India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020 - The Diplomat, 4 January 2020

In my column for The Diplomat last week, India’s Self-Inflicted Foreign Policy Challenges in 2020, I looked at India's foreign policy challenges for 2020. Sadly, many of them have been the government's own making. Hence, I argue that while the Modi government secured some notable gains during its time in office thus far, challenges lie ahead this year and beyond.

Since becoming prime minister in 2014, Narendra Modi has paid significant attention to India’s foreign relations. Though there could be some quibbles about how much he managed to achieve, there is little doubt that his focus at least led to greater energy and push in India’s foreign policy, even if Modi’s foreign policy has not witnessed any significant shifts.

But since his re-election last summer, India’s foreign policy challenges have been growing. And while the reasons for this may be varied, some of it is because of the BJP government’s own mistakes.

For the full essay, click here.



In his first term, Modi was able to undertake significant strategic outreach to the United States, Japan, and Australia. The revival of the Quad is a great indicator of the pragmatism in India’s diplomacy today. Despite some setbacks in between, India also managed to consolidate its position in two important Indian Ocean countries – Sri Lanka and Maldives. Modi can also be credited with a more effective outreach to Southeast Asia, with its Act East Policy.

But there are also growing difficulties. Managing China, India’s most serious challenge, has seen some success but it remains a major and continuing problem. India’s more active role in the Quad in its second avatar is a positive sign. Despite the occasional wavering in India’s Indo-Pacific policy, elevating the Quad to foreign ministerial level deliberations shows the willingness of all the four Quad members to acknowledge the reality of the China problem and the need for the four to work toward strategic coordination.

But there are serious problems with India’s hard capacity to manage the China problem. General V.P. Malik, the former chief of Indian Army Staff, said during the Kargil war that “we will fight with what we have,” but such an approach while facing a much a larger and strong force in China will be dangerous for India. For all the loud rhetoric on national security, the Modi government’s defense budget allocation has been abysmal. Year after year, it has driven down the defense budget, which now has the lowest allocation since the period before the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Even within this allocation, much of it is spent on salaries and pension, leaving very little for capital expenditure, thus leaving procurement issues unresolved. All three Indian services have significant gaps and this is going to test India’s ability to defend successfully against China. The Indian focus appears to be on diplomacy to deal with China, but depending on one toll alone could be dangerous.

Another major challenge is the neighborhood, and the problems here are compounded due to India’s internal developments. Today, India’s neighborhood policy is facing serious challenges, in part because of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the proposed National Register of Citizens (NRC). Together, they have had a particularly negative impact on India’s relations with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. With the CAA targeting three Islamic neighbors – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan – India’s neighborhood diplomacy suddenly faces new problems.

Relations with Bangladesh had improved significantly under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina but the CAA and the NRC have put the Bangladeshi government in a difficult position. Relations with Afghanistan, another friendly neighbor, are affected also. Moreover, the CAA is seen both as specifically targeting Muslims and as equating Indian citizenship with Hinduism, raising eyebrows across the world. Even India’s partners are questioning its credentials as a multicultural, pluralist society. India did enjoy certain soft power benefit as the world’s largest democracy, with diverse cultures and religions co-existing in a stable political system, but that image has been tarnished by the recent developments.

Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and even External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar can ignore the global concerns by saying these are internal matters of India. But the reality is that India’s moral standing has taken a hit and it will need significant efforts on the part of the Modi government to demonstrate that India is still a multicultural and secular democracy.

Modi did make a smart choice in getting Jaishankar to head the foreign ministry. Jaishankar, a former foreign secretary, is well-respected around the world, and is known to have been an important reason for many of Modi’s foreign policy successes in his first term. But it is unclear if an experienced technocrat like Jaishankar can weather the storms created by poor domestic political decisions. Jaishankar was successful to a large extent in assuaging the fears around the developments in Jammu and Kashmir, after Article 370 was revoked in early July. His extensive engagements in the United States, speaking in nearly a dozen think tanks, as well as other media interviews, helped stem the damage.

But India’s outreach has been poor after the CAA. Jaishankar’s cancellation of meetings with U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) because the delegation included Ms. Pramila Jayapal, for instance, has angered Democrats in the United States to the point where Jayapal now has another 10 legislators co-sponsoring her resolution in the Congress, seeking a return to normalcy in Kashmir at the earliest. It is not clear that India still enjoys the kind of bipartisan support in the U.S. as it did in the last 15 years.

This comes on top of Modi’s statement, “Ab ki baar Trump Sarkar,” which has not gone down well with Democrats. It would have been better for Modi to not poke his head into the internal politics of another country. The U.S. relationship is absolutely critical in managing the China issue and it will be a challenge to get it back to even keel, especially if a Democrat wins the White House in November.

It is unclear how the India-Japan relationship has been affected. The annual summit, originally slated to take place in Guwahati in December 2019, was postponed because of CAA-related protests. This has been an annual feature for more than a decade and it is possibly the first time that the summit meeting has been skipped.

India’s democracy and stability plays at least a supporting role in India’s partnerships, and even uncertainty can hurt these relations. While India has faced many external difficulties in the past, they have rarely been the result of domestic politics. Handling these new challenges could be much more difficult than the Indian government assumes.

India and Australia Defense Relations: Towards a Common Vision of an Open Indo-Pacific Region? - The Diplomat, 20 September 2019

I have been a little behind in updating my blog but I am trying it up to date. Two weeks ago, in my column for The Diplomat, I focused on the growing closer defence relations between India and Australia and the potential for the two countries in stabilising the Indo-Pacific. I argue that despite differences that remain, there is clear evidence of growing strategic convergence by both countries in the security realm.

After decades of being indifferent to each other, India and Australia have recently emerged as close strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. This is evident in the number of high level visits and the number of joint military exercises between the two countries. Indian Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh was in Australia in early September, and the Indian Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh, is slated to visit Australia in November.

The shift in the relationship, both in terms of the tone and direction, is remarkable. This is primarily led by a common concern about a rising China and its strategic consequences on the Indo-Pacific strategic order. But there have been concerns about whether the two countries are on the same page: as Frederic Grare says in a 2014 paper, it is not clear if the common concerns have materialized into a shared approach in addressing the China factor.

For the full post, click here.



Clearly, even as different countries have concerns about China, their concerns have been defined by local and often differing national interests and perspectives. Australia worries about China’s role and presence in the Pacific whereas India’s concerns are more to do with China’s increasing influence and activities in the Indian Ocean. And on the Indian Ocean, Australian analysts see little convergence and alignment of thinking with India. David Brewster for one, argues that “Australia is likely to be less willing to recognize any Indian claims of a ‘predominant’ maritime role in the Indian Ocean, much less any Indian sphere of influence in the north-east Indian Ocean.” But it is more important for India and Australia to come together in upholding rule of law, rules based order, respect human rights and establish norms of responsible behavior.

Despite this apparent mismatch in the thinking between the two capitals, maritime security concerns about the broad Indo-Pacific region has been gaining greater traction. The joint naval exercise, AUSINDEX, is a manifestation of this synergistic approach to maritime security. The third iteration held in April this year was the biggest so far between the two navies. Held off the coast of Visakhapatnam in southern India, it saw the participation of the highest number of units of the two countries so far including four frontline ships with integral helicopters, one submarine and a variety of aircraft including P8I and P8A long-range Maritime Reconnaissance Anti-Submarine Warfare aircraft. The exercise involved all three dimensions comprising anti-submarine warfare exercises, air defense exercises, and anti-surface warfare exercises. In a first, fifty-five American and twenty New Zealand military personnel were present to witness the exercise. According to an Indian government statement, “the increased scale of participation signifies the importance attached to the exercise by both countries while the enhanced complexity is indicative of the interoperability between the two navies.”

Therefore, it is clear that both New Delhi and Canberra have come a long way in their strategic engagements in a very short span of time, even if it has not advanced as fast as some observers would like to see. But this relationship will only further intensify in the coming years given that the common threat of a hegemonic China is unlikely to disappear anytime soon. It is quite likely that both countries will come to appreciate the increasing relevance of working together on a number of areas including maritime security, the establishment of a blue economy, infrastructure and connectivity initiatives, and strategic industry collaboration. The security dialogue, political consultations and bilateral and multinational military exercises can be expected to gain further depth and appreciation in both capitals. In addition, developing a common approach to certain ideas and principles like free, open and transparent Indo-Pacific is important.

Such strategic engagements will receive a major fillip with the visit of the Indian defense minister to Australia later this year. Reports suggest that India and Australia are likely to sign a number of important agreements including the mutual logistics support agreement, an information exchange agreement and a broader maritime agreement. A report citing diplomatic sources said that “These will lead to greater interoperability and help in elevating the strategic partnership.”

The logistics agreement has been in the discussion phase for a few years now and Australia is reported to have given India a draft text in 2016. It should be noted that India took more than a decade to finalize and conclude such an agreement with the United States. Ever since the LEMOA was concluded with the United States in 2016, it appears that India is getting a lot more comfortable with such agreements. Since 2016, India has signed two such agreements, one with France and a second one with South Korea, just a few weeks ago. These agreements go to enhance the interoperability between the militaries of the two countries, and simplify the process of using each other’s military facilities.

Maritime security cooperation, especially the information sharing arrangement, will help both sides to gain a better strategic awareness picture of the Indo-Pacific region. These have been on the bilateral agenda for some time – these were identified as elements in the India-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s visit to India in 2009 as well as the Framework for Security Cooperation between India and Australia of 2014.

It is clear that the India-Australian strategic relationship has some way to go yet. But despite understandable disappointments about the slow pace, there are also advances being made.

China in South Asia for Peace & Stability?

Many security analysts have often asked the question as to why India's rise is benign whereas China's rise seen as a threat? However, recently, I came across an entirely different argument as to how Chinese rise & rising influence in South Asia can bring about peace. A recent article written by a former foreign service officer argued that "the rise in China's influence in the region can lead to peace and regional stability provided we [India] eschew outdated notions of "sphere of influence."" I fail to understand the logic. He went on to argue that "On the contrary, a struggle will inevitably ensue if India chooses to contest China's growing influence since the quintessence of that choice will be that India is prepared to sacrifice peace and stability in the region in its quest for regional primacy. Our South Asian neighbours will only see our choice as a quest for regional hegemony and they cannot be expected to accommodate hubris."

Now that China has become the second largest economic power, should we sit back & just relax and say our destiny, our future rest in the hands of China? The Chinese being the second largest power, will have greater interests across the continents, but does this mean India adopt a defeatist strategy and say our future lies with China and China alone? Is that a good idea?

The full article is available here.



South Asia beckons China

M.K. Bhadrakumar

A peaceful South Asia can be built only if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples.

An Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia in the State Department in Washington a decade-and-a-half ago once took justifiable pride that she only needed a clutch of minutes to get the Indians all worked up into a tizzy. What the loquacious U.S. diplomat, who was an old India-Pakistan hand familiar with the human frailties (and vanities) in our part of the world, meant was that Indians never bothered to crosscheck facts when they came across an unpalatable thought.

She had a point. And her adage holds good. When an opinion piece by the U.S. strategic analyst, Selig Harrison, appeared in the New York Times recently alleging large-scale Chinese military presence in the Northern Areas of Pakistan, history seemed to repeat itself. Our tribal instincts resurfaced. It still remains foggy on what basis Mr. Harrison painted the apocalyptic vision of war drums beating distantly in the obscure Himalayan mountains. The regions beyond the northern edges of Kashmir comprise tangled, inaccessible mountains and it is highly improbable that Mr. Harrison wrote on the basis of any first-hand information regarding the 22 secret tunnels in which 11,000 Chinese soldiers belonging to the People's Liberation Army reportedly huddle uneasily alongside stockpiles of deadly missiles that could be launched against India. (Actually, the Pakistani authorities have invited him to go to that picturesque region and take a good look himself.)

Not much ingenuity is needed to discern that Mr. Harrison based his opinion piece on intelligence sources. All he would say later was that his story was based on “western and regional intelligence sources.” Who could be these sources? Politics should, after all, begin with asking a few blunt questions. Were these sources Pakistani, Afghan, Iranian, Russian or Chinese who guided Mr. Harrison? Seems illogical. Were they Indian sources based in Delhi — or Indian “analysts” comfortably located in Singapore? Indeed, by a process of elimination, we arrive at the conclusion that the greatest likelihood seems to be that Mr. Harrison's sources were American. This of course is by no means casting aspersions on Mr. Harrison's integrity. In fact, he has been most candid about his thesis when he concluded his opinion piece with a stirring call to the U.S. administration. He wrote: “The United States is uniquely situated to play a moderating role in Kashmir, given its growing economic and military ties with India and Pakistan's aid dependence on Washington.

“Washington should press New Delhi to resume autonomy negotiations with Kashmiri separatists. Success would put pressure on Islamabad for comparable concessions in Free Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan … Precisely because the Gilgit-Baltistan region is so important to China, the U.S., India and Pakistan should work together to make sure that it is not overwhelmed … by the Chinese behemoth.”

Both Islamabad and Beijing have since repeatedly and unequivocally refuted the contents of Mr. Harrison's article. Top Indian officials who have full access to intelligence have also off-the-record given their estimation that any Chinese presence in the Gilgit-Baltistan region could be related to flood-relief work and some development projects and it doesn't involve Chinese regulars of the PLA. They are also inclined to accept the Chinese assurance that there is no change in Beijing's stand on the Kashmir issue, including the part of Kashmir that is under Indian governance.

Equally, in their assessment, Chinese nationals are not taking up habitation in Gilgit-Baltistan, but come to the region from time to time to build infrastructure projects and they go away upon the completion of those projects. Delhi regards the figure of $1.7 billion as Chinese investment in Northern Areas and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as far-too inflated a figure. As a senior Indian official put it “They [the Chinese] are a business-like people and they won't invest in that kind of area like that.”

Evidently, there is a glaring disconnect in New Delhi between those who know and generally prefer not to speak and those who rave but have no flair or patience for checking the facts on the ground. The problem with disregard of facts is that incrementally you withdraw into a smaller and smaller coil of rage and ultimately resign yourself to a sense of powerlessness, frustration and defeat. Should that be the fate of a great country like India that has survived for millennia?

Ultimately, it all boils down to China's presence in the South Asian region and, as the Prime Minister put it the other day, “we have to reflect on this reality, we have to be aware of this.” The issue is: what is the nature of the “reality” so that we can come to terms with it?

The reality is China's growing power and influence that need to be tackled in regional politics. The security of our region and its future will significantly depend on the choices that China makes. Having said that, we too have choices to make. Even if India fails to overtake China economically, it will nonetheless be the second-strongest regional power and will be the most serious constraint on Chinese power. That is to say, the manner and the directions in which India chooses to use its power is going to be no less important than China's actions in their impact on regional stability.

Of course, our choices are going to be harder than China's. The heart of the matter is that a stable, peaceful South Asia can only be built if India works with China. The alternative will be war and mayhem and history provides many examples. The point is, there is a fundamental choice involved here — the choice between “influence” and stability. India and China are on the same side — both want influence and neither seeks instability.

However, we cannot insist that regional stability is synonymous with India's primacy. The international community will only mock at us if we do so in this era of globalisation. As, for that matter, was the region in a blissful state of stability even in the halcyon days when India's influence reigned supreme? In short, the rise in China's influence in the region can lead to peace and regional stability provided we eschew outdated notions of “sphere of influence.” On the contrary, a struggle will inevitably ensue if India chooses to contest China's growing influence since the quintessence of that choice will be that India is prepared to sacrifice peace and stability in the region in its quest for regional primacy. Our South Asian neighbours will only see our choice as a quest for regional hegemony and they cannot be expected to accommodate hubris.

Alas, a segment of our strategic community seems to think that South Asia can be peaceful only under Indian tutelage. It perceives China's desire to expand its influence in the region as inherently threatening. But what is the alternative? China has already grown to be the second biggest economic power in the world. With such economic power, political and strategic power inexorably follows. To quote from a recent thoughtful essay by well-known Australian scholar Hugh White, “China's power, controlled by China's government, must be dealt with as a simple fact of international politics. If Americans deny the right to exercise its power internationally within the same limits and norms that they accept for themselves, they can hardly be surprised if China decides not to accept the legitimacy of American power and starts pushing back. These days it can push back pretty hard.”

Again, all evidence so far points to a distinct pattern that China wishes to expand its influence in South Asia without breaking international law or the rules set out in the Charter of the United Nations. China has not used its power improperly. The fact that China has growing ambitions to develop communication links via South Asia to the world market bypassing the Malacca Strait (which is an American “choke-point”) or that China aspires to explore the vast untapped potential for regional trade and investment in South Asia do not make the Chinese policies illegitimate. Our dilemma is that we are used to exercising a level of regional primacy in the neighbouring countries and we may have come to regard it almost as a mark of our national identity. Clearly, the instinct to “fight” to keep our perceived regional primacy stems from a wrong notion.

The rise of China's influence doesn't have to be a story of India's weakness but can remain a story of Chinese strength. What is it, arguably, that prevents Indian companies even today from spreading wings to the mountains, jungles and beaches of Nepal, Myanmar or Sri Lanka with the gusto with which the Chinese businessmen are doing? Last week, Yunnan commenced direct flight to Colombo. Why is it that a Raipur-Colombo air link remains “uneconomical?”

Nothing like this Chinese “challenge” ever happened before in the South Asian region. Japan or America or Britain could have mounted it in these six decades, but they didn't. But then, they weren't South Asia's neighbours. China is a neighbour.