India Must Keep Its Eye on the China Challenge in Modi’s Second Term - The Diplomat, June 20, 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I focused on Modi 2.0 and China. I argue that in Modi’s second term, India needs to be pragmatic and cleareyed about the challenge that Beijing poses for its interests.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is back in office for a second term with an even bigger mandate. But this also means that the expectations on him to deliver are that much greater, and foreign and defense policy are no exceptions to this. As New Delhi deals with a range of priorities, it will be important to keep an eye on its China challenge in the coming years.

For the full essay, click here.



On the foreign and security policy front, India faces several different challenges, from cross-border terrorism and insurgencies of varying magnitude to the rise of China. Ensuring a stable and secure neighborhood is, rightly so, an important priority for the new government, as has been evident even at the swearing-in ceremony of the Modi government (during his first swearing-in in 2014, Modi had invited the SAARC leaders, and, for his second one, the BIMSTEC leaders were invited as guests). Terrorism is also a critical issue given Pakistan’s behavior. In his address at the 5th CICA Summit in Dushanbe last week, new Minister of External Affairs S. Jaishankar said terrorism was “the gravest threat that we face in Asia today.”

Even though neighborhood and terrorism priorities are important, India also faces a serious strategic challenge from China. But on this front, New Delhi appears to be getting carried away by China’s efforts to woo India against the backdrop of Beijing’s growing trade frictions with Washington. As a scholar of the Indo-Pacific recently noted, “With Washington full of anti-China sentiment and an Indo-Pacific Strategy to match, prying India away from the US becomes increasingly important geostrategically for Beijing. And it’s doing pretty well so far—Wuhan spirit/reset has lasted over a year now.”

Modi’s foreign policy approach as far as China is concerned appears to be immersed in the 2018 Wuhan Summit. He is now preparing for a follow-up informal summit in Varanasi later in the year. On the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit, Modi held a separate bilateral meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, where Modi remarked “There has been much improvement in our relations since [the] Wuhan Informal Summit. We have also become sensitive to each other’s interests and concerns. We are also showing better understanding of each other’s stance.”

Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Keshav Gokhale, briefing the media on the bilateral meeting, said that the meeting was a brief one but “very substantive and the atmosphere was very positive.” He underlined the fact that the Wuhan spirit was very much there and this is the beginning of a series of meeting between the two leaders, with the next meeting slated to be on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Japan. The two leaders will also meet for the BRICS Summit later in the year.

So far, Jaishankar’s induction as India’s foreign minister appears to have had little impact on India’s China policy. Certainly, China has been smart at throwing a few bones in India’s direction in a timely fashion, with China’s change of heart with regard to Masood Azhar just before the Indian elections being one case in point. It appears that there was a quid pro quo, possibly on the Belt and Road Initiative. While India is still opposed to it on account of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), New Delhi appears to have softened its criticism. According to one Indian news report, India agreed not to raise objections to BRI in return for China dropping its hold on adding Azhar to a UN terrorism-based sanctions list.

In the face of the changing global balance of power dynamics, India’s foreign policy challenges will get even more daunting. But India’s foreign policy has to approach national security considerations with utmost pragmatism. New Delhi must realize that it has few long-term common interests with China, and that partnering with Beijing even for short-term gains carries considerable risks.

Significance of the changing space security landscape for India - The Financial Express, June 18, 2019

In yesterday's Financial Express, I have a piece looking at the significance of the changing space security landscape for India.

Asian space landscape is changing. China’s recent launch of a rocket from a ship, India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test and the establishment of a tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA) are quite significant. But even accounting for this, India’s plans appears to be quite dramatic. Last week, India announced that it will be conducting a table-top war game called the “IndSpaceEx” with all the stakeholders including its scientific establishment and the military.



The war game, according to reports, is meant to give a better understanding of the new and emerging space security challenges in outer space which will aid India in developing appropriate capabilities to protect its interests. India has been concerned about the worsening space security scenario for a while now. The first successful Chinese ASAT test in January 2007, an inherently destabilising act, and with the growing sophistication of the Chinese military space capabilities are serious concerns.

India’s framing of its policy since 2007, whether by the scientific, military and even the political establishment, has been ambiguous. Even as there are concerns around space militarisation and the increasing trends towards weaponisation of space, India has come to appreciate the need for a more nuanced approach to space security in recent years. This recognition pushed India to conduct the ASAT test in March. Subsequently, India has taken the final steps to establish the DSA.

This new approach has not been easy for India. India has always maintained that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes alone. But the changing nature of warfare, with the increasing integration of outer space into conventional military operations, has proved to be a critical impetus for India to change its tack. Traditionally, the use of space assets for passive military applications such as surveillance and intelligence has been considered acceptable but given the networked nature of warfare, there is an increasing reliance on space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). Given this growing dependence on space for such functions, there are similarly growing vulnerabilities, with some states developing assets to interfere with, disrupt or damage space assets. In this context, while ASATs are destabilising, the development of counter-space capabilities including cyber and electronic warfare means to target space assets are worrisome. Also, terrestrial geopolitics is beginning to have an important bearing on how outer space affairs are conducted. A domain that remained relatively peaceful for decades is seeing greater competition and there are signs of a budding arms race in outer space, which India cannot afford to ignore.

After sitting on the margins for long, India has now begun to respond to these new realities in space security. India’s ASAT test, for instance, was an effort to establish credible space deterrence. But states have still not adopted deterrence within the space domain and there is time to prevent it from happening. The three other states that have demonstrated ASAT capabilities have not operationalised them yet. This offers states an opportunity to change course before it’s too late.

Nevertheless, as Ashley Tellis has argued, it was evident that the Indian ASAT test was aimed at China, which also means that it is likely to accelerate the pace of competition between the two and India needs to prepare for the long haul. India will need to improve its institutional architecture in order to have better coordination among the Department of Space, Ministry of Defence and the military. The first step in this regard was the creation of the Integrated Space Cell within the Integrated Defence Headquarters a decade ago but the establishment of the DSA is more welcome. Additionally, the government will be putting in place a Defence Space Research Organisation (DSRO), akin to the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The DSRO is meant to be doing the research and development in terms of the capability requirement on the space security side, whereas the DSA will be responsible for the policy and strategy affecting the space security dynamics. Another important step for the government to do is to declare a space policy in the open domain. This cannot be a sector-specific, like the SATCOM policy, but it has to be an all-encompassing one, issued possibly by the Prime Minister’s Office.

While these internal steps are much needed, India should play an active role and grab the opportunity to shape the global rules of the road for two reasons. One, this will strengthen India’s global governance credentials in the outer space domain. As a spacefaring state with growing reliance on outer space for a number of different functions, it makes both economic and strategic sense. Two, with India taking the lead, it can ensure that the rules that get formulated are comprehensive and inclusive to include the interests of India and other developing states. India championing the case of other developing states’ interests will also have multitude indirect benefits.

A First: India to Launch First Simulated Space Warfare Exercise - The Diplomat, 12 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian government's plans to conduct the first simulated space warfare exercise called the IndSpaceEx in July. Reports of a tabletop wargame speak to India’s ongoing efforts to develop its space policy.

The Indian government appears to be getting ready to conduct a table-top war game called “IndSpaceEx” involving all stakeholders including the military and the scientific establishment. The reports of such a development, which come against the backdrop of other key developments pertaining to outer space including the demonstration of India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), bear careful watching within the broader perspective of India’s space policy.



For India, space is a domain that has remained relatively peaceful for close to three decades, but is now changing because the nature of politics and competition in outer space is much more contested today. Terrestrial politics is casting a long and heavy shadow on outer space, and India could not have ignored these developments, of which China is just a part.

Along with the growing relevance of space to national security and conventional military operations, counter-space capabilities are also being developed in an effort to deny an adversary advantages by the use of space assets. The growth of counter-space capabilities including kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber means has sparked a fresh competition in outer space.

The increasingly contested nature of space has been an impetus to India’s changing approach to outer space, moving from a purely civilian and peaceful approach to one where certain military characteristics are evident, conditioned by changing security realities. Militaries around the world have been emphasizing network centricity which in turn brings out the salience of space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR), and as they have become more networked, they are also opening themselves up to more and more vulnerabilities, while anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have also added to the prospects for destabilizing scenarios in outer space.

India’s ASAT demonstration earlier this year was important in validating its deterrence capability. Meanwhile, the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), based in Bangalore, is an important institutional initiative that combines two key functions performed by the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre in Bhopal, representing the growing integration of India’s space capabilities.

Reports of the new wargame IndSpaceEx should be read as part of these wider developments. One of the reported goals of the IndSpaceEx, to be held towards the end of July under the Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence, is to gain a better understanding of the current and emerging challenges in the space security domain.

Another reason the wargame is also being undertaken to have a better appreciation of the capabilities that India must develop in order to protect its assets and secure its national interests. India has been growing mindful of the growing number of threats in outer space, both natural and man-made ones. While the global space competition between the key spacefaring powers is a well-known reality, New Delhi has worries about the counter-space capabilities in China’s inventory.

Such wargames are not uncommon. Indeed, think-tanks and governments in all the major spacefaring countries have conducted table-top and simulation exercises to understand space security crisis dynamics, major vulnerabilities and capability gaps during conflict. These could then feed into policy making. For instance, among the think-tank community in the outer space domain, the Secure World Foundation and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (both based in the United States) as well as the Observer Research Foundation have engaged in several such exercises.

These exercises were done to understand crisis dynamics including decision-making processes, the attainment of national objectives, the changing nature of warfare, and the influence and impact of emerging technologies. Even when these exercises were played with a space security focus, the results have been revealing. For instance, the ORF simulation exercise (SIMEX) conducted over three years has seen remarkable conclusions. Still, states have resisted carrying out attacks on outer space assets due to the fear of escalation.

The Indian government’s proposed war gaming exercise appears to have a slightly narrower agenda in terms of understanding the vulnerabilities and the gaps in India’s space security and identifying areas for India to develop and strengthen in terms of technological capabilities in order to establish effective deterrence capabilities. China has been the single most important factor shaping India’s approach to space. The growing sophistication of its military space program, including the recent launch of a rocket from a ship, is significant.

Clearly, efforts like the IndSpaceEx are important to determine the degree of the space security challenges India faces and to develop appropriate measures for effective deterrence. But India must step up its efforts to develop global rules and norms about such challenges and threats. While India must continue working towards all-encompassing legally-binding instruments such as the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the rising specter of threats means that more pragmatic and feasible measures should also be attempted because these could see more broad-based support among states. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India is in an ideal place to demonstrate its global governance credentials.

What Does the New 2+2 Dialogue Mean for the India-Japan Relationship? - The Diplomat, 8 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the recently announced 2+2 Dialogue between India and Japan and how this will further the relationship. I believe the new mechanism holds significance not only within bilateral ties, but for Indian foreign policy and the region more generally.

India and Japan have agreed to hold a two-plus-two dialogue between the defense and foreign ministers of the two countries. This will take place ahead of the summit-level meeting between Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe later in the year.

The decision is no doubt a significant one, both within India-Japan relations and Indian foreign policy more generally. So far, India had engaged in such a dialogue format at this level only with the United States, the inaugural edition of which was held in September last year. But India’s new foreign minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, and his Japanese counterpart, Taro Kono, took the decision to set this new mechanism up during a recent telephone conversation.

The concept is by no means new – the idea of establishing a two-plus-two dialogue between India and Japan was visible during the summit meeting between Modi and Abe during the former’s visit to Tokyo in October 2018. The joint statement issued following the summit meeting said that the two leaders had reiterated their “desire to further deepen bilateral security and defense cooperation and institute [a] Foreign and Defense Ministerial Dialogue (2+2)” in addition to existing institutional arrangements including the Annual Defense Ministerial Dialogue, Defense Policy Dialogue, the National Security Advisers’ Dialogue.

For the full essay, click here.



The upcoming Foreign and Defense Ministerial Two-Plus-Two Dialogue reflects the growing special relationship between India and Japan, which is driven by a number of factors including the desire to create an Asian strategic framework that is free, fair, and inclusive. The call for such a framework has become louder against the backdrop of increasingly muscular behavior by China. The more confrontational China becomes, the more willing countries like India are to play the balance of power games in Asia and beyond.

Traditionally, India has resisted taking sides in great power competition. But that option is becoming increasingly difficult. New Delhi has been compelled to astutely choose its strategic partners in order to strengthen its strategic maneuverability.

The India-Japan strategic partnership goes back a number of years. The two countries began a two-plus-two dialogue at the level of foreign and defense secretaries (not ministers) almost a decade ago in 2010. This dialogue was mandated by the Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation concluded between the two countries in December 2009. Key issues discussed under this format include maritime, cyber, and outer space security.

However, Japan’s engagement with India goes back much longer. As one recent report pointed out, Japan has played an important role in developing India’s infrastructure. India is one of the largest recipients of Japan’s Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) loans since 2003, even if trade and investment levels are still modest. But in an era of strategic uncertainties driven by shifting global and Asian power dynamics, India and Japan have felt the need to strengthen their defense and security linkages.

One of the primary objectives for both New Delhi and Tokyo is to prevent the rise of a unipolar Asia dominated by one single hegemonic power. It is this political objective that has been driving the relationship and the new two-plus-two dialogue will strengthen it further, especially the security relationship between New Delhi and Tokyo.

Some aspects of this offer much promise. One such facet is military exercises, with the first joint exercise between the armies and air forces of the two countries taking place last year. On the other hand, the defense trade relationship has not seen much traction as yet. The Japanese offer of the US-2 amphibious aircraft to India is just one case in point: despite much expectation, this deal appears dead. Japan is not a major arms exporter, and the Indian military services have little experience in buying Japanese equipment. In addition, India’s notoriously difficult arms procurement process is also likely to be a hindrance.

But Japan does have a technologically advanced arms industry and it is possible that India could tap into it in order to make up for its own weaknesses in critical areas. Another area where Japan could help is with submarines: India was reported to have been interested in buying Japanese submarines, though Tokyo did not appear keen. The two-plus-two dialogue could possibly give a political push to future arms sales.

Part of the reason for the growing strategic partnership between India and Japan is that it comes with no negative baggage in either country. In India, in particular, a security partnership with Japan carries none of the connotations or controversies that continue to dog a partnership with Washington. On the other hand, this partnership by itself will not suffice to achieve the kind of Asian balance that both sides desire.

What Does the Rise of Asia’s Space Forces Mean? - The Diplomat, June 4, 2019

A few days ago, I published a piece in The Diplomat understanding the implications of new space commands being established by key space powers.

While U.S. President Donald Trump’s release of Space Policy Directive-4 in February that enables the establishment of the U.S. Space Force received much focus in the way of headlines, this was hardly the first time that a military has set up a special branch for space operations. Indeed, there is a need to focus much more on what the significance of these moves means for Asian security and the implications of efforts to create space commands and forces.

For the full essay, click here.



First, the place to start is to acknowledge that several countries are establishing such special units. The U.S. space force is only the latest and so others are doing it as well. China established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, integrating the PLA space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, a key institutional innovation. Russia made similar institutional innovations with the Russian Space Forces in 2011 as part of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces meant for military space-related activities. India, similarly, appears also to be on the way to creating such a special space command.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that even though it sounds like a fighting force, the space force is mostly aimed to bring about greater integration of functions and the better coordination among different agencies involved. There is a need to pay greater attention to the details of these bureaucratic changes and innovations.

Third, it is necessary to be clear about what the details are in public policy discourse because alarmism can be negative too. The creation of space forces and commands does not necessarily mean we are on the cusp of states engaging in combat in outer space. We should be realistic about the limited nature of these efforts to date, even though we should not ignore development possibilities that may be more oriented toward actual combat in the future. The point is that we still have time to head off such dangerous developments.

Fourth, it is important to understand the varying rationales behind decisions to create these forces. For instance, the U.S. Space Force can be seen as a result of the increasingly worsening security situation and a consequence of the great power politics. Outer space was largely unaffected by terrestrial geopolitics for the first several decades of the space age, but in the last decade, this has changed. There are greater insecurities today and this has an impact on outer space too. We cannot ignore the political realities that are driving these developments, because they partly influence what we can do about it.

Fifth, we need to be clear about the dangers that stem from these developments. One danger is that more and more countries will follow this path and establish specialized space commands. As space begins to assume a more active role in the security and military operations including conventional ones, countries would seek greater coordination of their efforts and will end up establishing these specialized commands. The need for greater synergy in space activities is understandable, especially as outer space exploitation gets more important to welfare on the ground. But such coordination can also be possibly done by civilian agencies rather than military ones. We need to develop alternate models that do not ignore the need for greater coordination and synergy within governments, but without suggesting it can only be done under military commands.

A real danger is if this were to lead to a security dilemma between countries in outer space that spurs further development of space commands and forces. This is a danger especially because these new efforts are being led by military forces. The demonstration effect of some powers doing it, and the uncertainty of why they are doing it, will force others to imitate them. Even if no side wants it, we could end up having an arms race in outer space because of this. We should examine how this outcome can be prevented.

Sixth, we then need to look at a range of measures that can help us address these dangers. Greater dialogue and transparency can help, especially since these efforts are being driven by the need for greater coordination rather than the need to engage in military combat. Greater transparency and openness are the only possible solutions given the overall international security scenario and the nature of great power politics. Especially given that there might be an actual, understandable reason for setting up specialized coordination agencies, greater transparency might help avoid misunderstanding between the great powers.

Also, early effort is necessary to prevent more states from creating such space forces. It may still be possible to get some basic understanding between powers about what are the do’s and don’ts in creating such forces and commands. For example, to the extent that these are being driven by the need for greater national coordination, states could agree to put these efforts under civilian rather than military agencies. This could ensure that this effort at greater coordination does not get militarized.

All this is not to minimize the challenges posed by the growing security attention to outer space. But it is to suggest that for all the alarmism we have seen, there might still be time to head off a new security problem related to outer space. That requires greater attention to this problem, avoiding alarmism about space forces, and understanding and accepting the need for greater coordination within state agencies while at the same time creating some rules and norms to ensure that these efforts do not become militarized. Such a balanced approach can help us maximize the opportunities and minimize the challenges in this area in the coming years.

Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge - The Diplomat, May 24, 2019

In the last week's column for The Diplomat, "Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge", I examined the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear risks that need to be addressed much more directly.

Conversations around nuclear risks and the need for strategic stability have picked up momentum in the run up to the 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Nuclear risks are changing for the worse because of geopolitical and technological changes, but the latter, in particular, needs to be addressed much more directly.

As far as the geopolitical dynamics are concerned, the shift in the global balance of power equations has meant that rulemaking and enforcement have become the victims of great power politics because both rulemaking and enforcement require some consensus among powers. But a second significant factor should be noted that could also lead to possible breakdown in nuclear deterrence: The impact of new technologies.

Emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons, among others, are posing new questions to the traditional understanding of stability and deterrence. These emerging technologies are unfortunately not being discussed enough within Track 1 NPT platforms as directly as they should be. It can, however, be argued that these new technologies could increase regional and global nuclear insecurities and therefore it is necessary to discuss this more seriously in order to manage the risks associated with nuclear weapons.

For the full article, click here.



The development of hypersonic weapons could potentially have a big impact on nuclear stability. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the possibility of surprise attacks because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. They thus present the possibility of offering a temptation to attack first in the hope of decapitating the enemy leadership or even destroying second-strike nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Even if states do not plan such attacks, the fear that they may do so could drive potential targets to develop riskier nuclear operational plans, such as launch on warning.

Alternatively, it could also spur nations with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as China, to increase the size of their nuclear forces so that at least some survive such a first strike. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers, all of whom are working on developing these weapons.

An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability because of the discrimination problem. It is more stable if early warning systems can clearly distinguish between a nuclear attack and a conventional one. If the same system can undertake both conventional strikes and nuclear attacks, a prudent defense system will have to assume that any attack it detects is a nuclear attack because the risks of assuming the alternative will be too high. Though this is a problem that is not confined to hypersonic weapons, the combination of the risk of a first strike combined with the discrimination problem makes the danger particularly acute.

Another evolving technology is Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which also has similar problems. Nuclear deterrence and stability are based on mutual vulnerability, and BMDs threaten to undo this key source of stability, with unpredictable consequences. This is not a new problem of course: the fear that one side might develop a strategic technological advantage was one reason for the Cold War U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. It might be time to revisit the possibility of developing a wider ABM treaty-like instrument in order to avoid a larger technology arms race as ballistic missile defense technologies slowly improve.

A third area is outer space, which Russia has been raising repeatedly in the NPT platforms. The increasing use of and reliance on space for national security missions has led states to develop counter-space capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy space systems. These include both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

Counter-space capabilities such as anti-satellites (ASAT) add an inherently destabilizing dimension to outer space security. But these are also a problem for nuclear stability because nuclear early warning as well as command and control systems depend on space-based assets far more today than a few decades ago. While these are not new capabilities – the United States and Soviet Union had conducted several ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s – the greater reliance on space assets increases nuclear vulnerabilities.

The NPT faces myriad problems, of course, and many will be discussed in the coming deliberations. But these emerging technologies represent a danger that should not be minimized in the debates about how much has been achieved, whether all sides have lived up to their end of the NPT bargain (especially nuclear weapons states), and how to proceed forward.