Contradictions Grow Amid Another BRICS Summit - The Diplomat, 19 November 2020

In an earlier column for The Diplomat in November, I wrote on the 2020 BRICS Summit and the contradictions therein.  I argued that the group has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests.  The question, therefore, is it anything more than an ineffective talkshop?  

BRICS, the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa grouping, met virtually on November 17 for its 12th summit meeting. Prior to the meeting, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) released a statement saying that the meeting would discuss intra-BRICS cooperation around counterterrorism, energy, trade, health, and ways to mitigate the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Each of the five leaders stressed various aspects of cooperation in the face of the pandemic and the resultant economic slowdown. 

For the full post, click here.  

Chinese President Xi Jinping talked about “global epidemiological security” and said that “the BRICS countries firmly believe in the primacy of international law” and considered the World Health Organization to be the leading institution in addressing the pandemic. He added that once the pandemic is taken care of, focus must shift to economic recovery. Here, he argued “China can once again lead the way.” Citing how China’s “economy already bounced back from its low point earlier this year,” he said, “its new development paradigm of dual circulation where domestic and international circulation mutually reinforce one another will help stimulate the global economy” as well as “repair the damage done by some countries’ protectionist policies.” He concluded by saying that there will be “hiccups along the way” but “the trust-based relations between the BRICS countries could serve as a very stabilizing factor during this unprecedented transition in global political and economic affairs as the world begins to embrace new models.”  

Xi’s statements on the primacy of international law and trust-based relations within BRICS are bound to be taken with more than a little skepticism given China’s punitive economic actions against many of its neighbors and even partners further away. Such statements from China are not new. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers meeting last week, Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, said that the BRICS countries should come together in addressing the challenges of the pandemic and global economic recovery, and foster multilateralism and seek “political settlement of hot-spot issues.” 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also spoke about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and the reform process that has been initiated by his government to get the economy back on track. Modi highlighted the need for reform of multilateral institutions such as the IMF, WHO and WTO, but his particular emphasis was on terrorism, which he characterized as “the biggest problem today.” Modi said that the group must ensure that “countries that support and help terrorists are also held to account.”  

It is doubtful that the other members of BRICS necessarily share India’s view of the terrorism problem, but that is not the sole difficulty. The BRICS summit is also taking place at a time when India and China have squared off at their border, a temporary line called the Line of Actual Control (LAC). BRICS, as a multilateral platform, cannot address bilateral issues and hence, it was, understandably, not expected to address that particular issue. And given that the summit was held virtually, the possibility of informal bilateral meeting on the sidelines of the summit was nonexistent.  

The group itself has always been diverse in terms of economic, political, and security interests. These have only grown over the last two decades as Abhijnan Rej highlighted recently. China has emerged as the world’s second largest economy, while Brazil, Russia, and South Africa are nowhere near the indicators that brought them into the grouping initially.  

Politically, too, the group is diverse, with few common political interests other than singing the song of multilateralism. Even that rhetoric may not hold for long given the yawning gap between China’s rhetoric of multilateralism and its unilateral aggressive behavior on the ground.  

China and Russia have an anti-American political goal for the grouping, which sits very uneasily with Indian interests, considering India has invested significantly in building and nurturing its bilateral ties with the United States as well as engaging in strategic minilaterals such as the Quad and various trilaterals in the Indo-Pacific.  

That India works with China in the BRICS format, when the aim of India’s Quad and other such minilaterals are to restrict and restrain China’s aggressive and bullying behavior, adds to the growing array of contradictions. Certainly, BRICS cannot be a military and security grouping given the significant differences between each of the players, most notably between India, China, and Russia. The success of groupings such as BRICS will depend on the health of bilateral ties among those within the group. India-China relations in the backdrop of the Galwan conflict do not suggest that all is well on the bilateral front or even in the regional context.  

India’s aim in engaging with BRICS may be an effort to demonstrate that it retains strategic autonomy and that it engages with all major powers irrespective of these incongruences. In this respect, it may serve a limited domestic political agenda. But as contradictions keep piling up, questions about the future of BRICS as anything other than an ineffective talkshop are bound to grow.  

Hu's Delhi Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

Here's an analysis of mine published on ORF website on the recent visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to Delhi, perhaps his last visit as the president, for the BRICS Summit. However the focus of this article is to see if cooperation at the multilateral levels such as BRICS contributes to narrowing down the differences that exist at the bilateral level between India and China.

For the full article, click here.



Chinese President Hu Jintao was in Delhi for the fourth BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit, possibly his last visit as the leader of China. BRICS appear to have made progress on the economic, trade and financial arena although it will be naïve to assume that it will make similar progress in the political and strategic arena. With Syria, Iran and developments in the West Asia being part of the Delhi Declaration, Mr. Hu is reported to have said that BRICS has begun to make gradual progress on global political issues as well. Rightly so, bilateral issues are not part of the mandate of the BRICS Summit. But it is unclear if cooperation at the multilateral levels such as BRICS contributes to narrowing down the differences that exist at the bilateral level between India and China.

The trend is not particularly reassuring. While India and China have enhanced their trade ties from a mere $ 5 bn a decade earlier to $ 75 bn in 2012, similar trend lines have not been witnessed in the political and strategic arena. Emphasis on economic matters from the Chinese side is quite understandable given that Beijing is on a lookout for newer markets in Asia as the West may no longer be the biggest economic partner for them. India's large market provides an alternative, but New Delhi should also exploit this to its benefit. There are a few issues that need to be addressed, including trade imbalance that is hugely in favour of China and lack of access to Chinese markets for Indian goods and services in the area of pharmaceuticals, agriculture and IT. India is understood to have raised these issues repeatedly with the Chinese side over the last few years with no satisfactory response.

On the political and strategic arena, it has not been easy to say the least. While there has been no untoward incident on the border or elsewhere, it can be best characterised as an uncertain calm. Mr. Hu made tall promises saying China has an "unswerving policy to adhere to the Sino-Indian friendship, deepen strategic cooperation and promote common development. … China is ready to work with the Indian side to seize opportunities, accelerate development, jointly cope with challenges and share the fruits of development to benefit the two peoples and make greater contributions to peace, stability and prosperity of Asia and the world at large." In return, Singh reiterated that India "has no intention to contain China and will not take part in any schemes aimed at containing China. India recognizes the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China and will not allow Tibetans to pursue anti-China activities in India. He also expressed the hope to work with China to maintain peace and security on the borders and properly resolve border issues through friendly talks." While this is clearly an unobjectionable statement, it is noteworthy that China did not give any such assurances to India. New Delhi should have cashed in on an opportunity like this to gain similar assurances from Beijing as well.

On the sidelines of the BRICS Summit, Mr. Hu held separate meetings with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, discussing a range of issues, including bilateral issues on March 29, 2012. The two leaders also made the politically correct statements on bilateral ties while announcing 2012 as the "Year of India-China Friendship and Cooperation," with an intention to take bilateral ties to the next level, including making progress on strategic matters. The two leaders argued, among other issues, that there was a need for enhancing cooperation particularly in the fields of maritime and regional security. Anti-piracy operations and protection of SLOCS are ideal areas for India and China to cooperate if they have to make progress on the security and strategic front.

In addition, Mr. Hu laid out a five-point proposal to address India-China relations, including one on the border issue. The proposal says the two sides should handle their differences and work for peace and stability, while urging both to push forward border talks in the spirit of peace, friendship, equal consultation, mutual respect and mutual understanding and make good use of the working mechanism of consultation and coordination on border affairs so as to jointly safeguard peace and security on the borders. While the agenda appears comprehensive, this needs to be followed on the ground to make a difference to India-China strategic ties.

Having said that, it is not the border issue that remains at the crux of the problems between India and China. The bigger issue is to reach an understanding on their respective roles in the emerging Asian strategic architecture. It is India's growing role in Asian affairs and beyond and China's eternal desire to box India in South Asia that has been at odds in the recent years. Beijing's closer partnership with Islamabad and in fact with all of the neighbouring countries appears to have been motivated by the desire to balance India. Beijing's ongoing activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, or its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir or the Chinese protests at the Indian troop movement in Sikkim (an otherwise a peaceful sector on the Line of Actual Control (LAC); Sikkim was recognised by China as part of India during Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in 2003) are not reassuring to India. These do reflect a tendency on the part of China to question the very territorial integrity of India.

It is likely that the simultaneous rise of four major powers in Asia (China, Japan, Russia, India) will lead to a period of uncertainty and newer frictions. The fact that except for India and Russia, all the other countries have had troubled history, including war, does not help ease the situation. However, these powers have to recognise that their wealth and prosperity will also depend on the health of bilateral ties with each of these Asian capitals.

India and China have to shoulder greater responsibility in this regard to ensure that they adopt more inclusive and cooperative approach in addressing each other's concerns. And no amount of multilateral level cooperation (BRICS, G-20, WTO) can diminish some of these vexed issues. The fact is also that the two countries have cooperated mostly at the Chinese insistence and where it benefits them and not necessarily in a global forum that is supportive of India. Beijing's less than supportive role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are one or two instances. Therefore, India has to become more pragmatic in understanding and leveraging multilateral platforms to further its own national interests while strengthening India-China bilateral ties.

More Economic BRICS in the Development Wall

Here's the link to a news story by Ranjit Devraj of the IPS on the recent BRICS Summit, quoting me.

As BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) leaders prepare for Thursday’s summit in the resort town of Sanya in China’s southern Hainan province, experts here say there are limits to how ‘political’ the grouping can get.

For the full story, continue reading.



Leading China analyst Prof.Sujit Dutta told IPS that while it is true that BRICS countries are no longer "marginal players" in international politics, they are rooted in their own economic and geographical realities.

"While South Africa, the latest entrant into the BRICS grouping, did vote with the West on military intervention in Libya, it could not easily ignore the fact that it was also an Africa issue," said Dutta, who currently teaches at the Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Jamia Millia Islamia University in New Delhi.

"And if the other BRICS countries abstained from voting at the U.N. Security Council on Libya, that must have been the result of their own assessments," Dutta said. "When it comes to taking political positions, everybody is cautious, and that will be the trend in the foreseeable future."

Dutta said while BRICS is bound to increase its clout, its power as a grouping will depend on its ability to shape constructive change by bringing to the table modes of thought that lie outside the traditional East-West pattern.

"In a sense Libya was a test case for BRICS and threw up many disturbing questions," Dutta said. "The Libyan regime may have been authoritarian, but was it genocidal? Did it pose a threat to international security? Aren’t authoritarian Arab regimes being propped up by the West?"

Ultimately, Dutta said, BRICS will increase in value simply because of the fact that the world is rapidly becoming more diversified and also more integrated, throwing up new issues. "For example, how will the world deal with China’s aggressive state capitalism and the complex issues that will get thrown up because of it?"

Speaking to journalists before his departure for Sanya on Tuesday, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh dwelt on the "huge potential" of BRICS, provided they improve coordination on major issues of common concern to the five-member grouping.

But Singh was careful to say that such coordination should focus on the world economy, a democratic and equitable world order, and global governance reform.

Singh noted the fact that all BRICS countries are currently in the U.N. Security Council.

"If we can coordinate our positions on some key area such as sustainable development, balanced growth, energy and food security, reform of international financial institutions and balanced trade, that will be to our advantage," he said.

The Hindu newspaper’s foreign affairs correspondent Sandeep Dikshit wrote in a lead story datelined Sanya that (Indian) officials had "cautioned against reading too much into the accent on political discussions at the BRICS summit because this is more of a negotiating group with other world powers, than a coordinating one."

In his statement Singh said he looked forward to Wednesday’s bilateral meeting, including the one with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The India-China relationship is a critical one, and has now acquired global significance."

Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the independent and influential Organiser Research Foundation (ORF) based in New Delhi said India’s thorny relationship with China represented the sort of difficulties that BRICS will have to overcome or steer around to become truly effective as group.

"There is a trust deficit when it comes to Beijing’s relations with New Delhi, or even its relations with Moscow, that cannot be easily swept under the carpet," Rajagopalan told IPS.

"On the other hand," she said, "China needs India’s large markets and, during his visit to India in December, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao generously said that the long-standing border dispute between them could be left to future generations to resolve."

Currently, India has reason to worry about a military and infrastructural buildup along the ‘Line of Actual Control’ that serves as part of the border and about China’s nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.

Such niggling issues have, however, not stood in the way of bilateral trade between Asia’s two major Asian economies growing from 2 billion dollars in 1999 to nearly 60 billion dollars in 2010.

Rajagopalan said that the balance of trade was hugely in favour of China, and that Indian enterprise was being kept out of certain areas of the Chinese market. This includes possible ventures in information technology, pharmaceuticals and agriculture, where India has acknowledged strengths.

"These are issues that the Indian side can be expected to bring up in any bilateral with China," Rajagopalan said.

BRICS, said Rajagopalan, has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on "soft issues" such as climate change and trade, and has glaringly lacked strategic content to be able to effect significant changes in global politics.

Although three of the BRICS countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non- proliferation or outer space issues, Rajgopal pointed out.

The Sanya summit, she said, can be expected not to stray too far beyond the theme of "Broad Vision and Shared Prosperity" for the five BRICS countries, which account for nearly 30 percent of the world’s land area, 42 percent of the global population, and make up 18 percent of the world GDP.

China’s ambassador to India, Zhan Yan, in an article published on the editorial page of the Hindu on Wednesday emphasised that BRICS cooperation has provided "a valuable platform for the five countries to share development experiences and work together on development problems.

"BRICS countries are amongst the fastest growing economies in the world with tremendous potential. The cooperation among BRICS members reflects the development of international situation as well as the desire and choice of emerging economies," the ambassador writes.

"The issues discussed by BRICS members mainly focus on the economic, financial and development issues. In a sense, BRICS countries act as advocates and practitioners in forging a global partnership for development."

PM's China Visit: BRICS and the Bilateral Dynamics

Here's the link to an article of mine on the PM's visit to China, published by ORF. Indian Prime Minister has left for China for the third BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and now South Africa) Summit, but one of the key questions is as to what such coalitions mean for India-China bilateral relations.

For the full article, click here.



Besides the BRICS Summit in Sanya, on Hainan Island, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Chinese President Hu Jintao are scheduled to hold separate bilateral meetings, discuss a range of issues from economic to political and strategic issues. However, the Chinese officials have clarified to the Indian side that only multilateral issues and trade (establishing a strategic economic dialogue at the BRICS level is one item on the agenda) be discussed and that bilateral controversial issues are off the table during the Summit meeting.

At the multilateral level, the BRICS grouping is expected to discuss the international situation in the economic, financial, political and security domain. Obviously Libya is an important issue for all the BRICS countries. Except for South Africa that voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973, the other four countries - India, China, Brazil and Russia - had abstained from voting sending vague and ambiguous signals to Libya and the rest of the international community. However, it should be noted that the Libya vote was not the result of any collective decision taken by the BRICS. It was driven primarily by each country's individual foreign policy orientations than a common BRICS position. While China has justified its abstention by arguing that it does not interfere in another country's internal affairs, the Indian position has not been very clear. Some reports have argued that the open-ended nature of the Allied action is what got New Delhi worried. However, India's stand on the issue of use of military power against civilian population is contradictory. India stands aside while another government is using military power against unarmed civilians, even though India observes strict limitation on the use of military force in domestic rebellions. This contradiction will create problems to its standing in the coming years on the issue of UN's R2P (Responsibility to Protect) principle and willingness to take on greater responsibility in global affairs commensurate with its growing stature.

What does BRICS really mean? The fact that Goldman Sachs identified Brazil, Russia, India and China as the fastest growing economies and coined the term BRIC does not mean anything and cannot become effective glue to stitch the group together as a cohesive unit. The grouping has by and large remained a forum that has debated or taken positions on what may be termed as "soft" issues such as climate change, trade issues and so on. The lack of strategic content in the grouping has impeded the growth and development of BRICS as a forum that can effect significant changes in global politics.

Even on the climate change issue, there has been no common position. Russia's stance on climate change has been significantly different from that of India and China's. Despite the fact that China has become the largest emitter of green house gas, India has found it convenient to go under the Beijing shadow although India has taken important steps to curb green house gas emissions, thereby compromising India's position in the climate change debate. However, India and China coming together and taking common positions has often been cited as major breakthroughs in India-China relations.

How far is this claim valid? It can be argued that while the two countries may have cooperated at the multilateral fora, India-China bilateral relations have also witnessed worsening of the ties partly because of China's less than supportive role at the multilateral fora when it came to strategic issues affecting India (China's role at the NSG and its efforts to sabotage an ADB loan for India are examples).

From the Chinese side, it supports India when they perceive a potential benefit in improving ties, which by and large have remained in the economic arena or improving its own image as it holds major events. The two recent instances have been when China issued regular stamped visas to one singer who was travelling to China for performing at the closing ceremony of the Asian Games; and when four journalists hailing from J&K travelling with PM for the BRICS Summit, because they did not want the visa issue to become a dampener on either of the two occasions held by China on its soil.

For Beijing, the West (including the US and Europe) is no more the market for their products. Asia is the future market and in Asia, India provides the largest market for the Chinese products and services. This explains the Chinese rationale in emphasising economics as the biggest agenda in the bilateral ties (evident during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India with a 400-member economic delegation).

India is all for strengthening ties with China, including in the economic arena. The bilateral trade had touched nearly $62 bn in 2010 and the two countries are expected to take this to $100 bn by 2015, which is not an unrealistic target. However, India has to address a few issues even in this area, which is otherwise booming. While the trade touched $62 billion, China's exports had gone beyond $40 bn, further increasing the trade imbalance between the two. Another issue for India has been the lack of access to the Chinese markets for Indian products particularly in three sectors - agriculture, IT and pharmaceuticals.

Lastly, what is that India achieves through BRIC/S that it cannot or has not achieved through bilateral means?

Global governance is one issue through which India-China relations may be tested. Is China willing to live with an India that is more assertive and influential in Asian and global affairs? China has so far not exhibited such support as it deals with India. Its changing policy on Jammu & Kashmir (manifested through the issuance of stapled visas; circulation of internal documents in China indicating the deletion of 1500 square kilometres from LAC on the Ladakh sector) questioning the territorial integrity of India; its South Asia policy aimed at circumscribing India's manoeuvrability even within South Asia (China-Pakistan defence and nuclear weapons collaboration, China-Nepal, -Sri Lanka defence ties, and more recently utilising economic aid as an effective tool in furthering the Chinese interests are few examples) are some of the underlying issues that trouble India-China relations.

Three of the four BRIC countries are active and credible nuclear and space powers, yet the group has not managed to initiate a dialogue on non-proliferation or outer space issues. The lack of strategic depth and mutual trust among these countries come as major impediments in making this bloc a strategic one - one with teeth that can challenge the current policies on these issues or one that can institute a new mechanism to avert the dangers of proliferation or weaponization of outer space.

Each of the five BRICS countries has their own strengths in the S&T arena. While this area should have been an ideal candidate for strengthening cooperation among these five countries, the group has not been able to exploit this strength for a variety of reasons.

Therefore, India has to be realistic enough to understand that heightened engagement between India and China in BRICS or any other multilateral fora has serious limitations - limitations imposed by the underlying Chinese objective of keeping India bogged down in South Asia as a regional power.