Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Set to Enter Into Force - The Diplomat, 5 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat in November, I looked at the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that is set to enter into force in January 2021.  But the key question I asked is if it will matter.  

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), or the Nuke Ban Treaty, is set to enter into force soon. In 2016, the U.N. General Assembly, through resolution 71/258, decided to hold a conference for the negotiation of the treaty. The conference took place in March 2017. The treaty was subsequently adopted by a vote with 122 states in favor (with one vote against and one abstention) at the United Nations on July 7, 2017 and was opened for signature by the U.N. Secretary General on September 20, 2017.  When Honduras ratified the treaty in late October, it reached the requisite 50 ratifications, and is set to enter into force on January 22, 2021.  

For the full post, click here.  

The TPNW contains provisions that prohibit states from participating in any nuclear weapons-related activities including development, testing, possession, stockpile, use, or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Signatories are required “to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited under the TPNW undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.”  

While this is commendable on its own, the efficacy of the treaty is questionable because none of the current nine nuclear-armed states support the treaty or have signed it.  The United States in a recent letter sent to signatories of the TPNW stated that the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council — the P-5 countries, who also happens to be the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) — and NATO allies “stand unified in our opposition to the potential repercussions” of the treaty. In fact, the only NATO country that took part in the negotiations was the Netherlands but due to its NATO commitments, it voted against the treaty when it came up for adoption. 

The letter from the United States went on to add that the TPNW also “turns back the clock on verification and disarmament and is dangerous” to the NPT. Urging the signatories to walk out of the treaty, the letter further said that while these states have the sovereign right to determine whether to become parties to and ratify the treaty, “we believe that you have made a strategic error and should withdraw your instrument of ratification or accession.” 

The day when the treaty was opened for signature at the U.N., the United States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a joint statement slamming the treaty, saying it “risks undermining the existing international security architecture which contributes to the maintenance of international peace and security,” and that all states “share a common responsibility to protect and strengthen our collective security system in order to further promote international peace, stability, and security.”  

Countries like India, which have opposed the treaty. also made their positions clear.  While responding to a query on the Indian position on the treaty, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson said that it “did not participate in the negotiations… Also, none of the other States possessing nuclear weapons participated in the negotiations.” It had also voted against a U.N. General Assembly resolution in 2019 welcoming the adoption of the treaty. Earlier in 2016, it abstained from voting on the U.N. General Assembly resolution that gave the formal mandate for states to start the treaty negotiations.  

Much of Asia and the Middle East also remains outside of the TPNW. Ratification of the treaty by just 50 state parties still means that there is a sizeable number of countries that remain outside the TPNW. The International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has engaged in an effort to name and shame states that are not party to TPNW, but how effective that effort will be remains to be seen.  

Without the support of the nuclear armed states, it may not be possible to promote nuclear disarmament. Beyond nuclear-armed states, even those states such as Japan that are under the extended U.S. nuclear umbrella may be somewhat reluctant to support the TPNW.  While prestige may remain a factor in countries’ decision to pursue nuclear weapons, security considerations may not entirely be absent. These considerations should not be allowed to prevent progress on nuclear disarmament, of course, but treating such concerns as serious may help move the conversation in a more helpful direction than simply preaching or castigating such states. 

There are also complications that arise from the relationship of the TPNW to the NPT.  The NPT also includes obligations toward nuclear disarmament, though these obligations have not been seriously addressed by the nuclear weapon states. Some believe that the nuke ban treaty undermines the importance of the NPT as the foundation of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Gustavo Zlauvinen, president-designate of the 2020 Review Conference for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) raised questions about the effectiveness of the TPNW saying that it cannot challenge the “legitimacy of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” 

In a recent interview to Kyodo News, he said, “You can’t have nuclear disarmament without the nuclear weapon states in that system. And that’s why, for the time being, the only treaty that has been accepted by at least five nuclear weapon states, that includes obligations on nuclear disarmament, is the NPT.” He added that there exists a “huge difference” between the NPT and the TPNW and that the TPNW should not “erode the validity and the legitimacy of the NPT.” He also feared that this will be “another issue of contention” at the upcoming review conference. Maintaining the significance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, he added that “I believe that once the TPNW reaches numbers similar to the NPT, and obviously includes the signature and ratifications of nuclear weapon states, then probably we can talk about that new treaty being another pillar of the regime.”  

Although the TPNW is the realization of a long and dedicated struggle by civil society activists and some states, the history of previous such efforts are not encouraging. For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) has done stellar work that led to the Land Mine Ban Treaty and for greater endorsement of the treaty globally, with the aim of banning landmines and cluster munitions. While the Mine Ban Treaty is often showcased as one of the more successful treaties with only 32 states outside the treaty, many critical states including the U.S., Russia, China, India, Iran, and Pakistan remain outside.  Their refusal to adhere to the treaty undermines its effectiveness, and there has been little pressure on these states to change their minds. This experience suggests the need for some caution about the TPNW. Addressing the critical problem of nuclear disarmament should fare better than that example.  

Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge - The Diplomat, May 24, 2019

In the last week's column for The Diplomat, "Managing Nuclear Risks: The Emerging Technologies Challenge", I examined the impact of emerging technologies on nuclear risks that need to be addressed much more directly.

Conversations around nuclear risks and the need for strategic stability have picked up momentum in the run up to the 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Nuclear risks are changing for the worse because of geopolitical and technological changes, but the latter, in particular, needs to be addressed much more directly.

As far as the geopolitical dynamics are concerned, the shift in the global balance of power equations has meant that rulemaking and enforcement have become the victims of great power politics because both rulemaking and enforcement require some consensus among powers. But a second significant factor should be noted that could also lead to possible breakdown in nuclear deterrence: The impact of new technologies.

Emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons, among others, are posing new questions to the traditional understanding of stability and deterrence. These emerging technologies are unfortunately not being discussed enough within Track 1 NPT platforms as directly as they should be. It can, however, be argued that these new technologies could increase regional and global nuclear insecurities and therefore it is necessary to discuss this more seriously in order to manage the risks associated with nuclear weapons.

For the full article, click here.



The development of hypersonic weapons could potentially have a big impact on nuclear stability. A key problem here is that such weapons can increase the possibility of surprise attacks because of the difficulty of detecting and countering them. They thus present the possibility of offering a temptation to attack first in the hope of decapitating the enemy leadership or even destroying second-strike nuclear retaliatory capabilities. Even if states do not plan such attacks, the fear that they may do so could drive potential targets to develop riskier nuclear operational plans, such as launch on warning.

Alternatively, it could also spur nations with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as China, to increase the size of their nuclear forces so that at least some survive such a first strike. This could lead to a destabilizing arms race spiral between key great powers, all of whom are working on developing these weapons.

An additional problem is that hypersonic weapons potentially blur the line between conventional and nuclear weapons, which will also increase instability because of the discrimination problem. It is more stable if early warning systems can clearly distinguish between a nuclear attack and a conventional one. If the same system can undertake both conventional strikes and nuclear attacks, a prudent defense system will have to assume that any attack it detects is a nuclear attack because the risks of assuming the alternative will be too high. Though this is a problem that is not confined to hypersonic weapons, the combination of the risk of a first strike combined with the discrimination problem makes the danger particularly acute.

Another evolving technology is Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), which also has similar problems. Nuclear deterrence and stability are based on mutual vulnerability, and BMDs threaten to undo this key source of stability, with unpredictable consequences. This is not a new problem of course: the fear that one side might develop a strategic technological advantage was one reason for the Cold War U.S.-Soviet ABM Treaty. It might be time to revisit the possibility of developing a wider ABM treaty-like instrument in order to avoid a larger technology arms race as ballistic missile defense technologies slowly improve.

A third area is outer space, which Russia has been raising repeatedly in the NPT platforms. The increasing use of and reliance on space for national security missions has led states to develop counter-space capabilities to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy space systems. These include both kinetic and non-kinetic means.

Counter-space capabilities such as anti-satellites (ASAT) add an inherently destabilizing dimension to outer space security. But these are also a problem for nuclear stability because nuclear early warning as well as command and control systems depend on space-based assets far more today than a few decades ago. While these are not new capabilities – the United States and Soviet Union had conducted several ASAT tests in the 1970s and 1980s – the greater reliance on space assets increases nuclear vulnerabilities.

The NPT faces myriad problems, of course, and many will be discussed in the coming deliberations. But these emerging technologies represent a danger that should not be minimized in the debates about how much has been achieved, whether all sides have lived up to their end of the NPT bargain (especially nuclear weapons states), and how to proceed forward.

Non-Proliferation Challenges in Asia: An Indian Perspective

This was subject of my presentation at a recent bilateral dialogue between ORF and a Russian think-tank.

While nuclear non-proliferation has remained a major challenge for more than sixty years, the enormity of the challenge has grown manifold particularly since the end of the Cold War. In the past where there was one major nuclear threat – US-Soviet rivalry and the threat of nuclear war – today the world is faced with other challenges – WMD proliferation, terrorism, with a special emphasis on nuclear terrorism. Today, the number of countries pursuing nuclear weapons has gone up significantly. It is particularly in this context that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) along with their delivery systems has become a major issue of concern. The threat is particularly loud and clear in India’s neighbourhood. Issues of China-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation, nuclear and missile activities of North Korea and Iran are of specific concern from an Indian perspective. Chinese proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology, including delivery mechanisms to North Korea, Pakistan and Iran has altered military balance in South Asia and beyond.

The paper is divided into three broad aspects. The first section of the paper provided a contextualisation to the developments taking place in Asia, wherein there is a major emphasis on military power, conventional or otherwise. This in particular dealt with the changing security environment that is feeding into these developments. The second outlined three major non-proliferation challenges in Asia – China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation; North Korea; Iran. The last section examines the Indian approach to proliferation and to each of these particular cases.

Having listed out particular crises, it has to be acknowledged that the biggest challenge is the crisis of confidence among major powers. The lack of consensus among major powers on agreeing a particular course of action has stood in the way of taking any effective action against these individual challenges and more importantly it has contributed to the weakening of the regime itself.

If anyone is interested in reading the full paper, I will be happy to mail it.



First, unless the major powers are able to reach a consensus on the challenges, there are going to be many more countries and entities that will exploit the weakness of the regime.

Second, importance and insufficiency of non-proliferation efforts based largely on technological control; supply side of the issue needs to be addressed. Technological controls or export control regimes or sanctions only let the hard-core countries buy time and invest domestic, dedicated talent towards weaponisation. These measures do not and cannot halt the programmes of the hard-core countries.

Third, as long as the P-5 members are not able to agree on a timeframe for nuclear disarmament, countries around the world are going to pursue these weapons. Under such a scenario, global disarmament appears to remain a pipe dream for the near future.

Disarmament Still A Talk Shop Topic

Here's the link to an article of mine on the recently concluded NPT Review Conference and how disarmament remains a distant dream for the near future.

As long as Asia continues in this vicious cycle of security and insecurity, the salience of nuclear weapons in the overall security calculus cannot diminish, which in a way indicates that nuclear weapons will continue to play a major role in the coming decades and the issue of disarmament remains a talk shop topic and not a reality.



NPT Review Conference 2010 was considered a success by many around the world, wherein 189 countries were able to finalize on a 28-page document that reiterated nuclear disarmament, the need to prevent “further proliferation of nuclear weapons,” as well as “preserving the [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] Treaty’s vital contribution to peace and security.” Some in India have not been happy with the mentioning of India in the final document which called upon India, Pakistan and Israel to sign the treaty as non-Nuclear Weapon States and to put nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of the IAEA. But, by and large, the bottom line was that the Treaty is a good thing and it is also a good thing to be a “Friend of the NPT.” However, on the issue of whether the conference was a step forward, there are different views, depending on what one wanted to achieve through this conference. Assuming that stopping horizontal proliferation was a major objective, the conference did not see much progress. There are not going to be any “rollbacks” nor can one predict with certainty that more countries will not go nuclear in the near future, before the next NPT Review Conference in 2015. Therefore, global disarmament is likely to remain a pipe dream for the near future.

If nuclear proliferation is really as big a problem as the US and others seem to believe, then greater attention needs to be paid to nuclear disarmament. This is one side of the story – the demand side of the problem: as long as nuclear weapons remain legitimate for some, others are bound to seek it also. And this is not just for reasons of prestige, as it has been made out in the case of India. The Cold War rivalry drove the US and Soviet arsenals, and thereafter, Chinese insecurities about the US, and subsequently the Soviet power drove the Chinese to develop their arsenal. That same chain reaction led to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. This quest is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. Even if overwhelming American military power manages to stem the tide of proliferation for the next several years, the inevitable (relative) waning of American power can be counted upon to lead to a new round of WMD proliferation. Indeed, the disparity in power between the US and the other powers itself is likely to spur other nations to seek nuclear weapons. For example, North Korea seems to have decided that the main lesson of the decade-long crisis over Iraq is that one cannot challenge the US without first acquiring nuclear weapons.

The non-proliferation fundamentalists of Washington have found it very convenient to assume and even conclude that states pursue nuclear weapons for purpose of prestige, since it then precluded them from looking at the real reasons for acquiring these weapons – security-related reasons. If Washington shifts its focus to security concerns as the key, then the reasonably correct conclusion would be that the process of proliferation is inevitable unless there is some serious drive towards nuclear disarmament, which is rarely paid the attention it requires. Instead, the global (Washington’s) focus has almost entirely been on the supply side of the question: how and why states acquire these capabilities and what capabilities they acquire. But there are other issues that need attention too.

First and foremost, there should be questions as to how the policies of the great powers have encouraged such acquisition; Pakistan’s acquisition/development of nuclear weapons is a good point to start with. Without American and Chinese acquiescence or assistance, neither Pakistan nor Israel could have acquired nuclear weapons. The logic of such actions suggests that a significant source of future proliferation could be the imperatives of great power politics. The US policy approaches tend to be very short-sighted. In order to make some quick, tactical gains, these critical issues are often ignored. The manner in which Pakistan-China nuclear proliferation was ignored so as to have Pakistan on board for its Cold War policies against the Soviet Union is a classic example.

Second, NPT has been instrumental in seeing that there is no horizontal proliferation, i.e., states other than the five “haves” do not become nuclear weapon states. There has been hardly any mention of vertical proliferation and the need to stem that as well. This mismatch has to be looked into and until then, there cannot be any genuine progress toward nuclear disarmament. This issue needs to be addressed even if regional weapon free zones are to become a reality. Though there has been significant reduction in American and Russian nuclear arsenals, they still have thousands of warheads each and, of course, the other three nuclear powers are not yet part of this nuclear arms control process.

Third, the world is moving towards increasing insecurity. As the Cold War ended, the world in general was expected to become a much more secure place with the disappearance of the two superpowers and their rivalries. However, post-Cold War stability has given way to increasing insecurity, which in turn has put greater emphasis on military modernization, including nuclear weapons, which further increases insecurity. The Asian scenario is a classic case of this. There are several contributing factors, including US unilateralism, particularly during the Bush Administration. Rising China with major military focus has also contributed to the rising insecurities in the region. Similarly, Russian insecurities and its responses to that insecurity as well as increasing adventurism by North Korea have been factors contributing to the securitization of Asia.

As long as Asia continues in this vicious cycle of security and insecurity, the salience of nuclear weapons in the overall security calculus cannot diminish, which in a way indicates that nuclear weapons will continue to play a major role in the coming decades and the issue of disarmament remains a talk shop topic and not a reality.

US-India Deal Clouds Nuclear Summit

Here's a link to a story on India-US Nuclear Deal and the Nuclear Security Summit by Peter Brown that has quoted me. The story appeared today (April 13) in Asia Times Online.

For India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who was on Sunday tapped by US President Barack Obama for his first major one-on-one meeting at the sidelines of this week's Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC, much has changed since his visit to the US capital last November.

The two-day summit, which is focusing on making atomic sites and materials safer from terrorists, comes after last week's release of the latest US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the signing in Prague of the US-Russia START nuclear arms control treaty. In May, there is also the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.



There are sub-plots to the US-India engagement, including the continuing dispute over Indian access to David Headley, the Mumbai terror suspect being tried in the US, relations with Pakistan and the situation in Afghanistan. Still, Singh's superb salesmanship is once again on display thanks to the US announcement in late March of a nuclear reprocessing agreement with India.

The deal will allow India to acquire spent nuclear fuel from the US, and as a result, places India in an elite group along with Japan and several European nations.

"At a time when overall relations have been under something of a cloud, the reprocessing agreement, and its timely completion, suggests that a bipartisan commitment at the highest levels of the US government on the single most consequential issue area in bilateral relations for New Delhi - high-technology trade - remains intact," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

This was billed as one of the expected outcomes of the broad "123 Agreement" - the name commonly used for the 2008 civilian US-India nuclear deal officially known as the US-India Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. But it has faced a barrage of criticism especially from domestic opponents in the US.

Unlike the new START treaty between Russia and the US, and the recent release of the NPR, the US-India deal has not captured everyone's attention as the curtain rises on the summit. Along with the summit's focus on the threat of nuclear terrorism, Iran and North Korea - though not officially on the agenda - are likely to feature heavily in Obama's talks with leaders.

In discussions with Chinese President Hu Jintao, Obama is likely try to cement China's commitment to pressuring Iran over its nuclear program through sanctions, as well as cool recent Sino-US tensions. The summit of 47 nations in Washington comes ahead of an alternative international nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran on April 17-18.

China has kept silent on the US-India nuclear reprocessing deal. The visit to China by India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna a fortnight ago may be one reason. China also advocates the right of all nations to pursue civilian nuclear programs and the peaceful uses of nuclear power in general. China probably prefers to mask its displeasure, since China will sit down with India again at the latest of the increasingly important BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) summits, to be held in Brasilia on April 16.

"From the day this agreement passed muster at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in September 2008 - despite their non-constructive role in the NSG at the time, Beijing has known that this was a done deal,'' said Gupta, referring the US-India nuclear reprocessing agreement. ''To their credit though, they have thereafter chosen to pursue their interest in somewhat stabilizing the political relationship with New Delhi, rather than publicly nurse their grievances about an arrangement that became the capstone of the US-India bilateral partnership."

While Beijing would like the US and the international community to accord a similar set of civilian nuclear arrangements to Pakistan, that is not going to happen, Gupta said. ''And Beijing is not likely to facilitate such bilateral cooperation either to the extent that it calls into question its treaty and norm-based commitments to the international non-proliferation regime."

On the other hand, China has taken the opportunity to send a strong signal both to India and the US via its critique of the NPR, which China's views as deliberately distorting China's nuclear intentions at time when the US's strategy involves surrounding China with nations that have rapidly evolving nuclear capabilities of their own.

"It is publicly known that the US once had hundreds of nuclear warheads aimed at China. Even today, it has numerous naval vessels deployed carrying nuclear weapons that can be retrained on China swiftly," said an editorial in China's Global Times newspaper in early April. "In Asia, China is surrounded by countries that have signed nuclear pacts with the US. It is the US, not China, that should provide more transparency regarding its nuclear intentions." [1]

The reference to "nuclear pacts" applies to both India and Japan equally.

"I wouldn't be happy if I were [President Jintao], but China is also to blame for not blocking the original Nuclear Security Group waiver for India which was approved by consensus," said Miles Pomper, senior research associate at the California-based James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. "Still, I am not sure how much it will affect the tone of the summit, which is more focused officially on dealing with nuclear terrorism and, on the sidelines, on dealing with Iran."

India walks away the clear winner here. The Obama-Singh meeting further reinforces the perception that the US wants to highlight its strong relationship with India no matter how strong this relationship might be at present, especially in India's eyes.

"It is not the reprocessing capability right now that is the danger. India had sufficient capability to reprocess material in its existing unsafeguarded reactor facilities to build upon its stockpile," said Pomper. "It is what the agreement says about the willingness of the US to stand up to India, particularly when it comes the possibility of an Indian nuclear test such as one that clearly shows ability to develop a two-stage thermonuclear weapon. That is what I would worry about if I were China."

Pomper said the real problem with the deal is that it gives India a better deal in terms of reprocessing rights from the US than both Japan, which is a non-nuclear state, and Euratom, which is a mix of European nuclear and non-nuclear states.

"Not to mention those countries are closer allies to the US as well," said Pomper. "Those deals laid out explicit criteria under which the US could suspend the agreement. The most important of which that is in Euratom's [deal], for example, but is missing from the India deal is if the other party tests a nuclear device. This seems to open the door to further Indian nuclear tests. Also missing is a provision that it could be suspended in the case of a safeguards violation by Euratom and that was missing from this [agreement]."

Yes, there is a provision that if the agreement is suspended for more than six months, the US will have to enter into consultations on compensating India for its loss, too.

"For India, this is too good to be true, but US negotiators seem to have a congenital predisposition to giving away the store when they negotiate with India," said Pomper.

India is not changing any of its previously held positions with respect to nuclear issues as a result of signing this agreement. It will not be signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty anytime soon, for example. The same is true for the NPT.

Gupta emphasizes that the assurances that India has given here are contained "mainly within the understandings that were reached during negotiation of the umbrella 123 Agreement.

"Though the 123 Agreement, as read, leaves a degree of ambiguity as to what are the criteria for termination (so as to make ratification, then, of the deal palatable in both legislatures), a private communication from the State Department to then-chairman Lantos of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in January 2008 - and presumably known to the Indian side - explicitly lays out these criteria," said Gupta. "They are: detonation of a nuclear weapon; material violation of the 123 Agreement; or violation or termination by New Delhi of its IAEA-negotiated safeguard agreement. These are assurances communicated by India."

Furthermore, as part of the arrangement and procedures of the March 2010 agreement, New Delhi has provided written bilateral undertakings on end-user guarantees as well as non-diversion of nuclear materials.

"All overseas-supplied reactors, fuel, as well as facilities reprocessing such irradiated fuel are also to remain under IAEA safeguards. The [arrangement and procedures] also specifically list the number of facilities to be covered and the procedure for 'consultation visits' to such facilities by US officials," said Gupta.
India is very firm and relishes engagement in tough negotiations. These US visits may occur only every five years, for example. India makes no excuses, and retains its consistent hard-edged approach both in bilateral and multilateral forums.

"As far as the CTBT is concerned, our position is very well-known. It has been reiterated on a number of occasions. We are committed to a voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. That remains our position. That has been very clearly articulated to all our friends and partners," said India's Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao in response to a question at a press conference in New Delhi in early April.

India played trump card after trump card in this instance. The US wanted only a single reprocessing facility in India, but India prevailed after citing the 123 Agreement, and in the end, multiple reprocessing facilities were approved.

"According to the final agreement, the reprocessing of spent fuel is meant to be done at two dedicated stand-alone facilities, with India allowed to make additions and modifications without going back to the US for additional negotiations," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, a senior fellow in security studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "In fact, India could take up the lead in setting up an international reprocessing center in India for the whole region. Such a facility could possibly aid Iran in getting reprocessed spent nuclear fuel for its civilian energy programs."

Iran will be a formal agenda item at the BRIC Summit for the first time. However, regardless of what does or does not happen in Brazil, the reprocessing agreement is behind schedule - and that it surfaced just before the Nuclear Security Summit is little more than a coincidence.

"The timing is not terrible, to start with. This agreement was meant to be concluded between India and the US way back in November 2009 during Singh's visit to Washington. However, the negotiations went on for several more months," said Rajagopalan. "It is up to the Obama administration to ably justify this to the Chinese leadership and the larger international community."

At a time when jobs are scarce and unemployment is high, the economic ramifications of this deal are not to be overlooked.

"This important step is part of the great, win-win narrative of the US-India global partnership, affirming the commitment of our two countries to realize the full potential of our landmark civil nuclear agreement [in 2008]," said US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer. "These arrangements will help open the door for US firms in India's rapidly expanding energy sector, creating thousands of jobs for the citizens of both our countries. We applaud India's outstanding track record on non-proliferation issues, and we look forward to our continuing cooperation in this area." [2]

In addition, the US has watched as Russian and European companies have become more active in the India nuclear energy sector. While the final passage of India's Nuclear Liability Bill is still an obstacle, it is expected that differences will be ironed out.

"France and Russia have been more enthusiastic about working with India in its civilian nuclear energy sector. In fact, the India-Russian agreement signed during Prime Minister Putin's visit envisages building up 16 nuclear reactors in three different locations, of which six are to be finished by 2017," said Rajagopalan. "If the US does not get its act together, Russia and France will clearly have a head start. It is quite certain that commerce and big business are issues that the US will understand and accordingly tailor its policies. In fact, conclusion of this agreement facilitates early participation by US firms in India's rapidly expanding civil nuclear market."

The politics of job creation and politics of nuclear non-proliferation are two different things entirely. In this instance, India enjoys such a unique status that the lines are easily blurred when it comes to figuring out exactly where the US is heading.

"Reprocessing is the Holy Grail for non-proliferation advocates,'' said Subrata Ghoshroy, senior associate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ''It is not such a bad idea as long as the facilities are under safeguards. Under the NPT, each nation has a right to technology for peaceful development of nuclear energy. So, we cannot deny specific technologies to countries. Now, it is true that India is not an NPT member state. So, it does not have that right. But, the US has branded India a 'responsible' nuclear state. So, how can we deny them this technology?"

By the way, India considers Iran to be a "responsible state" too in this regard.

"When we talk about nuclear security and the threat of nuclear terrorism, we are referring to it in a global context. All responsible members of the world community, international community, have a stake in ensuring that we have comprehensive nuclear security," said Rao in a recent news conference. "Iran is a country with which we have bilateral relations which go back many many years. It is a substantive relationship. We regard Iran as a very important country in the region and a country with which we have had, as I said, extensive bilateral relations and dialogue and cooperation. It is a responsible country."

As for the Russians, they benefit enormously in India from the inability of the US to establish and maintain firm policies.

"The Russians are not hampered by the liability issues as the US firms are. Russians are also cheap and they have maintained a long-standing relationship with the Indian [nuclear sector], when the US had sanctions on India. So, they do have a leg up," said Ghoshroy. "However, the Indians are interested in better technology, which the US could provide. The Russian presence continues to be significant, and as long as US equivocates perhaps of necessity between India and Pakistan, the Russian presence will continue."

As for the sense that things will simpler and less complicated as time moves along, well, there is little chance of that happening. The highway to nuclear energy nirvana features numerous large potholes.

"The Chinese also want reprocessing technology from the US. Pakistan may try to raise it, but it has lot on its plate given the continued controversy around the Khan network. It also wants a nuclear deal like India's," said Ghoshroy. "The main topics [at the Nuclear Security Summit] will be, of course, Iran and North Korea, which the administration wants and Israeli nukes, that both Israel and Obama do not want to discuss. Well, Netanyahu nixed that plan by not coming. The administration will also have a lot to defend about its new NPR."

Notes
1.) US nuclear review misreads China, Global Times, April 2010.
2. US - India Nuclear Deal, Voice of America, April 12, 2010
Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from Maine USA.

Indo-US Relations in the Second Manmohan Singh Administration

This essay on Indo-US relations in the second Manmohan Singh Administration first appeared on the IPCS website.

With a decisive mandate for the Congress (I)-led UPA government, the general assumption is that there will be continuity in India’s relations especially with the United States. With the Congress (I) not having to depend on the Left parties for support anymore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be able to pursue the strategic partnership with the US with greater ease. The Left parties would have exercised a stronger say particularly in matters pertaining to US, China and Nepal, and have been overly critical about US-India defence agreement of 2005, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the strengthened defence and military ties with the US. The end-user monitoring agreements on American defence items supplied to India too would have come under the Left scanner. The defeat of the Left parties has particularly elated the NRI community who believe that the new government will not only take the economic relations to a higher level but also significantly strengthen the strategic ties between the two countries.



With the Congress (I) and Manmohan Singh at the helm of affairs, there could be easy passage of further economic reforms and of FDI into India. Opening up of sectors including telecom, retail, media and insurance can now be speeded up and fiscal reform measures will also be on the table that can get the country out of the economic downturn faster.

In fact, Manmohan Singh’s decision to call the Left a bluff and conclude the Indo-US nuclear deal proved his mettle and strong leadership qualities. Although the nuclear deal will enable it to meet about 3 percent of India’s energy needs, more significantly, the deal, as the Prime Minister saw it, got India out of the nuclear apartheid of more than three decades and put India on the global map as an important and responsible player.

While continuity is foreseen, there might be a few issues that one has to factor in India’s relations with the US. These concern nuclear issues, regional security issues including Kashmir and Pakistan, China, Iran and WTO and climate change issues.

The Democrats including Obama have been staunch opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Now that the deal has been completed, their opposition cannot mean very much. However, there could possibly be some difficulties at the next stage of negotiations on operationalizing the deal. It should also be borne in mind that the Obama Administration will remain committed to non-proliferation goals, including Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) that will be pushed with greater vigour. The Obama Administration is also likely to strengthen its efforts to bring in countries like India, Pakistan and Israel into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, though it is unclear if this is just a declaratory posture ahead of the next year’s NPT Review Conference or something more serious. India not being a member of the NPT remains a major issue for the Democrats. Obama’s renewed interest in getting CTBT ratified by the US Senate and thereafter by other countries, including India and Pakistan could become a sore point in bilateral relations. On the other hand, India’s opposition to the CTBT has weakened somewhat, if one goes by the speech that Shyam Saran gave at the Brookings Institution recently.

Obama’s AfPak strategy linking Kashmir to the security of Afghanistan is not a very palatable one for India. This is exactly what Pakistan has always sought and it could possibly be a sticking point in India-US relations. Second, there is a clear gap between the US and India on their objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban / al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. For India, it is a much more complex issue of ensuring that Afghanistan does not fall back into the hands of Taliban and become a fertile ground for terrorism and instability in the region. India also disagrees with the US on dealing with Taliban by making a differentiation between good and bad Taliban. Besides, a deal with the Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results when the effective command and control are with the ISI in Pakistan. Lastly, the US will be making the same mistakes as it did at the peak of the Cold War when it funded a large number of tribal groups. It must be kept in mind that over a period of time, these groups outsmart their masters and get out of control.

Finally, the nature of US-China relations will also affect Indo-US relations. A softer approach towards China is not something favourably looked upon by India as it happened, for example, during the Clinton administration, where they wanted to jointly manage South Asia. On the other hand, India does not want to see them become hostile to each other and get into a conflict situation, where India may be forced to take sides. Both of these situations could prove dangerous for India. Similarly, improved Indo-US relations will likely have a negative effect on Sino-India ties. In the same way, improved US-China relations will raise concerns in New Delhi and could affect both US-India as well as Sino-India relations.

Randon Thoughts on China Factor in Indo-US Relations

State of US-China relations will affect Indo-US relations. Neither do we want to see very close relations between the two countries like during the Clinton administration, where they “want to jointly manage south Asia” just as they did post-1998 n-tests. On the other hand, we do not want to see them hostile to each other and get into conflict situations, where India being a neighbor, may be forced to take sides. That could prove dangerous for India. While the two extremes should be avoided, there are increasing concerns about China, its rise, particularly on the military side. The rising profile actually translates into hardline postures adopted by china in various decision-making foras and those decisions are more taking care of china’s national interests reasons than for regional and global issues. Every country will pursue its national interests, but if they are pursued in a short-sighted manner without any regard for other country could be harmful. Here, China’s repeated attempts at curtailing India’s rise could prove a limiting factor in improving the atmospherics of this important bilateral relationship.



China’s hardlining positions in the last few years, clearly a result of its increasing international profile, is creating difficulties for India and other regional players. It has toughened positions on the border issues, Arunachal Pradesh, Tibet issue. China adopted a less than constructive role in the last few years, evident at the September 2008 NSG meeting, post-Mumbai attacks at the UNSC, and most recently at the ADB where it vetoed and withheld its approval on a development loan for India’s northeast Arunachal Pradesh. Such behaviour on the part of china is going to create increasing frictions on the bilateral relations as well as on the emerging Asian strategic framework.

Such concerns on the part of US and India had become the basis for closer indo-US relations in the last few years. In fact, indo-US nuclear deal was the result of such a line of thinking. The more sec concerns with china, the more we will look at the US for closer relationship. How and whether the US reciprocates in another matter. So far it has. But how the Obama administration will look at the China and india is extremely important. Especially under the current circumstances where china and the US are caught in a symbiotic relationship. Their closer ties are bound to have effect on Indo-US relations. However, this is not to suggest that this is a zero sum game, that improvement in one relationship will necessarily lead to complete downturn in the other relationship. It might be correct to say that it will be a negative sum, where a strengthened US-China relationship could slowdown in certain aspects. An improved Indo-US relationship will have negative effect on Sino-India ties as well as a slowdown in US-China relations. Similarly, an improved US-China relations will raise the antenna in New Delhi and could affect both US-India as well as Sino-India relations.

US partnership with China on a range of issues on global governorship, is understandable, from North Korea to Afghanistan and Central Asia to the current economic crisis, but if this relationship is strengthened at the cost of India, it could lead to a slowdown of Indo-US relations. It will also have its ramifications on the emerging Asian security order.
This is not to say that the US does not have any concerns. At least until early this year, these concerns were pretty loud and clear.

At the same time, closer Indo-US partnership – concern for china. India’s rising profile of which Indo-US relations is one aspect, continues to worry China. Although India has never been formally listed as one of the challenges that China faces, it certainly irks them to see a more powerful India in its neighbourhood. As India continues to re-define and modify its foreign and security policies, given its increasing stature in the international arena, it calls for a dynamic debate on how Beijing views this emerging pole.

There have been several analyses pointing out to Chinese concern on a rising India –talking about India’s democratic and capitalist orientations, India’s territorial disputes with China, talking about India having a militaristic and religion-based strategic culture. Similarly, China views India as a “future strategic competitor” that would join any anti-China grouping in the future. In fact, one of the well-known scholars, Mohan Malik brings to the fore an internal study undertaken in 2005 that recommended China to undertake measures to keep the current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership, and the Nuclear Club, hold on to diplomatic advantages through its special relationship particularly with India’s neighbouring countries and as also maintain the economic lead over India. This has become evident several times in the recent past, which all is an evidence that China does not willingly accept India's rise on the world stage, nor the prospect of closer US-India ties. However, India’s rising stature is a reality and China has to live with that reality.

Another issue. India’s role and stand on Tibet may be irksome to the Chinese leadership.
China has continued to reiterate its claims on Tibet and thereby Arunachal Pradesh through a series of statements as well as action on the ground by the PLA forces. Chinese leadership’s assertion to choose the next Dalai Lama is another way of pressuring India and Tibet on its claims, because such a step would essentially mean India conceding its access to the Tawang monastery. Article 2 of the Shimla Agreement was categorical to state that China recognizing the autonomous nature of Tibet shall “abstain from interference in the administration of Outer Tibet (including the selection and installation of the Dalai Lama),” which was totally left to the Tibetan government in Lhasa. The recent Chinese interest in the selection of Dalai Lama go against the principles of this treaty. However, China will continue to maintain the stand that it does not recognise this treaty as any valid instrument.
China has unleashed huge economic and infrastructural development programmes in Tibet as part of this larger politico-military objective of systematically killing the spirit of Tibetan nationalism. The new railway line – Qinghai-Tibet line – is being further extended, linking Lhasa with Shigatse and Yadong, near the Sikkim border. Hence, if China has some concerns of India’s strengthening relations with the US and other major powers, India too has concerns of a rising China whose ambitions are not very clear.

Arms control issues: FMCT, CTBT. These are issues that are going to be taken up by the Obama administration before too long. Obama’s renewed interest in getting the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) ratified by the US Senate and thereafter by other countries, including India and Pakistan could become a sore point in bilateral relations. India remains opposed to signing CTBT and this was clarified recently again by India’s envoy on nuclear issues, Ambassador Shyam Saran. He stated that India remained opposed to CTBT because it “was not explicitly linked to the goal of nuclear disarmament.” Additionally, he said, “this was crucial since it was not acceptable to legitimize, in any way, a permanent division between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states.” Shyam Saran in fact suggested that if abolition of nuclear weapons was an agenda, then both India and the US should establish a working group at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to chart a future direction, which could possibly be a positive and constructive link in the bilateral relations. If Obama administration is willing to look at strengthening Indo-US ties, this could be a positive agenda on the table. Otherwise, this is an area where the US and China will arrive at a common position and that could prove harmful for Indo-US relations. US and China already have similar positions on FMCT.

Terrorism: South Asia is the other area. In fact, the AfPak strategy that has come about, linking Kashmir to the security of Afghanistan, it is not a very palatable situation to India. This is exactly what Pakistan has always sought and it could possibly an area that China too agrees. There again, you have China, US and Pakistan on the same side and this could create setbacks in Indo-US relations.