Countering Chinese assertiveness: India’s changing posture in the Indian Ocean - Indo-Pacific Analysis Brief, Perth USAsia Centre, 4 December 2020

In my third Analysis Brief as an Indo-Pacific Fellow at the Perth USAsia Centre, I looked at India's changing Indian Ocean strategy in order to address China's growing footprint in the region.  

Note: The paper contains endnotes, which I have not been able to incorporate here.  So, please check out the main page of the article, the link for which is given here.  

Major Takeaways are: 

→ The Indian Ocean region is becoming increasingly contested as Chinese presence expands. In recognising the threat posed by China, India has shifted its perceptions and priorities in the region. 

→ A large concern is the security of sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean, which many Asian countries use as a trade corridor. 

→ China has demonstrated an objective to become a key player in the region with increased presence and activities, including in India’s Economic Exclusion Zone. 

→ India has become more active in protecting its interests in the region by calling for cooperation with external powers and enhancing its capabilities in the Indian Ocean to overcome capacity constraints. 

→ Cooperation between like-minded powers in the region is challenging due to divergences in individual perspectives, approaches and outlooks. Closer coordination is needed between these powers to build greater synergy. 

The Indian Ocean is once again at the centre of major geopolitical competition. China’s growing footprint and influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has made the contest for power and control in the region between China and the US and its partners significant. The Indian Ocean sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are important for many Asian countries because it is both an energy and trade corridor, making these countries sensitive to any vulnerabilities. Now, undersea cables add to these vulnerabilities.1 

India has long been wary of power-plays in the Indian Ocean but finds itself with few options today but to participate in securing a free and open Indo-Pacific. 

In the process, India appears to be willing to reconsider some of its old concerns about external actors in the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, there are also some questions about the terms of engagement between India and its partners about the focus of their common efforts. Resolving these could lead to greater synergy and easier cooperation. 

For the full brief, click here.  

Growing Chinese presence is cause for concern

India’s stakes in the IOR are obvious, despite India’s lack of attention to the maritime front. From a security perspective, since independence, India has not faced any significant maritime threat. Much of the Indian maritime security focus was in terms of the relatively minor naval threat from Pakistan and non-traditional threats including piracy and terrorism. While these concerns remain, they have been overtaken by worries about China as an emerging IOR power, with a growing footprint in the region. 

Darshana Baruah argues that China’s growing Indian Ocean presence is not just about contesting India’s strategic role in the IOR, but it is part of a determined agenda to “emerge as a key player in the IOR” which feeds into “China’s larger objective of becoming a global maritime power2 .” The PLA Navy’s growing strength means that it is shaping up to be a formidable force to reckon with. This is complemented by China’s growing maritime ties with countries in the IOR and increasing naval presence in the region. 

India has multiple concerns about China in the Indian Ocean. One, already alive, is Chinese activities in India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Speaking earlier this year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh said that both Chinese research vessels and fishing boats have been seen in Indian Ocean, including in the Indian EEZ. 

This is a long brief but I concluded the Brief with the following thoughts.  

Australia’s participation at the 2020 Malabar naval exercises is a clear recognition of India’s changing attitude towards foreign navies in the Indian Ocean. It is a step towards fulfilling Modi’s call for cooperation with like-minded strategic partners, fuelled by India’s changing posture towards China. 

It is also an indication of the increasing synergistic approach among the major Indo-Pacific powers – Australia, India, Japan and the United States. The expanded Malabar exercises demonstrate the common strategic endeavour among the four to develop cogent responses to the many security challenges in the Indo-Pacific including China. The naval exercises could go a long way in creating greater confidence and interoperability among the four navies, which will be key in ensuring a stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific. 

But cooperation with such partners will also require some common terms of understanding, most basically of the relationship between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Pacific’ components of the IndoPacific. Even though the concept of Indo-Pacific has gained greater traction over the last couple of years, there have been differences in the understanding of what constitutes the Indo-Pacific. 

The geographical limits of the Indo-Pacific in particular has been a topic of considerable debate. India, Japan and France have similar perceptions that the term ‘Indo-Pacific’ covers the area from the eastern shores of Africa to the west coast of America. Others, especially the US, appear more focused on the Pacific component. The Pacific powers, including Japan, the US, Australia, and New Zealand, appear to be more focused on countering China’s power in the Pacific and South China Sea, whereas Indian worries have been around China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean. There clearly needs to be better coordination between these two sets of concerns. Only when there is better coordination between these two sets of focus areas would it be possible to consider burden-sharing between the partners. 

Hopefully, a clearer enunciation of India’s Indian Ocean strategy will also translate into efforts for coordination between India and its partners in dealing with maritime challenges, especially those posed by China. 

There is a precedent for cooperation, though, at a smaller scale: India has worked with others to cooperate in anti-piracy operations. These, of course, included China also. Cooperating to deal with the security challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific will be at an entirely different scale and seriousness. This would require a sustained dialogue involving the different partners to evolve some sort of division of labour and burden sharing in order to effectively monitor China’s naval activities in all theatres of the Indo-Pacific. This could lead to arrangements in which India bears a greater burden in the Indian Ocean, while others bear a similar burden in the eastern waters. Other minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific are exploring such options of burden sharing in order to address capacity gaps – the India-France-Australia trilateral is a case in point. 

There is little doubt that China’s growing naval capacity affects all Indo-Pacific powers. New Delhi appears to recognise the difficulties involved and thus appears more keen to cooperate with other maritime powers in maintaining security in the Indian Ocean region. This is a good first step to greater Indo-Pacific cooperation, but further coordination is clearly needed.

Sino-Indian Competition in the Indian Ocean Region Intensifies - The Diplomat, 16 October 2020

In my third column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Sino-Indian competition in the Indian Ocean Region.  As competition intensifies in the Region, India loses touch with Sri Lanka and solidifies relations with the Maldives.  

India has recently faced some stiff competition from China for influence in its South Asian neighborhood. China’s increasingly visible footprint in Sri Lanka since the return of the Rajapaksas has made India’s position a little shaky. While New Delhi’s relations are being put to the test in one Indian Ocean state, India has had better luck with the Maldives, another key state in the region. 

For the full post, click here.  

With the Rajapaksas back in office, Sri Lanka appears to be once again on the verge of rebuilding a stronger Sri Lanka-China relationship. Last week, a group of senior officials led by top foreign policy official Yang Jiechi, a member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo and the director of the Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Commission, its top policymaking body, visited Sri Lanka. The visit was part of a four-nation tour by Chinese officials, which included visits to the UAE, Algeria and Serbia. 

In a statement, Sri Lanka’s foreign ministry reportedly lauded this “first ever Chinese visit in the South Asian region since the global coronavirus epidemic,” and looked forward to strengthening cooperation between Sri Lanka and China, “in the areas of combating the global pandemic and revival of economic relations.” The high-powered delegation met with both President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa in Colombo.  

Since the Rajapaksas returned to power, China-Sri Lanka relations have been warming up. Following Mahinda Rajapaksa’s landslide victory, China welcomed him as the prime minister and pledged complete support, stating that “Beijing looks forward to advancing its strategic cooperative partnership with Colombo.” After he took office, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian stated during a press briefing that two countries enjoyed a “traditional friendship” and that the two have been advancing their “strategic cooperative partnership based on sincere mutual assistance and ever-lasting friendship.” 

China’s influence in Sri Lanka will remain a cause of concern for India. The Rajapaksas have been generally perceived as close to China. The fact that the Hambantota Port development was given to China by Mahinda Rajapaksa during his previous term in office as president continues to be a sore point for India. While this has been worrying enough, that the Sri Lankan government signed the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year lease is even more of a concern in New Delhi.

With China giving high-profile attention to Sri Lanka, Colombo is slowing down some of its planned projects with India and Japan. Reports have suggested that China believes that Colombo must maintain some distance from New Delhi and Tokyo. Accordingly, Sri Lanka has decided to pause or slow down some of the development projects involving India and Japan, such as a Japanese-funded light rail project and the East Container Terminal (ECT) project in Colombo, which is backed by both Japan and India. In the latter case, this came despite the fact that the three countries signed an MoU for the project more than a year ago. Since the recent change in political dispensation in Colombo, there is no assurance that these projects will go through. 

In contrast, India appears to have got a bit of a breather in the Maldives. In fact, the Maldives may be one of a couple shining spots for India in its immediate neighborhood. India has been pitching a number of economic, connectivity and capacity-building projects in the Maldives. While many of the recently announced projects are economic in nature, the Indian objective is to limit China’s footprint in India’s backyard. Earlier in the week, the EXIM Bank of India entered into a line of credit agreement for $400 million for the Greater Male Connectivity Project. This is reportedly the largest of the infrastructure projects in the Maldives, connecting Villingili, Gulhifalhu and Thilafushi islands. This comes in addition to $100 million that India has promised for the project, which involves the construction of a 6.7-kilometer bridge and causeway network linking Male with the other three atolls. It is reported to be second most important connectivity project in the Maldives, after the China-Maldives Friendship Bridge linking the airport island of Hulhule with the capital’s island.

India announced its assistance for the project in a virtual meeting between External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Maldives Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid in August. Thanking India for this assistance, the Maldivian foreign minister tweeted, “The Greater Male Connectivity Project will lead to greater possibilities. It is the gateway to a more developed & economically resilient nation.” The current assistance package comes in addition to a previous line of credit of $800 million, which is one of the largest loan packages that India has given to any nation in its  neighborhood.

Earlier in July, India also gave the Maldives a symbolic check providing assistance for nine projects, through the High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDP) scheme. India has signed several bilateral MoUs for the construction of fish processing and bottled water plants, and the establishment of tourism zones. Prior to this, New Delhi had offered Male $400 million through an extended currency swap arrangement in order to deal with its liquidity crisis. India is also reported to have granted the Maldives $1.4 billion in budgetary aid to negate the adverse economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.  

Things have turned around for India in the Maldives since the 2018 elections, when Ibrahim Mohamed Solih was elected president. But another change in political dispensation could just as easily sour relations with India. So, while things are still working in its favor, India is trying to do its best to bring Male under its wing. Whether these aid and assistance efforts can maintain a positive role for India in Male over the longer term is unclear. But for the time being, the Maldives remain a relative success story for Indian diplomacy. More importantly, the course of events suggests that competition with China has forced India to up its diplomatic game in the region. 

What’s Behind the Rising India-France Maritime Activity in the Indo-Pacific? - The Diplomat, 26 March 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on the rising India-France maritime activity in the Indo-Pacific. A recent engagement spotlighted the broader strategic collaboration between the two countries in this realm.

Despite growing fears of the global coronavirus pandemic, India and France held a joint exercise in the Indian Ocean. While dealing with this and other challenges, both countries understand that they share broader strategic interests including the implications China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.

For the full essay, click here.



In a first, the two navies conducted joint patrols from Reunion Island, the French naval base in the Indian Ocean. The Commander of the Indian Navy P-8I, which was part of the joint patrols, is reported to have said that that such joint security operations “make it possible to maintain the security of international maritime routes for trade and communications.”

These engagements are not without significance. India has so far generally conducted Coordinated Patrols (CORPAT) only with its maritime neighbors. Currently, the Indian Navy has Joint Exclusive Economic Zone surveillance exercises with the Maldives, Seychelles and Mauritius and CORPAT series are undertaken with the navies of Bangladesh, Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia. The United States had earlier made an offer to India to carry out CORPAT but India rejected it.

But India’s own comfort level in engaging in CORPAT-like exercises is growing because New Delhi seems to be realizing that it is in India’s own interests to expand the number of countries with which its does such engagements. Thus, India in the last five years has shown greater inclination to engage with like-minded countries to expand its presence in the Indian Ocean. The current engagement is also a clear acknowledgement of the growing strategic importance of the areas between the East African coastline and the Malacca Straits.

Speaking to an Indian newspaper on the latest India-France interactions more specifically, Indian defense ministry sources said that while both India and France are on the same page when it comes to the challenges and concerns in the region, both also have capacity limitations. These constraints have in fact become an imperative for the two to join hands and undertake more coordinated and joint naval maneuvers. The sources were careful to add that these “patrols will be periodical” and that “there is no set pattern” to these engagements. Nevertheless, it remains an important indicator of India’s greater willingness for expanding its own footprint in the region as also for strengthening capacity-building by partnering with navies of like-minded nations.

India and France discussed CORPAT-like engagements in November 2019 during the visit of the French Navy Chief Admiral Christophe Prazuck. He had then emphasized the importance of “organizing joint patrols with the Indian Navy” and stated that the two sides are working on “the very precise objectives” of such maneuvers. He added that “if a zone [Exclusive Economic Zones] is not controlled, then it is bound to be pillaged, and if it is pillaged, then it is bound to be occupied. And if it is occupied, it will be contested.” As for the areas of engagements, he said it could be “North Western Indian Ocean or Southern Indian Ocean around the islands that are part of France.” Earlier in October 2019, the French President Emmanuel Macron had mentioned that a patrol aircraft from the Indian Navy will be deployed at Le Reunion to participate in surveillance missions in the first quarter of 2020.

Speaking about the growing Chinese presence in western Indian Ocean and the threat it poses, Admiral Prazuk noted that before piracy issues flared up in Somalia in 2008, there were no Chinese vessels. But clearly piracy has become an excuse for China to send its ships and they are still sending them even though the threat from piracy has diminished significantly. In addition to ships, China has also been sending Nuclear Attack submarines (SSNs) into the western Indian Ocean. As the Admiral noted, SSNs are “not the most effective tool to fight against pirates.”

The closer strategic engagement between the different arms of the governments including the militaries is a sign of the comfort and confidence that exist between India and France. This comfort level is demonstrated by the comments of an Indian official, who said that “France is a safe country for us, there will be no concerns in conducting joint patrols with them.” Thus, it is no surprise that France became the first country to have a Liaison Officer at the Indian Navy’s Information Fusion Centre (IFC-IOR).

France is one of the oldest, most trusted of India’s partners, possibly second only to Russia. But today with Russia having established an uncomfortably close relationship with China, India’s reliance on France has become that much greater. Even though India has traditionally remained uneasy with terms like alliance, Modi used the term to describe the relations with France at his speech at UNESCO in Paris, where he said, “Today in the 21st century, we talk of INFRA. I would like to say that for me it is IN+FRA, which means the alliance between India and France.”

This is a significant recognition of how much closer New Delhi and Paris have become even in the last few years. Some in the Indian strategic community discounted this as word play, but the reality is that the two countries’ strategic engagements have expanded and deepened in significant ways. The manner in which France backed India at the UN Security Council discussion on Jammu and Kashmir in 2019 is the latest indication of France’s strategic commitment to India. Russia used to be that reliable partner in the UN Security Council in the past but increasingly that spot is occupied by France (and of course, the United States).

While India and France have collaboration across a number of important sectors such as space, nuclear and defense, the particular focus on Indian Ocean and maritime security is significant. This is in line with India’s own changed vision for the Indian Ocean. In 2014, Prime Minister Modi made a pitch to India’s friends and strategic partners, saying “collective action and cooperation will best advance peace and security in our maritime region,” wherein India looks to key partners such as France and the United States in guaranteeing a stable maritime order in the Indian Ocean. This is a big shift from India’s earlier approach of criticizing the presence of any extra-regional powers in the Indian Ocean.

The recent CORPAT between Indian and French navies in Reunion Island became possible only because India and France signed an agreement in 2018 that would give reciprocal access to each other’s military facilities. This is similar to the logistics agreement, LEMOA, that India signed with the US. The agreement with France has expanded the presence and the type of naval operations that the Indian Navy is able to undertake in the western Indian Ocean. France has military facilities in the island of La Réunion, Mayotte, and the French Southern and Atlantic Lands. India’s pragmatic approach to Indian Ocean will go a long way in strengthening its operational maneuverability and creating more strategic options as it prepares to address a more muscular Chinese presence in the maritime spaces in India’s vicinity.

What Does Xi’s Myanmar Visit Mean for India’s China Anxieties? - The Diplomat, 22 January 2020

In my third column for The Diplomat, I wrote a piece on Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Myanmar and its implications for India. The trip produced a mixed outlook for New Delhi’s perceptions of Beijing’s inroads in the wider Indo-Pacific.

Last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping concluded a two-day visit to Myanmar, the first for Xi in his current capacity and his first overseas visit of 2020. Viewed from the perspective of growing Chinese inroads in the Indian Ocean, Xi’s trip spotlighted Beijing’s continued efforts to make geopolitical gains in line with its broader regional interests, which will be of concern to India.

While there may have been some surprise about Xi’s choice of Myanmar for his trip, it is in fact in line with China’s continued interest in making inroads with respect to the Indian Ocean. With the Myanmar visit, Xi has effectively completed his key neighborhood trips, having traveled through the Maldives and Sri Lanka in 2014, Pakistan in 2015, Bangladesh in 2016, and Nepal in 2019.

For the full essay, click here.



From India’s perspective, New Delhi can be none too pleased with China’s constant forays into the wider Indian Ocean region. But at least for now, India appears to be letting Myanmar’s natural caution limit China’s influence.

The significance of Xi’s trip ought not to be understated. It has been nearly two decades since a Chinese leader has traveled to Myanmar. While consolidating political and strategic ties are important for China, like in Nepal, there has been skepticism in Myanmar about partnering with China on the Belt and Road projects. But at the same time, given the difficult times that Myanmar is faced with internationally, clearly Myanmar is looking for support from China, which comes at a price.

Consolidation and implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor was an important item in Xi’s Myanmar agenda and China has been quite successful on that front as the joint statement clearly outlined. China has other security interests as well, seeing Myanmar as a potential gateway to the Indian Ocean.

From New Delhi’s perspective, both are problematic. India has taken a strong position against Belt and Road and it worries about the strategic implications of any Chinese bases in the Bay of Bengal under guise of infrastructural projects.

India’s worries are only likely to grow. During Xi’s visit, China and Myanmar have signed a total of 33 agreements, memoranda of understanding (MoU), protocols, and exchanges of letters on areas including major infrastructure projects, railways, industrial and power projects, trade and investment. Giving a big boost to China’s efforts at seeking greater presence in the Indian Ocean, the two countries signed a concession agreement and shareholders’ agreement for the Kyaukpyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) deep seaport project.

The Kyaukpyu deep seaport is particularly critical for China as it would provide it with an alternative to Straits of Malacca, which is currently their lifeline for energy transportation as well as a trade corridor. Making progress on the Kyaukpyu port is important also because it is linked to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and therefore the China-Myanmar agreement on the port is touted as a big success for the BRI.

Yun Sun, a China specialist, was earlier quoted as saying that “It’s all part and parcel of Beijing’s projection of soft power, with the intention of winning the hearts and minds of the whole of Myanmar, without whom their strategic Belt and Road Initiative southwestwards will stall.”

The two countries have also agreed on MoUs to undertake a feasibility study on the Myanmar-China Power Interconnection Project in addition to conducting feasibility studies for the Yangon River Estuary West Bank Protection, Mandalay-Bagan Railway Line, and Watalone Tunnel projects. Clearly, the Myanmar government has tried to accommodate some of the Chinese demands, but much like in Nepal, Myanmar’s response has also been to stall the process by agreeing to feasibility studies rather than undertaking these projects right away.

In an opinion survey conducted by the Myanmar local newspaper, The Irrawady, analysts were skeptical about these projects, saying there are no significant benefits for Myanmar. On many of the projects, the analysts pointed out that “China views our country as a transit country. It has plans to export its products via Myanmar to the Indian Ocean. So, let’s see if Myanmar has any strategic thinking beyond that.” They are not overly optimistic: “According to our [ISP Myanmar’s] study, Myanmar barely ever thinks strategically. Usually, Myanmar makes decisions ad hoc, only aiming to solve immediate problems.”

K Yhome, a close watcher of Myanmar, notes certain similarities in China’s timing for some of these trips. He wrote in a recent essay that these visits seem to take place when leaders of small countries are under enormous international scrutiny and pressure on issues such as treatment of religious and ethnic minorities and human rights violations.

That pattern seems to hold on this trip too. Last month, Myanmar’s de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi defended the Myanmar government’s action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague on the issue of violence against the Rohingya minority. The ICJ is expected to deliver its verdict on possible emergency measures on January 23. Given the difficult situation that Myanmar is in, Xi picked the right time to extract its pound of flesh from Myanmar in return for China’s support.

China has also been attempting to play the role of an “honest broker” between Myanmar and Bangladesh in repatriating the refugees. The joint statement issued during the visit stated that “The Chinese side supports the efforts of Myanmar to address the humanitarian situation and to promote peace, stability and development for all communities in Rakhine State.” For Beijing’s support on the Rohingya issue, Naypyidaw has reconsidered some of the earlier tough positions it had taken on stalled projects.

New Delhi can only hope that Myanmar may not want to tilt too much to one side, and there are indications of some discomfort in the country about China. For instance, many commentators have criticized the title of Xi’s recent article in local newspapers in Myanmar, which used the phrase “pauk-phaw.” It means fraternal or “siblings from the same mother,” but Myanmar analysts don’t seem to like the characterization. In an opinion piece in The Irrawady, Kyaw Zwa Moe, a local analyst commented that “The countries are close geopolitically, but distant in many ways.”

Also, there are certain projects that were not given any play during the visit although they were big on China’s agenda. For instance, the stalled $3.6 billion Myitsone dam project was not mentioned during the meetings in Myanmar, possibly sensing the opposition in Myanmar, from northern Kachin state to the deep south. There were reportedly about 40 civil society groups calling for a permanent cancellation of the project.

Therefore, for all the gains China it is making, which may worry India, Beijing will have to be careful in Myanmar. Despite the unfavorable international situation for Myanmar, Naypyidaw does not want to give into all of China’s demands yet, and if Beijing pushes too hard, it may only accelerate Myanmar’s quest for more diversification where New Delhi may gain. Though China keeps reiterating that it conducts its diplomacy with mutual respect and reciprocity as the guiding principle, smaller countries in Asia have found China’s projects have significant downsides. India, lacking China’s economic muscle or infrastructure-building capacity, can only hope that Myanmar’s caution will limit China’s influence.