India-Russia Relations Face More Trouble - The Diplomat, 31 December 2020

In my last essay for the year, I wrote a short essay on India-Russia relations for The Diplomat.  The immediate context of course was the cancelled annual bilateral summit, a first in two decades. Was Covid-19 the reason or did the China factor influence the decision?  

India and Russia have gone through several ups and downs in their decades-old bilateral relationship. The two appear at present to be going through a tricky phase. The two-decade old India-Russia annual summit was cancelled for the first time. A news report in India suggested that the postponement was the result of “severe reservations on New Delhi joining the Indo-Pacific initiative and Quad.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) spokesperson responded by saying, “The India-Russia Annual Summit did not take place in 2020 because of the COVID pandemic. This was a mutually agreed decision between the two Governments. Any imputation otherwise is false and misleading. Spreading false stories on important relationships is particularly irresponsible.” The Russian side also responded with a statement saying that it is in “close touch” with its counterparts in India to finalize new dates for the summit, “postponed due to epidemiological reasons.” 

But such denials are unlikely to entirely remove speculation about the state of bilateral relations, especially considering that India has taken part in a large number of bilateral and multilateral talks virtually, even if the pandemic has prevented physical meetings.  

For the full essay, click here.  

Moreover, overall speculation about difficulties in the relationship is not exactly new.  There has been a lot of it, especially because of comments from senior Russian officials, such as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, on India’s Quad and Indo-Pacific policy. Russian officials have repeatedly criticized the idea of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, arguing that it is meant to contain China. Lavrov publicly stated so at the annual Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi in January 2020. More recently, Lavrov returned to the theme, saying at the general meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council in Moscow on December 8 that “India is currently an object of the Western countries’ persistent, aggressive and devious policy as they are trying to engage it in anti-China games by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called ‘Quad’ while at the same time the West is attempting to undermine our close partnership and privileged relations with India.”

Indian officials and public commentators are increasingly miffed at this lack of sensitivity to Indian concerns about China, especially coming after China’s intrusion in Ladakh this year, which led to a bloody clash and Indian casualties. Even the normally cautious Indian foreign ministry was forced to respond, with the MEA spokesperson stating that India has always had an independent foreign policy based on its own national interests, that India’s Indo-Pacific approach was not directed at any particular country, and that India stands for a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific. He also added, for good measure, that “India’s relationship with each country is independent of its relations with third countries. We hope that this is well understood and appreciated by all our partners.” 

All of this is coming at a time when the India-China relationship is in one of its worst phases. India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar while speaking at an Australian think tank, the Lowy Institute, commented that India and China are “at the most difficult phase of our relationship” in the last three or four decades and that the relations between the two were “very significantly damaged” over the past year.  

These damages are unlikely to be undone easily. It took several decades to rebuild relations after the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, but the progress made since 1988 has been entirely lost with the current Galwan clash, provoked by China in an effort to unilaterally change the status quo on the border.   

Russian comments have led to some criticism in India of Moscow’s position and are increasingly eroding public support that the relationship always had. But there are contrarian voices too. In fact, Rahul Gandhi, leader of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress, criticized the government’s decision to cancel the annual summit with Russia in a tweet saying, “Russia is a very important friend of India. Damaging our traditional relationships is short-sighted and dangerous for our future.” It should be noted, of course, that it was the Congress-led UPA government that joined the Quad the first time, back in 2007. It was the same UPA government that has also strengthened the strategic partnership with the United States, including by signing the U.S.-India civil nuclear deal.  

While Russia’s dependence on China is understandable considering its worsening relations with the West, Moscow cannot expect India to ignore its national security concerns regarding China. And as I have written previously, a China-India crisis invariably puts Russia in a tight spot, with difficult choices between India, a traditional partner and also a lucrative defense market, and its newfound but mighty partner, China. For India, it will be increasingly difficult to see China as a partner. Finding common ground and partnering with a neighbor that has aggressively pursued a salami slicing strategy at India’s expense will be difficult. In order to build appropriate diplomatic and defense response against its aggressive eastern neighbor, India will need to partner with like-minded states that have also borne the brunt of Chinese aggressive behavior.  Moscow will either have to understand this reality or risk further hurting its ties with India.  

Indian Frustration With China Grows - The Diplomat, 12 August 2020

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Indian frustration in dealing with China. I argue New Delhi’s responses to Beijing’s efforts — such as raising the Kashmir issue at the U.N. — are becoming increasingly harsh.

Since August 2019, China has consistently raised the Kashmir issue at the United Nations Security Council. Last week, on August 5, China again sought a discussion on Kashmir under the “Any Other Business” category in the UN Security Council. This was the third time that China has done this, following earlier efforts in August 2019 and January 2020.

Indian responses to such efforts, as well as Chinese comments, are becoming harsher, a possible indication that the Indian government is losing patience with Beijing.

For the full essay, click here.



Kashmir has not been on the U.N. Security Council’s agenda since 1971. China resurrected the Jammu and Kashmir issue in the Security Council in August 2019 following the Indian decision to nullify Article 370, the special status given to the state of Jammu and Kashmir under the Indian Constitution. China has continued to describe the Indian action to remove the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and bifurcate the state into two union territories as affecting its territorial claims in the Ladakh region. In August 2019, China said the Indian decision was “unacceptable.” India rejected China’s criticisms, saying the decision was an internal matter with no impact on its external borders. China has persisted.

After last week’s UNSC meeting, India’s Permanent Representative at the UN in New York tweeted, “Another attempt by Pakistan fails!” Although the tweet did not name China, Indian officials elsewhere explicitly named China as responsible. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) in a statement said:

We have noted that China initiated a discussion in the UN Security Council on issues pertaining to the Indian Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir. This was not the first time that China has sought to raise a subject that is solely an internal matter of India. As on such previous occasions, this attempt too met with little support from the international community. We firmly reject China’s interference in our internal affairs and urge it to draw proper conclusions from such infructuous attempts.

Unnamed Indian officials pointed out that the United States and France have been especially notable in rebutting Chinese attempts. They have https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/sino-pakistans-unsc-attempt-on-kashmir-fails/articleshow/77400944.cms the Indian press that the United States took the lead in in challenging China’s actions and was followed by other UNSC members as well.

Indian responses to Chinese comments have become angrier. For example, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin stated that Beijing pays close attention to the Kashmir issue and that “any unilateral change to the status quo in the Kashmir region is illegal and invalid.” The spokesperson added that the issue has to be “and peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation between the parties concerned.” Wang added that “China sincerely hopes that the two sides can properly handle differences through dialogue, improve relations and jointly safeguard peace, stability and development of the two countries and the region.”

Despite that slightly gentler tone, India responded harshly, stating that “The Chinese side has no locus standi whatsoever on this matter and is advised not to comment on the internal affairs of other nations.” This kind of response is becoming more common among Indian officials, a possible reflection of the frustration that New Delhi is feeling with Chinese behavior. During a recent interview, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar pointedly stated that “the state of the border and the future of our ties… cannot be separated,” in essence suggesting that the standoff at the border will affect the bilateral relationship.

This is a link that India has been made before, but not (as starkly) in the recent past. For example, during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this link in response to a border confrontation that was ongoing during that state visit. Modi said publicly, with Xi at his side, that he had “raised our serious concern over repeated incidents along the border. We agreed that peace and tranquility in the border region constitutes an essential foundation for mutual trust and confidence and for realizing the full potential of our relationship.” He went on to add that “peace and stability in our relations and along our borders are essential for us to realize the enormous potential in our relations,” explicitly making the linkage between the border and peaceful bilateral cooperation.

India is also stepping up its strategic partnership with like-minded Indo-Pacific partners. This is prompted by a number of factors, including the pandemic and Chinese military pressure in Ladakh, rather than just China’s antics at the UNSC, but there appears to be an effort to signal further linkages. Tweeting about his conversation with U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Jaishankar stated that he also “(D)iscussed meeting in the Quad format in the near future.” A day later, the minister had a virtual meeting with Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne and others.

There is little doubt that frustration is growing among officials in New Delhi at the intransigence from Beijing, both in terms of the Ladakh confrontation but also about bilateral relations more broadly. Even if the current problems are resolved, Sino-Indian ties are unlikely to swing back to normal for some time.

India Expands Diplomatic Efforts Amid Border Standoff With China - The Diplomat, 5 June 2020

In this week's essay for The Diplomat, I looked at India's strengthened diplomatic outreach amidst border standoff with China. I argue that New Delhi has been sending Beijing signals via its diplomatic interactions with the U.S., Taiwan, and Australia in recent weeks.

As India’s border confrontation with China deepens into a crisis, New Delhi appears to be using a combination of military power and diplomacy. According to reports in the Indian media, India has already begun moving troops from other sectors, including those facing Pakistan along the Line of Control (LOC), toward the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that separates India and China in Ladakh. At the same time, in a move that could be seen as a signal to China, India has stepped up its diplomatic efforts. In the last week, India has reached out to the United States, signaled a warning on Taiwan, and is set to strengthen security ties with Australia.

For the full essay, click here.



The United States remains the most critical of India’s partners. On May 29, U.S. Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper and Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh spoke on the phone, taking stock of their defense cooperation, and vowed to continue their efforts “for a strong and enduring U.S.-India defense partnership.” Even though the China matter was not specifically mentioned, both official statements, one released by the U.S. Department of Defense and other by the Indian Ministry of Defense, mentioned Esper and Singh discussing regional security issues. It would be highly unlikely that they discussed “regional security issues” without touching on the current Sino-Indian border confrontation.

In addition, on June 2, there was a telephone conversation between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Donald Trump. Unusually, the readout of their conversation specifically stated that they discussed the Sino-Indian border standoff and the need to reform the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO has been much criticized for being too cozy with China. Trump also wants to expand the G-7 grouping (which China is not a part of) to include Australia, India, South Korea, and possibly Russia, thus making it a G-10 or G-11, which Modi also supported.

The messaging was not lost on Beijing: Promptly after the call between the two leaders, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that there was “no need for any third party to intervene.” He added that “at present, the overall situation in the China-India border areas is stable and controllable.”

At the same time, India made another unusual diplomatic play, this time with regard to Taiwan. In an extraordinary move, two Members of Parliament (MPs) — Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan — from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) virtually attended President Tsai Ing-wen’s swearing-in ceremony online. The two MPs also sent congratulatory messages to Tsai on the start of her second term, highlighting how India and Taiwan are bound by their shared belief in democratic values. Reportedly, in addition to the two MPs, Sohang Sen, the acting director general of India-Taipei Association, joined the ceremony, representing India in Taipei. In a separate video message, which was played at the ceremony, Lekhi emphasized the “continued strengthening of the comprehensive relations between India and Taiwan.”

This was a departure from India’s traditional stand on the Taiwan issue and the contrast to India’s decision in 2016 is striking. After naming two parliamentarians to attend Tsai’s first swearing-in ceremony in 2016, the government backtracked at the last moment, leading to much disappointment in Taipei. Many suspected that it was worry about China’s reaction that led to the last minute cancellation then, with one official saying that India possibly “bound itself up tightly in its own policies.” It was even more puzzling for many Taiwanese as to why India accepted the invitation in the first place and then cancelled, which made the disappointment bigger.

The third recent move worth taking into account regards Australia. Modi and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison just concluded their first virtual India-Australia summit meeting. Though the summit had originally been scheduled for February, but postponed because of the Australian bushfires and then the pandemic, China continues to very much be on the minds of both leaders. Australia is feeling China’s wrath for pushing for an investigation into the origins of the pandemic, while Indian troops are confronting Chinese forces directly at the border. Not surprisingly, the meeting appears to have been a successful one, with several agreements and MOUs on strategic issues concluded between the two countries. Given the progress made in bilateral relations over the last few years, the two leaders decided to elevate their Strategic Partnership status reached in 2009 to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).

The Joint Statement issued at the end of the meeting is carefully worded, with several important messages. It noted that “the CSP is based on mutual understanding, trust, common interests and the shared values of democracy and rule of law.” Further, it said that both India and Australia “share the vision of an open, free, rules-based Indo-Pacific region supported by inclusive global and regional institutions that promote prosperous, stable and sovereign states on the basis of shared interests.” The emphasis on maritime security and defense cooperation is significant. On regional and multilateral cooperation, the statement said that the two countries “share a vision of a free, open, inclusive and rules-based Indo-Pacific region to support the freedom of navigation, over-flight and peaceful and cooperative use of the seas by adherence of all nations to international law including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and peaceful resolution of disputes rather than through unilateral or coercive actions.” There were press reports in India that New Delhi was finally going to invite Australia to the Malabar naval exercise, though that has not been confirmed.

Among the nine agreements signed or announced, some were particularly significant: the Joint Declaration on a Shared Vision for Maritime Cooperation in the Indo- Pacific; Arrangement concerning Mutual Logistics Support (MLSA); an MOU on cooperation in the field of mining and processing of “critical and strategic” minerals; and the Implementing Arrangement concerning cooperation in Defense Science and Technology to the MOU on Defense Cooperation. These have the potential to deepen India and Australia’s bilateral defense and strategic cooperation for navigating the turbulent Indo-Pacific. While China has not been named specifically, many of the agreements as well as the joint statement appear clearly driven by the shared concern about China.

It is unclear how India’s diplomatic moves will be interpreted in Beijing, but it is clear that in New Delhi the pressure from an unrelenting China is pushing India farther away and leading it to deepen its security partnerships.

BORDER CLASHES WITH CHINA: DOES INDIA FACE A FAIT ACCOMPLI? - 9DashLine, 26 May 2020

Last week, I published a short essay for the 9DashLine.com on the current India-China border standoff.

There is still a lot of difficulty in understanding what is happening on the Sino-Indian border because of patchy and contradictory reporting, mostly based on sources in New Delhi Thus any analysis has necessarily to be quite preliminary and tentative. As of today, citing government sources, one media report said, “there are close to 10,000 soldiers of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian territory.” It should be noted though that other reports have suggested fewer numbers.

For the full essay, click here.



The current series of incidents started on 5 May, when around 250 Indian and Chinese military personnel clashed at Pangong Tso, a large lake in eastern Ladakh region. These were reportedly violent clashes, injuring several soldiers on both sides. Quoting a senior bureaucrat, one Indian media report said that some Indian troops were detained, but then released. But the Indian Army promptly denied this, though the detention story has continued.

In addition to Pangong Tso, there is also reported to be Chinese forces crossing the Line of Actual Control (LAC) further to the north, near the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers, though there have been no reports of confrontations here. A newly constructed Indian road runs along the Shyok river to the north, a critical supply line for Indian forces. Quoting an unnamed military source, China’s state-run newspaper, Global Times, said that it was India who crossed the boundary in Galwan and entered Chinese territory. Meanwhile, on 9 May, clashes also reportedly took place at Naku La Pass in North Sikkim, much farther to the east.

If China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground.

Initially, even the government assumed that these were merely fisticuffs and that the two sides were possibly engaged in the usual stand-offs that happen between these forces every summer. The Indian Army Chief even said, possibly to reduce tensions, that “aggressive behaviour by both sides resulted in minor injuries to troops post which both sides disengaged.” But it seems clear now that three different confrontations, hundreds of kilometres apart, is unlikely to be an accident. The large number of Chinese forces included also suggest some prior planning. In fact, a knowledgeable former Indian ambassador to China, Ashok Kantha, referred to these “incursions at multiple locations” as “worrisome.” He argued that China appears “to be physically changing the ground situation.”

Indian analysts are at a loss to understand China’s behaviour. A former Indian Foreign Secretary, Shyam Saran, suggests that China was warning India about its policies on COVID, Taiwan and foreign investment (India had recently changed foreign investment rules that may affect Chinese investments). Ambassador Gautam Bambawale, who was formerly Indian ambassador in Beijing, meanwhile argued that the current incidents could be related to India’s actions with regard to Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, when India split the Jammu and Kashmir state to form a new province for the Ladakh region, administered directly from Delhi. Ambassadors Saran, Bambawale and Kantha appear to also suggest the closer India-US strategic engagement as a factor. Most Indian analysts also suggest that China’s response was at least partly a response to India’s faster infrastructure building along the LAC. China has already built excellent infrastructure on its side, and India’s is still wanting, though it has dramatically improved in the recent past.

There have not been much of an formal response from India to the ongoing crisis. Commenting on the situation, on 14 May, India’s Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson Anurag Srivastava said that both countries see enormous importance in maintaining peace and tranquillity along the entire border. The spokesperson added that the problem is the difference in perception of the alignment of the LAC, suggesting that this “could have been avoided if we had a common perception of the LAC.” India has long suggested this, but China has balked, apparently fearing that this could lead to additional problems. What is worrying is that existing mechanisms to resolve such disputes do not appear to be working.

India and China have signed several agreements, including the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (September 1993), the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (November 1996), and most recently, the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (2013), none of which appear so far to have helped in the current tensions. Even though these agreements are significant, there have also been problems with their implementation because many clauses in these agreements require both sides to limit their activities in reference to the LAC. In the absence of clarity on where the LAC is, it is very difficult to execute these agreements, even in the best of times.

India’s options are also severely constrained in dealing with this crisis. In the Doklam crisis, India moved to block China’s actions, forcing China to choose to either escalate or back down. China backed down, helped by India also backing away on the promise that China would desist from continuing with its road-building. This time, the shoe is on the other foot: if China has indeed moved forward and built roads and checkposts beyond where it has traditionally had such facilities, India faces a fait accompli. New Delhi faces the choice of either escalating or accepting the new reality on the ground, or possibly offering concessions (halting infrastructure development in the region, for example) in order to get China to recall its forces. New Delhi is not going to be happy with any of these choices. Irrespective of how this plays out, one thing is certain: India’s attitude towards China will only harden.

India Bets Big on Kashmir - Handelsblatt (German Newspaper), 30 August 2019

Last week, I wrote an essay on I write on the internal and external dynamics of India’s recent decision on Jammu & Kashmir for a prominent German newspaper, Handelsblatt. Originally, this was a longer essay, as asked by the newspaper editors but they had to cut it short as the newspaper changed the format to include an editor's note and another piece providing a Pakistani perspective. If anyone is interested, I am happy to share the longer version.

Article 370 was a recognition of the India-Pakistan dispute over the State and the conditions of its accession to the Indian Union that made this state different from others in India. Eliminating the provisions of Article 370 means that Jammu and Kashmir loses this special status. Indeed, the current move makes Jammu and Kashmir’s status even lower than other Indian states because the State has also been downgraded to a Union Territory. In the Indian federal structure, Union Territories are provinces that are directly administered by the central government in Delhi and thus have even less autonomy than other Indian states. Furthermore, the State was divided into two, hiving off the Ladakh region which will become another Union Territory.

Given the potentially dire consequences of this action, why did the Indian government decide on this course of action? One reason is ideology: the BJP has for long argued that Article 370 should be removed, and Jammu and Kashmir fully integrated within the Indian Union. This was even listed in the BJP election manifesto.

For the original essay in German, click here.



A more immediate reason may have been worries about the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences. Pakistan has significant control over the Taliban, which makes the US beholden to Pakistan because the US wants a semblance of stability as its forces prepare to withdraw. India has bad memories of Pakistan using Afghanistan as a base for training terrorists and sending them into India. An Afghanistan that once again falls under the Taliban – and indirectly under Pakistan and its murderous Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) – is not a happy prospect for India.

Whatever New Delhi’s reasons, this move will likely be deeply unpopular in sections of the State, especially in the predominantly Muslim areas such as the Kashmir Valley. If any such protests are not handled with care, there is also the likelihood that Kashmiri anger could boost the simmering insurgency within the State.

This is one of the immediate dangers: that the insurgency and terrorism in the State will intensify. Indian security forces have been engaged in fighting this war for over three decades now. Though the insurgency has not ended, the Indian security forces have so far managed to keep it under control. A renewed insurgency and increased violence will have obvious grim consequences and it will deepen India’s internal security problems at a time when external security threats are growing.

These external security threats are serious. Pakistan, which never abandoned its claim on all of Kashmir, has already protested India’s moves, though Islamabad itself had assimilated the territories it occupies. It is unlikely that Pakistan will deliberately engage in a direct military assault on India because it is a far weaker power – Pakistan’s GDP at about $250 billion is less than a tenth of India’s at $2.85 trillion. But it could always miscalculate. Pakistan has sponsored terrorist groups that operate in Kashmir and in other parts of India, and terrorist attacks by such groups have repeatedly pushed India and Pakistan to the brink of war. And Pakistan’s possession of a substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons makes the consequences of any such miscalculation far more dangerous, a worry for both India and the international community.

Another problem is China. China has taken a strong stand against the Indian move because Beijing says that it affects China’s claim over a part of Ladakh called Aksai Chin. China currently occupies Aksai Chin but it is part of India’s claim. Beijing forced a discussion at the UN Security Council on India’s action (…). In any case, China’s actions have antagonized India, and it seriously weakens a spluttering effort by the two sides to improve their ties after their last serious military confrontation, less than two years back.

New Delhi appears to be betting that the fallout from its decision can be managed and that the actual consequences may prove to be far less dire. (…) Whether India’s bet pans out remains to be seen but this much is clear: it’s a big one.

Sino-Indian Relations: Wuhan Spirit Under Growing Strain - The Diplomat, 19 August 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Sino-Indian relations and how the "Wuhan Spirit" is quickly fading. The already tenuous effort by both sides to manage their ties has been further complicated by contemporary developments.

Last week, in his typically dramatic fashion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced India was changing its relationship with the State of Jammu and Kashmir, withdrawing the provisions of Article 370 of the Indian constitution that gave the state special rights in the Indian Union. The move included also splitting the state into two, making Ladakh, the eastern part of the state that abuts Tibet, a separate “Union Territory” that will be administered directly from New Delhi.

The decision appears to have wide popular support in India (outside of the State of Jammu and Kashmir), though the manner in which it has been implemented has been severely criticized. In particular, elected local leaders of the state have been detained, telecommunication facilities in the state have been completely cut off and the population itself has been subjected to repeated curfews and other restrictions. Some of these restrictions are now being slowly lifted though as of this writing, political leaders have not been released.

While the internal situation itself is troubling, there are potentially international ramifications to this move. One casualty could be the “Wuhan Spirit,” which refers to the informal summit between Prime Minister Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping that reset the India-China relationship after the Doklam crisis in 2017.

For the full essay, click here.



India’s move was immediately opposed by Pakistan, with the Pakistani foreign minister flying to Beijing to seek China’s support. The Chinese statement of that meeting did not appear to indicate much change in China’s position. Indeed, it was fairly neutral. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi noted “China is seriously concerned about the latest escalation of tensions in Kashmir” and that “unilateral actions that will complicate the situation should not be taken.” The foreign minister also noted that “Pakistan and India are both China’s friendly neighbors” and called “on the two sides to proceed from their national development and peace in South Asia, properly resolve historical grievances, get rid of the zero-sum mindset, avoid unilateral action and seek a new path to peaceful coexistence.”

This was far less than what Pakistan had appeared to have hoped for and was only obliquely critical of the Indian actions. In fact, China’s position appeared to be quite confused. While one spokesperson had identified the issue on August 6 as one between India and Pakistan and one that was an issue “left from the past,” another reportedly criticized India giving special status to Ladakh, stating that it “challenged China’s sovereign interests.”

The Chinese position appears to have solidified in the next few days, by the time India’s Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar reached Beijing on a pre-arranged visit on August 12. Though the Chinese statement of that meeting noted a number of areas of cooperation between the two sides in the evolving global political and trading systems, China’s position had also settled on the harsher of the two statements from August 6. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told Jaishankar “the Chinese side’s principled position” on what was characterized as India’s unilateral move on the Kashmir issue.

Another statement issued on the same date titled, “Wang Yi States Clear Position on the Kashmir Issue” was even harsher. It noted that “the constitutional amendment of the Indian side will change the current situation in Kashmir and give rise to tensions in the region.” This statement went well beyond stating China’s worries about India-Pakistan tensions. As the statement said, “the Indian side’s measures also challenge the sovereign rights and interests of the Chinese side and go against the agreements between the two countries on safeguarding peace and stability in border areas, about which the Chinese side is seriously concerned.” The statement went on to say that “Such practice of the Indian side is neither valid in relation to the Chinese side nor will it change the status quo that the Chinese side exercises sovereignty and effective administrative jurisdiction over the territory.” In brief, China’s position went from calling on both India and Pakistan to resolve historical grievances and get rid of zero-sum mindsets to not only blaming India directly for creating tensions, but also questioning the sovereign rights and interests of China.

The Indian side does appear to have pushed back. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) statement on the meeting between Jaishankar and Wang Yi not only reiterated that this was an internal matter, but also noted that “There was no implication for either the external boundaries of India or the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China. India was not raising any additional territorial claims. The Chinese concerns in this regard were therefore misplaced.” When the Chinese foreign minister referred to the rising tensions between India and Pakistan, the MEA statement noted that the Foreign Minister Jaishankar stated that “Where India Pakistan relations are concerned, Chinese side should base its assessment on realities.”

There is little doubt that both sides are trying hard to maintain the Wuhan Spirit: indeed, Jaishankar’s visit itself was meant to prepare the ground for a second informal summit between Modi and Xi to be held in October in India. But there is also little doubt that the Article 370 issue has created a fresh bone of contention between India and China.

Things have possibly gotten worse because China has also pushed for a discussion on India’s actions in the UN Security Council. The discussion was originally sought by Pakistan but it was rejected by the Polish Permanent Representative, who is currently chairing the UN Security Council. But China put its shoulders behind Pakistan’s request and forced a discussion in the UN Security Council, though it was a closed-door “informal consultations” rather than an open one which China had originally wanted. It appears that during the consultations, the United States and France strongly supported the Indian position that the issue was an internal matter while China was of the opinion that what India had done was a unilateral action that should not have been undertaken.

India is unlikely to take kindly China’s behavior. It is clear that both India and China want to maintain the Wuhan Spirit especially given the multiple tensions and uncertainties that both countries face internationally and domestically. But there is also little doubt that though the Wuhan spirit may continue, it is under serious strain.

my interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV on the recent Chinese incursions....

Here's the link to my interview with the Hong Kong-based Phoenix TV on the recent Chinese incursions....


Type rest of the post here

PM's China Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

Here's the link to an article of mine on the PM's visit to China, published by ORF. Indian Prime Minister has left for China for the third BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa) Summit, but one of the key questions is as to what such coalitions mean for India-China bilateral relations.

For the full article, click here.



Besides the BRICS Summit in Sanya, on Hainan Island, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao are scheduled to hold separate bilateral meetings, discuss a range of issues from economic to political and strategic issues. However, the Chinese officials have clarified to the Indian side that only multilateral issues and trade (establishing a strategic economic dialogue at the BRICS level is one item on the agenda) be discussed and that bilateral controversial issues are off the table during the Summit meeting.

At the multilateral level, the BRICS grouping is expected to discuss the international situation in the economic, financial, political and security domain. Obviously Libya is an important issue for all the BRICS countries. Except for South Africa that voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the other four countries - India, China, Brazil and Russia - had abstained from voting sending vague and ambiguous signals to Libya and the rest of the international community. However, it should be noted that the Libya vote was not the result of any collective decision taken by the BRICS. It was driven primarily by each country's individual foreign policy orientations than a common BRICS position. While China has justified its abstention by arguing that it does not interfere in another country's internal affairs, the Indian position has not been very clear. Some reports have argued that the open-ended nature of the Allied action is what got New Delhi worried. However, India's stand on the issue of use of military power against civilian population is contradictory. India stands aside while another government is using military power against unarmed civilians, even though India observes strict limitation on the use of military force in domestic rebellions. This contradiction will create problems to its standing in the coming years on the issue of UN's R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle and willingness to take on greater responsibility in global affairs commensurate with its growing stature.

What does BRICS really mean? The fact that Goldman Sachs identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as the fastest growing economies and coined the term BRIC does not mean anything and cannot become effective glue to stitch the group together as a cohesive unit. The grouping has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on what may be termed as "soft" issues such as climate change, trade issues and so on. The lack of strategic content in the grouping has impeded the growth and development of BRICS as a forum that can effect significant changes in global politics.

Even on the climate change issue, there has been no common position. Russia's stance on climate change has been significantly different from that of India and China's. Despite the fact that China has become the largest emitter of green house gas, India has found it convenient to go under the Beijing shadow although India has taken important steps to curb green house gas emissions, thereby compromising India's position in the climate change debate. However, India and China coming together and taking common positions has often been cited as major breakthroughs in India-China relations.

How far is this claim valid? It can be argued that while the two countries may have cooperated at the multilateral fora, India-China bilateral relations have also witnessed worsening of the ties partly because of China's less than supportive role at the multilateral fora when it came to strategic issues affecting India (China's role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are examples).

From the Chinese side, it supports India when they perceive a potential benefit in improving ties, which by and large have remained in the economic arena or improving its own image as it holds major events. The two recent instances have been when China issued regular stamped visas to one singer who was travelling to China for performing at the closing ceremony of the Asian Games; and when four journalists hailing from J&K travelling with PM for the BRICS Summit, because they did not want the visa issue to become a dampener on either of the two occasions held by China on its soil.

For Beijing, the West (including the US and Europe) is no more the market for their products. Asia is the future market and in Asia, India provides the largest market for the Chinese products and services. This explains the Chinese rationale in emphasising economics as the biggest agenda in the bilateral ties (evident during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India with a 400-member economic delegation).

India is all for strengthening ties with China, including in the economic arena. The bilateral trade had touched nearly $62 bn in 2010 and the two countries are expected to take this to $100 bn by 2015, which is not an unrealistic target. However, India has to address a few issues even in this area, which is otherwise booming. While the trade touched $62 billion, China's exports had gone beyond $40 bn, further increasing the trade imbalance between the two. Another issue for India has been the lack of access to the Chinese markets for Indian products particularly in three sectors - agriculture, IT and pharmaceuticals.

Lastly, what is that India achieves through BRIC/S that it cannot or has not achieved through bilateral means?

Global governance is one issue through which India-China relations may be tested. Is China willing to live with an India that is more assertive and influential in Asian and global affairs? China has so far not exhibited such support as it deals with India. Its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir (manifested through the issuance of stapled visas; circulation of internal documents in China indicating the deletion of 1500 square kilometres from LAC on the Ladakh sector) questioning the territorial integrity of India; its South Asia policy aimed at circumscribing India's manoeuvrability even within South Asia (China-Pakistan defence and nuclear weapons collaboration, China-Nepal, -Sri Lanka defence ties, and more recently utilising economic aid as an effective tool in furthering the Chinese interests are few examples) are some of the underlying issues that trouble India-China relations.

Three of the four BRIC countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, yet the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non-proliferation or outer space issues. The lack of strategic depth and mutual trust among these countries come as major impediments in making this bloc a strategic one - one with teeth that can challenge the current policies on these issues or one that can institute a new mechanism to avert the dangers of proliferation or weaponization of outer space.

Each of the five BRICS countries has their own strengths in the S&T arena. While this area should have been an ideal candidate for strengthening cooperation among these five countries, the group has not been able to exploit this strength for a variety of reasons.

Therefore, India has to be realistic enough to understand that heightened engagement between India and China in BRICS or any other multilateral fora has serious limitations - limitations imposed by the underlying Chinese objective of keeping India bogged down in South Asia as a regional power.

Chinese intrusions into Sikkim yet again on the rise

While the India-China border talks are going on at the top level, PLA intrusions into Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been on the rise. What is the message that China is trying to signal to India?

NDTV 24x7 reported in its 8'o clock news broadcast reported fresh Chinese intrusions in all the three sectors -- Sikkim, Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. There were reportedly six incursions into the Finger Area (Sikkim) in the last two months as compared to six incursions in total in 2008.

Does China want to see a peaceful Asia in the future? There have been increasing concerns of a militarily strong China growing and what its impacts would be. Will it lead to a period of stability or one with destabilising consequences for the region? Rise of new powers have altered the security milieu historically. However, if the rising power indicates that its intentions are peaceful and defensive, essentially through its defence/military postures, this could reduce the suspicion and thereby help create a peaceful region. If the region has to march towards peace and stability, it may be worth the effort to see how China can be brought into the camp through CBMs, particularly in the military-security arena.



In May 2008, China had begun to make fresh claims on Sikkim, otherwise a peaceful sector on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that divides India and China. Sikkim is a state in the north-eastern part of India, bordering China, which acceded to India in 1975. China lays claims to the northernmost tip of Sikkim that appears on the map like a protruding finger and thus termed Finger Area. It contains some stone cairns or heaps of stones that demarcate the India-China border. However, China has continued to state that it will demolish those cairns as the current mapping is not entirely correct and is based on the 1924 Survey of India. The current border controversy started last year when PLA (Peoples Liberation Army) troops began frequenting the area and constructed a road that crossed the Finger Area. Although India protested such moves in February 2008, the Chinese have continued assert their claims and have succeeded in introducing the issue as an agenda in the boundary talks between the two countries. It should be noted that the recent Chinese assertions on Sikkim along with the 2008 claims form part of its larger objective of claiming the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Thus, it is only a symptom of the larger Chinese disease of territorial expansion.

China has been trying to activate the Sikkim card as a bargain for its larger claim on the state of Arunachal Pradesh, and more particularly Tawang. China has been trying to adopt various measures to put pressure on India so as to get major leverage from India on the boundary issue. For instance, the Chinese border incursions have been on an increase. There were nearly 200 border intrusions in all three sectors in 2007, although most of the intrusions have taken place in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. Border incursions into all sectors, including Sikkim have recently gone up significantly. While the numbers may not critical, it still demonstrates changed Chinese attitude towards India. The Chinese incursions are also getting deeper into Indian territory than before. Despite India’s stationing of more than 40,000 troops in the state of Sikkim, its policy and posturing have continued to be, by and large, defensive.