India-China Talks on the Standoff: Cautious Optimism? - The Diplomat, 12 November 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last month, I looked at the India-China talks on the continuing stand-off in Ladakh and if there was any room for optimism.  Reports vary about the details of the latest talks, but there seems to be some optimism for an agreement.  

Indian and Chinese military forces have been engaged in a military standoff in Ladakh for more than six months now. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks had yielded no progress. But there was cautious optimism in New Delhi after the eighth round of corps commander-level talks between India and China, held on November 6. There are increasing hints that some agreement may be reached. According to one report in the Indian media, the two sides reportedly “agreed to restoring status quo ante” on the Line of Actual Control (LAC). According to sources quoted in the report, “all that remains is for both sides to formalize the sequencing of steps required to achieve the objective.”  

But this is the most optimistic of the reports, though earlier reports about the November 6 meeting also claimed that progress had been made. On the same day that these more optimistic reports appeared, Indian Army Chief General M.M. Naravane, speaking at a public event in Delhi, said, “We are hopeful of reaching an agreement which is mutually acceptable and is really beneficial in keeping with the overarching policy guidelines.” There remains understandable caution, as he also added that the border troops are fully equipped with appropriate clothing and weapons and that the forces face “no shortages whatsoever.”  

For the full post, click here.  

In earlier reports on the November 6 meeting, an official said that India “want[s] complete de-escalation. Reduction of troops from some areas and de-induction of weapons is not a viable option and is not what we have proposed.” Chief of Defense Staff General Bipin Rawat also maintained that the any change in the status quo “is not acceptable to India” and that one cannot rule out the “situation getting out of hand and spiralling into a larger conflict.”  

India’s official statement was also along the same lines and did not mention “restoring status quo ante.” The statement simply said that “the two sides had a candid, in-depth and constructive exchange of views on disengagement along the Line of Actual Control in the Western Sector.” The statement further added that the two sides would “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, ensure their frontline troops to exercise restraint and avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.” 

Other Indian media reports also suggested some progress, though not that the two sides had agreed to restore the status quo ante. According to one of these reports, an Indian Army officer said that “China’s latest proposal is better than their previous proposals.”  

There is also disagreement in the reports about the sequencing of steps for a withdrawal of forces. Some media reports said that India and China have agreed to a three-point disengagement agenda which included pulling back of tanks and anti-personnel carriers within a day as the first step. A second step would involve the withdrawal of 30 percent of troops on both sides every day for three days around the northern bank on the Pangong Tso.  This reportedly would push the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) east of Finger 8. The third step would include withdrawal of frontline troops on both sides in the southern bank of Pangong Tso, as well as areas around Chushul and Rezang La  The three-step disengagement process is to be enforced through a joint verification mechanism, which includes both delegation meetings as well as the use of drones.  

Another report, however, suggested that China would pull back from the Pangong Tso area first. China “has apparently agreed to go back to Finger 8 and remove all temporary structures and deployments the PLA had put up between Finger 4 and Finger 8 since May,” according to this report. The area between Finger 4 and 8 could be kept as a “no-patrolling” area, with neither side permitted to patrol.  But there is no agreement to this effect, yet. The second step would be disengagement of heavy armor and artillery. Currently, the deployment of tanks in close proximity, T-72 Indias on the Indian side and Type-99s on the Chinese side, in the Chushul sector, is seen by both sides as risky. Other reports have said that these are all still proposals, which will be taken up in the next round of talks. It should be noted too that only one report has talked about both sides agreeing to restoring the status quo ante.  

Even if the current tensions were to be resolved in the near term, India’s security perceptions about China are forcing India to undertake some force restructuring to maintain constant vigilance along the LAC, especially in the western sector. In addition to the 3 Infantry Division that is responsible for the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the Northern Command has decided to deploy another division of around 10,000 troops in Ladakh on a longer-term basis.  

Whether these optimistic reports will be borne out remains to be seen. On both sides, there are likely to be worries about the risks involved in withdrawing from positions that they now hold, which carries with it the risk that the other side may renege and attempt to occupy these positions. Trusting each other may still be the biggest hurdle.  

Is India Ready to Play the ‘Tibet Card’ in Its Battle With China? - The Diplomat, 16 July 2020

I am a bit behind in updating my blog but here is the column I did for The Diplomat a couple of weeks ago, looking at the 'Tibet Card' in India's battle with China. While the talk of a “Tibet card” in India’s hands is not new, the key question is if New Delhi is likely to play it?

In the month since 20 Indian Army personnel were killed as a result of the clash at Galwan on the Sino-Indian border, public anger at China is palpable. There have been growing calls for a strong response from the Indian government, including a strengthened partnership with Taiwan. There have also been similar calls for enhanced support for Tibet and the Dalai Lama.

For the full essay, click here.



About 10 days after the Galwan clash, Pema Khandu, chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh, referred to the Line of Actual Control dividing India and China as the India-Tibet border. Several points are noteworthy here: He was speaking at an Indian Army meeting at the Bumla border post; he is from the BJP, the party that also holds power in New Delhi; and his state is entirely claimed by China, which calls it “southern Tibet.”

Coming against the backdrop of the Galwan clash, this could appear to be an attempt at rekindling the Tibet issue, which India has done every now and then when there is a conflict with China. This was of course music to the ears of Tibet activists, who have been seeking active Indian support for a long time. Tenzin Tsundue, a Tibetan writer and activist, during a recent media interview, echoed Khandu and said that the border must be called “the Tibet border and not the China border.” Not surprisingly, Chinese media has commented on such Indian views and opposed them.

There is ongoing debate about how India should respond to the Tibet question in the light of China’s increased pressure. Some Indian public commentators support playing the Tibet card while others are somewhat cautious. Well before the current conflict, in 2018, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the Hindu nationalist organization out of which the BJP emerged, had argued for a reappraisal of India’s Tibet policy. Prominent BJP ideologues have supported reopening the Tibet issue, even supporting the right of Tibetans to live “as a free nation.”

Such voices have become louder. A retired senior Army officer wrote about the strategic importance of Tibet, and argued that time has come “to challenge the very legitimacy of the Chinese claim over Tibet.” In another opinion piece in Business World, Krishan Varma, a former head of India’s foreign secret service, made a case for a fresh assessment of India’s Tibet policy. He argued that a new Indian policy approach on Tibet “has the real potential of causing major turbulence in China’s underbelly.” He added that India might do well to “align its policy on the issue with the U.S. and support the ‘Tibet Policy and Support Act (2019)’ that has been passed by the U.S. Congress and is pending U.S. Senate approval before being promulgated into law through due process.”

Similarly, an editorial in Hindustan Times, a national newspaper, called for a rethink of India’s Tibet policy. Stating that India has had an inconsistent approach to Tibet, it said, “Delhi now needs to shed its hesitation, not just because Tibet is a ‘card’, but is intertwined with the values of freedom and peace central to the vision to resist China.” The editorial added that although India has continued to respect to China’s core interests, Beijing has not reciprocated. The editorial argued for honoring the Dalai Lama with the Bharat Ratna, India’s highest civilian honor, and for India to take up the rights of Tibetans in international platforms and build deeper links with the younger generation of Tibetan activists who are the face of the new resistance. Finally, it also recommended that India make a statement on the Dalai Lama’s successor indicating that India will respect the Dalai Lama’s wishes on the succession issue. Others have argued that China’s paranoia about the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan presence in India ensures that India continues to have a Tibet card to play at all.

The idea of the “Tibet card” is not new, of course. And various Indian commentators have previously warned against such a strategy. For example, Suhasini Haidar, a prominent foreign policy correspondent, had argued in 2018 that the idea of the Tibet card is “out of step” with shifting ground realities in Tibet and cautioned the Indian establishment against using “the Tibetan population in India as a strategic tool,” a point others have also made.

Similarly, Sudha Ramachandran, writing also in 2018, asserted that India never did have a Tibet card, considering that India and the even the Tibetans have accepted the One China formulation and India’s efforts to keep the Tibet card has only angered China, “without yielding tangible dividends.” Echoing Ramachandran’s sentiments, P. Stobdan, a China analyst who had previously argued that the idea of a Tibet card is a folly, declares in a recent book that China’s slow invasion tactic has been successful in dealing with India whereas New Delhi, even after 60 years, has made no significant gains in its China policy. Instead, he argues that India is now “worryingly and helplessly entangled in a Tibetan quagmire with serious implications for the stability of its frontier region.” What is noteworthy is that arguments against using the so-called Tibet card have been rare during the current crisis.

Part of the problem is the inconsistency in the Indian approach to Tibet under the Modi government. In December 2016, the Dalai Lama was invited to the Rashtrapati Bahavan, India’s presidential palace in New Delhi, for an event in honor of Nobel Peace prize winners, which raised objections from China. In March 2017, the Dalai Lama was also allowed to travel to Tawang, which was again questioned by China. In July that year, in the middle of the Doklam conflict, Lobsang Sangay of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), the Tibetan government-in-exile, was allowed to unfurl the Tibetan flag at Pangong Tso in Ladakh, one of the points of the current stand-off. But since the 2017 Doklam confrontation, New Delhi has attempted to play down the Tibetan presence in India, even preventing government officials from attending the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile.

Ultimately, it is unlikely that the Modi government will really play any “Tibet card,” despite the frequency and prominence of those arguing for it in the Indian debate. Even these opinions are more likely a reflection of the general anger toward China, rather than carefully thought out policy proposals.

Darkening Mood in Delhi Over China - The Diplomat, 3 July 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I look at the changing moods and perceptions on China in Delhi. I note that opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists.

The Sino-Indian border confrontation may fundamentally alter Sino-Indian relations, if the darkening mood in New Delhi is any indication. Diplomatic and military negotiations have been ongoing since the June 15 clash at the Galwan River, but they do not appear to be yielding much progress. Not only has there been no troop disengagement on the border, both India and China appear to be sending more troops to the border.

For the full essay, click here.



China is also reported to be building up forces opposite the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, hundreds of kilometers to the east of the current confrontation. Adding to an already complex situation, Pakistan is sending almost 20,000 troops to territories it controls on India’s western flank opposite Ladakh, confronting India with a possible two-front problem. Pakistani radars are also reported to be active. Citing military sources, reports say that the Skardu air base in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) has been active as well. China is reportedly in talks with cadres of terrorist groups such as Al Badr to possibly stir-up violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian Air Force and the Navy are also reportedly on high alert.

The so-called areas of “friction” under discussions include the north bank of Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley and the Gogra Post-Hot Springs pockets. Meanwhile, there has also been the meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC) on June 24 and according to news reports, this will be done on a more regular basis. At the 15th meeting held on June 24, it was reportedly decided that the WMCC will be active in finding terms of disengagement, non-violation of the current but differing perceptions of the LAC, and adherence of the existing border mechanisms such as the 1993 and 1996 agreements.

Reports quoting Indian Army sources say that the “Army is preparing for the long haul and the standoff is expected to continue well into the winter.” Commenting on the last meeting of the military officials on June 30, the Indian Army Public Affairs Directorate is reported to have said that both sides “have emphasised the need for an expeditious, phased and step wise de-escalation as a priority.” With the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) making no formal statements, “army sources” paint a rather a gloomy picture of the meeting.

The crisis has impacted the broader Sino-Indian relationship. Several Indian infrastructure projects in which China won the contract have been revoked or cancelled. Examples include the Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company of China which received a contract to build the underground portion of the rapid rail project between New Delhi and Meerut, a city about 60 kilometers away. Similarly, the Bihar government cancelled a deal for the construction of a new mega bridge because two out of the four contractors had Chinese partners, China Harbour Engineering Company and Shaanxi Road Bridge Group Company (JV), even though they had earlier been cleared by the Central Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs. There are also calls by the Maharashtra government to boycott Chinese investment. For instance, memorandum of understanding (MoU) worth 50.2 billion Indian rupees (INR) ($670 million) signed with three Chinese firms, Hengli Group (2.5 billion INR), Great Wall Motors (37.7 billion INR), and PMI Electro Mobility Solutions, a joint venture with Foton (10 billion INR) is already on hold.

Opinions in New Delhi are hardening, even among sections of elite opinion-makers who are not seen as hyper-nationalists. Ajai Shukla, a prominent defense analysts usually critical of the Modi government, tweeted that “India’s military has to fight this out, or New Delhi becomes vassal to Beijing and the Middle Kingdom.” Another moderate voice, Lt. Gen. H.S. Panag argues that with diplomacy reaching a dead end, “it is logical that India may have to exercise the military option to restore status quo ante April 2020.”

Similarly, Shivshankar Menon, National Security Adviser under the previous Congress party-led government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, noted that China’s behavior today is different, something that has not been seen in a very long time. As he put it, this crisis “is serious . . . And it is even more serious because it is a part of a broader Chinese behaviour, not just vis a vis us, but with other people as well.” India’s deterrence appears not to be working, he suggests. The question then becomes “how do you then deal with it politically because this is more than just a military problem, this is diplomatic, political, it’s a much broader challenge.”

Gautam Bambawale, former Indian Ambassador to China, also argues that the current PLA offensive is different because China has come in large numbers up to areas of their perceived Line of Actual Control (LAC). He charges that China’s PLA has violated “all the principles, norms, standard procedures which have evolved over the past 25 years to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas. They have displayed how little store it sets by agreements signed by its own government.” In an earlier interview, he said that “For minor tactical gains on the ground, China has strategically lost India.” More pertinently, he makes a clear call for “India as a country, as a people, including, of course, the government in the lead” to do “a fundamental reassessment of its China policy, make changes in it, and then implement it at the earliest.”

What is important is that these are voices that had usually supported stronger, mutually beneficial even if clear-eyed, relations with China. Whether these opinions will necessarily lead to changes in India’s long-term policy remains to be seen. C. Raja Mohan, one of India’s most important foreign policy commentators, has suggested that “the potential direction of the Sino-Indian relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.” But there is little doubt that, much like the Sino-Indian war of 1962, fundamental questions are being asked in New Delhi of India’s China relations.

India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff With China - The Diplomat, 5 June 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at India's strengthened diplomatic outreach amidst border standoff with China. I argue that New Delhi has been sending Beijing signals via its diplomatic interactions with the U.S., Taiwan, and Australia in recent weeks.

As India’s border confrontation with China deepens into a crisis, New Delhi appears to be using a combination of military power and diplomacy. According to reports in the Indian media, India has already begun moving troops from other sectors, including those facing Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC), toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China in Ladakh. At the same time, in a move that could be seen as a signal to China, India has stepped up its diplomatic efforts. In the last week, India has reached out to the United States, signaled a warning on Taiwan, and is set to strengthen security ties with Australia.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States remains the most critical of India’s partners. On May 29, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh spoke on the phone, taking stock of their defense cooperation, and vowed to continue their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” Even though the China matter was not specifically mentioned, both official statements, one released by the U.S. Department of Defense and other by the Indian Ministry of Defense, mentioned Esper and Singh discussing regional security issues. It would be highly unlikely that they discussed “regional security issues” without touching on the current Sino-Indian border confrontation.

In addition, on June 2, there was a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump. Unusually, the readout of their conversation specifically stated that they discussed the Sino-Indian border standoff and the need to reform the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has been much criticized for being too cozy with China. Trump also wants to expand the G-7 grouping (which China is not a part of) to include Australia, India, South Korea, and possibly Russia, thus making it a G-10 or G-11, which Modi also supported.

The messaging was not lost on Beijing: Promptly after the call between the two leaders, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that there was “no need for any third party to intervene.” He added that “at present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable.”

At the same time, India made another unusual diplomatic play, this time with regard to Taiwan. In an extraordinary move, two Members of Parliament (MPs) — Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan — from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) virtually attended President Tsai Ing-wen’s swearing-in ceremony online. The two MPs also sent congratulatory messages to Tsai on the start of her second term, highlighting how India and Taiwan are bound by their shared belief in democratic values. Reportedly, in addition to the two MPs, Sohang Sen, the acting director general of India-Taipei Association, joined the ceremony, representing India in Taipei. In a separate video message, which was played at the ceremony, Lekhi emphasized the “continued strengthening of the comprehensive relations between India and Taiwan.”

This was a departure from India’s traditional stand on the Taiwan issue and the contrast to India’s decision in 2016 is striking. After naming two parliamentarians to attend Tsai’s first swearing-in ceremony in 2016, the government backtracked at the last moment, leading to much disappointment in Taipei. Many suspected that it was worry about China’s reaction that led to the last minute cancellation then, with one official saying that India possibly “bound itself up tightly in its own policies.” It was even more puzzling for many Taiwanese as to why India accepted the invitation in the first place and then cancelled, which made the disappointment bigger.

The third recent move worth taking into account regards Australia. Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison just concluded their first virtual India-Australia summit meeting. Though the summit had originally been scheduled for February, but postponed because of the Australian bushfires and then the pandemic, China continues to very much be on the minds of both leaders. Australia is feeling China’s wrath for pushing for an investigation into the origins of the pandemic, while Indian troops are confronting Chinese forces directly at the border. Not surprisingly, the meeting appears to have been a successful one, with several agreements and MOUs on strategic issues concluded between the two countries. Given the progress made in bilateral relations over the last few years, the two leaders decided to elevate their Strategic Partnership status reached in 2009 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The Joint Statement issued at the end of the meeting is carefully worded, with several important messages. It noted that “the CSP is based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further, it said that both India and Australia “share the vision of an open, free, rules-based Indo-Pacific region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions that promote prosperous, stable and sovereign states on the basis of shared interests.” The emphasis on maritime security and defense cooperation is significant. On regional and multilateral cooperation, the statement said that the two countries “share a vision of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region to support the freedom of navigation, over-flight and peaceful and cooperative use of the seas by adherence of all nations to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes rather than through unilateral or coercive actions.” There were press reports in India that New Delhi was finally going to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, though that has not been confirmed.

Among the nine agreements signed or announced, some were particularly significant: the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support (MLSA); an MOU on cooperation in the field of mining and processing of “critical and strategic” minerals; and the Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defense Science and Technology to the MOU on Defense Cooperation. These have the potential to deepen India and Australia’s bilateral defense and strategic cooperation for navigating the turbulent Indo-Pacific. While China has not been named specifically, many of the agreements as well as the joint statement appear clearly driven by the shared concern about China.

It is unclear how India’s diplomatic moves will be interpreted in Beijing, but it is clear that in New Delhi the pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away and leading it to deepen its security partnerships.

BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA: DOES INDIA FACE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? - 9DashLine, 26 May 2020

Last week, I published a short essay for the 9DashLine.com on the current India-China border standoff.

There is still a lot of difficulty in understanding what is happening on the Sino-Indian border because of patchy and contradictory reporting, mostly based on sources in New Delhi Thus any analysis has necessarily to be quite preliminary and tentative. As of today, citing government sources, one media report said, “there are close to 10,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian territory.” It should be noted though that other reports have suggested fewer numbers.

For the full essay, click here.



The current series of incidents started on 5 May, when around 250 Indian and Chinese military personnel clashed at Pangong Tso, a large lake in eastern Ladakh region. These were reportedly violent clashes, injuring several soldiers on both sides. Quoting a senior bureaucrat, one Indian media report said that some Indian troops were detained, but then released. But the Indian Army promptly denied this, though the detention story has continued.

In addition to Pangong Tso, there is also reported to be Chinese forces crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) further to the north, near the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, though there have been no reports of confrontations here. A newly constructed Indian road runs along the Shyok river to the north, a critical supply line for Indian forces. Quoting an unnamed military source, China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, said that it was India who crossed the boundary in Galwan and entered Chinese territory. Meanwhile, on 9 May, clashes also reportedly took place at Naku La Pass in North Sikkim, much farther to the east.

If China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground.

Initially, even the government assumed that these were merely fisticuffs and that the two sides were possibly engaged in the usual stand-offs that happen between these forces every summer. The Indian Army Chief even said, possibly to reduce tensions, that “aggressive behaviour by both sides resulted in minor injuries to troops post which both sides disengaged.” But it seems clear now that three different confrontations, hundreds of kilometres apart, is unlikely to be an accident. The large number of Chinese forces included also suggest some prior planning. In fact, a knowledgeable former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, referred to these “incursions at multiple locations” as “worrisome.” He argued that China appears “to be physically changing the ground situation.”

Indian analysts are at a loss to understand China’s behaviour. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, suggests that China was warning India about its policies on COVID, Taiwan and foreign investment (India had recently changed foreign investment rules that may affect Chinese investments). Ambassador Gautam Bambawale, who was formerly Indian ambassador in Beijing, meanwhile argued that the current incidents could be related to India’s actions with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, when India split the Jammu and Kashmir state to form a new province for the Ladakh region, administered directly from Delhi. Ambassadors Saran, Bambawale and Kantha appear to also suggest the closer India-US strategic engagement as a factor. Most Indian analysts also suggest that China’s response was at least partly a response to India’s faster infrastructure building along the LAC. China has already built excellent infrastructure on its side, and India’s is still wanting, though it has dramatically improved in the recent past.

There have not been much of an formal response from India to the ongoing crisis. Commenting on the situation, on 14 May, India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that both countries see enormous importance in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the entire border. The spokesperson added that the problem is the difference in perception of the alignment of the LAC, suggesting that this “could have been avoided if we had a common perception of the LAC.” India has long suggested this, but China has balked, apparently fearing that this could lead to additional problems. What is worrying is that existing mechanisms to resolve such disputes do not appear to be working.

India and China have signed several agreements, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (September 1993), the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (November 1996), and most recently, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013), none of which appear so far to have helped in the current tensions. Even though these agreements are significant, there have also been problems with their implementation because many clauses in these agreements require both sides to limit their activities in reference to the LAC. In the absence of clarity on where the LAC is, it is very difficult to execute these agreements, even in the best of times.

India’s options are also severely constrained in dealing with this crisis. In the Doklam crisis, India moved to block China’s actions, forcing China to choose to either escalate or back down. China backed down, helped by India also backing away on the promise that China would desist from continuing with its road-building. This time, the shoe is on the other foot: if China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground, or possibly offering concessions (halting infrastructure development in the region, for example) in order to get China to recall its forces. New Delhi is not going to be happy with any of these choices. Irrespective of how this plays out, one thing is certain: India’s attitude towards China will only harden.

Sino-Indian Relations: Wuhan Spirit Under Growing Strain - The Diplomat, 19 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Sino-Indian relations and how the "Wuhan Spirit" is quickly fading. The already tenuous effort by both sides to manage their ties has been further complicated by contemporary developments.

Last week, in his typically dramatic fashion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced India was changing its relationship with the State of Jammu and Kashmir, withdrawing the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gave the state special rights in the Indian Union. The move included also splitting the state into two, making Ladakh, the eastern part of the state that abuts Tibet, a separate “Union Territory” that will be administered directly from New Delhi.

The decision appears to have wide popular support in India (outside of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), though the manner in which it has been implemented has been severely criticized. In particular, elected local leaders of the state have been detained, telecommunication facilities in the state have been completely cut off and the population itself has been subjected to repeated curfews and other restrictions. Some of these restrictions are now being slowly lifted though as of this writing, political leaders have not been released.

While the internal situation itself is troubling, there are potentially international ramifications to this move. One casualty could be the “Wuhan Spirit,” which refers to the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping that reset the India-China relationship after the Doklam crisis in 2017.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s move was immediately opposed by Pakistan, with the Pakistani foreign minister flying to Beijing to seek China’s support. The Chinese statement of that meeting did not appear to indicate much change in China’s position. Indeed, it was fairly neutral. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted “China is seriously concerned about the latest escalation of tensions in Kashmir” and that “unilateral actions that will complicate the situation should not be taken.” The foreign minister also noted that “Pakistan and India are both China’s friendly neighbors” and called “on the two sides to proceed from their national development and peace in South Asia, properly resolve historical grievances, get rid of the zero-sum mindset, avoid unilateral action and seek a new path to peaceful coexistence.”

This was far less than what Pakistan had appeared to have hoped for and was only obliquely critical of the Indian actions. In fact, China’s position appeared to be quite confused. While one spokesperson had identified the issue on August 6 as one between India and Pakistan and one that was an issue “left from the past,” another reportedly criticized India giving special status to Ladakh, stating that it “challenged China’s sovereign interests.”

The Chinese position appears to have solidified in the next few days, by the time India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reached Beijing on a pre-arranged visit on August 12. Though the Chinese statement of that meeting noted a number of areas of cooperation between the two sides in the evolving global political and trading systems, China’s position had also settled on the harsher of the two statements from August 6. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Jaishankar “the Chinese side’s principled position” on what was characterized as India’s unilateral move on the Kashmir issue.

Another statement issued on the same date titled, “Wang Yi States Clear Position on the Kashmir Issue” was even harsher. It noted that “the constitutional amendment of the Indian side will change the current situation in Kashmir and give rise to tensions in the region.” This statement went well beyond stating China’s worries about India-Pakistan tensions. As the statement said, “the Indian side’s measures also challenge the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese side and go against the agreements between the two countries on safeguarding peace and stability in border areas, about which the Chinese side is seriously concerned.” The statement went on to say that “Such practice of the Indian side is neither valid in relation to the Chinese side nor will it change the status quo that the Chinese side exercises sovereignty and effective administrative jurisdiction over the territory.” In brief, China’s position went from calling on both India and Pakistan to resolve historical grievances and get rid of zero-sum mindsets to not only blaming India directly for creating tensions, but also questioning the sovereign rights and interests of China.

The Indian side does appear to have pushed back. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement on the meeting between Jaishankar and Wang Yi not only reiterated that this was an internal matter, but also noted that “There was no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. India was not raising any additional territorial claims. The Chinese concerns in this regard were therefore misplaced.” When the Chinese foreign minister referred to the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, the MEA statement noted that the Foreign Minister Jaishankar stated that “Where India Pakistan relations are concerned, Chinese side should base its assessment on realities.”

There is little doubt that both sides are trying hard to maintain the Wuhan Spirit: indeed, Jaishankar’s visit itself was meant to prepare the ground for a second informal summit between Modi and Xi to be held in October in India. But there is also little doubt that the Article 370 issue has created a fresh bone of contention between India and China.

Things have possibly gotten worse because China has also pushed for a discussion on India’s actions in the UN Security Council. The discussion was originally sought by Pakistan but it was rejected by the Polish Permanent Representative, who is currently chairing the UN Security Council. But China put its shoulders behind Pakistan’s request and forced a discussion in the UN Security Council, though it was a closed-door “informal consultations” rather than an open one which China had originally wanted. It appears that during the consultations, the United States and France strongly supported the Indian position that the issue was an internal matter while China was of the opinion that what India had done was a unilateral action that should not have been undertaken.

India is unlikely to take kindly China’s behavior. It is clear that both India and China want to maintain the Wuhan Spirit especially given the multiple tensions and uncertainties that both countries face internationally and domestically. But there is also little doubt that though the Wuhan spirit may continue, it is under serious strain.

India Is Still Losing to China in the Border Infrastructure War - The Diplomat, 21 September 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the state of the Sino-Indian border infrastructure. In "India Is Still Losing to China in the Border Infrastructure War," I argue that a year after the Doklam crisis, New Delhi faces the same old challenges in this realm.

It has been a year since India and China ended the 73-day border crisis in Doklam. And for all the focus on the crisis itself and its implications for Sino-Indian relations, it is worth recalling that along their border, Doklam is arguably an exception where the Indian military may be perceived to have a slight advantage over the Chinese military because of its slightly better infrastructure there.

Relatively speaking, however, the infrastructure on the rest of the border is quite appalling. Indeed, unless India accelerates the pace of the physical border infrastructure build-up, New Delhi will face serious difficulties in any future confrontation with China.

For the full article, click here.


The Indian vice chief of army staff, in his statement to the Indian parliament’s Standing Committee on Defense, voiced serious concerns on the lack of adequate allocation of funds for the Army for 2018-19. He pointed to the “large number of Chinese strategic roads and infrastructural development along the northern borders” and made a case for bigger resource allocation, given that the sanctioned budget for infrastructure development was running massively short.

The current state of affairs with regard to the border infrastructure is the result of a flawed policy that was in place for several decades. The political, civil bureaucracy, and military leadership in India believed that building infrastructure in the Sino-Indian border area would actually compromise India’s security because it would facilitate any Chinese invasion.

In a testament to this line of thinking, the former defense minister, A.K. Antony, while addressing a function of the Border Roads Organization (BRO) in 2010, stated that “Earlier, the thinking was that inaccessibility in far-flung areas would be a deterrent to the enemies.” Acknowledging that this was an “incorrect approach,” he added that the government is now taking a number of measures to upgrade roads, tunnels, and airfields in the border areas.

Similarly, the BRO director general, Lt. Gen. A.K. Nanda, too went on record to say that the poor infrastructure in the border areas is by design but that “our approach has changed and we are building it on our capacity, modern equipment, and workforce.”

This policy underwent a change in 2006 with the Cabinet Committee on Security, a key policymaking body on national security issues within the government, taking a decision to develop 73 strategic roads along the LAC.

But more than a decade later, there is very little evidence to show on the ground. This is surprising considering that the BJP government has stressed infrastructure building, especially along the Sino-Indian border.

Minister of State for Home Affairs Kiren Rijiju stated in the Parliament earlier this year that infrastructure development along the border is “taken up based on threat perception, availability of resources and various other factors like terrain, altitude etc.” Speaking about the state of the Sino-Indian border areas, the director general of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), Krishna Chaudhary, said that 172 of the 176 new Border Out-Posts (BoPs) are now raised and that the work has picked up pace. He too acknowledged that India has been late in waking up to the border infrastructure requirement, but now “work has been ‘fast paced’ to build border roads in the states of Jammu and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, that share their borders with China.”

Still, in the middle of the Doklam crisis, the minister of state for defense, Dr. Subhash Bhamre, while responding to a question in the Parliament, said that “73 Indo-China Border Roads along Northern Borders are approved for construction [back in 2006]. Out of this 27 roads have been completed and balance roads are planned for completion by December 2022.” The BRO, which is responsible for building strategic infrastructure in border areas, has missed several deadlines, raising questions about the BRO’s assurance about the 2022 deadline.

The minister went on to say that the delay in the construction of these projects is “due to delay in forest / wildlife / environment clearance, hard rock stretches, limited working season, delay in land acquisitions, difficulties in availability of construction material, and damage due to natural disasters such as flash flood.” Despite changes in governments, the excuses remain the same.

Reports suggest that incursions on the Sino-Indian may be coming down – there were reportedly about 500 transgressions in 2015, 350 in 2017, and around 200 up to July this year. Still, in addition to infrastructure problems, India also faces other difficulties For example, a multiplicity of agencies — the Army, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), the Border Security Force (BSF) and the Assam Rifles– managing the border on the Indian side is an issue. This means that both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Ministry of Defense have jurisdiction and India is not particularly known for good coordination between different departments and ministries.

On China’s side of the border, on the other hand, a single unified commander for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) forces is responsible for the border areas. It must also be noted that China has further strengthened the military command on the border by elevating the rank of the Military Command responsible for the border “by putting it under the jurisdiction of PLA ground forces.”

Though India’s infrastructure development is slow, this has not stopped Chinese media outlets such as Global Times from arguing that New Delhi is being provocative in building border posts and other infrastructure. But New Delhi has little choice but to continue pushing its border infrastructure, though there is little hope that it will very much faster.

Sino-Indian border infrastructure: an update, paper written by Rahul and me....

Here's an occasional paper on Sino-Indian border infrastructure, written by Rahul and me. The paper has been published by Observer Research Foundation.

Improved infrastructure has a critical role in enabling a nation to apply military power. On the India-China border, there is a clear military imbalance—not just in terms of equipment and forces on the border but also in terms of the physical infrastructure. This paper compares the infrastructure as it exists today, while identifying the gaps.

For the full paper, click here.





Type rest of the post here