The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now - Asia Unbound, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 May 2020

In a first, I have a short essay on India-US relations for the Council on Foreign Relations blog, Asia Unbound where I guest-blogged for Alyssa Ayres. The Pandemic and China Are Strengthening U.S.-India Relations, for Now, as the title suggests, argued that the pandemic and China's aggressive behaviour are driving the US-India relations.

This post was published a few days ago, and is part of an Asia Unbound series of voices from Asia on the COVID-19 crisis, and on its implications for Asia and for Asian views of the United States. This is the ninth post in this series; the first can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, the seventh here, and the eighth here.

Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S.-India relations have shown signs of continued cooperation. Officials of the two countries are in frequent contact, including President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his counterpart, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar. Concerns about China’s growing aggressiveness may be driving New Delhi and Washington closer together. But there are signs of turbulence ahead, and the outcome of the U.S. presidential election and the uncertain path of the pandemic itself make any prognosis tentative at best.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States has taken the lead in extending assistance to other countries, including India. According to a Department of State Fact Sheet issued on April 16, the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) together have earmarked about $500 million dollars in emergency health, humanitarian, and economic assistance. This is in addition to State Department funding to multilateral and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) actively providing assistance during the pandemic. Washington and New Delhi have great potential for further collaboration. This crisis drives home the importance of ensuring that multilateral agencies remain effective and unbeholden to any one power. India and the United States can work together with their allies to promote neutrality, transparency and accountability in such agencies.

Both countries have a stake in ensuring that they do not cede influence to China in the provision of pandemic relief, especially to smaller countries in the region. The pursuit of influence continues unabated despite the pandemic. China’s missteps such as allowing the pandemic to spread, focusing more on shifting blame than investigating the origins of the virus, using pandemic aid for publicity, and engaging in assertive military behavior toward its smaller neighbors have helped but they only provide an opportunity, not a guarantee, for regional leadership. The United States has stepped up diplomatic consultations for cooperation with a geographically diverse group of countries, which has now been dubbed the Quad-plus because it includes South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand in addition to the original Quad (United States, India, Australia and Japan). The crisis could help generate subsequent strategic cooperation—the original Quad grew out of multilateral cooperation after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.

China’s behavior is also making this cooperation easier. Despite the crisis, China appears to be stepping up its military presence in the region. Since early February, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been probing Taiwan’s air and maritime borders. The PLA Eastern Theatre Command has been particularly active, deploying fighter jets and bombers around Taiwan. According to reports, Chinese fighter planes momentarily traversed into Taiwanese airspace. China has claimed that it was only conducting military exercises though the United States has said that this was completely inappropriate. PLA air exercises have continued into April. In addition, China’s new aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and five other warships sailed close to Taiwan’s waters in mid-April.

Meanwhile, in Southeast Asia, the PLA has been particularly aggressive toward Indonesia and Vietnam. Chinese fishing vessels accompanied by coast guard ships have been intruding in Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Last week, China also established two districts on disputed territories in the South China Sea. China this week also targeted a Philippine Navy vessel that was conducting territorial defense operations and sovereignty patrol. And in a more serious incident in early April, Chinese ships hit and sank a Vietnamese fishing vessel near the Paracel Islands, leading Vietnam to issue a formal diplomatic protest. The U.S. State Department also put out a strongly worded statement, expressing serious concern at “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea.”

If COVID-19 cooperation and China’s behavior are helping to keep the momentum in U.S.-India relations, there are also some uncertainties. New Delhi is unlikely to be happy at the latest changes in U.S. immigration rules which could pose a challenge to the Indian expatriate community in the United States. New pressure on India’s budget means that India is unlikely to have enough money to buy foreign military equipment, including from the United States. Trump has been a keen promoter of U.S. arms sales and could retaliate if deals with India fall through.

But the most serious uncertainty concerns the U.S. elections in fall 2020. On one side, there appears to be a growing political consensus in the United States that China is a problem, leading to efforts by both U.S. presidential candidates to frame the other as “soft on China." This is music to India’s ears. But New Delhi has concerns about both candidates. The Democrats are perceived to have been traditionally soft on China. But Trump’s unsteady hands at the tiller is also a problem for New Delhi. His early praise for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s handling of the crisis, in particular, is seen in India as an example of his undependability. New Delhi should be most concerned about the growing chorus from both sides of aisle in the United States to draw down its global commitments. As China flexes its muscle, India is looking for more U.S. involvement, not less.

This could take several forms. At the declaratory level, Washington could emphasize that ensuring a non-hegemonic Asia is a core American interest. But the US also needs to act consistently to promote this value including by supporting countries that are threatened by coercive trade practices and by leading regional response against using force to resolve territorial disputes. Finally, the United States should also take the lead to coordinate the various minilaterals in the region in order to promote the values enshrined in the idea of the free and open Indo-Pacific.

The Danger of China’s Maritime Aggression Amid COVID-19 - The Diplomat, 10 April 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I looked at the danger of China's maritime aggression in the middle of the COVID-19 pandemic. I argue that Beijing’s behavior, while unsurprising, is only likely to further antagonize its neighbors.

While most countries in the Indo-Pacific region are battling the coronavirus pandemic, China has been active in the South China Sea, taking aggressive action against Indonesia and Vietnam. China’s belligerent behavior, including military maneuvers and large-scale deployment of military assets to the region, have caught many of its neighbors and the United States off-guard, understandable considering their preoccupation with the pandemic in their respective countries. Such aggressive behavior, in the midst of a crisis that is itself blamed on China, is only likely to further antagonize China’s Indo-Pacific neighbors.

For the full post, click here.



For several weeks, China has been hounding Indonesian fishing vessels in the Indonesian waters off the Natuna Islands. Chinese fishing fleets with the support of armed Chinese Coast Guard ships have been encroaching into areas that Indonesia considers exclusive. Indonesian fishermen are perturbed that the government in Jakarta is not doing anything to protect them. Ngesti Yuni Suprapti, the deputy regent of the Natuna archipelago, said, “There was a vacant period, then China came back. Our fishermen feel scared.”

Such Chinese excursions are becoming more common. In January too, the Chinese fishing vessels were hovering around the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Natuna Islands, but they retreated to the edge of the EEZ just before President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s visit to the region. The Joint Defense Area Command (Kogabwilhan) I commander Rear Admiral Yudo Margono, commenting on the situation, said, “Around 30 foreign vessels are currently situated on the Natuna EEZ border” but affirmed that irrespective of the withdrawal, Indonesian military operations in the region will continue. He added that there are still four fighter jets on standby at the Natuna Air Base.

Indonesia has not been keen to raise the issue through political or diplomatic channels with Beijing for fear of negative impact on the economic ties between the two countries. But that has not helped because Beijing now claims that these are China’s traditional fishing waters and lawful under UNCLOS. Still, Indonesian officials are categorical that “Indonesia has to do nothing with China over the Natuna Islands and their surrounding waters, as UNCLOS does not recognize ‘traditional’ fishing grounds.”

But while Indonesian diplomats may not feel the need to open any talks with Beijing on this issue, the military has a different take, saying that “China’s position is totally unacceptable and we should take concrete actions in the field.” Also, for ordinary Indonesians, China in recent times has become too aggressive. In a recent opinion piece, Kornelius Purba wrote in The Jakarta Post that “For millions of Indonesians, China’s diplomat has crossed the line by openly challenging Indonesia’s territorial integrity. Their pride as a nation has been wounded, for right or wrong reasons. ‘China can easily do it to smaller members of ASEAN, but not with us,’ was the common reaction of Indonesians on social media.” This was a reference to the Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson, who made quite harsh statements regarding the rights of Chinese fishermen in the Indonesian EEZ.

Meanwhile, last week, China rammed into and sank a Vietnamese shipping boat with eight fishermen on board while they were out fishing in the Paracel Islands, which are controlled by China but also claimed by Vietnam. The spokesperson for Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Chinese action “violates Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands . . . [and is] not conducive to the development of the bilateral relations between the two countries as well as the maintenance of peace, stability and cooperation in the East Sea (South China Sea).” Vietnam also lodged a formal protest against China at the local embassy in Hanoi.

The U.S. Department of State also responded with a strongly worded statement expressing its concerns about China’s behavior. The statement further noted that this is only “the latest in a long string of PRC actions to assert unlawful maritime claims and disadvantage its Southeast Asian neighbors in the South China Sea.” The statement also pointed out since the outbreak of the pandemic, China has announced the setting up of “new ‘research stations’ on military bases it built on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef and landed special military aircraft on Fiery Cross Reef,” in addition to the continuing deployment of maritime militia around the Spratly Islands. Of course, China has predictably come out with its harsh criticism of the U.S. statement, calling upon Washington to focus on its COVID-19 response rather than sending ships and aircraft to the South China Sea.

In a surprising move, the Philippines Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also come out with a strong statement expressing concern over the Chinese sinking of the Vietnamese fishing boat and referencing a similar incident involving a Filipino fishing vessel last year. The statement said, “Our own similar experience revealed how much trust in a friendship is lost by it; and how much trust was created by Vietnam’s humanitarian act of directly saving the lives of our Filipino fishermen. We have not stopped and will not stop thanking Vietnam. It is with that in mind that we issue this statement of solidarity.”

The statement further noted the importance of maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea and said that incidents such as these derail “the potential of a genuinely deep and trusting regional relationship between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China… [and hence] it is crucial that such incidents be avoided and that differences be addressed in a manner that enhances dialogue and mutual trust.”

It would appear that China, in addition to mishandling both the coronavirus outbreak in Wuhan and its rather crass public relations efforts on the pandemic, is demonstrating further strategic tone-deafness in its actions toward its neighbors. In doing so, China is likely to shoot itself in the foot: further accelerating efforts by Beijing’s neighbors to partner with the United States and other Indo-Pacific powers.