Washington Watching as Beijing’s Space Power Grows -The Diplomat, 10 September 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the latest U.S. Defense Department report on Chinese military power that recounts Beijing’s growing space and counterspace capabilities.

The U.S. Department of Defense last week released its annual report on China’s military power. The report details all aspects of China’s military including land, naval, air, space and information domains. The report identifies a few areas such as shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems where China has “achieved parity with – or even exceeded – the United States.”

According to the report, China has also made impressive strides in critical sectors such as cyber and space. Since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, there has been greater focus on overall military capabilities and the PLA has devoted more attention to space and information capabilities. The last Chinese Defence White Paper (2019) identified space as “a critical domain of international strategic competition.” The 2019 White Paper also identified the important role that space will play in “improv[ing] the capabilities of joint operations command to exercise reliable and efficient command over emergency responses, and to effectively accomplish urgent, tough and dangerous tasks.”

With China emerging as a global power, it is only natural to expect it to develop a range of space and counterspace capabilities. However, Beijing’s emphasis on developing these capabilities to “paralyze the enemy’s operational system of systems” as well as “sabotage the enemy’s war command system of systems” means others have to take note. This, Beijing believes, can enable it to disrupt and deny any space-based advantage that an advanced military like the U.S. may have. The Pentagon’s report highlights PLA writings that have noted “the effectiveness of IO and cyberwarfare in recent conflicts and advocate targeting C2 and logistics networks to affect” an adversary in times of conflict. The report also cites “authoritative PLA sources” who have called for “the coordinated employment of space, cyber and EW as strategic weapons” in order to create significant disruptions in an adversary’s command and control as well as logistics networks.

Worryingly, the U.S. report states that China has plans to use a combination of these capabilities on assets beyond military ones to include “political and economic targets with clear ‘awing effects’ – as part of its deterrence.” This would entail the PLA’s possible use of its cyber warfare capabilities “to collect data for intelligence and cyberattack purposes; to constrain an adversary’s actions by targeting network-based logistics, C2, communications, commercial activities, and civilian and defense infrastructure; or, to serve as a force-multiplier when coupled with kinetic attacks during armed conflict.”

With the goal of being a “world-class military power,” China has gone about advancing its space power, both in terms of institutional reorganization and development of space and counterspace capabilities. The military modernization and reorganization undertaken by China since 2015 is worth noting. In terms of institutional architecture, the most significant development is the creation of the PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF), a theater command-level organization designed to combine “the PLA’s strategic space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare missions and capabilities.” The U.S. report adds that the PLASSF’s Network Systems Department, which controls information warfare, has identified the U.S. as the “current major target.” The PLASSF is an institutional innovation to bring about greater synergies in functions that were previously spread across a number of departments. Under the reorganization, the PLASSF is directly under the Central Military Commission and is responsible for extending support to the entire PLA. China’s 2019 Defence White Paper clearly outlined the goals of the PLASSF as “seeking to achieve big development strides in key areas and accelerate the integrated development of new-type combat forces, so as to build a strong and modernized strategic support force.”

The U.S. Department of Defense’s report details the structure and functions of some of the key institutions under the PLASSF. The PLASSF houses two near-independent departments – the Network Systems and the Space Systems Departments – that are responsible for an entire range of capabilities and missions involving space, cyber and electronic warfare technologies. The Space Systems Department, for instance, has the complete responsibility for almost all of the PLA space operations including space launch and support, space surveillance, space information support, space telemetry, tracking and control, and space warfare. While it is not clear where the counterspace capabilities fit and which institution is responsible for it, China is clear on the role of space in future conflicts to enable “long-range precision strikes and in denying other militaries the use of overhead command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems.”

Unlike many other space powers, China’s space program has historically been under the PLA, and it continues to play a critical role in developing China as a major space power Today, China has fielded a large fleet of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), communication and navigation satellite constellations which is enabled by strengthened launch capabilities. China has been also active in its human spaceflight and lunar exploration missions, plus a debut Mars mission in 2020. China has additionally gone about developing a larger space ecosystem that has resulted in diversification to include several sub-sectors beyond the military, to the political, defense-industrial and commercial arenas. It is not clear if this was a deliberate decision by the PLA or not, but it could possibly help in strengthening China’s overall space competitiveness. China is also thought to have developed “quick response” small satellite launch vehicles to cater to the growing small satellite market. This capability could be helpful to China “to rapidly reconstitute low Earth orbit space capabilities,” which could come into play during conflicts should Beijing have the need to launch a large number of satellites to replace satellites that are damaged or increase the number of satellites in a particular orbit for better services.

While China’s development of space capabilities has been impressive, it has also pursued counterspace capabilities in a focused manner. Beijing has an array of counterspace capabilities including direct ascent and co-orbital anti-satellite weapons, offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities such as satellite jammers, as well as directed energy weapons that can target an adversary’s system and create disruptions or denial of services, thereby cutting off “an adversary’s access to and operations in the space domain during a crisis or conflict.” According to the U.S. report, China has expanded its space surveillance capabilities which aids Beijing in keeping a watch on “objects in space within their field of view and enable counterspace actions.” China has demonstrated its ground-based ASAT capability which is capable of targeting satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) but the report notes that China possibly has plans to expand its ASAT capabilities to destroy satellites in geosynchronous Earth orbit, targets that are much farther away.

Over the last few years, a number of open-source reports have detailed growing Chinese counterspace capabilities. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report of 2019 also highlighted these growing threats. China is known to be engaged in testing certain dual-use technologies in space that could be used for counterspace activities as well. For example, China’s “Roaming Dragon” system, fitted with a robotic arm, is supposed to be used for space debris removal missions but can very well be used for counterspace missions. In fact, Chinese scholars have stated that the “Roaming Dragon” could be engaged in debris removal activities during peacetime but at times of conflict, “they could be used as deterrents or directly against enemy assets in space.”

The U.S. report also outlines China’s efforts at espionage to steal U.S. military technology including space technology. According to the report, a number of U.S. criminal indictments have been handed down involving Chinese nationals, naturalized U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens from China, and U.S. citizens since 2015, for attempts at “procuring and exporting controlled items to China.” Some of the sensitive, dual-use technology or military-grade equipment in these cases have included radiation hardened integrated circuits, monolithic microwave integrated circuits, accelerometers, gyroscopes, syntactic foam trade secrets and space communications technologies, among others. The report listed some recent cases including one in October 2019 when a Chinese national was sent to prison for 40 months for “conspiring to export military- and space-grade technology illegally” from the U.S. to China. The individual is reported to have worked with others in China “to purchase radiation-hardened power amplifiers and supervisory circuits used for military and space applications.”

China’s achievements in the space domain are indeed impressive but the increasingly contested geopolitics make space yet another arena for competition and rivalry. China’s actions will be closely watched and, in many respects, will fuel further rivalries in the Indo-Pacific.

A First: India to Launch First Simulated Space Warfare Exercise - The Diplomat, 12 June 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian government's plans to conduct the first simulated space warfare exercise called the IndSpaceEx in July. Reports of a tabletop wargame speak to India’s ongoing efforts to develop its space policy.

The Indian government appears to be getting ready to conduct a table-top war game called “IndSpaceEx” involving all stakeholders including the military and the scientific establishment. The reports of such a development, which come against the backdrop of other key developments pertaining to outer space including the demonstration of India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) capability and the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), bear careful watching within the broader perspective of India’s space policy.



For India, space is a domain that has remained relatively peaceful for close to three decades, but is now changing because the nature of politics and competition in outer space is much more contested today. Terrestrial politics is casting a long and heavy shadow on outer space, and India could not have ignored these developments, of which China is just a part.

Along with the growing relevance of space to national security and conventional military operations, counter-space capabilities are also being developed in an effort to deny an adversary advantages by the use of space assets. The growth of counter-space capabilities including kinetic physical, non-kinetic physical, electronic, and cyber means has sparked a fresh competition in outer space.

The increasingly contested nature of space has been an impetus to India’s changing approach to outer space, moving from a purely civilian and peaceful approach to one where certain military characteristics are evident, conditioned by changing security realities. Militaries around the world have been emphasizing network centricity which in turn brings out the salience of space for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance” (C4ISR), and as they have become more networked, they are also opening themselves up to more and more vulnerabilities, while anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons have also added to the prospects for destabilizing scenarios in outer space.

India’s ASAT demonstration earlier this year was important in validating its deterrence capability. Meanwhile, the establishment of the new tri-service Defence Space Agency (DSA), based in Bangalore, is an important institutional initiative that combines two key functions performed by the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre (DIPAC) in Delhi and the Defence Satellite Control Centre in Bhopal, representing the growing integration of India’s space capabilities.

Reports of the new wargame IndSpaceEx should be read as part of these wider developments. One of the reported goals of the IndSpaceEx, to be held towards the end of July under the Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence, is to gain a better understanding of the current and emerging challenges in the space security domain.

Another reason the wargame is also being undertaken to have a better appreciation of the capabilities that India must develop in order to protect its assets and secure its national interests. India has been growing mindful of the growing number of threats in outer space, both natural and man-made ones. While the global space competition between the key spacefaring powers is a well-known reality, New Delhi has worries about the counter-space capabilities in China’s inventory.

Such wargames are not uncommon. Indeed, think-tanks and governments in all the major spacefaring countries have conducted table-top and simulation exercises to understand space security crisis dynamics, major vulnerabilities and capability gaps during conflict. These could then feed into policy making. For instance, among the think-tank community in the outer space domain, the Secure World Foundation and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (both based in the United States) as well as the Observer Research Foundation have engaged in several such exercises.

These exercises were done to understand crisis dynamics including decision-making processes, the attainment of national objectives, the changing nature of warfare, and the influence and impact of emerging technologies. Even when these exercises were played with a space security focus, the results have been revealing. For instance, the ORF simulation exercise (SIMEX) conducted over three years has seen remarkable conclusions. Still, states have resisted carrying out attacks on outer space assets due to the fear of escalation.

The Indian government’s proposed war gaming exercise appears to have a slightly narrower agenda in terms of understanding the vulnerabilities and the gaps in India’s space security and identifying areas for India to develop and strengthen in terms of technological capabilities in order to establish effective deterrence capabilities. China has been the single most important factor shaping India’s approach to space. The growing sophistication of its military space program, including the recent launch of a rocket from a ship, is significant.

Clearly, efforts like the IndSpaceEx are important to determine the degree of the space security challenges India faces and to develop appropriate measures for effective deterrence. But India must step up its efforts to develop global rules and norms about such challenges and threats. While India must continue working towards all-encompassing legally-binding instruments such as the Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), the rising specter of threats means that more pragmatic and feasible measures should also be attempted because these could see more broad-based support among states. Having demonstrated its ASAT capability, India is in an ideal place to demonstrate its global governance credentials.

What Does the Rise of Asia’s Space Forces Mean? - The Diplomat, June 4, 2019

A few days ago, I published a piece in The Diplomat understanding the implications of new space commands being established by key space powers.

While U.S. President Donald Trump’s release of Space Policy Directive-4 in February that enables the establishment of the U.S. Space Force received much focus in the way of headlines, this was hardly the first time that a military has set up a special branch for space operations. Indeed, there is a need to focus much more on what the significance of these moves means for Asian security and the implications of efforts to create space commands and forces.

For the full essay, click here.



First, the place to start is to acknowledge that several countries are establishing such special units. The U.S. space force is only the latest and so others are doing it as well. China established the Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) in 2015, integrating the PLA space, cyber and electronic warfare capabilities, a key institutional innovation. Russia made similar institutional innovations with the Russian Space Forces in 2011 as part of the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces meant for military space-related activities. India, similarly, appears also to be on the way to creating such a special space command.

Second, it is important to keep in mind that even though it sounds like a fighting force, the space force is mostly aimed to bring about greater integration of functions and the better coordination among different agencies involved. There is a need to pay greater attention to the details of these bureaucratic changes and innovations.

Third, it is necessary to be clear about what the details are in public policy discourse because alarmism can be negative too. The creation of space forces and commands does not necessarily mean we are on the cusp of states engaging in combat in outer space. We should be realistic about the limited nature of these efforts to date, even though we should not ignore development possibilities that may be more oriented toward actual combat in the future. The point is that we still have time to head off such dangerous developments.

Fourth, it is important to understand the varying rationales behind decisions to create these forces. For instance, the U.S. Space Force can be seen as a result of the increasingly worsening security situation and a consequence of the great power politics. Outer space was largely unaffected by terrestrial geopolitics for the first several decades of the space age, but in the last decade, this has changed. There are greater insecurities today and this has an impact on outer space too. We cannot ignore the political realities that are driving these developments, because they partly influence what we can do about it.

Fifth, we need to be clear about the dangers that stem from these developments. One danger is that more and more countries will follow this path and establish specialized space commands. As space begins to assume a more active role in the security and military operations including conventional ones, countries would seek greater coordination of their efforts and will end up establishing these specialized commands. The need for greater synergy in space activities is understandable, especially as outer space exploitation gets more important to welfare on the ground. But such coordination can also be possibly done by civilian agencies rather than military ones. We need to develop alternate models that do not ignore the need for greater coordination and synergy within governments, but without suggesting it can only be done under military commands.

A real danger is if this were to lead to a security dilemma between countries in outer space that spurs further development of space commands and forces. This is a danger especially because these new efforts are being led by military forces. The demonstration effect of some powers doing it, and the uncertainty of why they are doing it, will force others to imitate them. Even if no side wants it, we could end up having an arms race in outer space because of this. We should examine how this outcome can be prevented.

Sixth, we then need to look at a range of measures that can help us address these dangers. Greater dialogue and transparency can help, especially since these efforts are being driven by the need for greater coordination rather than the need to engage in military combat. Greater transparency and openness are the only possible solutions given the overall international security scenario and the nature of great power politics. Especially given that there might be an actual, understandable reason for setting up specialized coordination agencies, greater transparency might help avoid misunderstanding between the great powers.

Also, early effort is necessary to prevent more states from creating such space forces. It may still be possible to get some basic understanding between powers about what are the do’s and don’ts in creating such forces and commands. For example, to the extent that these are being driven by the need for greater national coordination, states could agree to put these efforts under civilian rather than military agencies. This could ensure that this effort at greater coordination does not get militarized.

All this is not to minimize the challenges posed by the growing security attention to outer space. But it is to suggest that for all the alarmism we have seen, there might still be time to head off a new security problem related to outer space. That requires greater attention to this problem, avoiding alarmism about space forces, and understanding and accepting the need for greater coordination within state agencies while at the same time creating some rules and norms to ensure that these efforts do not become militarized. Such a balanced approach can help us maximize the opportunities and minimize the challenges in this area in the coming years.