase its influence in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Speaking at a press conference in March 2018, Xi highlighted China’s shift towards “rejuvenation” as a world power. Xi also attached great importance to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and under his watch, the military has undergone changes in its doctrine and force modernisation.

Indeed, Xi has partly bolstered China’s rise in the region through these military reforms, beginning in 2015. Since then, there have been major changes in the operational structure of the PLA, with the modernisation and optimisation of the military to “achieve enhanced jointness and efficiency.” China’s inclination towards building an improved operational force is driven by its need to safeguard its national interests amidst the changing dynamics of power.

According to the US Department of Defense’s 2018 China Power report, China’s military has introduced reforms to the operations of the PLA with the “most comprehensive restructuring of forces in its history.” The PLA’s ultimate focus is to improve its ability to conduct joint operations in an effective manner. Its most recent defence White Paper 2019 highlighted maintaining combat readiness, in particular, empahasising the need “to improve the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.” According to the White Paper, the PLA, since 2012, have conducted extensive mission-oriented training including 80 joint exercises at and above brigade/division level.

This White Paper is a significant departure from its predecessor, published in 2015. In that document, China maintained that its intentions in force modernisation was defensive and in the interest of safeguarding national security and development interests. The 2019 White Paper emphasises the impact of competition in the military sphere with the US and how China’s growing military is being developed and modernised to face such challenge. China, according to the document, will pursue national defence goals which include safeguarding national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and security as well as maritime interests.

Even as China’s primary objective is to compete with the US, however, the strategic consequences of a more modern PLA will be felt in India as well as in its neighbourhood. China argues that seeking hegemony or expansion in its areas of influence are not part of its strategy; yet, the reality has been different. Maintaining its position in the power hierarchy in the region, and beyond, remains at the core of China’s goals with regard to both military modernisation and its foreign policy strategy. This has been evident in the last several years in its various policy statements. At the 6th Xiangshan forum in October 2015, for instance, vice foreign minister Liu Zhenmin detailed some of what he called the “injustice” to China in its relations with other countries. While this is nothing new, the problem comes from the deep contradictions between China’s rhetoric and the reality. For instance, Liu called on the big powers to not seek spheres of influence, and of the small and medium countries to not take sides between big powers. The flaw in this formulation is that China looks at the world through a divided prism that categorises countries into big, small and medium, highlighting China’s hierarchical approach in international politics and the differentiated response that Beijing assumes these countries to play. Clearly, India needs to be mindful of such Chinese inclinations and work with like-minded partners in shaping an inclusive agenda in the Asian strategic space.

This paper examines a particular aspect of the PLA reforms as they pertain to training and jointness in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the Sino-Indian border areas. The paper starts with an examination of the Chinese military reforms as it applies to these areas, in terms of the military restructuring and the new commands responsible for them. The paper then chronicles the increasing number of military exercises being undertaken by China in these areas. The paper also examines the Sino-Indian border landscape and weighs China’s state-of-the-art infrastructure against India’s own. The paper concludes with the strategic consequences and tactical implications of these for India.

For the full essay, click here.



It is a long paper but I conclude with a few thoughts on what these imply for India.

Implications of PLA’s Joint Exercises

PLA’s impressive achievements with regard to troop mobilisation, joint training, and integration on the Sino-Indian border as well as in the TAR should be of concern to India. Given the unresolved border and territorial issues between India and China, the PLA’s military buildup and the overall capability mix could produce outcomes possibly in China’s favour, at least in the initial stages of a conflict. China has made significant advances for such an outcome through a number of reforms including through overhauling combat units to undertake joint, integrated and “informationised” operations. China could be engaged in these for a number of reasons. One, Xi’s attempts could be to reassure the domestic audience on the combat preparedness of its military. Chinese security analysts believe that demonstrating combat readiness to adversaries can deter an actual conflict.

Irrespective of the logic, PLA is attempting to address a serious lacuna with its military. Its lack of operational experience for the last several decades has been considered a serious deficiency of the PLA, and the intensive trainings and frequent joint military exercises are meant precisely to address this. PLA exercises held over the last few years have been focused on joint and integrated military operations to bring about a synergistic approach under informationised conditions. The establishment of logistic centres and oil depots in TAR and Sino-Indian border areas along with the improved road, air and rail networks have enhanced their ability for rapid mobilisation. This has also strengthened their capacity to sustain forces in the border areas for reasonably longer periods of time. Exercises testing their mobilisation and coordination capabilities have been undertaken through many joint exercises in the TAR.

Second, the improved physical border infrastructure that has aided the mobilisation of forces for training and joint exercises have also demonstrated the effectiveness of their command and control networks. Today, the PLA is in a position to undertake quick troop deployment to the Sino-Indian border areas. Previously, such mobilisation exercise would stretch over six months and could be undertaken only during the summer. The PLA has been engaged in military exercises to test the effectiveness of the Rapid Reaction Forces in mobilising them to the border areas in any weather or season. The quick mobilisation capabilities tested during these military exercises essentially validate the effectiveness from both operational and mobilisation perspectives.

Third, the PLA has also used these military exercises to assess the effectiveness of jointness and integration. Moving away from Military Regions to Theatre Commands is a big shift aiding the process of military integration. Nevertheless, operational jointness and integration may still be an issue. A joint and integrated planning is again not an easy task. There is no clarity on this issue until they engage in an actual operation – there have been no open reports assessing the success of the training and exercises but certainly they are making the efforts, which is worth closer examination.

Four, the overall military balance is tilted in favour of China. The former Indian Air Force Chief Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa, for instance, had noted the big increase in the number of Chinese aircrafts in the TAR. He mentioned in particular the deployment of Sukhoi-27 and J-10 aircraft for year-round operations, giving the PLAAF possibly a major tactical boost. This is a new trend as against the earlier practice of deploying these aircrafts during summer months alone. The overall mix of multi-role fighter and strike aircraft of the PLAAF can address any possible attrition during a conflict.

Five, improved border infrastructure has assisted the PLA in making a realistic appraisal of the state of their infrastructure. The multiple exercises done along the border areas and in the TAR can help identify the weaknesses and problems that need to be addressed on a realistic basis.

For its part, India’s lack of physical border infrastructure has impeded progress on multiple fronts, including its ability to undertake military mobilisation to engage in joint military exercises in the border areas. The critical role of strengthened physical infrastructure cannot be emphasised enough in this regard. India’s ability to bring about more effective jointness and integration will also depend on a better border management system, possibly under a single command structure that will focus on infrastructure and the capability mix for the border forces, and monitor the frequency of exercises.

Conclusion

Since the ascent of Xi Jinping to China’s presidency, strong emphasis has been given to the Chinese military’s competitiveness as well as that of the world’s other major militaries. This emphasis has translated to greater prominence for jointness and integration among the different arms of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially the PLA Army and the PLA Air Force. These joint exercises and efforts at bringing about better integration have been on full display on the Sino-Indian border areas and the Tibetan Autonomous Region. This brings about serious security implications for India.

The problem becomes more acute with the massive military imbalance in the border areas, both in terms of infrastructure and equipment, in favour of China. India’s poor infrastructure has also impacted on the military’s ability to mobilise forces, undertake exercises to test out the vulnerabilities and gaps, and the overall jointness in terms of operations and strategic approach. The central government must undertake two important measures in this regard. One, the government has to find a way of incentivising private sector participation in infrastructure development in the border. In the harshest of terrains, private sector ventures have succeeded in setting up, for example, hydroelectric plants. However, the private sector will not enter an area unless there is a profit calculation to its benefit. Given the strategic nature of these infrastructure projects, the central government has to find a way of encouraging the private sector to take them on.

There should be a new institutional authority established under the PMO that will track the progress of these projects on a periodic basis. While the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) has undertaken a review of these projects, these were merely recommendations that have not necessarily been followed up by the political leadership to address the inadequacies, especially the problem of multiplicity of agencies involved in the development of border infrastructure including road and rail networks and bridges. The need for a single authority for periodic monitoring and completion of these projects cannot be overemphasized. The government should constitute a parliamentary committee on strategic infrastructure which could monitor and update the status of the projects.

Given China’s apparent seriousness in its single-service and joint military operations in the Tibetan region, India should urgently step up its own capabilities on multiple fronts.

China’s Worrying Military Exercises Near Taiwan, The Diplomat - 17 April 2020

In last week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at China's worrying military exercises near Taiwan. I argued that China’s moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China’s military activities and resultant confrontation with its Southeast Asian neighbors, Indonesia and Vietnam. Despite the Indo-Pacific region reeling under the coronavirus pandemic, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been active farther east as well. There have been reports of several Chinese naval and air intrusions in Taiwan and Japan.

Back in the first half of February, the PLA Eastern Theater Command started sending its fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. In response, Taiwan’s Air Force had to scramble its own fighters to shadow the Chinese aircraft. On February 10, Chinese jets reportedly briefly crossed “an unofficial middle line in the Taiwan Strait.” The same day, the PLA Eastern Theater Command stated that its military has been engaged in “air-ground assault and fire support drills to further refine and test their multi-service joint combat capabilities.” Further, Zhang Chunhui, Air Force spokesman of the PLA Eastern Theater, said that “following the February 9 sea-air combat readiness cruise, the theater forces organized a joint exercise of sea and air forces in the sea area of ​​southeastern Taiwan on February 10, mainly carrying out air-ground assault, firepower support and other actual combat training, further tempering and testing the joint combat capabilities of multiple arms in the theater.”

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a tweet asked Beijing to stop threatening Taiwan militarily, and instead focus on the coronavirus. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) in a statement affirmed that “provocations by PLA warships and planes which have frequented the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait in recent years to seek unification through military force gravely undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait and heighten regional tensions.” Commenting on the situation, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs R. Clarke Cooper said, “It was completely inappropriate of China to take such an aggressive act.” Elaborating on the impact on the security of the Indo-Pacific, Cooper said that “there should be responsible behavior to make sure that the region is free and open — not just for navigation but also for trade and for relationships. Such coercive, aggressive behavior is counter to having a free and open Indo-Pacific region.”

The PLA’s air intrusions continued in March and April as well. In mid-March, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense stated that they had to respond to Chinese J-11 fighters and KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft, which flew into the waters southwest of Taiwan conducting night-time exercises. This was possibly the first time that they were engaged in a night-time drill near Taiwan. The Ministry also said that these aircraft had come close to Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. The Ministry added that “After our air reconnaissance and patrol aircraft responded appropriately, and broadcast (an order) to drive them away, the communist aircraft flew away from our Air Defense Identification Zone.” Toward the end of March, Taiwan’s Defense Ministry claimed that there were as many as four “targeted” drills by China around Taiwan, which Taipei considered as “concrete evidence of provocations and threats.” In response, Taiwan conducted its own exercise, deploying its F-16 fighter jets. The PLA Daily reportedly said that the Eastern Theater Command responsible for Taiwan had carried out long-endurance training with its early-warning aircraft lasting for 36 hours.

Tensions between China and Taiwan are not new. Friction has been increasingly evident since Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016 and her re-election in January has served to further increase tensions. Put simply: Beijing fears that Tsai will encourage pro-independence forces in Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in mid-April, China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and five other warships were reportedly sighted sailing past Taiwan waters and through the Miyako Strait. A Japanese Ministry of Defense official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said that they tracked the Chinese aircraft carrier, two guided missile destroyers, two multirole warships, and one supply-class fast combat support ship. Citing Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense statement, the report said that the Taiwanese navy, too, had sent its ships to monitor the carrier strike group as it sailed east of Taiwan. Taiwan’s vice defense minister, Chang Guan-chung, stated in parliament that when the pandemic was spreading worldwide, “if the Chinese Communists attempted to make any military adventure leading to regional conflict, they would be condemned by the world, and regardless of what would happen, we are all ready and have made the best preparation for this.”

Currently, the Chinese aircraft carrier is the only one in the area. Two U.S. carriers, Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan, are in port. The Theodore Roosevelt is now in Guam, on account of an outbreak of coronavirus cases among the crew, and the Ronald Reagan is in Yokosuka Naval Base for maintenance. However, the increase in PLA military activities in the Taiwanese waters and airspace have spurred greater U.S. military engagements as well. It has been reported that a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane was sighted close to Taiwanese airspace near Kaohsiung. Increased military drills of such kinds could potentially lead to unintended mishaps. The EP-3 spy plane incident in April 2001 should be a useful reminder regarding the kind of mishaps that can happen. China’s military moves in the region, despite the pandemic, are only likely to generate fear in the region and inspire greater cooperation with Washington.

Why China’s Growing Military Might in Tibet Should Worry India - The Diplomat, 3 March 2020

Earlier in the week, I had a short essay for The Diplomat looking at the implications of China's growing military might in Tibet. I have tried to locate the importance of the PLA military exercise in Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) in January but the essay is also a shorter version of an Occasional Paper I co-authored with Pulkit Mohan, my colleague, for the ORF in February 2020. In this essay, I argue that the rising tempo of Chinese deployments in Tibet should be of concern to New Delhi.

Last month, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) engaged in a major military exercise in the Tibet region. The engagement showcased some of the latest weapons in the Chinese military inventory and also spotlighted its deployments in the region more generally.

According to reports, the exercise last month in Tibet witnessed the deployment of several key aspects of Chinese military capabilities, including the Type 15 light battle tank and the new 155 mm vehicle-mounted howitzer. A Chinese military analyst speaking to the Global Times said that both “had powerful engines, allowing them to maneuver efficiently in Tibet’s terrain.” The same Global Times report also stated that the PLA Tibet Military Command had deployed helicopters, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft missiles across the region, from Lhasa, which has an elevation of around 3,700 meters, to border defense frontlines at an altitude higher than 4,000 meters.

For the full essay, click here.



These developments were by no means surprising. Indeed, the PLA has been beefing up its overall combat proficiency in the last few years by engaging in training and joint exercises, especially in high-altitude regions, with implications for how China’s military operates and how other actors in the Indo-Pacific region respond in kind.

With respect to Tibet in particular, the PLA has been doing a number of exercises in Tibet, and the frequency seems to be increasing. Close to a decade ago, in 2011, the PLA conducted two joint exercises at the group army level in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), with the goal of practicing employing a division-size force in a truly integrated manner, involving armor, artillery, and the PLA Air Force (PLAAF). There were also reportedly network-centric operations in a high-intensity electromagnetic environment practiced during this exercise. A J-11 regiment was sighted engaging in night-combat training in Tibet in August 2015.

Beyond individual exercises and more broadly, these developments demonstrate the growing air infrastructure in the TAR, including civilian airports, many of which are used by the PLAAF. These exercises have continued to grow bigger and more sophisticated. Even amidst the Doklam crisis in 2017, the PLA was engaged in a joint military exercise on the Tibetan plateau to test agility and combat proficiency in tasks such as assaults on enemy positions.

China’s engagements are part of an effort to step up their combat proficiencies in Tibet. More specifically, they address a significant lacuna of the PLA – lack of recent operational experience. These exercises have also focused on bringing about true jointness and integration in military operations. In addition to these exercises, there are other indicators of increased PLA activity in the TAR. For example, from 2013 onwards, PLAAF aircraft and helicopters have been sighted doing increased patrolling. Since 2013, troops coming to sectors opposite the Ladakh sector have been instructed to only travel by air and not by road, though the implications of this is unclear. Since April 2015, there have been increasing PLAAF activities, with J-11 and Su-27 aircraft of the PLAAF engaged in periodic exercises in the TAR.

From an Indian perspective in particular, China’s military efforts in the TAR are of grave concern. Even though this was the first major exercise of the PLA in 2020, there has been a significant increase in PLA engagements in terms of military training and exercises in the TAR over the last decade. The fact that Beijing has established all-weather physical border infrastructure in these areas has enhanced its ability to project military power in the region.

Additionally, the PLA is also known to have set up many military camps close to the border areas with periodic deployment of forces in these camps. This would imply that the PLA remains relatively acclimatized to the high-altitude conditions prevalent in the region, whereas on the Indian side, most forces responsible for the Sino-Indian border areas are in the plains of Assam.

This is a challenge in itself, but the bigger worry for New Delhi should be the growing number of Chinese military exercises in the TAR. The PLA has been engaged in many single-service and joint military exercises to validate several operational concepts.

The increase in the frequency and complexity of the PLA exercises in the TAR could also be an indicator of things to come. The fact that the Chinese state-run media are publicizing these exercises in Tibet is possibly an effort to send a signal to India and a demonstration of the overall better combat proficiency of the PLA. New Delhi cannot afford to ignore them.

Clearly, the tempo of China’s military activities in the TAR is growing, and it is likely to lead to even greater efforts on the Indian side. Though the Doklam confrontation ended peacefully, the preparations being undertaken by both sides suggest that the next one may have a different outcome.

China’s Second Aircraft Carrier: A Sign of PLA Naval Muscle? - The Diplomat, 26 December 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at China's commissioning of its second aircraft carrier and what it means for the overall PLA Navy.

On December 17, China commissioned into service its first home-built aircraft carrier, Shandong, at the Sanya naval base in Hainan, with President Xi Jinping presiding over the commissioning ceremony.

The commissioning of the aircraft carrier is significant. This is China’s second aircraft carrier, and an important addition to China’s power projection capabilities. It is also noteworthy because it displays China’s capability to develop aircraft carriers indigenously.

For the full essay, click here.



Military analysts argue that the layout of the warships “limits her military potential” as also its power projection capabilities since it is simply a copy of its first carrier, Liaoning, which itself is a refurbished ship bought from Ukraine. The J-15s that it operates also imposes limitations on the kind of operations it can undertake. Nevertheless, PLA Navy is clearly on the way to becoming a more credible blue water navy and it warrants close attention from key Indo-Pacific nations including, India, the United States, Japan and Australia.

China’s Navy has traditionally remained weak on account of the excessive focus on China’s ground force. As such, it did not have an aircraft carrier and even lacked amphibious operations capabilities. But all this is changing. China has strengthened its ability to project sea power significantly in the last few years. The building of the naval base, Sanya, in Hainan was one such indicator. Sanya has the capacity to maintain a large fleet of surface warships, and as an underground base for submarines. The Sanya base gives China significant advantages because of its proximity to the South China Sea as well as the Malacca Straits.

China has given great importance to building its aircraft carriers. It sees the utility of a carrier both for achieving sea control and for sea denial goals. The PLA Navy acknowledges the importance of maintaining air superiority in future naval conflicts, for which large aircraft carrier are important. The best pilots are being selected for the air wing, and they are also expected to eventually command these ships.

The construction of the Shandong, displacing around 50,000 tons, and with a conventional propulsion system, appears to have begun in 2013. The carrier can reportedly “carry up to 24 Shenyang J-15 multirole fighter jets and a variant of the fourth-generation Sukhoi Su-33 twin-engines air superiority fighter, as well as around ten rotary wing aircraft including Changshe Z-18, Ka-31, or Harbin Z-9 helicopters.” Unlike the U.S. aircraft carriers that can carry up to 100 fighter jets, Shandong will be able to carry a total of only 32 aircrafts, as per senior PLAN officers.

China had procured its first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (originally the Varyag, and built for the Soviet navy) from Ukraine as scrap for $20 million, but it was eventually restored and entered service in 2012. A senior colonel and spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, Geng Yansheng, said the carrier was to be “used for scientific research and training.” But the colonel also clearly outlined the necessity of an aircraft to protect China’s varied interests, giving some clue to future Chinese plans.

In November, on its ninth sea trial (since May 2018) to undertake equipment tests and personnel training, it sailed through the Taiwan Straits. Both of China’s aircraft carriers have a ramp to launch J-15 fighter aircraft, which is seen as the primary combat jet for the Chinese carrier battle group.

The exact composition of a Chinese carrier battle group is unknown, but some have suggested that a future Chinese Carrier Strike Group (CSG) could include Jiangkai-II-class (Type 054A) frigates, Luyang-III-class (Type 052D) destroyers, Renhai-class Type 055 destroyers, and a couple of Yuan-class (Type 039A) or Song-class (Type 039) submarines along with additional support vessels. There are also reports that both of China’s carriers could operate together, along with others (two Type 055 guided-missile destroyers; four Type 054 frigates; six guided-missile frigates, as well as one supply ship and three Type 093B nuclear submarines), to prevent u.s. or Japanese military assistance to Taiwan in case of a war.

The PLAN’s operational tempo is also increasing. A PLA naval formation led by its first carrier, Liaoning entered the Miyako Strait for the second time in June this year; the first such passage was in December 2016. Japan had then sent its surveillance vessels although an article by Xiakedao, the official WeChat account operated by the overseas edition of People’s Daily, called the Japanese action an overreaction and unnecessary, adding that “China’s aircraft carriers will routinely pass the Miyako Strait.” In addition to a possible Taiwan Straits scenario, experts foresee the use of the aircraft carriers “to stop US long-range bombers from taking off from a naval base in Guam.”

While the induction of China’s second aircraft carrier is a significant development, there are still issues that China will need to resolve in terms of training and operational experience in operating an aircraft carrier. There will also be issues of jointness to be sorted out with other combat units such as the amphibious troops, rocket forces and other service legs.

A more significant issue would be its ability to take on other traditional naval powers such as the United States and Japan. China’s two carrier battle group together would have only 30 J-15 fighter jets to take on U.S. forces in the area. And unlike the American aircraft carriers that use catapults, Shandong’s ski-jump configuration adds additional burdens, including how fast aircraft could be launched. China plans to address this issue in the next two aircraft carriers that it will build in the coming years. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency in a January 2019 report on China’s military power had noted other limitations of the ski-jump configuration including its ability to “operate large, specialized support aircraft, such as an AEW [airborne early warning] aircraft.”

There are other weaknesses as well that China needs to address before it can take on more capable navies in the Indo-Pacific. But the fact remains that China’s progress so far has been impressive, and that point ought not to be lost even as we remain cognizant of Beijing’s limitations.

China Isn’t Hearing Asia’s Fears About Its Military Buildup - The Diplomat, March 11, 2019

In last week's column for The Diplomat, "China Isn’t Hearing Asia’s Fears About Its Military Buildup," I looked at the 2019 Chinese defence defence expenditure. The response to the country’s new defense budget suggests that Beijing continues to be tone deaf to regional anxieties.

China recently announced a defense budget of 1.19 trillion yuan ($177.61 billion). This represents a slower growth rate in the budget, falling to 7.5 percent as against an 8.1 percent increase in 2018. Nevertheless, there are likely to be predictable expressions of concerns at the size of even the publicly announced budget, considering that it is more than three times as large as India’s, which has the second largest defense budget in Asia.

For the full essay, click here.



China’s military power has expanded dramatically in the last several years. A recent report by the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) noted that “since 2014, China has launched more submarines, warships, principal amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan, and the United Kingdom.”

Beijing has been closing the gap even with the United States, though the latter still maintains a considerable lead. Where China has been not able to catch up, it has developed certain asymmetric capabilities to compete with the United States. As Andrew Erickson points out, “In many areas, they have weapons systems that only a few other countries possess.” The development of the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities across all domains has been “impressive” under Xi’s leadership.

Such growth has also led to concerns in the neighborhood. Even countries like South Korea that have generally had good relations with China are beginning to face hostile actions from the Chinese PLA. For more than a year now, there have been repeated violations of the South Korean air defense identification zone (Korea-ADIZ) by the PLA Air Force, the most recent one in late-February.

However, these foreign concerns are falling on deaf ears in China. Headlines like “history proves China’s defense budget growth benefits the world” appear to be more the norm. Officially, Zhang Yesui, spokesperson for the annual session of the 13th National People’s Congress, termed the defense budget hike as “reasonable and appropriate.”

China has continued to reiterate that much of the hike in the defense expenditure goes to meet the salaries and other benefits of the troops, in addition to developing weapon systems, military reforms, and training. It has tried to make the case that China still lags behind a number of countries like the United States and that there are outdated systems and platforms that need to be replaced.

A quick look suggests that China’s defense analysts are largely reiterating the official line. Commenting on the defense budget announcement, Xu Guangyu, a senior consultant with the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, noted that the Chinese military has reached “a normal and stable speed instead of a premature rush.” Chinese analysts also slammed reports that say the Chinese spending in actuality is much bigger than what is announced by the Chinese authorities, saying that “China’s military modernization is meant for self-defense and not threatening other countries. We should not care much about what others say.”

Many Chinese military analysts have also tried to highlight the fact that its defense spending has moved away from a double-digit growth rate since 2016. Chinese military analyst Li Daguang from the National Defense University of the PLA argued that the defense spending of 2018, which was 1.107 trillion yuan, was only 1.3 percent of China’s GDP, a much smaller proportion compared to other countries like the United States and Russia that spend around 4 percent of the GDP on defense. Instead, there are suggestions that as China engages in more international projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, its security concerns will only go up and accordingly, “it must speed up its national defense power to protect the legitimate interests of Chinese people.”

Broader ambitions are also driving China’s defense budgets. Xi Jinping has outlined important goals for China in the next few decades as part of his Chinese Dream. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is all set to celebrate its 100th anniversary in 2021, by which time China hopes to have a “moderately well-off society.” The second major centenary goal is the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China itself and China hopes to be “a completely developed country” by 2049.

Along with these broad goals, China has specified areas for focus like military drones, space, artificial intelligence, and overall development in the strategic domain. The Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation could see a lot more emphasis in the coming years with higher spending on each of these high-tech and defense arena. But China – and Chinese analysts – should take greater cognizance of the concerns around the region.

Chinese Defence White Paper: An Initial Assessment

Here's the link to an article of mine published by ORF on the just released Chinese Defence White Paper.

China's defence White Paper, titled China's National Defense in 2010, the seventh in the series, was published on March 31, 2011. Does the White Paper bring out anything new? The answer may be a "No" given that it has continued reiterating the same positions on all of these issues. Because of criticism of lack of transparency on security issues, China has decided to come out with these white papers but unfortunately it sheds no new light on the PLA, its objectives or the military modernization. While it remains an important CBM measure, the suspicions about the long term intentions of Beijing can be hardly wished away with the publication of these white papers. The White Paper is essentially what the Chinese want the world to believe what they are doing. Therefore, if China is serious about reducing the regional suspicion about its rise, it has to do something more meaningful.



Underlying the fact that the momentum for economic globalization and multi-polar world are irreversible, the White Paper identifies a few challenges as it outlines its security environment. The "intermittent tension" on the Korean Peninsula and the unraveling security scenario in Afghanistan are seen as major concerns, and the White Paper argues that the Asia-Pacific security has become "more intricate and volatile." Occasional disputes and flare-ups over undemarcated territorial issues and maritime rights have been mentioned as issues contributing to the volatile situation in the Asia-Pacific though thereis no mention of the recent incidents at sea, fuelled by Chinese naval actions.2 The presence of external powers in China's extended neighbourhood - the US and its strengthened regional partnerships -is an issue for Beijing. However, China claims that it is still in "the period of important strategic opportunities for its development," and therefore the idea of cooperating with major traditional powers and new emerging powers, along with good neighbourly relationship, is seen as something Beijing must continue with for mutual benefits. While acknowledging relations with the United States as significant and as a stabilizing tool, Beijing does not mince its words in criticizing Washington for its alliance-kind of relationship, particularly the military sales to the region.

Describing its national defense policy as purely defensive, the White Paper sets out four critical tasks for its armed forces: safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development; maintaining social harmony and stability; accelerating the modernization of national defense and the armed forces; and maintaining world peace and stability. It further details its strategy as adhering to "the principles of independence and self-defense by the whole nation" and is essentially for maintaining the territorial integrity of its land border, territorial sea and air defenses. China has also begun to emphasize on MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War), again a theme that began with the last defense White Paper. Beijing argues that there is an increased role for its armed forces on a range of missions, from disaster management missions to riot control to search and rescue operations given the penetrating nature of non-traditional security threats faced by Asia today.

On the modernization of national defense capabilities, the White Paper argues that the PLA is modernizing its forces and equipment "with mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, while making extensive use of its achievements in information technology, and stepping up the composite and integrated development of mechanization and informationization." Talking of PLA modernization, it emphasizes shifting from a "manpower-intensive to a technology-intensive model." The document mentions the formation of new types of combat forces,without divulging much detail. There is also the modernization of the artillery forces - with the introduction of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles- for undertaking important military maneuvers - "to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities." In addition, the PLA Army aviation wing has made significant changes to its role and function - moving away from being a support arm to being a main-battle assault force. Air power has been given a lot of emphasis evident from the upgradation undertaken in its armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, thereby making marked differences in its ability to move and support infantry forces, force projection as well as extending support role in various missions.

There has been marked progress on the naval front as well. Introduction of new submarines, frigates, aircraft and large support vessels in support of China's offshore defense strategy or "Far Sea Defense Strategy" as stated by Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen, deputy commander of the East Sea Fleet in April last year.3 Accordingly, PLA Navy plans construction of new support bases in order to strengthen the shore-based support system while complementing the deployment of forces and development of weaponry and equipment. This suggests the future intentions of the Navy to project power beyond the immediate neighbourhood.

However, the most significant pronouncement has been regarding the role of the PLA Air Force - to meet "the strategic requirements of conducting both offensive and defensive operations." The Air Force is projected to have important roles in the coming years that emphasizes "air strikes, air and missile defense, and strategic projection," while improving its "leadership and command system for an informationized, networked base support system."Similarly, it has been training on various scenarios involving extensive electromagnetic environment, recognizing the importance of these in future warfare scenarios. Similarly, there has been major push for modernizing its Second Artillery Force with an objective of sharpening their capabilities for "rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection, and survivability, while steadily enhancing its capabilities in strategic deterrence and defensive operations."

A great deal of emphasis has been placed on the need to accelerate the development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment for undertaking the above-mentioned missions and goals. Accordingly, it has strengthened "the retrofitting and management of existing equipment, and promoting the composite development of mechanized and informationized weaponry and equipment."

Additionally, the White Paper discusses defence expenditure and bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Such cooperation involves a range of issues from joint military exercises and training to strengthening cooperation as a Confidence Building Measure (CBM). Confidence building measures are also discussed for maintaining social stability and non-proliferation and arms control issues.

My Book on Chinese Military Strategy

 


My book, The Dragon's Fire: Chinese Military Strategy and Implications for Asia, is going to be out on October 20.



This book has essentially looked into the military strategy of China and how it implicates on India and Asia. Rise of China has been a subject of interest and concern not only in India and Asia but globally. The growth of China as a major military and economic power along with its global aspirations for a superpower status remains a serious concern to India, as well as the United States, Russia, and Japan. For example, will China be more willing to resort to force to settle the various territorial disputes with its neighbours? Will it become more aggressive in other bilateral issues? While it may be important to analyse the military and other capabilities that China has acquired, it is more pertinent to look at the military strategy through which it will employ these capabilities. While China has continued to argue that its rise is peaceful and that its military modernization is only geared towards defensive purposes, it is the perception that matters. Perception of a potential China threat has had several spin-off effects, in the form of alliances and/or force posturing by regional and global powers.

Recent Xinjiang Riots: A Commentary

The riots that have rocked the southern Chinese province of Xinjiang may remind the Beijing political leadership yet again of the fragility of the Chinese state and that the threat of separatism and identity politics are alive and kicking. Unless Beijing takes steps to assimilate the Uighurs into the Chinese society and usher in economic and social development for them, the problem can linger and become a hotbed for violence and terrorism in China.



Background
While the Chinese leadership has maintained that Xinjiang does not pose any serious challenges, there is also hype about terrorist threat that stems from the Xinjiang Uighur movement. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee member in charge of security Luo Gan stated that the “overall situation in the region is satisfactory, but the police and security agencies should be prepared for dangers.” This is the case because China fears that the religious and ethno-nationalist movements in the Central Asian region could easily spread across the border to Xinjiang.

Xinjiang undoubtedly is an area of significant strategic importance to China, given that it borders eight nations in Central and South Asia. The region is an energy-rich area, and the third largest oil-producing region in the country. Proximity to the Central Asian nations provide China with abundant opportunities to promote border trade, tap oil and gas resources from Central Asia in addition to keeping US influence in Central Asia under check through various means, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The Uighurs numbering 130 million are one of the 55 officially designated minority groups in China. They are believed to be enjoying all the civil rights of full citizenship, beneficiaries of certain affirmative policies of the Central government, and enjoy less strict family planning regulations. Unlike the rest of China, the Uighur population are allowed to have two or three children. However, this group remains much poorer, less educated and are not well-represented in the Communist Party or government positions. It is an irony that Uighur top party leadership is under a Han Chinese. While some of the other minority groups -- Zhunag with a population of 16 million, Hui Muslims of 10 million, or the Lhoba with only 3,000 -- have also been treated not too fairly by the state and have had conflicts at a local level, they have not resulted in political or separatist movement status. This has been mainly on account of the Chinese policy of changing the demographic mix of the region by promoting Han migration to Xinjiang.

It might be pertinent to understand the background of the current Uighur movement. The Qing Dynasty gained control over East Turkestan (the current Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) in the 19th century. But as central control weakened as a consequence of the Chinese civil war, the ethnic Uighurs sought to re-establish sovereignty over their homeland. They managed to establish themselves as Republic of East Turkestan for a brief period from 1945-49. However, after Mao’s victory in the civil war in 1949, the PLA troops re-entered Xinjiang and established complete control over Xinjiang. This was in fact the first wave of population shifts that took place in the region. Thereafter, the Chinese leadership began consolidation of the area by sending retired ethnic Han Chinese soldiers into Xinjiang to form new units called “Production and Construction” Corps (Bingtuan). The second wave of population shifts took place in the 1990s, due partly to the disintegration of Soviet Union and thereafter Beijing’s fear of instability creeping in the region. This time around, China fashioned major economic incentives to move Han population to Xinjiang. Beijing also undertook the “Big Development of the Northwest” that brought in nearly two million Han Chinese to Xinjiang. Although there was a surge in the economic sphere with massive subsidies, oil exploitation and rapid urbanization, Uighurs did not benefit from any of these and this created bitterness in the minds of the Uighurs.

The Beijing government has followed rather illiberal policies of pumping in Han Chinese into areas inhabited by migrants, whether it is in Tibet or in Xinjiang. Such policies implemented by Beijing have altered the population balance in a significant manner and has aggravated the situation. The area, which had a mere 6 to 7 per cent of Han population, is today 40 to 45 per cent Han. Fearful of marginalisation through such proactive measures by the Chinese government, Uighurs have become fiercer in their agitation against Chinese rule in Xinjiang. In 1996, the Chinese government decided to adopt a series of measures on the Uighurs termed as “Strike Hard” (Yan Da) campaign to re-establish firmly its control on Xinjiang.

Similarly, the local leadership of the Central leadership has taken measures that would further isolate the Uighur minority. For instance, in 2002, Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan declared that the Uighur language was “out of step with the 21st century,” and accordingly, the government started to shift the entire education system to Mandarin, replacing Uighur teachers with Han Chinese. The local officials went to the extent of organizing public burnings of Uighur books. Control over religion and religious practices too were implemented, including religious weddings, burials or pilgrimages to the tombs of local saints. Earlier in 2008, the government announced plans to demolish the city of Kashgar, one of the oldest cultural centre of the Uighur civilization. This move was to uproot 50,000 families from their traditional homeland to some new township.

While this is one side of the story, the other side relates to the reports of apparent linkages between some of the Uighur groups and terrorist organisations like Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb-ul-Tahrir, Jamaat-i-Islami, Tableegi Jamaat, and such other groups that operate out of Central Asia. This has constrained American moves to pressurise the Chinese governments on human rights issues particularly after September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States. There have been however reports by human rights groups worldwide to suggest that the Chinese leadership is using the campaign against global terrorism as a way to crackdown and thereby curtail the Uighur movement.

Recent Violence
The recent violence started with a minor brawl between Uighurs and Han Chinese workers at a local factory in Shaoguan, Guangdong on June 25, 2009, leading to the deaths of two Uighurs. This in turn is believed to have set the trigger for the July 05 riots. Chinese leadership continues to argue that the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), an Uighur separatist group associated with Al Qaeda, is driving the hatred and fuelling the violence in Xinjiang. The leadership is also of the view that it is the ETIM leadership, located in Waziristan on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border that is responsible for a series of bombing in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China prior to the Beijing Olympics. For the first time, the government, through an article in People’s Daily, also blamed the United States, accusing that it financed the World Uygur Congress led by Ms. Rebiya Kadeer’s organization, and other organisations that advocate human rights and democracy for ethnic Uighurs in China.

The Beijing leadership has reacted to the violence rather aggressively, trying to crush the uprising and preventing any spread of it to other parts of the region. About 20,000 troops from nearby regions were brought into Urumqi after the violence began, forming cordons between ethnic Uighur neighborhoods and those dominated by Han Chinese. The government has also enforced severe restrictions on any religious and cultural expression including the Friday prayers by the Uipghur’s Muslim population. Further, China has interpreted any expression of dissent and anger as advocating separatism, thereby crushing it by repressive means. Advocating separatism is a crime under Chinese law that can be met with death penalty. The party chief of Urumqi, Li Zhi, did not mince words of their intentions when he said, “To those who have committed crimes with cruel means, we will execute them.”

China, in order to cash in international support and sympathy for the Xinjiang fiasco, implanted the Al Qaeda element and that China was fighting the Al Qaeda in the global war on terrorism. However, the manner in which the whole issue has been treated by China has invited Al Qaeda right into their borders. Following the death of nearly 200 people, Al Qaeda has issued warning to China, more particularly the Chinese abroad in Africa. Meanwhile, protesting against the killing of nearly 200 Uighur Muslims, thousands of Turks and Uighur expatriates took to demonstrations and burning Chinese flags and Chinese products. Unless China puts out a more nuanced response, the troubles in Xinjiang could spiral out of control.

Mixed signals over Chinese missiles

Here's a link to a story on the recent NASIC report and Chinese missiles by Peter Brown that has quoted me extensively. The story appeared in today's Asia Times Online.

As defense analysts and experts in the United States, Japan and India digest the recent "Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat" report by the US Air Force (USAF) National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) - particularly any elements pertaining to China - important gaps or omissions are surfacing.

The bottom line is that these gaps, along with differences between the NASIC report [1] and a US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-authored report on the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) released earlier this year, are making the overall US analysis of the situation unfolding in China involving missiles and military space matters increasingly hard to gauge.

An admission by the commander of the USAF Space Command

(AFSPC), General Robert Kehler, made in a written response to questions submitted to him during a Congressional sub-committee hearing in March and just recently published, underscores the fact that the US recognizes that it has to do a much better job when it comes to the broad topic of space intelligence.

"Several initiatives have been taken to address the need for more and better qualified space intelligence analysts. Recent billet additions at AFSPC, NASIC, DIA and CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] have taken place through internal reallocations and external over guidance approval. NSA [National Security Agency] has reprioritized for better space analysis and USSTRATCOM J2 [US Strategic Command - Intelligence] is reestablishing space analysis.

Overall analytic resources will remain insufficient, despite the improvement cited above, and will require active efforts to increase efficiency and collaboration. AFSPC is hosting an interagency forum to review/refine intelligence shortfalls and to seek interagency solutions," said General Kehler.

"The Defense Intelligence Space Threat Committee under NASIC leadership has been established to oversee and coordinate a wide variety of complex space/ counterspace analytical activities. Space/counterspace intelligence requirements have been revaluated and are now being reprioritized and rewritten to more clearly focus the intelligence community."

As the world adjusts to China's overt display of anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare in 2007 - satellites like the inactive Chinese weather satellite it destroyed that year represent a critical component in almost all ballistic missile defense systems - and as the line which separates conventional ballistic missiles from small satellite launchers becomes blurred due to advances in satellite design and complexity, the task at hand does not get any easier. Witness the launches undertaken since last year both by Iran and North Korea, for example. China's decision to use its latest manned space flight in 2008 as an opportunity to launch a small satellite from the manned spacecraft may not fall into the same category as these launches, but it does not make matters less complicated either.

"Training is also a critical element of USAF efforts to address adversary space threat. AFSPC recently expanded the Space Professional Development Program to include the USAF intelligence community. The National Space Security Institute has begun a comprehensive review and expansion of AFSPC's space professional training courses in close cooperation with the (AFSPC Directorate of Intelligence) and the intelligence community at large," said General Kehler.

His response speaks to the process and not the results. Still, it is quite unlikely that a Chinese military commander would make any admission in public view.

Dr Gregory Kulacki, China project manager at the Union of Concerned Scientists, identifies the lack of analysts with meaningful proficiency in the Chinese language as one of the most important gaps in US space intelligence capabilities.

"The mistaken characterization by US experts of the BX-1 satellite released from the Shenzhou VII [last year] is a good example of how insufficient or non-existent language skills can weaken analysis," said Dr Kulacki. "The BX-1 mission was highly publicized and discussed in detail in the Chinese media, but because [many US experts were] unable to understand that material, [they] created yet another tempest in a teapot over the BX-1."

In Asia, important gaps in the NASIC report have generated questions in India in particular. Specifically, two important omissions involve China's activities in Tibet, and a reorganization of its missile facilities at a base near Tibet that started two years ago, according to Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

"China's positioning of its intermediate range missiles such as DF-4s and DF-21s in Tibet, and reports which suggest that China could also deploy DF-31 and DF-31A ICBMs at bases such as Delingha near Tibet, raise serious concerns. Both the DF-31s and DF-31As are road mobile and use solid propellant engines. Placing medium-range ballistic missiles in Delingha which can hit targets approximately 2,500 kilometers away can put all of northern India at risk, including New Delhi," said Dr Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi.

On page 3 of the NASIC report, it is reported that, "China has the most active and diverse ballistic missile development program in the world ... China's ballistic missile force is expanding in both size and types of missiles. New theater missiles continue to be deployed in the vicinity of Taiwan, while the ICBM force is adding the CSS-10 Mod 1 (DF-31) and CSS-10 Mod 2 (DF-31A) ICBMs. The new JL-2 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) is also under development. Future ICBMs probably will include some with multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the number of ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years."

Richard Fisher, a Chinese military expert at the Washington DC-based International Assessment and Strategy Center, told the Washington Times in early June that, "in just over two months, US intelligence community estimates have China's ICBMs increasing by 25%. That's a formidable rate of growth." [2]

For Fisher, this sharp increase signals a need for more in-depth analysis, and for more players to become involved.

"This year's dual assessments have been produced by two US intelligence community teams: the DIA is largely responsible for the annual PLA report to the Congress [released in March], and a USAF team produces the NASIC report," said Fisher. "We should not be surprised that they produce differing results, but the fact that we have benefited slightly in terms of new ICBM number assessments to me proves that there should be much more competition in the production of such assessments. Democracies require more facts, not less."

Rahul Bhonsle, a South Asian defense analyst based in New Delhi, finds Fisher's statement quite alarming.

"However, this does not denote the trends of developments in the past which have been more conservative. For China to suddenly attain a leap does not appear to be practical. My reading is that China is more focused today on improving its internal information and logistics management systems so as to enhance response times rather than develop and or induct additional systems," said Bhonsle.

Otherwise, despite the fact that the NASIC report specifically mentions Taiwan in three different sections, he is not concerned about the omission of China's activities in or near Tibet in the report which, "appears to be more of a capability-based rather than a threat-based analysis".

"There are some indications of the Chinese preparing some advanced launch positions in Tibet which is of concern to us. These locations remain unidentified so far, so building up information on these is a priority," said Bhonsle.

Brian Weeden, technical advisor at the Colorado-based Secure World Foundation, sees the NASIC assessment as warranting further clarification. He describes what is underway in China as "actually fairly slow growth compared to what the US and Soviet Union did starting in the 1950s".

"Right now, it is clear that China has no intention of matching the US or Russia warhead for warhead, and it has no plans to achieve the same level of overwhelming nuclear force. They are still sticking to the philosophy of limited deterrence, ie having just enough," said Weeden. "And if having 'just enough' is your goal, then it is obvious that you would want to have those few nuclear weapons as survivable as possible. Road-mobile ICBMs and SLBMs are exactly that."

Weeden finds that talk about percentages is a way to overemphasize or perhaps even conceal real numbers.

"Going from 10 to 20 nuclear weapons is a 100% increase, but so is going from 1,000 to 2,000, and adding 1,000 more warheads is much more of a problem than adding 10," said Weeden.

According to Rajagopalan, China's growing missile capabilities - both in actual numbers and the types of missiles - and the proliferation of those missiles have triggered regional insecurity and resulted in a spiraling arms race in the region.

"If China increases the number of ICBMs from even 20 to 25 in a year, this small growth is something that India, US, and Japan might watch out for. It may not have reached any dangerous proportion, but this is something that needs close monitoring," said Rajagopalan. "Development of these missile forces and the ever-growing submarine force indicate that China prefers to implement an area denial strategy. Such a capability will allow China to create a buffer zone around its land and maritime periphery which in turn will increase the difficulty for others to operate close to the Chinese mainland."

Weeden is also eager to examine several recent projections of Chinese submarine-launched nuclear warheads in greater detail, too.

"Recent predictions that China could have upwards of 400 sub-launched nuclear warheads within the decade are absurd. The newest class of [Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear] SSBN (JL-2) has 12 launch tubes, each of which can hold a missile with one warhead. There is no way that China is going to be able to roll out 30-plus SSBNs in a decade."

For Hideaki Kaneda, a retired Vice Admiral and former Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) commander, who is the director of the Okazaki Institute in Tokyo, the debate over numbers does not tell the whole story. While he agrees with Fisher's assessment, he finds China's persistent lack of transparency involving its overall nuclear strategy, not to mention its entire military strategy, unsettling given the steady increase in Chinese defense budgets since the mid-1980's. China's focus on ASATs, and other countermeasures intended to disable otherwise effective missile defense systems, and China's efforts to secure its position as a third nuclear superpower, while "anticipating the trend of global nuclear reduction" are important developments that Kaneda elects to highlight.

When asked which specific Chinese missile-related trends disturb him, he responded simply - "Every trend."

"The Japanese government will review its "National Defense Program Guidelines [NDPG]" by the end of this year. I hope the revised NDPG would effectively address all my concerns as expressed here. Though it depends on which parties [achieve] political dominance in the next general election," said Kaneda.

Certainly, the recent debate over Japan's possible adoption of a preemptive strike capability as a reasonable measure has cast the emerging NDPG in a different light.

Kaneda would not comment on how open he felt the Japanese people are today to his point of view. A longtime and somewhat hawkish advocate for a greater emphasis on ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Japan, he also would not comment on the BMD efforts now underway in Japan involving all the existing branches of the JSDF. He also did not comment on whether or not he would prefer to consolidate BMD developmental and testing activities under one command or under a single agency in a manner similar to what is now in place in the US under the Missile Defense Agency.

No matter how you interpret the numbers or what upward curve you select, Fisher finds them disturbing.

"PLA nuclear missile numbers are growing to a point to which we can drop this notion they have a 'minimum' nuclear deterrent force. An early nuclear missile force in excess of 120 is plausible, and they could be divided roughly evenly between land and sea-based platforms," said Fisher. "This means that all PLA nuclear missiles will be harder to find, and that China will become increasingly aggressive toward the US and other navies operating in the South China Sea, the best place for their SSBN operations."

As for the PLA Navy's (PLAN) development of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) capabilities, Weeden emphasizes that the real story is not what PLAN is doing, but what the US Navy is not doing.

"The Chinese are not doing anything new with ASBMs. The concept dates back to 1955 and was pioneered by the US. The main issue is that the US Navy has not really been paying attention to the threat and is not really prepared to defend against it," said Weeden. "There are multiple technologies that can defend against it, but right now the navy is not really tackling it seriously."

At the same time, Weeden cautions that any description of China's missiles as "being technologically advanced is true when compared to the likes of Iran and North Korea, but China's ICBMs and SLBMs are still decades behind that of the US, Russia, France, and Great Britain".

"China's sole SSBN has never done a deterrence patrol. China has still yet to MIRV any of its nuclear delivery vehicles, something that the other powers did a long time ago. The significance of MIRVing cannot be understated," said Weeden.

"In the NASIC report, [it states] that 'the number of ICBM nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States could expand to well over 100 within the next 15 years'. So the growth is 'considerable' compared to how many warheads China has capable of reaching the US now, but negligible compared to what Russia already has deployed and historically had deployed."

Fisher, on the other hand, wants readers to understand that the number of Chinese nuclear missile warheads could grow more quickly than has been suggested by recent US open or unclassified intelligence reports.

"My sources suggest the DF-5A already carries up to six warheads, and that future versions of the DF-31A and JL-2 could carry three to four warheads. If true, then it is plausible to consider future PLA nuclear warhead counts that reach 500, again, no longer a 'minimum' force," said Fisher.

Fisher like Kaneda wants to firmly establish the links between Chinese ASAT and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) components in a broader public debate about US and Japanese defense policies.

"Even though the PLA has conducted multiple ASAT tests leading up to its success in 2007, no unclassified [US intelligence] report since has commented on how the PLA ASAT program may also indicate the existence of a larger PLA ABM program. The PLA's first ABM program took place from 1963 to 1980. If you can shoot down a satellite then you can shoot down a missile warhead," said Fisher. "The potential for the PLA's future no-longer-minimum nuclear force also being defended by an ABM system should be causing the Obama Administration to halt its nuclear disarmament plans. Such may also help explain why the Russians do not want to go below 1,500 deployed warheads, a reduction that I think would still be foolish for Washington and Moscow."

According to Fisher, while experts in Japan, India and the US may disagree at times over what is going on and why, "Americans are quite fortunate to have access to any level of [US intelligence] assessment of the PLA, which is issued at a level of detail that would put any Chinese commentator in jail."

Notes
1. Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat - NASIC (June 2009)
2. Missile threats - Bill Gertz (June 4, 2009)

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

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