India’s Big Defense Acquisition Challenge - December 22, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I wrote on India’s big defense acquisition challenge. I argue that occasional concerns about corrupt defense deals are merely the symptoms of broader structural issues that need to be addressed.

Accusations about corruption in defense deals are once again roiling in Indian politics. This time, the charges pertain to India’s decision to purchase 36 Rafale fighter jets from France. Questions have been raised about why the deal was abruptly changed from 126 fighter jets, many of which would have built under license in India, to just 36, which are being bought as fly-aways.

Irrespective of the veracity of the charges, it is clear that opposition parties will use the issue in the upcoming general elections in mid-2019. The case illustrates the broken nature of India’s defense acquisition process, but even more importantly, it demonstrates that the Indian political system and governing institutional mechanisms have not come up with a way to adjudicate these issues outside of the political arena. The consequence is that Indian defense acquisitions are likely to continue to suffer for the foreseeable future.

The immediate consequence will be felt by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The IAF has a sanctioned strength of 42 squadrons but it is currently down by a quarter at just about 31 squadrons. Even of these 31, almost half of the aircraft are of the 1960s and 1970s vintage, such as the MiG-21s, MiG-27s, and Jaguars.



The IAF was planning to replace these under the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) program, which featured competition between fighter planes from several countries, with Rafale emerging as the ultimate winner. Negotiations for the acquisition of the Rafale, however, proved to be difficult and the Congress-led UPA government, which initiated the deal, was replaced before the deal could be concluded.

But in 2015, Prime Minister Narendra Modi changed the deal and decided to purchase 36 jets outright. Questions were raised about the sudden change but more recently, opposition parties have charged that the new deal and particularly its offset clause favors business interests, who are alleged to be close to the ruling BJP and specifically Modi. While the deal itself is going through, it still leaves the IAF with a huge shortfall. The IAF has restarted the process for buying another 110 fighter planes, which would see a re-run of the MMRCA competition with the same planes once again competing for more-or-less the same deal.

More importantly, the travails of the MMRCA deal highlight once again the politically fraught nature of large defense acquisitions in India. The charges of corruption in defense deals are not new. There have been accusations of corruption in previous defense deals also including the Bofors artillery gun, coffins bought for soldiers during the Kargil War, and the purchase of Augusta Westland VVIP choppers.

While none of these accusations have been decided by the courts in India, the political and bureaucratic effects on India have been far more damaging. Fear of accusations has slowed Indian defense procurement to a crawl as illustrated by the nearly two-decade long MMRCA case.

Part of the response to these problems has been to write very elaborate rules for acquisition, with the hope being that such rules will eliminate any element of discretion because any exercise of discretion could potentially be challenged as being motivated by ulterior reasons. But other than complicating the process, these rules really haven’t helped smooth the path of defense acquisition. Bureaucrats are increasingly worried about having their name attached to any such deals because they could later be called to answer questions if the deals run into problems at the political level. Thus, they would rather postpone making decisions, leaving the choice to their successors rather than risk being caught up in political games.

An important part of the problem is also the inadequacy of Indian police agencies and Indian courts. These cases are usually handled by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), but the CBI has a very poor record of being an effective or independent police agency. It is usually seen as acting on the whims of the government in power, changing its positions on criminal and corruption cases when its political masters change. Even the Supreme Court (SC) has criticized the CBI, calling it a caged parrot.

Even more importantly, the CBI’s investigative capacity is also clearly wanting. Even in cases where political masters are presumably interested in letting the CBI move ahead, such as the cases involving a previous government, the CBI has not been able to effectively investigate or close these cases. The consequence of the CBI’s lack of autonomy and its incompetence is that these cases are likely never to be closed but continue to run in political cycles for decades on end. The absence of a neutral and effective investigative and judicial process means that accusations of corruption essentially become simply political ploys rather than matters of justice that eventually reach any closure.

Thus, India is likely to continue facing to have difficult time with large defense acquisitions, especially when they involve foreign military equipment. And consequent to this, India’s defense acquisition is likely to continue to be slow and creaky. Combined with low levels of defense budgets, the effect on India’s defense preparedness is likely to be telling.

New Delhi has shown a lack of strategic vision by choosing the Rafale fighter aircraft

Here is an article of mine on the recent MMRCA decision published by The Economic Times. I have argued that GoI underplayed the importance of strategic interests and went ahead with the risk free option of relying on technical inputs alone to make one of the most high profile defence deals.

India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

For the full article, click here.



The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

India has made powerful enemies by selecting Dassault ... my take on the MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer ....

Here's my OpEd on the recent MMRCA decision in yesterday's Pioneer. India is not likely to bow to Anglo-American pressure to revisit the MMRCA decision in favour of Dassault-Rafale. By deciding on the basis of technical parameters alone, India satisfied its own needs, but quite ignored the diplomatic fall out.



Price negotiation is what remains of the crucial MMRCA deal. It’s a complicated process. Nevertheless, it appears unlikely that the decision to buy the Rafale itself will be revisited. Given how drawn-out and difficult the choice was, the government is unlikely to add further controversy by admitting it made a mistake, which will be the consequence if the MMRCA competition is reopened. The selection apparently involved testing the platforms on around 600 odd technical parameters. This is the key argument made by proponents of the deal: that the deal was so carefully and technically handled that it should not be questioned.

But the premise that technical factors are all that matters is not defensible especially for such a large and politically important deal. While the technical qualifications are an important set of elements that should go into while making a decision, this has also brought to the fore how strategic factors were underplayed in this critical deal.

A decision made purely on technical parameters seems like the decision makers in India were opting for an easy, risk free option. This is understandable in the domestic political context. The single most important political concern today is about corruption in administrative decisions. Given the importance of this issue in public perception, and particularly given the many corruption scandals that have come out over the last year, it is not surprising that the government wants to play it safe. And the easiest way to play it safe is to leave political discretion out by letting the IAF make a purely technical decision.

Indian military services are known for their thoroughness in assessing weapons systems. Clearly the IAF did a good job of picking what was the best fighter from its perspective. But while the Rafale might have been the best from a

technical standpoint, it is not clear that it was diplomatically and strategically a good choice.

A strategic perspective should have looked at which of the countries fighting for the contract was most useful to India. This is not just about who wants good relations with India or who is a well-wisher because all of the competitors were good friends of India and were India’s well-wishers.

Where they were different was in terms of which could do more for India. This should have been a purely cold, hard assessment. Such an assessment would have put the US and Russia as the top choices. While the European consortium and Sweden would probably have brought up in the back of this list, France would have been somewhere in the middle. It definitely has greater global weight than Sweden and probably a better bet than a consortium of several countries, but it would have been no match for the US or Russia.

Of course, this should not have been the only consideration. Strategic and diplomatic reasons alone should not decide which fighter jet was picked. India’s decision-makers should have also looked at the different technical capabilities of the various competing planes. In fact, the final choice should have been a combination of the technical merits and the political and strategic requirements. And this is the key criticism if the manner in which India has chosen to make the deal — using only technical parameters to make a choice and ignoring diplomatic and strategic factors.

Considering how big this contract was, India could have received significant political benefits, which it stands to lose by making a technical decision. Even France could very well make the argument that there is no political quid pro quo for India choosing the Rafale because India itself claims that this was not a political choice. There is little reason why France has to give any political support for a decision that was purely technical in nature.

This leaves India in the politically the worst position possible — both the US and Russia, politically far more significant than France on global issues, are unhappy with India, but India is unlikely to get much benefit from France despite picking the French plane. And unlike Britain, which is also unhappy about the Indian decision, the US and Russia matter quite a lot in the global arena. So, India has effectively annoyed more important friends for nothing.

There are other factors in addition to the strategic factor that also needs closer examination. The cost factor itself is a serious issue. The unit cost of the plane is only one factor. The cost — acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance cost — should have been an important determinant in this decision. As against hundred odd Rafale, India could have procured many more Russian or US fighter jets for the same value. The Rafale option has cost India dearly both on the acquisition as well as the cost of spare parts.

Thus, though there may have been good reasons for picking the Rafale from a technical point of view, or even from a domestic political perspective, this is not enough. The choice should have at least considered the strategic implications in such a big contract.

That might still have led to the Rafale being picked, but it would have been a more defensible decision.

Flying into rough weather .... My OpEd on India's MMRCA decision in ToI

Here's a piece of mine on India's MMRCA decision that appeared in Times of India on Friday, Feb. 10, 2012.

New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.



India's long and convoluted search for a new fighter plane - a medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation now remains.

The Rafale had been shortlisted along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field that originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice are unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, a former IAF officer proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. If accurate, this reveals serious strategic shortsightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the IAF, such a decision should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus, it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done.

A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. A pragmatic strategy would have been to analyse the risk and opportunity through these three parameters and then make the final decision about which of the fighter plane choices would have best advanced Indian security. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the MMRCA debate that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload but an equally important consideration is that of numbers.

Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600, and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option.

Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American F-18s would have been the best given that they (as well as the F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. India does not enjoy a benign neighbourhood, and these security needs are important. But India also needs to balance these with its requirements as a rising power, which means having capable friends. The MMRCA deal was a great opportunity to consolidate its strategic ties with either Russia or the US, or even with both. Instead, New Delhi has ended up antagonising both of them.

The standard response that India has signed many other defence contracts with both Russia and the US does not wash because this was a very different and high-profile deal which was closely watched around the world. Signing smaller deals, even if they add up to significant amounts, does not have the same weight as the MMRCA deal. New Delhi needs to be more careful in both understanding strategic moments and being able to exploit them if it wants to sit at the global high table.

India's MMRCA Decision: Strategic Implications

Here's my take on India's MMRCA decision .... While the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon. For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

For the full article published by ORF, click here.



India's long and convoluted search for new fighter plane - or the MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) - has entered its final stage. New Delhi has just announced that the Rafale, built by Dassault Aviation of France, has been chosen to meet the Indian Air Force's (IAF) requirement. Only price negotiation remains now.

The fight over the choice of aircraft appears to be now over. The Rafale had already been short-listed along with the Eurofighter Typhoon from a field which originally included four more jets: the US-built F-16 and F-18, the Russian MiG-35 and the Swedish JAS 39 Gripen. But, though the fight over the selection is over, questions about the wisdom of New Delhi's choice is unlikely to end any time soon.

Commenting on the MMRCA decision, Air Marshal Ahluwalia, a former IAF officer, proudly stated that this was probably the first decision that was made purely on technical grounds. While probably accurate, this reveals serious strategic short-sightedness. While the government should have received inputs from the Air Force, such decisions should not have been taken on purely technical grounds. For India's decision-makers, limiting themselves to technical specifications was a risk-free option, but that reveals more about the state of strategic decision-making in Delhi than the wisdom of the choice they made.

Ideally, the Indian decision should have been guided by a strategy that balances reducing danger and broadening opportunity. Accordingly, the question for New Delhi should have been how to use this lucrative deal to beef up India's strategic options. Thus it is probably a strategic blunder to narrowly focus on the technical specifications and capabilities alone, as many proponents of the IAF's choice have done. A decision of this magnitude should have been filtered through three key parameters: strategic, operational and tactical. Additionally, numbers (of aircraft India could acquire) and cost should have been factored in. Buying fewer but more expensive aircraft might make some fighter jocks happy, but having greater numbers might be more relevant to a country like India which faces a two-front threat from China and Pakistan. It was often argued in the debate about the MMRCA that maintaining air superiority required technological superiority, range and payload, but an equally important consideration is that of numbers. Numerical superiority in India's regional context is of particular significance given that the current strength of India's fighter jets is only around 600 and unless replenished, it will reach critically low numbers soon. Meanwhile, both Beijing and Islamabad have been augmenting their fighter fleets. India could have procured far greater numbers of fighters with the US or Russian option. Though the probability of a two-front war is low, no pragmatic Indian strategic decision-maker should rule it out. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that the Indian army is raising new forces to deploy on the China border. It is unclear if the technological superiority of the Rafale is so great as to compensate for the smaller numbers that India will have to settle for.

Cost should have also had an important role in the MMRCA decision. India's decision to go for Rafale is going to cost New Delhi around $20 billion, if not more. Opting for a Russian or US jet would have been far cheaper for India. The Russian option would have been the least expensive whereas the American fighters would have been somewhere in the middle with the European jets being the most expensive. In overall terms, the American option in an F-18 would have been the best given that it (as well as F-16s) came with the second-generation AESA radars.

Lastly, the most important consideration should have been the strategic benefits that accrue to India through this deal. Indian decision-makers should have been mindful of the fact that this deal was as much about making strategic investments in a relationship as simply buying fighters. In strategic and geopolitical terms, France can provide little help to India in either Asia or in the global theatre. While France has always been a well-wisher, it has never had much capacity to help India. For example, though France wanted to sell India nuclear reactors, it could do little to change the nuclear non-proliferation rules that prevented it from doing so. It took Washington to change these rules to India's benefit.

For India's current administration, beset with corruption scandals, letting technical merits alone determine the MMRCA decision was probably the politically easiest choice. But its strategic merits are somewhat less clear.

GoI's Decision on MMRCA: A Strategic Blunder?

Here's a link to an article of mine published yesterday on the GoI decision on MMRCA.

A strategic blunder of sorts, this is how India's selection on medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) will be characterised as. The MMRCA deal worth Rs. 42,000 crores (about $ 11 bn) was not a deal that India could have made such errors on. India had to be naïve if it based its decision purely on the technical parameters. Even on technical parameters, the decision is questionable. However, the underlying factor is that through this deal, India was buying a strategic partnership.2 This was a deal with huge political message to its friends and foes, alike.

This article lists out some of the issues that India clearly ignored in making its decision which are going to hurt India in politico-strategic terms than any significant gains that India may have had by going for the European option. This paper argues that not just numerical superiority and costs but more importantly the strategic benefits should have been the guiding factors in making the decision on MMRCA.



First of all, let's look at the number issue. India's dwindling Air Force strength along with the cost factor should have been an important consideration. Air power strategists argue that in ensuring air superiority, quality, including range, payload and precision are important parameters. But even more important is the numerical superiority which should have guided India towards an American or a Russian option, which are better value for money options. India's current strength of approximately 630 fighter aircraft is fast depleting. Therefore, the need to beef up the fighter force numbers is significant given the security environment in India's neighbourhood.

Acquisition, lifecycle and maintenance costs are another set of considerations. Once again, when the acquisition costs and costs of spare parts are considered, the European options are going to be very expensive to the Indian exchequer. The cost per unit and the spare parts costs are said to be high in the case of the European ones. An American option – the F-18 – that came fourth in the technical evaluation3 would have proved to be far better an option. An F-16 with AESA radar would have been a good platform except that India will be using the F-16s against Pakistan whose Air Force has been using this platform for decades.4 However, both the F-16s and the F-18s do come with second generation AESA radars and they provide far greater gains in terms of reliability.

While the costs are important considerations, more critical is the strategic benefit an American option would have accrued for India. As argued earlier, the MMRCA decision is a strategic decision – a decision that would reflect India's strategic priorities and commitments. In this regard, analysts have argued that American ambiguity on India's geopolitical concerns having had a major role. Whether the US comes to Indian aid or not, one can be certain that the Europeans are not going to burn their fingers. With India having gone with the European option, it can only be hoped that this was not a strategic decision and that it does not reflect a particular (anti-US) sentiment within the Indian establishment. If India had assumed that Europe was going to come to India's aid in the case of an India-Pakistan or India-China conflict, it is far from being realistic. A deal with the Russians may have been somewhat more understandable, but the geopolitical clout of Europe, particularly in Asia, is almost nil.

Additionally, strategic messaging should have been a vital imperative. US fighter aircraft in the Indian inventory would have a huge strategic message. Therefore, the argument that India has done several deals with the US through the FMS (Foreign Military Sales) does not hold much weight. An American option would make India's adversary think twice before venturing into a conflict with India, be it Pakistan or China. The deal would have had a huge deterrence value.

Lastly, India opting for one of the most expensive single engines with no proven operational AESA radar is imprudent, to say the least.5 Dassault Rafalealmost with no customers (except for Brazil that plans for major procurement), India may provide the largest order to the day. Whether this huge deal will have corresponding positive spin-offs for India need to be seen. India might experience a long hard summer with the European Union beginning to put pressure on India, through various channels, to endorse and accept the EU Code of Conduct on space. India should also prepare itself for EU dictat on space vs. growth debates in the coming years.
1 As a strategic decision, it was not good enough that India looked at the technical specifications and the best in the technical evaluation. As some analyses have pointed out, the technical superiority argument is not valid as all of these are of the same class and are marginally up or down depending on certain parameters. But this decision should have been based on technical, operational / tactical and most important strategic considerations. India had to look at beefing up the overall security assurance that it would be gaining instead of merely looking at the technical specifications. Technology alone does not guarantee security for any nation. Four factors should have prevailed upon the decision-maker: security through partnerships; freedom of action; national competitiveness; and regional influence. For an excellent perspective on strategic decision-making, see Peter A Garretson, "MMRCA Selection: A Strategist's Point of View," Unpublished Paper, available with the author.

2 Admiral Raja Menon, commenting on NDTV on April 28, argued that India had taken a bad decision, questioning whether India was investing in a strategic partnership with a European consortium. Additionally, he argued that any of the six companies would have provided the 126 aircrafts that India was looking for but the decision-makers should have looked for what more could we get out of the deal.

3 The gradation following the technical evaluation is not clear yet. Different reports have provided contradictory assessments.

4 F-16 is a platform that has remained in the Indian neighbourhood for a considerable time and the operational superiority of the PAF on F-16 platforms may have been an important enough consideration for India, although the version on offer to India was far superior. The longer standoff range of AESA radars also provide the pilots with more time for persistent target observation, information sharing, tactical analysis and commander assessment before taking critical decisions. In addition, these radars can also be used for non-traditional ISR and electronic attacks. They have been battle-proven and they provide the best bet in any tactical operation that India may be engaged on its eastern or western borders.

5 Neither Rafale nor Eurofighter has proven AESA radar.