China extends terrestrial rivalries into orbit with new space race - The Nikkei Asian Review, 23 August 2019

On this Friday, I published a short essay on the emerging Asian space race in The Nikkei Asian Review. I believe that the emerging space dynamics especially in Asia will spur new competition as well as cooperation. For example, India and Japan unite over Beijing's moon landings and anti-satellite weapons and find new avenues to collaborate including in joint lunar missions in the future.

On September 7, India will attempt to land an unmanned mission on the moon. If it is successful, it will join China as the second Asian power that has landed on the lunar surface -- its efforts driven by China's achievements.

While such peaceful rivalry can spur countries to greater feats, unfortunately competition between Asian nations is now having more hostile effects: earlier in the year, India tested an antisatellite weapon, or ASAT, in space, trying to match a capability that China had demonstrated earlier.

These are two facets of the space race in Asia and it now looks like both will be determined by terrestrial power tussles more than anything else.

For the full essay, click here.



Asian powers have made significant advances in developing their capacities in outer space in the past couple of decades. China landed a rover on the far side of the moon earlier this year, an impressive feat that no other country has achieved, three years after landing on the near side.

While China has not officially commented on plans for a manned mission to the moon yet, many believe that will be the next step. In fact, Beijing has disclosed that its future lunar missions will set the foundation for a potential research base there.

Further, China's plans to construct and operate its own space station in low-earth orbit sometime around 2022 are impressive, but also add to space competition. By the time China's space station is established, it will probably be the only one operating. The current International Space Station is likely to wind up by 2024.

Similarly, India became the first Asian country to send an orbiter around Mars, called the Mangalyaan. ISRO, India's space agency, has an ambitious agenda, including a mission to study the sun in 2019-20, a second mission to Mars around 2022-23 and a Venus mission around 2023. Like China, India also plans manned space missions.

Japan, the other Asian power, has focused more on commercially viable projects but it has impressive achievements including a lunar orbiter mission in 2007 as well as the Hayabusa mission, the first time that a spacecraft landed on an asteroid and brought back samples.

While these achievements are commendable, there is a darker side; tense international relations in Asia are being felt in outer space.

In 2007, when China tested its ASAT weapon, it was the first such test since the 1980s. China's decision to demonstrate that capability meant that every power which had a reasonable level of dependence on outer space, not just military but also civilian, through such uses as GPS and telecommunication satellites, was now suddenly vulnerable.

Not surprisingly, the U.S. immediately followed with its own ASAT test the next year, and India began its own program. Now it appears that Japan may be on its way to developing an ASAT capability.

ASATs are only the visible element of this competition. There is also a less well known race to develop other capabilities that can damage the outer-space assets of potential adversaries. These include everything from cyber attacks to electronic warfare and spectrum interference, deliberate attempts to jam or otherwise impede radio signals.

The problem is of course a global one. But it is also specifically Asian because most of the key players are the rising powers in this region. Growing national wealth and technological capabilities have made these countries more dependent on space -- and hence more vulnerable.

The difficulty is exacerbated by the lack of international rules or norms. Existing treaties such as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 have proved to be outdated and inadequate to meet these challenges. The problem is well recognized and there have been recent international efforts to address it, though these have gone nowhere.

The consequence is that deterrence appears to be the only real safeguard to protecting national assets in space. Simply put, the absence of strong rules and norms means countries must implicitly threaten retaliation by developing their aggressive capabilities.

This competition is spurring cooperation of a sort, however. China's enormous capacity means that no other Asian power can counter it alone. Just as this is encouraging new terrestrial alignments between India, Japan, Australia and others, it is also leading to cooperation in outer space by a number of countries, all whom have common concerns about China's capabilities and behavior in space.

Thus India and Japan, despite having highly nationalistic space programs, are cooperating more. In 2017, the two countries formally recognized the importance of deeper cooperation, and the space agencies of the two countries plan to conduct a joint lunar mission. More significantly, the two countries have just started a space security dialogue.

The first space race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union petered out without too much damage. With only two players in the game and a far simpler outer-space environment, management of that competition was relatively easy.

Asia may not be so lucky unless wiser counsel prevails. Asian powers have made significant advances and accomplished much they can be proud of, but unless they can either manage their terrestrial power politics or at least isolate outer space from those politics, it is likely that all of Asia could suffer.

Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit - The Diplomat, May 15, 2019

In last week's column for the Diplomat, "Deepening US-India Maritime Ties in Focus with Navy Chief Visit," I examined the deeper engagement between Indian and the US navies in the face of growing maritime threats in the Indo-Pacific. A recent interaction highlighted this aspect of relations between the two countries.

Admiral John Michael Richardson, the chief of naval operations of the U.S. Navy, has just wrapped up a visit to India to explore additional areas of naval cooperation between the Indian and U.S. navies. Richardson’s trip provided the opportunity for both sides to deepen their naval collaboration as part of their broader defense ties.

For the full essay, click here.



During his visit, Richardson met with a number of Indian officials, including Indian naval chief Admiral Sunil Lanba, who is also chairman of India’s Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), as well as Indian Defense Secretary Sanjay Mitra and other senior officials. They are reported to have discussed all issues covering operations and exercises, training interactions, as well as capacity building and enhancement.

The visit comes against the backdrop of U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s statements that the United States is reorienting its ties with like-minded partners in nurturing “a free and open order” in the Indo-Pacific. He said that the United States is “banding together with the likeminded nations like Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea to make sure that each Indo-Pacific nation can protect its sovereignty from coercion.”

Like this one, many of the recent initiatives have been in the backdrop of a more muscular China that has been using infrastructure investment and other economic tools to further its narrow interests, even when China understands the economic non-feasibility of these projects.

A particular concern, as Admiral Richardson’s visit shows, is China’s growing naval power, a concern to both India and the United States. The PLA has traditionally been a land-focused force, but this is no more the case. Both the specific need of protecting China’s sea routes of commerce – vital for a nation as dependent on foreign trade as China – and China’s larger ambition to return to its traditional great power role, require China to expand its naval power.

The Chinese naval base in Djibouti established in 2017 is a case in point. It has also established a firmer foothold in the Indian Ocean by acquiring Sri Lanka’s Hambantota part for 99 years. (Interestingly, possibly to demonstrate its control over the port, Sri Lanka held a week-long exercise with the United States known as Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) in Hambantota). China also has access to Pakistan’s Gwadar port, which adds to its growing maritime footprint.

China’s naval push is leading India and the United States to do a lot more together, especially in the seas. Even though India has been trying to improve relations with China, New Delhi has also stepped up its security engagements with Washington. India’s recent decision to join the United States, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines in sailing through and conducting a naval exercise in the South China Sea demonstrated India’s growing concerns with a belligerent China and the need to cooperate and coordinate with other like-minded partners in the region.

The United States, too, has changed, with the Trump Administration, in particular, taking a much more strategic and longer-term approach to India that is more clearly directed at China. The United States granted the ‘Major Defense Partner’ status to India in 2016 and the ‘Strategic Trade Authorisation-1’ (STA) rank to India in 2018, evidence of the changing view in Washington regarding India’s role in the region. The 2+2 Strategic Dialogue between the two sides also had its inaugural edition in September 2018 and the signing of the Communications, Compatibility, Security Agreement (COMCASA) have added more substance and depth into the defense and strategic cooperation.

The recent U.S. decision to approve the sale of two dozen multi-role MH-60R Seahawk maritime helicopters to India for around $2.6 billion is important in the context of having strengthened anti-submarine warfare capabilities against China. These helicopters can operate from a number of different platforms including frigates, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers and can be used for multiple missions including anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare operations along with secondary missions including vertical replenishment, search and rescue, and communications relay. Other important developments in this respect include the Seahawk helicopters to be armed with Hellfire missiles. These are capable of undertaking multiple missions with anti-submarine warfare missions being a critical one.

The two sides have also strengthened education, training and joint exercises in recent years – the two navies recently concluded a joint submarine-hunting exercise in the Indian Ocean, with the goal of having more reinforced and coordinated maritime patrol and reconnaissance missions in the region. The United States has sold India a number of major non-naval items also, underlining the broader nature of military ties. Earlier, India took possession of four of the 15 Boeing-made Chinook heavy-lift helicopters ordered in 2018. In addition, India has placed orders for 22 Apache attack helicopters from the United States, the first of which was handed over to the Indian Air Force last week.

Richardson’s visit will help in furthering the growing cooperation between the two sides. Because this cooperation is being driven by external pressures that both the United States and India feel, it is likely that it will deepen, irrespective of the outcome of the current national elections in India.

Should India Declare a Space Policy?, my short essay published by the Diplomat

Here's the link to an essay of mine published by The Diplomat on whether India should declare a space policy or not.

A low-intensity debate has been taking place in India as to whether India should have a declared space policy or not. The general consensus appears to be that there is no need. But there are several arguments to make in favor of outlining a policy in the open. In today’s world, the advantages of a declared policy far outweigh the disadvantages. A declared policy calls for a clear understanding of how it should be tailored, what it should contain and what should be left out.

For the full essay, click here.

First, open policy statements and declared policies have remained the best means to assuage fears, build confidence and avoid ambiguities. These are important measures for building transparency and reducing tensions in regional and global contexts. Since the Asian context is characterized by growing competition and rivalry and the potential for conflict, even relative openness and transparency will go a long way in diluting the levels of regional insecurities.

A declared space policy would be an effective tool of communication for both internal and external audiences. For both audiences, it will set limits as well as open up opportunities as the number of states engaged in space exploration and utilization continue to grow. The value of communication through such an exercise, with both internal and external communities, is important. However, it is worth remembering that as a policy is prepared and articulated, while an internal audience is important, the policy will also send a message to external audiences. As such, it must be written in a manner that does not aggravate insecurities. Fail to do that, and external audiences could be left with the wrong impressions about India’s space program and policy, further raising the risk of misperception and miscommunication. How external audiences will read the policy statement and what they perceive about India’s needs, objectives and plans for the future, therefore, must be an important consideration as New Delhi readies a space policy document.

Second, India should have a clear picture of its long-term objectives and these should become guiding factors for a good space policy. The long-term objectives should consider both where India wants to be in a 25-year framework, and the perspective of outer space itself. A long-term vision should be followed by prioritization of important capabilities (political, diplomatic, military and economic) and partnerships that will help India reach its destination. This should translate into national security strategies articulated by the political leadership and then national military strategies derived from the national security strategy.

The second set of objectives will come from a debate on what sort of future India wants to achieve in space and accordingly what sort of behavior will be counter-productive to achieving those goals. Once there is clarity on these issues, India should adjust the orientation of its own space program and its priorities while working towards a favorable framework that would allow it to meet those goals. India should also steer its efforts in developing rules that would affect and curtail certain space programs and activities that may potentially be destabilizing and irresponsible. In addition to creating a framework that will protect its own interests, the political impact of this exercise is important. India should also strengthen its ability to maneuver at the global high table by prioritizing and fostering partnerships with countries that might share India’s vision in space.

Third, India should articulate its interests and policies in the broader context of the region and beyond, rather than talk about its interests in a narrow sense. This will have multiple benefits. For one, India’s policy articulation will be perceived as less threatening to the region. There are apprehensions particularly in the immediate neighborhood because of India’s dominant presence in South Asia. India’s growing capabilities in the space arena as in several other areas has the potential to heighten insecurities among these smaller neighbors. It will benefit India in the longer run if it were to showcase its interests and benefits in the regional context. Moreover, India should be able to cultivate regional interests that are akin to its own interests. It should be articulated in a manner wherein the region is able to transpose its interests and ideals with that of India’s. India should be able to convey to the region as to how such a policy might be in the interests of regional peace and stability.

Fourth, the domestic debate on India’s space policy has tended to highlight the utility of being ambiguous about policy. However, it should be understood that ambiguity has its limits. Bringing clarity to India’s policy and program will have multiple benefits. Despite the fact that India’s space program has been predominantly civilian in focus, the rising trend towards militarization in the region and beyond is influencing India’s orientation as well. Categorization of India’s space program into civilian and military components followed by clear-cut departmental structures would allow for greater focus, clarity and better financial outlays. Currently, institutional and budgetary resources are stretched across different programs. Devising a military space program will cater for better budget allocations as well as dedicated human resources.

Fifth, articulating an open policy would also add to the credibility of India as a major spacefaring nation. It would be a major transparency and confidence building measure, which is particularly important in the Asian context. Apart from its value in that regard, the policy should also articulate in clear terms redlines and limits that should not be crossed. This should be in terms of both capabilities and activities that may be considered irresponsible and contributing to regional and global uncertainties. Indicating such boundaries is important both for national security and deterrence as well as an international rule-making perspective. A national policy that would categorize certain activities as irresponsible and destabilizing will be in a position to determine when defensive responses can be activated and justified.

Similarly, defining what may be considered a space weapon or how one may define peaceful or defensive use of space will be significant in deterring accidents in outer space. This may be truer in the case of Asia, but space being a truly global commons, it has the potential to trigger conflicts even among the larger community of spacefaring powers. Being ambiguous about these boundaries and redlines undermines deterrence and increases the potential for accidental conflict. From an international framework perspective, a code of conduct that would set restrictions and limits and categorize certain capabilities as irresponsible or unacceptable might deter such actions. India should take a lead role while framing these restrictions at the global level in order to have its own interests protected.

Apart from the Cold War rivalries between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., space was seen as a benign domain with great utility in the civilian and developmental sectors. However, growing space capabilities are increasingly part of comprehensive national power. Growing facets of space use from space exploration to a quest for resources, including minerals, exploitation for energy resources (space-based solar power), operational response to natural disasters, and military use are changing the nature of our engagement with outer space. The technological spin-offs of ambitious projects such as space-based solar power have tremendous potential to bolster the science and technology base of any country.

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) should be commended for its achievements, particularly given its modest budget. However, as recently noted by the ISRO Chairman, private sector involvement will inject a much-needed stimulus to India’s program. India must aim at creating a strategic space industry if it is to keep pace with growing commercialization. Launching satellites is becoming a lucrative business and India should not lose opportunities in this regard. Also, the number and types of players have undergone a major change in the last few years. India needs to respond to these changes and become a leading figure by articulating its needs and objectives for the future. As in many other areas, articulating a policy along with its broad orientations would also bring much-needed clarity internally within the space sector. Additionally, partners that look to India for collaboration across fields including the use of space-based assets and space situational awareness will only benefit India’s capabilities.

Finally, India’s space policy should also outline its efforts in the area of international rule-making. Given the potential for space exploitation to affect every aspect of our daily lives, actions could have serious consequences. Therefore, laying down the rules of the road is a task that should not be left until space is highly weaponized. Aside from the political and strategic value, India has a huge financial stake given its investments and reliance in this regard.

"Reassessing the US Pivot to Asia," my take on the continuing debate on the US pivot policy....

As the US continues its 'pivot' back to Asia, three important points need to be reiterated. First, is there really a 'pivot'? Did the US really leave Asia to pivot back? While Asia may have had attention deficit from the US, the reality is that the US never left the region and the US pivot or rebalancing, as it is now called, is more of an attempt of reassurance to its friends and allies in the region.

For the full post, click here.

This strategy is arguably an effort to rationalise its priorities after over reaching itself in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade. Fiscal compulsions and the emerging dynamics in the Asia Pacific region also demand this new rationalization. The changing nature of warfare along with an increasing emphasis on hard power has meant that there is a potentially dangerous arms race in the making. The resulting newer capabilities and strategies including the anti-access and area denial capabilities have caught the attention of the US military and defence department.

Why Is Assurance Needed?

Second, while the US pivot strategy is not a China-specific one, the US has had to pay attention and factor in China as it outlines its priorities for the Asia Pacific region. Therefore, China is only a part of the story, although a major part. China can be in fact seen as a major trigger for the changes that one witnesses in Asia.

While China has continued to articulate that it is 'rising peacefully,' its actions on the ground leave a different message, particularly to its neighbours. China's actions in some of the conflict areas in the region have been threatening. Looking at the emerging trends, states have come to firm conclusion that it is the Chinese actions and not words that needs to be counted.

Growing Chinese military capabilities including some of the asymmetric capabilities are of concern to many countries in the region, prompting them to acquire new weapon systems in response. AMI International, a US-based consultancy firm forecasts that Asia Pacific accounts for about 25 per cent of the projected global new ship market, spending about $180 billion for almost 800 new ships including surface vessels and submarines through 2013.

This region houses some of the busiest maritime and trading routes essentially for transporting of energy resources and cargo. For major energy hungry powers such as India, China, and Japan, protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) is a major preoccupation. India's dependence on oil imports, for instance, at the current level of consumption, is expected to reach 91.6 per cent by 2020. The same story goes for all these other players as well.

All of these developments would result in what is traditionally called the security dilemma in Asia. How the US would respond to crises in the region is a big consideration for some of the smaller countries as well as its allies.

Thus, there is still strong support for an active US role in Asia even among potential adversaries. Whether this will stay the same depends to a great degree on how China behaves. A reasonable China might make the US less important to regional stability. On the other hand, continuing aggressiveness will make the US role necessary, whether or not China accepts it.

Third, clearly, Washington's friends and allies do feel reassured with the US refocus on Asia. Even as there is apprehension of the intertwining economic relationship between the US and China, allies such as Japan support the new strategy. While these countries are still uncertain about the ramifications of a rising China, states that are not typical allies of the US are also enthusiastic about the US rebalancing. It is also clear that China too would welcome the US in the region (even while it will not acknowledge the utility of the US presence) in order to check potential instability. So it could be said that the US rebalancing contributes to much-needed regional stability.

However, the relative decline of the US or at least the perception of decline could instill concern among the allies and others such as India. How this should be managed is an issue that China should seriously ponder over. Filling that power vacuum may be one issue but doing it without furthering additional insecurities is important.

The US pivot to Asia has, in this regard, provided new choices and options for countries in the region although it may be years before this strategy fructifies into something concrete. While hedging was the preferred strategy in Asia since the end of the Cold War, this is now undergoing change. The tendency among a lot of countries in Asia is now to embrace open balancing as a strategy.

Finally, these strategies and counter-strategies are still in their early stages and nothing is yet written on the stone. China clearly mishandled the relations with its neighbours, both big and small. China needs to re-think why it handled its relations so badly. It still has time to take corrective measures and reverse some of the security trends in the region. Many countries in the region are not comfortable playing the balance of power game but have been forced into it. So if China is willing to introspect and become more accommodative, a lot could change in Asia.

China, a major factor pushing changes in Japan's security narrative. a short essay on the Japanese defence White Paper....

Here's a short essay of mine on the China factor in Japan's defense White Paper. The White Paper that was released in June highlights important issues facing regional and international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. In terms of the regional threat perception, North Korea and China figure prominently in the paper. Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh."

For full essay, click here.

Japan's new White Paper on defence was released on 25 June, 2013. A comprehensive document, the first part deals with the security environment both at the regional and global levels and then it looks at the defence policies of important countries and regions - the US, Korean Peninsula, China, Russia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Australia and Europe - and important issues facing the international community such as WMD proliferation, safe and continued access to global commons like sea, outer space and cyber space, and international terrorism, from a Japanese perspective. However, the most interesting and pertinent one is the section on developing Japan's Dynamic Defence Force1.

Satoshi Morimoto, the Japanese Defence Minister, in his introduction to the White Paper, notes that the security environment faced by Japan is "increasingly harsh." The major emphasis on Japan's regional threat perception was on North Korea and China. North Korea's continuing nuclear and missile development efforts - including the recent missile test that Pyongyong called as a "satellite" test - was particularly highlighted. In addition to the three rounds of nuclear tests, Tokyo is worried that North Korea could be "developing nuclear weapons using highly-enriched uranium." Pyongyang's continuing development of delivery mechanisms, including the long-range ballistic missiles, also pose "a significant threat to Japan's security, and are absolutely unacceptable as they are significantly detrimental to the peace and stability in Northeast Asia and the international community."

Next, the White Paper focuses on China's military modernisation along with its rising defence budget. Even though China justifies Taiwan as the main driver of its modernisation, the report notes that China's rise as a major economic and political power will dictate it to expand its military capabilities and also that the global community will pay greater attention to China. However, the report notes that China's rapid expansion and modernisation of its military and the enhancement of its power projection capabilities, along with lack of transparency, are alarming not only to Japan and the region but also to the larger global community. While the report acknowledged that the publication of Chinese defence white papers since 1998 is a means to address the transparency issue, the document also notes that "China has not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the international society."

The document noted that the Chinese strategy "emphasize(s) not only physical means but also non-physical means with respect to military affairs and warfare, incorporated the concept of "Three Warfares"-"Psychological Warfare," "Media Warfare," and "Legal Warfare"-into the tasks of the political work by military, and declared a policy of "close coordination between military struggle and political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legal endeavors."

As for the long-term plans and objectives, the White Paper said that China will want to reach "basic mechanization and achieve a major progress in construction of informatization by 2020." This is expected to be done with the long-standing primary objective of developing capabilities to win a local war under informationized conditions, while beefing up to undertake multiple and diverse military missions and "complete the historical military missions in a new phase of the new century."

The rising Chinese defence budget is a key issue. The paper says the nominal size of China's announced national defence budget has more than doubled in the past five years and has grown nearly 30-fold in the last 24 years. The paper noted that the announced figures are only a part of the actual military spending, pointing out that "equipment procurement costs and research and development expenses" are not part of the budget.

The paper, in addition, goes into great detail about the growing size of the Chinese inventory - various types and ranges of ballistic missiles: intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), intermediate-range ballistic missiles/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM), and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) - and what it might mean for Japan and the region. In addition to procurement that goes unabated, the paper notes with alarm China's ability to serial production of missiles in large numbers for domestic as well as export purposes.

Increasing number of Chinese vessels in close proximity to Japanese waters engaged in information gathering activities and training exercises has also been highlighted in the White Paper. There have also been Chinese government ships "engaged in monitoring activities for protection of its maritime rights and interests" in addition to advancements by Chinese naval surface vessels to the Pacific Ocean since 2008.

China has criticised the new White Paper in harsh terms and has called on Japan to "conduct some introspection and do more to facilitate regional peace and stability." The criticism has been along expected lines, with China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Hua Chunying arguing that "China adheres to a road of peaceful development and pursues a national defense policy with a defensive nature," while dismissing the issue of opaqueness about the military and saying that it does not pose threat to any country. On the Senkaku islands, the spokeswoman said that China will "not change its position and determination" and that it will take any additional measure that is necessary to protect its sovereignty.

Given the growing number of challenges, Japan foresees development of defensive capability in accordance with the National Defense Program Guidelines and the Mid-Term Defense Program, despite difficult economic scenario. This defensive capability will involve development of the Dynamic Defense Force on a priority basis. The paper notes that in the backdrop of heightened military modernisation in the region, "not only deterrence through the existence of the defense force per se, but also "dynamic deterrence", which focuses on operational use of the defense force such as demonstrating the nation's will and its strong defense capabilities through timely and tailored military operations under normal conditions, is important."2

Japan has been changing in its security posture over the last several years. Its attempts to become a "normal" nation by assuming greater security responsibilities have been driven more by necessity than choice. While the US-Japan security alliance is key to Japan's security, the US distraction over the last few years in Afghanistan and Iraq forced Japan to re-examine its own security options. Also Japan has been assuming more security responsibilities in the international arena which became evident in the deployment of Japanese troops in Iraq and its naval vessels in the Arabian Sea in support of the US military operations in Afghanistan.

Also the growing partnership between the US and China has cast doubts in Tokyo about the credibility of the US-Japan alliance. Given such apprehensions, Japan has been developing new partnerships and strengthening old ones. The newer and enhanced role of the Self Defence Forces (SDFs) appears to have domestic support; a recent public survey showed a 91.7% approval for the SDFs. Thus, there is a high likelihood of a more "normal" and muscular Japan emerging in the coming years.

1. "Dynamic Defense Force" was first referred to in the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines, with "response to large-scale disasters and various other situations" as one of the key roles assigned for this force. Maritime security and protection of the sea lanes are also highlighted as important roles.

2. Additionally, the paper said, "warning times of contingencies is shortening due to exponential advances in military technology. Thus, in order to respond speedily and seamlessly to a contingency, comprehensive operational performance such as readiness is increasingly important."

Asia-Pacific Security: Challenges and Opportunities, one of the latest books on the subject and I have a chapter on it as well....

Here's a chapter of mine on the Asia-Pacific security, edited by Dr. Adam B. Lowther. I have contributed a chapter on the US role in the region, to this edited book, titled, Asia-Pacific Century: Challenges and Opportunities. The book has been published by the US Air Force Research Institute, Alabama.

The United States’ Pacific pivot has been much debated since the end of last year. This chapter addresses three specific questions: (1) how Asia-Pacific nations see the role of the United States in the region; (2) as China rises, how its neighbours in the region will react, whether they will they bandwagon or balance; and (3) how states in the region are hedging their bets on the future. The discussion delves into the new alliances and partnerships that are likely responses in view of the new challenges.

For the full book, click here.



Type rest of the post here

North Korean imbroglio: Who can do what?, my short essay on the subject.....

Here's a short essay on the situation in North Korea and who can do what to calm down the tempers?

While on the surface, both the US (and South Korea and Japan) and China appear to have the goal of seeing a stable Korean Peninsula, there appear to be serious differences about what regional stability means.




North Korea appears to be yet again on a war path with repeated provocations and increasing rhetoric for the past few months. It has also been a year since Kim Jong-un formally took over power. Power transfer to the new young leader has not however eased the policies in Pyongyang. In fact, the military-first politics of North Korea is continuing ever more fervently under Kim Jong-un. The situation may even be more dangerous under Kim Jong-un than the previous leaders because at least previous leaders were slightly more experienced and had a sense of the thresholds that must not be crossed.

This has serious implications for the region. The US, bound by its alliance commitments, has reassured its partners Japan and South Korea that the US will do what was necessary to any attack from North Korea. After his visit to Seoul, the US Secretary of State John Kerry headed to Beijing where he called upon China to step in actively to bring about restraint in Pyongyang’s behavior. Given that Pyongyang is already so isolated internationally and that China continues to be one of the few countries that maintain ties with the regime, Kerry said "China has an enormous capability to make a difference here." Thereafter, while in Tokyo, Kerry even softened up a bit to say, "Our choice is to negotiate, our choice is to move to the table and find a way for the region to have peace," but of course if Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons programme.

What are the expectations from the region and beyond on China? Following the meeting with Chinese officials, there was much optimism with headlines like, "Kerry Hails Chinese North Korea Pledge", "China, United States to work together to calm down North Korea" and the like.

Will China rise to the occasion and do something? Would China step in as an active partner in bringing down the tempers in the Korean Peninsula? Are China and other regional powers on the same page as far as regional security is concerned?

Beijing’s continuing aid and trade relations with Pyongyang does offer it a leverage and one that can be used to extract some benefits in the interests of regional stability. However, China’s State Councilor Yang Jiechi’s statement that "We advocate addressing and settling the problem through dialogue and consultation and by peaceful means," and that it is "the common responsibility of all" does not suggest that China is serious on extracting any conciliatory steps out of North Korea.

While on the surface, both the United States (and South Korea and Japan) and China appear to have the goal of seeing a stable Korean Peninsula, there appear to be serious differences about what regional stability means. It appears that Chinese perspective on regional stability is driven by a narrow objective of ensuring no internal crisis in Pyongyang which will drive a large number of refugees into China; and second, that there is no US military presence near its borders. This vision differs sharply with that of the others who perceive a denuclearized North Korea that respects human right for its people as an essential step to regional stability. This time around, at least in its rhetoric, China has made calls for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was not the case earlier.

Does the Chinese rhetoric for a denuclearized Korean Peninsula mean anything if it fails to act on North Korea? What could be the potential rationale for China not to act on Pyongyang? One, it may be a buffer between China and the US and its allies in the neighbourhood. So, it may be in China’s interests to sustain the regime but under limits and one that does not engage in repeated provocations that reinstate the role of external players, particularly that of the US.

On the other hand, it is possible that China may not enjoy the same clout as it did earlier vis a vis the new regime in North Korea. It is a fact that the new leader has not much of a contact with the new leadership in China nor has Kim Jong-un undertaken a visit to Beijing to solidify relations between the new leadership teams in both countries. And if one were to go by a Wikileaks report, it may be true that China is beginning to be frustrated with North Korea including over the increasing belligerent approach and the failing economy of Pyongyang. While there is a grain of truth in these reports, the Chinese response to some of the recent incidents including the Cheonan sinking or the repeated missile tests suggest otherwise.

While China may be increasingly getting frustrated with the North Korean leadership, they remain the sole friend and benefactor, extending the much needed economic, political and moral support to the Kim Jong-un regime. Therefore, China remains the sole country that has some leeway in bringing the North Korean situation under control. The west should not get carried away by the Chinese pledges and open rhetoric and instead get China to act on its words.

It may also be in the interests of China to see that North Korean nuclear programme is rolled back because if Pyongyang were to continue with repeated tests including that of its delivery vehicles, it would only strengthen the regional insecurities prompting Seoul and Tokyo to contemplate all options including potential nuclearisation. While China may see immediate short-term benefits in not acting strongly against the Pyongyang leadership in curbing its nuclear programme, the end result of a nuclear Seoul or Tokyo may be much harder for China to live with. Therefore, taking strong measures and going beyond the rhetoric on North Korea may be in the long-term interests of China as well.

Space Conduct Code Seen by Some as Western Ploy ... story in the Space News

Here's a story on the international code of conduct on space and how it is seen by some as a western arms control ploy in the Space News.

I was recently in Brussels for the annual space conference organised by Ifri and Secure World Foundation-Brussels. The conference brought together a good mix of officials (Europeans by and large), policy analysts and strategic community members, including media from Europe, US, Japan and India. While I was not presenting an absolute Government of India (GoI) perspective, it did raise some of the concerns that one has learnt of through official and other channels.

The proposed International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities is viewed by many nations as cover for a Western attempt to corral developing countries’ space ambitions, an Indian think tank has concluded.

For the full story, continue reading or click here.



That perception, plus the squabbling between the United States and Europe over the code’s content, could scuttle attempts to promote common standards for space operations, according to Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Dehli.

Originally drafted by the European Union (EU), the code, currently undergoing revision, is designed to include all spacefaring nations. But the lack of formal consultations on its contents has undermined its credibility, Rajagopalan said Sept. 13 during a space policy conference in Brussels, organized by the Secure World Foundation of the United States and France’s IFRI Space Policy Program.

“A sizable number of nations believe the EU code is a Western ploy to limit the activities of other spacefaring countries, including India,” Rajagopalan said, adding that established space powers’ judgment about space conduct violations “has not been credible.”

The European Union and the United States have been discussing the proposed code for more than two years. U.S. State and Defense department officials have issued occasionally contradictory statements about the U.S. willingness to adopt the nonbinding code.

The State Department earlier this year said the U.S. position is favorable to such a code so long as it does not impinge on U.S. space activities related to national security.

Rajagopalan said India has some $2.3 billion in assets already in orbit, a figure that rises to some $37 billion when related ground infrastructure and value-added services are included. Protection of these assets is “a major challenge” that should push India toward supporting the code.

But the fact that the code is nonbinding and has no enforcement mechanism, she said, undermines its effectiveness, as does its request that nations provide information on their military activities.

As debate about the code continues, a series of efforts heading in the same general direction are moving forward. Major commercial satellite fleet operators have created a Space Data Association that pools information in the interest of preventing unintentional signal interference or physical collisions between telecommunications satellites.

Nations active in launching satellites, including India, have joined together to create the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee to limit the amount of debris that remains in popular orbits for long periods.

China Walks the US-India Space-Based Solar Power Dream

Here's a link to the analysis on how China walks the US-India space-based solar power dream, written by Rahul and me for the ORF.

While India and the US make pledges about potential collaboration on space, others walk those promises and potentials. In the India-US context, space has remained a potential area of cooperation for the last decade or so whereas China, which has studied the Indo-US joint communications carefully, has made fast progress on space-based solar power (SBSP), in terms of devoting financial and human resources into the project.



The need of the hour is for democracies like India, US and may be even Japan to come together, structure large collaborations around space and capture the political space in this regard. The political leadership in both India and the US should recognise the importance of it and act accordingly before it is too late.

Recognising the spin-off benefits of space-based solar power, China recently unveiled a plan to build and orbit a solar power station for commercial use by 2040. The Chinese plan drawn by one of its space pioneers Wang Xiji is an ambitious one and aims to look at various aspects of space-based solar power applications, designs and key technologies that would make the option economically feasible in the first instance and sustainable by 2020. Detailing the research conducted by the China Academy of Sciences, Wang said at the fourth China Energy Environment Summit Forum: "The development of solar power station in space will fundamentally change the way in which people exploit and obtain power. Whoever takes the lead in the development and utilization of clean and renewable energy and the space and aviation industry will be the world leader."

Given China's rising energy requirements, it is imperative that Beijing look at alternate sources of energy to meet its enormous demand. By 2050, it is estimated that China would have an energy gap of approximately 10.5 percent which it would seek to fill in by exploring alternate sources of energy such as fusion and space power stations. Also, the greenhouse gas emissions and climate change considerations have become serious enough concerns for the international community. These factors have also pushed Beijing to invest more in low-carbon energy sources. SBSP is possibly on top of the options list for China given the safety concerns vis-à-vis nuclear energy, particularly after the Fukushima crisis. According to the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST), the Solar Power Satellites (SPS) and solar power applications will help China in sustaining its economic and social development, disaster prevention and mitigation and would also assist in retention of qualified personnel.

China has been working on this concept for several years with CAST spearheading its research work. After the initial feasibility report compiled by CAST, a concept design for the SPS was submitted to China's Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, which eventually gave the approval and funding for the design. According to CAST, the SPS development includes four parts - satellite launching, in-orbit construction/multi-agents, efficient conversion of solar energy and wireless transmission. Apart from the launch factor, an area where China has excelled significantly, other parts of the project will demand greater effort for development.

While China's lead in the SBSP could provide for a co-operative framework in Asia, the geopolitical realities and the inherent problems in Asia - competition, rivalry and mistrust - may hamper such collaboration in the near future.

Under such a scenario, there lies a strong imperative for India, the US and other like-minded democracies to come together and realise the SBSP utilisation dream. This will not only provide economic gains but also give a strategic advantage in the changing security environment in Asia. For India, such collaboration would meet its growing energy demand and provide other spinoff benefits like job creation and access to advanced technology, much-needed for sustaining India's growth story. It is estimated that India's energy requirements would double by 2030, making it imperative for it to explore other feasible options. Also, if India becomes a part of the process of realising the SBSP dream, it will augment India's position in Asia as well as the world as a responsible leader.

The political consensus for India and the US to collaborate in space already exists although it appears that each side has been leaving it to the other to take the initiative and materialise the potential. The US-India Agreement to establish an S&T Board and an endowment for research provides the apparatus needed for starting the SBSP research and development. This fund can finance a broad number of issues of mutual interest such as bio technology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science, clean energy technologies, basic space, atmospheric and earth science. SBSP easily fits into the sphere of issues supported by this fund. As far as other funding options are concerned, private sector companies on both sides have shown interest in exploring the SBSP option. US companies like Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Tata in India have shown positive signs. Other countries like Japan have also done considerable research in this field. Japan's Aerospace Exploration Agency has done decade-long research on SBSP in collaboration with high-end technological companies such as Mitsubishi. Collaboration among these countries would also facilitate funding for this ambitious project.

While China may not have developed the best model in terms of cost effectiveness, it will surely send out a strong message to the international community about China's capabilities in developing such technologies and its ambitions to become the global leader in space solar power harnessing. If China wins the race in developing SBSP as a feasible source of energy, which would meet the world's growing energy demand, it will result in huge economic and strategic gains for China.

It is now time for both India and the US to explore the opportunity seriously and not let prospects for cooperation remain only as prospects. Hopefully, the advent of China into the picture would give the much-needed push for both countries to actually start real-time development work on SBSP.

How to Deal with China -- A Viewpoint from India ... my OpEd in yesterday's Mainichi daily ....

Here's my OpEd, "How to Deal with China-A View Point from India" in yesterday's morning edition of Mainichi Daily (Japanese).



Type rest of the post here

Post-Japan, the hunt for the safest option

Here's the link to an article of mine that appeared in today's Pioneer about the space based solar power option.

The nuclear meltdown in northern Japan has confirmed our worst fears about nuclear energy. Tragically, India continues to blindly follow the discarded notions of yesterday, ignoring viable possibilities like solar power

With the nuclear crisis still unfolding in Japan, there is fresh thinking around the world about the safety of the nuclear energy option. While India has examined several alternative energy options, no single option is likely to be a magic bullet. It will probably be wise to look at other options including ones that have not yet been seriously considered as yet.

Under such a scenario, it may be a good time for India to explore the option of space-based solar power (SBSP) — a possibility that has not caught the popular or government attention very much, for a variety of reasons. Unlike the ground-based solar power option, SBSP does not have problems like cloud cover or availability of sunlight and so on.



The SBSP option is likely to be costly. While cost may have been the most serious impediment in making the SBSP option a reality so far, there has been lack of direction and commitment from the political leadership that has also contributed to this. Exploiting space for solar power is not a new idea although it has remained a theoretical exercise for a number of reasons, including because of the lobbying by other alternate energy groups.

SBSP involves using extremely large satellites made up of a large number of solar cells to collect the sun’s energy, convert it to radio waves to be beamed to antenna farms on the ground where it is reconverted to energy.

The scale of such a project will be large but the SBSP is comparable to several mega projects undertaken in the past by both India and the US — the US National Highway project or the Indian rural electrification programme are two cases in point. On cost, experts opine that developing a prototype or putting a 10 MW demonstrator in GEO (geosynchronous Earth orbit), using exiting launch vehicles, will be to the tune of around $10 billion over 10 years. Collaboration with other space-faring nations will bring down the cost to make it a cheaper, safer and cleaner option. More important is the need to calculate the cost on the basis of both direct and indirect cost of climate change and environmental issues. Also, this will be a huge effort in strengthening international hi-tech cooperation, creating several spin-off benefits, including job creation and gaining access to advanced technology.

In the recent past, former President APJ Abdul Kalam promoted the idea of SBSP at the Aeronautical Society of India (AeSI) and later at a NSS (US-based National Space Society) press conference in Washington DC last year. This initiative as of now remains an India-US initiative although it needs to be broadened, may be at a later stage, to set up a larger consortium to make SBSP into a viable proposition.

Why SBSP? Speaking in November last year, Dr Kalam highlighted the huge energy shortage that India and the world would be facing in the next few decades. Kalam estimated that by 2050, even if one were to use all possible sources of energy, there will be a global shortage to the tune of 66 per cent. On the other hand, if one were to use the SBSP option, the world would move from an energy deficit to an energy surplus situation. Additionally, the clean and safe energy option will go a long way in solving the world’s climate change woes.

At the India-US level, this initiative is associated with some key technocrats such as Dr Kalam, Mark Hopkins, CEO of the NSS, John Mankins from the Space Power Association and a veteran of NASA and also Dr TK Alex from the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) Satellite Centre, Bangalore who is also heading the Chandrayaan Project. Participation of TK Alex in a sense gives an official colour to the project.

On the Indian side, some preliminary studies were done in 1987 on advanced space transportation system at a conceptual level to make SBSP a cheaper option, but there has been no follow up. In the recent past, the ISRO has been engaged in getting some additional technical studies on the feasibility of this option, looking at three specific configurations. While continuing with the technical feasibility studies, ISRO has also made it clear that it can proceed only if they get suitable proposals/funding from foreign governments. While the technical studies are one aspect of it, more important is the need for a clear directive from the government. A clear political mandate calling upon the technocrats and scientific community to develop the necessary technologies is one way to take this option forward. The government can thereafter be a facilitator if it seeks foreign collaboration, for instance. But the initiative has to come from the political leadership.

What are India’s options to make SBSP a real viable option given the cost factor and technology? Can the governments and the private sectors of both India and the US make serious commitments to take the first step towards R&D investment on SBSP? It might be worth the effort to place the SBSP initiative within the US-India S&T Endowment and Board. The Indo-US S&T Fund finances projects on an entire range of issues from biotechnology, advanced materials and nanotechnology science to clean energy technologies, basic space and atmospheric and earth science. Other countries making significant investment in this area include Japan that has made an investment of $21 bn for the next few years. India and the US can take the lead to establish an international consortium based on cost sharing and more importantly on international technology cooperation.

Countries like India and the US need to take up initiatives to do major technological demonstrations and milestone projects, which will have far reaching consequences across political, strategic and technological spheres. Cooperation on SBSP will convey a major strategic message.

China's Stealth Fighter: Implications of the J-20

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recent test flight of the Chinese fifth generation fighter aircraft, J-20. The article published by ORF can be found here.

The PLAAF (PLA Air Force) conducted the test flight of its new generation stealth fighter J-20 on January 11, 2011, just days before US Defence Secretary Robert Gates landed in Beijing on a mission to repair the bilateral defence ties. The timing of the test flight was curious. Was this itself a message for the US as also the rest of the world? Or is this another demonstration of the lack of coordination at the highest levels of the Chinese government?



J-20 will rival for the latest US stealth fighter - the F-22 Raptor. Russia is also in the process of developing one - the Sukhoi T-50 that made its flight test in January 2010 - although it is going to be another decade before it gets inducted into service. The fact that China has been able to develop the J-20 prototype demonstrates the ability of the PLA to make steady progress in an area where it is otherwise considered weak.

Having said that, it remains to be seen as to how good the new aircraft is. Comparing it with the F-22 or the Russian T-50 is going to be mere speculation. Whether it actually makes it into the fifth generation category or not is also an issue. It will depend on the kind of avionics & communication gear, sensor performance and low radar reflectivity, speed, how advanced it is in terms of the composite material used and a variety of other parameters. But it should be borne in mind that China has been encountering serious problems as far as developing jet engines are concerned. They have not been able to produce a good engine indigenously even for their fourth generation aircrafts.

Several unofficial Chinese and foreign defence-related websites have published pictures of the J-20 prototype doing high-speed taxi test, a step closer to being readied for actual flights. The J-20 has been presumably developed at the Chengdu Aircraft Design Institute,1 although there has been no concrete evidence of such a system being developed until these pictures popped up. While the Chinese authorities have not commented upon the new aircraft, General He Weirong, deputy head of PLAAF had stated in 2009 that China was readying to do the test flight of its first stealth fighter and that it would be operationalised in "eight or 10 years."2

Aviation experts and China watchers have said that the photos seem genuine. Gareth Jennings of the Jane's Defence Weekly noted that since "the nose wheel is off the ground in one picture suggest[ing] that this was a high-speed taxi test." He added that "all the talk we've heard is that this could happen some time the next few weeks".

There are also doubts about whether the technology has been developed indigenously and if not, where they got the technology from. Xu Yongling, one of the top test pilots stated that the J-20 "is a masterpiece of China's technological innovation."3 He added that the jet has advanced supersonic cruise capabilities.

There have been several reports suggesting that US technology that is the foundation for the new fighter. In January 2011, an Indian-American engineer (who worked at the Northrop Grumman, where he worked from 1968 to 1986) was sentenced 32 years imprisonment for selling military secrets to China. Noshir S Gowadia who called himself a father of the technology that protects the B-2 stealth bomber from heat-seeking missiles was originally arrested by the FBI in 2005.4

A second potential source would have been the US F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter, the world's first operational stealth fighter, which was shot down by a Serbian anti-aircraft missile during the Kosovo War in 1999. The US hardly took any step to obtain the wreckage of the downed F-117 and several critical elements appear to have made its way into the Chinese hands. In fact, a RAND study titled, Friction and Operational Problems, notes that the US did not go about destroying the wreckage as the site attracted large number of people including government officials and journalists.. General John M Loh, a former commander of Tactical Air Command said, "I'm surprised we didn't bomb it, because the standing procedure has always been that when you lose something of real or perceived value - in this case real technology, stealth - you destroy it."5 The report stated that the initial thinking within the military was to destroy the wreckage but they were forced to reconsider "because they could not have located it quickly enough to attack it before it was surrounded by civilians and the media." It said, "For the record, it should be noted that USAF F-15Es were immediately put on alert to destroy the wreckage with AGM-130s after the F-117 downing was confirmed, but by the time the wreckage location could be positively determined, CNN was on the scene and collateral damage issues precluded the attack."6An Aviation Week and Space Technology report on September 27, 1999 noted that while Moscow obtained some parts from the wreckage, a significant size of the airframe found its way into China.7

Admiral Davor Domazet-Loso, who was the head of the Croatian military during the Kosovo War, stated, "At the time, our intelligence reports told of Chinese agents crisscrossing the region where the F-117 disintegrated, buying up parts of the plane from local farmers. We believe the Chinese used those materials to gain an insight into secret stealth technologies … and to reverse-engineer them."8

The US has played down the Chinese stealth achievement. The Pentagon spokesman Col. David Lapan suggested that while the Chinese are working on a fifth generation fighter, the progress has been uneven.9 Another spokesman Geoff Morrell was sceptical about the stealth capabilities of the new aircraft.10 Although the US has known of the Chinese stealth aircraft, they have given different estimates as to when such a system would be ready: from 2018 to 2025.

The new Chinese fighter appears to be modelled around the F-22, a heavy twin-engine fighter about the same size as that of Lockheed's F-22. F-35, which has currently gone into the production mode, is a single engine fighter aircraft, smaller in comparison to the F-22. There have been speculations as to which one the J-20 will be modelled around and the pictures now suggest that it is closer in appearance to that of the F-22. Some reports suggest that J-20 is possibly and larger and heavier than the Russia T-50 or the US F-22.11 The large size indicates the ability to carry heavy weapon load as well as the long range of the aircraft.

The US, which has stopped the production of the expensive F-22 Raptor, preferring the cheaper F-35, may now be confronted with a new rival. Given the size of the new stealth fighter, as mentioned before, it appears closer to the F-22 and therefore the Chinese test-flight of the J-20 will likely trigger some re-thinking within the US defence community. F-22 is far superior to the F-35 and the Pentagon may be forced to re-start the production, which was halted in 2009 after the originally produced 187 were given to the US Air Force. Although both are of the current generation, the F-22 is clearly a superior fighter that ensures air superiority whereas F-35 is intended primarily as a ground attack aircraft. One such analyst commented that there could be a new consensus developing for "the resurrection of the F-22."12

There are important implications for Asian countries that look at these developments with wariness. Japan, for one, has been arguing for an F-22 Raptor but had been asked by the US to settle for F-35. Analysts in Washington have argued that exporting F-22 stealth fighters could potentially impede the "strategically important Sino-US relations." Accordingly, Japan is believed to be developing its own stealth fighter, called Shinshin, meaning the heart of God. Japan had allocated about 8.5 billion yen in 2010 for the purpose. Japan plans to spend a total of a total of 39.4 billion yen for the fighter programme until the fiscal year 2015.13

It remains to be seen as to how India will respond to this latest development. New Delhi has already tied up with Moscow for the joint design and development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft and the Indian Air Force plans to induct into service 300 of them by 2017-18.14 Meanwhile, South Korea plans to speed up its procurement of an advanced fleet of stealth fighters, ready for induction anywhere between 2016 and 2020. The EADS Eurofighter jets, Lockheed F-35 and the Boeing F-15 are in the fray for the Korean order.15

Whether the J-20 matches the F-22 or not, the Chinese flight-test has spot-lighted the spiralling arms race in Asia and beyond.

(Dr. Rajeswari Rajagopalan is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Security Studies, Observer Research Foundation)
________________________________________

1Reports in 2002 (Jane's Defence Weekly and New Scientist) talked about Shenyang Aircraft Corporation being selected for heading the R&D for the new fighter. An article later in Military Technology in 2006 brought out three designs - J-12 and J-14 by Shenyang Aircraft Corporation and J-13 by Chengdu Aircraft Corporation. For more details see, "China's 5th Generation Stealth Fighter Programme," Asian Defence News, October 12, 2010, available at http://asian-defence.blogspot.com/2010/10/chinas-5th-generation-stealth-fighter.html.
2Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
3Press Trust of India, "China Denies Stealing US Stealth Technology," Hindustan Times, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.hindustantimes.com/China-denies-stealing-US-stealth-technology/Article1-654833.aspx.
4The B-2 is a strategic, long-range stealth bomber capable of flying more than 6,000 miles without stopping for refuelling and has a carrying capacity of 40,000 pounds of conventional or nuclear weapons. For details on the espionage case, see Arun Kumar, "NRI Engineer of B-2 Bomber Gets 32 Years for Selling Secrets to China," NRI Internet, January 25, 2011, available at http://www.nriinternet.com/NRI_terrorist/USA/Noshir_Gowadia/Index.htm; and "Former B-2 Engineer Convicted of Selling US Secrets," New York Times, Associated Press, August 11, 2010, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C03EFDA1639F932A2575BC0A9669D8B63.
5Vago Muradian, "Stealth Compromised by Not Destroying F-117 Wreckage," Defense
6Daily, April 2, 1999, cited in Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), p. 119.
7Benjamin S Lambeth, NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment, (RAND: Santa Monica, 2001), pp. 119-20.
8Cited in Peter Lee, "The Tearful Origins of China's Stealth," Asia Times Online, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MA29Ad01.html. This account goes onto greater details as to how China took away critical components from the wreckage site. It said, "The navigation system, fuselage fragments with the Stealth coating, and high temperature nozzle components of the engine were spirited into the basement of the Chinese Embassy. Unfortunately, according to this story, there was a locator beacon inside the INU powered by a battery and, before the Chinese could discover and disable it, the US military was alerted to the location of the F-117 fragments and executed the [Chinese embassy] bombing."
9"Chinese Stealth Fighter Jet May Use US Technology," The Guardian (UK), Associated Press, January 23, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/23/china-stealth-fighter-us-technology.
10Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," The Wall Street Journal, January 05, 2001, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html.
11Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
12Reports suggest that the J-20 is about 75 ft long with a wingspan of 45 ft and weighs around 80,000 lb, without any external aid, indicating large size fuel tank. For details see, "China 'Leaks' Sneak Peek of its First Stealth Aircraft Going for A Test Run," Daily Mail, January 06, 2011, available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1344115/J-20-stealth-fighter-China-leaks-sneak-peek-latest-aircraft-test-run.html.
13Tony Capaccio, "Pentagon Still Learning China Stealth Jet Details, Morrell Says," Bloomberg, January 26, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-26/pentagon-still-learning-china-stealth-jet-details-morrell-says.html.
14For details see, Kosuke Takahashi, "Japan Frets over the US's F-22s," Asia Times, February 05, 2009, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/KB05Dh01.html; Dennis Sevakis, "Killing the F-22," American Thinker, April 11, 2009, available at http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/04/killing_the_f22.html.
15The idea of the joint production of the fifth generation fighter aircraft was reached in 2007 and the agreement was signed during the visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to New Delhi in December 2010. The fighter aircraft is jointly being developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited from India and the Sukhoi Design Bureau and Rosoboronexport from Russia.
16For details see, "S Korea to Speed Up Combat Fighter Purchase - Yonhap," Reuters, January 29, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/30/korea-defence-fighter-idUSTOE70T00720110130.

North Korean Crisis and China

Here's an article of mine on the North Korean crisis, looking specifically at the role of China. The article was published on the ORF website and can be accessed here.

China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?



North Korea appears to be in an aggressive mode with its second attack this year against South Korea, provoking the world at large, and certainly its neighbours, to respond. In March this year, Pyongyang had sunk the 1,200 ton South Korean corvette Cheonan in the Yellow Sea, which prompted the United Nations to issue a resolution condemning the incident, although it did not blame Pyongyang for the incident. This week Pyongyang shelled a South Korean fishing community and military base in Yeonpyeong, a disputed island, on Nov.23 with highly inflammable ammunition that killed four people, including two civilian construction workers, and blew the windows out of a school and torched houses. As of November 29, the US and South Korea had completed their third day of naval exercises off the Korean Peninsula’s west coast, although Seoul has cancelled the live firing drill at Yeonpyeong.

Meanwhile, Pyongyang has also clarified that it is pursuing its nuclear programme vigorously. It recently stated that it has a uranium-enrichment facility with thousands of centrifuges, to provide for a light water reactor, for “peaceful purpose of meeting electricity demand.” Quoting an editorial from the ruling communist party’s newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, media reports said, “Our nuclear energy development, which is for peaceful purposes and to solve the electricity demand, will be more active.” In fact, this was the first time that Pyongyang has openly talked about its nuclear programme. The existence of the modern enrichment facility was disclosed by Stanford University professor and scientist Siegfried S Hecker, who was given a tour of the site on November 12.1

What has prompted Pyongyang to adopt such hardline measures in the recent years? The “military-first politics” of Kim Jong Il, the expansion of DPRK military capabilities and its increasing defence budget continue to be an area of concern. Pyongyang has continued to argue that nuclear weapons and missiles along with their conventional capabilities are required as deterrents against possible South Korean, Japanese and American military aggression against North Korea. The North Korean leadership has also maintained that this is one possible way that it can get the international attention and that the world will engage it only under such conditions. This argument is difficult to sell anymore given that the international community, and the US in particular, have been engaged with Pyongyang on a bilateral basis as well as through the Six Party talks format.

Second, is there a message for the world that the new leadership in North Korea is as hardline as the old one? In fact, continuity can be visualised as far as Pyongyang’s future trajectory is concerned, given that Kim Jong Il chose the youngest son and not the older one (who is considered a peacenik) to carry on with the Kim Jong Il legacy in Asian affairs.

What has been the role of China in this regard? The Chinese interests, while they seem congruent on the surface with that of the US and other regional powers, are actually different and incongruent. For instance, the Chinese and American perspectives about the issue of North Korean stability are very different. For the regional powers as well as the US, what they want is a denuclearised North Korea at peace with its neighbours, and also a country that protects the human rights for its own people, whereas Chinese interests are to ensure that there is no crisis that might prompt the influx of large number of refugees into China and that there are no US troops on the Chinese borders, say if South Korea takes over the North after a collapse. Therefore, the Chinese interests are driven by narrower perceptions of North Korean stability.

Pyongyang has adopted a defiant attitude in its dealings with its neighbourhood, with the possible exception of Beijing. Beijing has become almost the only friend of the Kim Jong Il regime, extending the crucial economic, political and moral support. China remains North Korea’s largest trading partner as well as an important source of food, fuel and arms.2 Given that Pyongyang’s relations, particularly with Seoul, have declined drastically after the two nuclear tests, Beijing’s bargaining power with the North Korean leadership should have increased dramatically.

Some analysts argue that the US is dependent on China to put any serious pressure on North Korea. While this may be partly true, it is also possible that China has not put any serious pressure on North Korea because they see it as a buffer state between itself and the US allies in its neighbourhood. Second, with the US having been preoccupied with Iraq and Afghanistan, China has managed to create a vital strategic space in Asia, particularly as the US deals with problem cases like North Korea or Myanmar. In both of these cases, China has emerged as the conduit for any dealing, be it the democracy, human rights or the WMD proliferation issues. Therefore, China does not want to lose that privileged position where the West has to route itself through Beijing to achieve some of their foreign policy objectives.

However, some have argued that the West has overestimated the Chinese hold on North Korea and that Beijing is unable to exercise that kind of influence on Pyongyang. There are experts who note that China is beginning to reach a point of frustration with North Korea on three issues: its increasingly belligerent behaviour; growing economic crisis; and the leadership succession issues. The recently-released WikiLeaks too suggested that China may have been re-thinking its policy towards North Korea, although the Cheonan incident and the recent shelling incident have established that Beijing has not altered its policy towards North Korea. There have been undoubtedly subtle changes in the last few years in China’s approach towards Pyongyang, evident from the support lent by China in imposing sanctions on North Korea post-nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009.3 There were reports which noted that after the Cheonan incident, although China did not issue any action against North Korea despite strong evidence, President Hu Jintao is believed to have directed the leadership to be less provocative and avoid confrontations.4 Nonetheless, the subtle change that one witnessed is clearly reversible, which was evident in the recent crises.

Whether there is a change or not, China’s role in finding a solution to the North Korean crisis is critical. However, like any other country, China will get on board with an effective response only if it sees that its interests are affected or its interests can be served better by an active role. For China, there are three issues that could drive a more active role. As mentioned earlier, one of the major imperatives for China keeping Pyongyang as an ally is because it is a buffer state between the pro-west US-allies and Beijing. The Chinese have been paranoid about the US troops on its border. Second, in the case of any instability in North Korea or a serious conflict, there could be a huge refugee influx into China -- a nightmare scenario becoming a reality for Beijing. Lastly, any serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula can also weaken the Chinese standing and hurt its leadership, exposing its inability to deal with a problem successfully in its neighbourhood. This will seriously damage the image of the global leader-in-the-making.

In conclusion, China has to recognise the pitfalls of its approach as it deals with North Korea. China has to recognise that North Korean actions are triggering several developments that are not necessarily in the interests of China. For instance, it has triggered major debates on defence in Japan about becoming proactive in defending themselves, including the option of nuclearisation. Can a nuclearised East Asia be ruled out in the next decade if Pyongyang is to continue on the same path?

As India pushes east, so China worries ....

Here's the link to a story on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's Japan visit by Peter Brown. The story, quoting me, is appearing in tomorrow's Asia Times.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

For the full story, click here.



As India pushes east, so China worries
By Peter J Brown

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's trip to Japan in late October was a success, but not a complete success. Thanks to Japan's fundamentally pacifist worldview and rigid take on nuclear cooperation, the outcome was somewhat underwhelming.

Real damage might have been done if Manmohan and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan had decided to forego an annual summit they have held since 2005, rather than announce a comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) after making little headway in firming up strategic and civil nuclear cooperation issues during the annual cycle of discussions between the two countries.

"With a Strategic Partnership being declared - in 2006 - a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation being issued, and an Action Plan related to the Joint Declaration thereafter being issued almost in successive years, expecting another deliverable of the magnitude of the previous ones to be pulled out of the hat - or turban - again this year is tantamount to placing an overly high threshold of expectation," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

Expectations matter, but above all else, this trip and its limited agenda might have been a strong indicator of the nature of a rapidly maturing relationship. There could be little doubt that, regardless of what other positive moves the meeting held for the bilateral relationship, the participants were pleased by the fact that approximately one quarter of the allotted time was devoted to the topic of how best to deal with China.

"Most of all, India wanted further Japanese foreign direct investment especially in infrastructure, and technological assistance on nuclear power plants, along with [some sign that they were] reaffirming their mistrust against China," said Yukie Yoshikawa, a senior research fellow at the Edwin O Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies in Washington DC.

In response to Japanese concerns that it has been slower than other countries to capitalize on the opportunities that India's rapidly growing economy presents, India was quite willing to make important concessions in the process.

"Japan fears it is already a late comer into the Indian market. Japan has been slow in signing a free-trade agreement with India, and some companies already investing in India, including Suzuki, were dying to have the EPA approved," said Yoshikawa. "The [Japanese government] should be very pleased by India's strategic decision to of drop agricultural products for Japan. India compromised with Japan to exclude rice, and wheat [as well as other products] from the EPA."

To Professor Kazuto Suzuki of Hokkaido University's School of Public Policy, the summit provided a positive reflection of the steady overall improvement in ties between the two nations.

"It was good meeting and there was a good advancement of the relationship - not the best though," Suzuki said.

Beijing was watching the proceedings closely because if both the establishment of an EPA and the conclusion of nuclear deal had taken place during Manmohan's visit, the impact on China would have been substantial. Especially so given that the heated showdown between Japan and China over the fishing boat seizure near disputed islands claimed by Japan, China and Taiwan is still simmering.

"From a Chinese point of view, these strengthening ties between Japan and India represent nothing less than an effort to contain China - something that has yet to be accomplished completely," said Suzuki, who added that the initiation of institutionalized military and security cooperation between India and Japan that has been underway since 2008 means that Japan and India have formed "a semi-alliance" which is reinforced "by regular 2+2 meetings and military cooperation at all levels".

Gupta poured some cold water on the notion that this series of bilateral discussions is gaining momentum at a rapid enough pace and in such a way that might cause Beijing to think seriously about taking decisive moves to counter this trend.

"Going forward, there might be grounds for creeping doubt as to how fast this bilateral relationship will proceed under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) PMs, [former Japanese prime minister Yoshiro] Mori and [his successors], had been the decisive driving force behind Japan's new outreach to India - and each LDP PM's degree of emphasis on Indo-Japanese ties bore a relative correlation with his anti-China [or pro-China] inclinations. That dynamic is not readily apparent in the DPJ," said Gupta.

It is possible that the DPJ contains an invisible dividing line which seems generational when it comes to Japan's relations with India.
"The older generation including [former premier Yukio] Hatoyama, [former DPJ leader Ichiro] Ozawa particularly, and Kan - privately perhaps too - who take a more autonomist view of Japanese geopolitical strategy, had a place for India," said Gupta. "The younger generation including [Foreign Minister Seiji] Maehara .... [DPJ deputy secretary general Yukio] Edano .... even as they hold hawkish views on China, developed their worldviews at a time when India's image was at its poorest during the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Hence they are not altogether sold on the India strategic connection."

This younger group certainly does not dismiss its importance, but simply prefers to place more emphasis on building Japan's strategic ties with allies positioned closer to Japan.

"India is beneath the radar in their scheme of things. But this is all very tentative and preliminary, and time will tell how this dynamic within the DPJ plays out in terms of India-Japan relations in the coming years," said Gupta.

How India goes about cultivating its vital relationship with the 10 countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will also affect its relationship with Japan.

"India's most common refrain on Asian security architecture issues is that it be 'open, balanced and inclusive'. For it to turn out to be such, India's obligation is to participate within its processes, engage actively with all stakeholders, carry its share of the burden, and not be an irritant in the mix,'' said Gupta, ''ASEAN is a key shareholder in this dynamic and for India, a gateway too to its East Asian destiny - hence the low key but utterly concentrated effort on New Delhi's part to get this relationship right."

Gupta described the signing of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Agreement last year as "a big deal", and the same is true of New Delhi's decision to invite President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia, Southeast Asia's biggest economy, to be the honored guest at India's forthcoming annual Republic Day parade.

As part of its Look East policy, India sees these relationships as an important bridge to East Asia. ''A more robust economic engagement with Malaysia, ASEAN and Japan will provide strategic ballast down the line," said Gupta.

South Korea will certainly play an important role here and both Japan and India agree that better coordination is in order. They also zeroed in on what to do about Japanese allegations (denied by Beijing) that China is holding back on exports of the rare earth minerals that are a crucial ingredient for their hi-tech industries.

"It was significant that the two PM's mentioned an India-Japan dialog on Africa on foreign policy and security issues. We all know what has prompted such a dialog. Rare earths supply problems were also discussed along with potential cooperation in developing technologies to mitigate the problem," said Subrata Ghoshroy, a research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Program in Science, Technology, and Society.

However, China has nothing whatsoever to do with the chronic differences affecting Tokyo and New Delhi on the nuclear front, where India and the United Stated last year pledged closer civilian nuclear cooperation.

"Japan was not enthusiastic about the US-India nuclear deal and gave it grudging support toward the end. Japan is also concerned about the status of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as can be surmised from the joint vision statement issued during the Indian PM's visit," said Ghoshroy. "Singh did not directly mention India's stance on the CTBT and reiterated India's 'unilateral moratorium' on nuclear testing."

In the end, the only thing really holding up completion of the nuclear deal was the nuclear test clause.

"If an Indian test yields a nuclear explosion, then Japan would halt all cooperation with India," said Suzuki. "PM Singh did not commit to a halt in nuclear testing, but he mentioned that there will be no planned test for a moment. This is good enough for Japan."

Regarding the India-Japan nuclear cooperation agreement, it appears that there are still outstanding issues.

"It is interesting to note that India has speedily concluded a nuclear agreement with South Korea, while the Japan deal is on a sticky wicket," said Ghoshroy. "Unlike South Korea, France, or Russia with which India has easily concluded such deals, Japan does not sell reactors. It does not have an overwhelming economic driver behind the nuclear trade."

India cannot be pleased that Japan has been so slow to come aboard as a willing supporter of its nuclear program.

"There have been three rounds of negotiations and while there is appreciation of the Japanese concerns - Japan being the only victim of nuclear weapons - India has made it clear that it cannot become party to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "There has been a slightly modified position on CTBT wherein the prime minister has stated India will consider signing the treaty provided the US and China ratify it. It appears that it will take several rounds of negotiations before the two sides can reach any compromise on this issue."

On the issue of nullifying the agreement if India carries out a nuclear test, New Delhi is not willing to make an exception in its terms and references for Japan alone.

"India has insisted that India will use the same terms and references as it did in its agreements with other countries - US, Russia, France and Canada," said Rajagopalan.

The national security dimension of this situation may not get overlooked entirely, but it is often downplayed by observers.

"The national security dimension will remain critical in India's negotiations not just with Washington, but with other capitals as well - Tokyo, Canberra, Paris or Moscow. It is indeed this national security dimension that has restrained India from accepting the conditions imposed by Tokyo," said Rajagopalan.

While these stubborn nuclear obstacles persist, there are strong imperatives for both India and Japan to cooperate not just economic and commercial issues, but more importantly on security issues, particularly those in the maritime realm, given the challenges that both New Delhi and Tokyo are facing.

"The Look East policy is an important component of India's foreign policy which is likely to acquire special significance in the coming years. Given the belligerent approach of China towards all of its neighbors including Japan, and Vietnam, India is likely to pursue the Look East policy with much more vigor to consolidate its ties with both Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian countries," said Rajagopalan.

The very fact that both India and Japan have kept up with the annual summit meetings is a testimony to the importance that each side attaches to the bilateral relationship despite the change in Japanese leadership along with the change in ruling parties.

"The inability to conclude the civil nuclear agreement may be a shortcoming, although these are issues that cannot be hammered out in one or two meetings. The fact that the two sides are still keen to continue negotiations to iron out their differences is a positive indicator," said Rajagopalan.

As Manmohan departed Tokyo and flew onto Malaysia and Vietnam, he could not have ignored Kan's declining approval ratings just as he cannot overlook or ignore the changing political winds which are now affecting United States President Barack Obama as Obama is about to show up on his doorstep.

In the case of Kan in particular, the situation surrounding Russia's activities on the islands due north of Japan was a topic that Manmohan would have avoided despite the fact that Russia and India are longtime partners.

Russia ignored Japan's protests much to Kan's displeasure. This did not help Kan's ratings at all.

And Kan cannot offer to sell India any Japanese weaponry, including submarines and electronic warfare gear, until the strict ban on the export of Japanese weapons is lifted. Besides, India and Russia are jointly building state-of-the-art missiles and new warplanes are appearing on the drawing board, while US defense contractors are eager to see their advanced aircraft parked aside India's runways. Perhaps painfully slow nuclear bargaining may be Kan's only option, hypothetically anyway.

While Kan and Obama have exerted their influence over India's future, Kan is not guaranteed at least two more years in office like Obama. And at the same time, Obama who has made a big deal out of his administration's endorsement of closer US ties to Asia and who has applied considerable energy to improved relations with India is no longer guaranteed a vote of confidence, nor is it a blank check from the US Congress.

And important members of his team including US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates who has held the line on US bases in Okinawa will soon be heading out the door. Some have already left.

As anti-Chinese sentiment in the halls of the US Congress is likely to intensify, and as it becomes more noticeable in the coming weeks, the challenge for Manmohan will be to harness this energy to India's and Japan's advantage - and at Pakistan's expense. Not doing so during Obama's upcoming state visit to India will simply be a matter of common sense and diplomatic courtesy.

That is, after all, a strategic plan that is sound and applicable only if Manmohan has concluded that stronger ties to the US under the current rules will benefit rather than hinder India over time.

Manmohan will soon sort this all out. In the meantime, he is signaling to China that Look East is alive and well.