India-Iran-Uzbekistan Pursue Central Asian Connectivity - The Diplomat, 18 December 2020

In my column for The Diplomat this week, I looked at India-Iran-Uzbekistan plans for Central Asian connectivity.  The region has its fair share of great power politics, but the Iranian port of Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India's favor.   

India, Iran, and Uzbekistan have held their first trilateral meeting for possible joint use of Chabahar port. The meeting was chaired jointly by India’s Secretary of Shipping Sanjeev Ranjan, Uzbekistan’s Deputy Minister of Transport Davron Dehkanov, and Iran’s Deputy Transport Minister Shahram Adamnejad. Using Chabahar port for trade and transit purposes as well as strengthened regional connectivity were the key agenda items at the meeting. India’s keenness to explore this option comes from its desire to extend connectivity into Eurasia. Double landlocked Uzbekistan has also been interested in using the port for transit facilities into the Indian Ocean and as a means to expand its trade and transit options. That Uzbekistan has already developed rail connectivity into Afghanistan as a means to link with Iranian railway lines reflects Tashkent’s seriousness. Other Central Asian states like Kazakhstan have also been interested in exploring such options.  

For the full post, click here.  

Given the geostrategic location of Central Asia, the region is also witnessing a fair share of great power competition. While the region is viewed as Russia’s immediate backyard and Moscow has traditionally maintained a dominant role in relations with Central Asia, China has steadily strengthened its footprint. India has also been pursuing both geopolitical and economic ties with the region. 

Chabahar has the potential to shift some of the regional dynamics in India’s favor. First, it could prove to be a gateway to Central Asia and Eurasia, which can, most importantly, avoid Pakistan. A year ago, the Trump administration exempted India from sanctions for the development of the port because of the benefits it potentially had for both India and Afghanistan. A Trump administration official said, “We have provided a narrow exemption for the development of Chabahar that allows for the construction of the port and rail line that allows for the export of refined oil products to Afghanistan.” 

This week’s trilateral meeting is reported to be an outcome of last week’s India-Uzbekistan bilateral summit between India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This is clearly an effort at exploring an alternate option for Central Asia to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India has long historic connections to Central Asia, but its relations with the region waned for a number of reasons, most importantly the partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Pakistan, which blocked Indian access to the region. Since coming to office, Modi has made fresh efforts to re-establish linkages with the region, calling Central Asia a part of the country’s extended neighborhood. 

But lack of physical connectivity has proven to be a major hurdle in building trade and economic ties. Modi became the first Indian leader to travel to all five Central Asian republics – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – in 2015. In addition to energy security cooperation, India and Central Asia have both shunned Islamic terrorism and extremist ideology. Fighting cross-border terrorism has become an important common issue shaping their agenda. India has also been stepping up defense cooperation with the region, with a defense attaché posted in each of the Indian missions in Central Asia. Among the Central Asian republics, Uzbekistan has emerged as one of the more proactive players in its engagement with India. The two countries signed a civil nuclear agreement in January 2019, under which Uzbekistan agreed to supply India with uranium.  

Regional connectivity and infrastructure projects have also been high on Uzbekistan’s agenda. Seeing Chabahar port as a connectivity solution for Uzbekistan is not new either. In fact, in June 2018, following an earlier meeting between Modi and Mirziyoyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, then-Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said the two leaders were keen to use Chabahar port as an additional connectivity route.  

Not surprisingly, at last week’s bilateral summit meeting between India and Uzbekistan, infrastructure and connectivity projects figured prominently. The two countries signed nine agreements including on counterterrorism and infrastructure-related issues. Both Modi and Mirziyoyev agreed to pursue connectivity projects via the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). INSTC is a multi-modal infrastructure initiative spanning around 7,200 km. It encompasses a network of ship, rail and road routes for transporting freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Central Asia, Azerbaijan, and Europe, with the goal of creating transport linkages among major cities including Astrakhan, Baku, Bandar Abbas, Moscow, and Mumbai. Feasibility studies undertaken so far has shown significant reduction of transportation costs, to the tune of $2,500 per 15 tons of cargo. India is “pitching for” Uzbek participation in the INSTC connectivity project.  

India’s push with the trilateral arrangement for Uzbekistan to use Chabahar port is important in the context of expanding bilateral, trilateral, as well as broader regional cooperation. But more significantly, it is a geopolitical move aimed at countering growing Chinese influence in the region. India has capacity issues in this regard compared to China, but New Delhi is planning on cashing in on existing projects to expand its reach and linkages so that the Central Asian republics have an alternative to China’s BRI.  

Xi’s Visit Exposes the Limits of China-Nepal Strategic Convergence - The Diplomat, 17 October 2019

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at the Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Nepal. It appears that despite the interests both sides have for better ties, there are real limits and challenges to this.

Last week, as expected, Chinese President Xi Jinping stopped in Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, for a state visit on his way back to China after an informal summit with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

Xi’s Nepal trip itself came as no surprise: China has been attempting to woo India’s smaller neighbors in South Asia, and there is clearly interest among some including Nepal to use the Sino-Indian competition for their own benefits. But Xi’s trip also showed the limits of these converging interests. Indeed, the lack of progress on issues, with an extradition agreement not signed being a case in point, reinforces the fact that any alignment has its limits despite the strategic interests that both Nepal and China see in the wider relationship.

For the full essay, click here.



The mutual attraction between Nepal and China is easy enough to understand. From Beijing’s perspective, Nepal is important for a few strategic reasons. For one, Nepal borders China’s Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Though Tibet is relatively quiet, China always worries about the possibility of a resurgence of Tibetan nationalism. Though the largest chunk of Tibetan refugees lives in India, Nepal also hosts about 20,000 Tibetan exiles. Any disturbance in Tibet will likely have some reverberations in Nepal too.

Thus, China is concerned about ensuring that the Tibetan exile population in Nepal does not become an issue of concern. This appears to have been the primary reason why China was pushing for an extradition treaty with Nepal. This also makes good relations with Nepal an important means of managing any future problems in Tibet itself.

In addition to this direct linkage, China also has more general and obvious balance of power considerations in befriending Nepal. As a small South Asian neighbor of India, Nepal affords the opportunity to balance India within the region itself. Nepal’s relations with India, which had its ups and downs, makes Kathmandu a potentially attractive partner for Beijing. There is nothing unusual in this because this is at least part of the reason for Beijing’s outreach to all of India’s smaller neighbors. And of course, India returns the favor, trying to partner with China’s own smaller neighbors such as Vietnam.

A third reason for China’s interests in Nepal is China’s drive to develop the Belt and Road scheme, both as a means of exporting Chinese capital and labor but also expanding its interests. China has discussed several BRI projects with Nepal, including a railroad that would link Lhasa and Kathmandu as well as a Parliament building, National Defence University, and other infrastructure projects.

Nepal also has some interest in developing this partnership with China. For one, a closer relationship with China makes India a lot more receptive to Nepali concerns. Nepal, like India’s other neighbors, has complaints about the lackadaisical manner in which New Delhi approaches development projects in Nepal. Chinese help with infrastructure kills two birds with one stone. It potentially helps Nepal develop economic infrastructure – China has been very efficient in completing such projects, especially in comparison to India – while also putting pressure on India to pay greater attention to Nepali connectivity requirements. Seen from this perspective, having two great powers competing for Nepal’s attention will not be entirely unwelcome in Kathmandu.

In addition, Nepal, a small, landlocked country, also feels vulnerable to Indian pressures. India has been known to impose blockades on Nepal because much of Nepal’s international trade either originates in India or passes through Indian territory. The most recent of these blockades was in 2015, when India imposed an unofficial blockade in an ill-advised move to pressure Kathmandu over what was perceived by India to be discrimination against the Madhesi population in the new Nepali constitution. Though it appears somewhat impractical, Nepal would like to reduce its dependence on India by building trade and transit linkages through China. At the very least, closer linkages with China might make India more careful antagonizing Nepal.

But the strategic interests both sides have for better ties does not mean that there are not limits and challenges for relations. Indeed, if anything, Xi’s visit to Nepal, which saw the relative lack of substantive outcomes despite the hype, reinforced this reality. Despite the seeming attractiveness of the China partnership, there appears to be some disquiet within sections of the Nepali elite about getting too close to China as well as other dangers such as the potential debt-trap by way of involvement in the BRI. India’s unwillingness is also possibly an issue, because as Constantino Xavier, a close observer of India’s relations with its neighbors, has pointed out, one of the projects was meant to be a Sino-Nepalese-Indian, which India is now reluctant to pursue.

All this suggests that mutual interests by itself may not be sufficient to power China-Nepal relations. Negotiating the terms of actual deals, domestic national concerns, as well as the fear of getting dragged into the Sino-Indian competition, are all likely to limit how close India’s neighbors such as Nepal will get to China.

India and the Maldives: Back on Track? @ The Diplomat, 30 November 2018

In this week's column for the Diplomat, I wrote on the changing dynamics in the India-Maldives relations. Clearly, the recent changes have provided an opening for both sides to recalibrate ties.

With a new government under President Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in office, the Maldives appears ready to get its relationship with India back on track.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi made his maiden visit to the Maldives earlier in the month for the swearing in ceremony of Solih. A joint statement signed by the two leaders noted the “importance of maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean and being mindful of each other’s concerns and aspirations for the stability of the region,” a clear reference to recent controversies in their relationship.


Solih also used the opportunity to apprise Modi of the urgent assistance needed in the areas of housing and infrastructure as well as setting up water and sewerage systems in the remote islands.

For the full article, click here.



Following tradition and highlighting India’s importance to the Maldives, the new president will be visiting India on December 17. Within a few days of Modi’s visit, a number of Maldivian ministers and officials visited India, including Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid, Finance Minister Ibrahim Ameer, Economic Development Minister Fayyaz Ismail, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Ahmed Khaleel, and Foreign Secretary Abdul Ghafoor Mohamed.

There are definitely some signs of a fresh beginning. The Ministry of External Affairs in a statement, following the foreign minister’s visit, said that “India attaches highest importance to its relationship with the Maldives which is marked by trust, transparency, mutual understanding and sensitivity.” Further, Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj noted that as per India’s “Neighborhood First Policy,” India “stands ready to fully support the Government of Maldives in its socio-economic development.” The statement further noted that Maldivian Foreign Minister Abdulla Shahid had reiterated his government’s “India First” policy and had said that his government looks forward to working closely with the government of India on all issues.

The two ministers discussed defense and security cooperation and scheduled the next meeting of the Defense Cooperation Dialogue between India and the Maldives in the first half of December 2018. The foreign minister also noted that the Maldives has asked India for a Dornier aircraft and the MEA has also “promised that it would be delivered soon.”

These developments are significant because the Maldives under the previous Abdullah Yameen regime seemed to be slipping into China’s orbit. For instance, the Maldives had signed a new law permitting developers to own islands on lease for development for a period of 99 years. Subsequently, a Chinese company took control of Feydhoo Finolhu, an uninhabited island close to Male and its international airport, on a development lease for 50 years for $4 million.

The current finance minister is also now finding out that China is running “most of these projects (are) at inflated price” but many of them are now completed, which means these are fait accompli. But the new government is reviewing every project that is yet to be completed. For instance, a Male hospital project given to China has already cost $140 million, whereas a rival cost estimate was just $54 million.

The two countries also signed free trade agreement (FTA), which took India by total surprise and one that could have longer term implications for India. In addition to the strategic concerns, India has worries that Chinese goods dumped in Maldives could find its way into India.

The negative impact of the China FTA for the Maldives is huge too. Mohamed Nasheed, former Maldivian President and now adviser to Solih, recently said the trade imbalance is quite enormous and called the FTA “very one-sided” arrangement. Chinese companies also benefited disproportionately, pouring in large sums of money into infrastructure projects, including upgrading of the airport at a cost of $830 million and building a bridge linking the airport to Male at a cost of $400 million. Beijing now worries that Male will scrap some of the agreements.

Even as the economic component of the relationship is significant to Beijing, it is the geographical location of the Maldives in the Indian Ocean that appears to have been of the greatest interest. With the Maldives endorsing China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Maritime Silk Road, Beijing felt that it had developed better hold and influence over a crucial piece of real estate in the Indian Ocean.

The fact that India enjoyed unparalleled access and influence in many of the Indian Ocean island states, including the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius has been a problem for China. India has been the unofficial security guarantor to these states, providing patrol vessels, helicopters, and military training. So China’s interest in the Maldives was understandable and Beijing was able to secure its interests in Male through the “raw power of financial incentives” to the detriment of Indian interests.

With a new government in the island nation, there is much hope in India that New Delhi and Male will be able to undo some of the damage under the previous regime. Both Modi and Sushma Swaraj, as well as the Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman, have promised significant help to deepen and expand the partnership while helping to prevent Maldives from falling into a possible debt trap with China.

However, like in India’s relations with other smaller neighbors, the key question is one of delivery. India has to be mindful of the fact it is competing with China in many of these projects and India will be judged against China’s accomplishments.

Even though things have turned around for India politically in many of the neighboring countries such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives, New Delhi’s ability to match China in providing economic and infrastructural assistance is open to question. While dealing with smaller neighbors, India also needs to become a lot more magnanimous, staying true to its own “Gujral doctrine,” thus creating greater confidence. India has a great opportunity in the Maldives to demonstrate that it can learn from its previous errors.

Maldives Shock Election: China's Loss and India's Win? - September 28, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I write on the Maldives election results and what they mean for India. I argue that the results are not simply a loss for Beijing or a win for New Delhi. There may be some minor setbacks for China with the new leader, but the reality is that Male cannot cut China lose because of Beijing’s economic capacity to deliver what Male needs. For all the goodwill that India may enjoy in Maldives, New Delhi lacks the material capacity to offset China. India’s track record in establishing infrastructure and regional connectivity networks has not been the best, to put it mildly.





The results of Maldives’ presidential elections on Sunday came as a total surprise to most observers in the Maldives and outside. The Election Commission announced the victory of Ibrahim Mohamed Solih of the Maldivian Democratic Party, who secured 38,484 more votes than the incumbent president, Abdulla Yameen.

The head of the Election Commission stated that there were no election irregularities or complaints that could affect the results. President Yameen conceded defeat on Monday, clearing the path for President-elect Solih. Solih is the joint candidate of the opposition parties: the election saw the coming together of three opposition political parties – the Maldivian Democratic Party, Jumhooree Party, and the religious Adhaalath Party. The president-elect, considered an old-timer in politics, belongs to the Maldivian Democratic Party whereas his deputy, Faisal Naseem, a new face, comes from the Jumhooree Party.

Many newspaper headlines have drawn quick and not-so-correct reading on the impact of the election results. There have been exceptions of course, which called for caution. Still, most of the accounts suggested rather simplistically that the defeat of Yameen is bad news for China and good for India.

In fact, while there may be some minor setbacks for China with the new leader, the reality is that Male cannot cut China lose because of Beijing’s economic capacity to deliver what Male needs. For all the goodwill that India may enjoy in Maldives, New Delhi lacks the material capacity to offset China. India’s track record in establishing infrastructure and regional connectivity networks has not been the best, to put it mildly.

But, certainly, the sizeable anti-India sentiment that prevailed during Yameen’s presidency will be gone. The new government will be forced to do a fine balancing act between India and China, and the Solih Government will have to balance economic and strategic interests.

Nevertheless, China’s foreign ministry in a press briefing responded to a question on Maldives saying that it “congratulates the Maldives on the smooth holding of the presidential election and Mr. Solih on his election as the President. We respect the choice made by the people in the Maldives and hope that the Maldives can maintain stability and development. China and the Maldives enjoy traditional friendship.”

Yamen was seen as particularly close to China and also had a bit of an anti-India streak. During Yameen’s time in office, the China-Maldives economic and investment relations grew at a fast pace, and his tenure also saw the conclusion of free trade agreement between the two. Also, in February there were reports that talked about China’s plans to set up a joint ocean observation station in Makunudhoo, the westernmost atoll, which raised alarm bells in India.

However, a day after the initial reaction from China, Beijing did not shy away from lashing out at opposition leaders in Male, especially Nasheed for apparently “questioning the commercial viability of Chinese projects in the Maldives lacking in transparency and democratic procedures.” In a strongly worded reaction, China’s foreign ministry said, “Whether the cooperation between China and the Maldives can work out or bring benefits to the two countries is all up to what the two countries’ people say. It cannot be smeared by certain individuals.” “We will oppose if certain people harm China’s interests,” it added rather ominously.

Sunday’s election results have the potential to effect some changes internally and externally. Internally, five political prisoners have been released so far and more may be released in the coming days and weeks. Externally, the changes could be significant. Earlier in the year, the former foreign minister Ahmed Naseem reflected on Yameen’s ruling style, suggesting that it “is not just about democracy, it is about peace, security, and stability in the entire Indian Ocean neighborhood.”

To be sure, the new government in Male will want to renegotiate the projects that China is engaged in because, as MDP leader Nasheed said, many believe that “China has pulled his country into a “debt trap” and that a future opposition-led government would renegotiate Chinese loans.”

The current domestic political crisis began with Yameen’s decision to disregard the Maldivian Supreme Court’s ruling in February this year, which called the Government’s imprisonment of opposition leaders a “violation of the constitution and international law.” The court also ordered the government to release the nine opposition leaders including Nasheed. In response, Yameen declared a state of emergency that extended for a period of 45 days, during which he also had two judges, hundreds of activists and opposition leaders including former President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom arrested. Yameen lifted the emergency after 45 days on March 22.

Many opposition leaders, including Nasheed, claimed that Yameen lifted the emergency because by then he had consolidated power, including over judiciary and parliament. Nasheed and many opposition leaders have been in exile since the beginning of the crisis and is now set to return to Male.

India, which has traditionally played an influential role in Maldives, has been perplexed by the recent developments in the run-up to the elections. New Delhi had supported the government of President Gayoom, to the point of squashing an attempted coup against him in 1988 by sending Indian troops. But under Yameen, the country was slipping out of India’s orbit, supporting China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and moving closer to China.

While there may be some cancellations and renegotiations of China-funded projects by the newly elected government, China’s influence in Male is unlikely to reduce significantly because there is simply no one else to replace China. Though India may not like it, it does not have the capacity. Moreover, India’s credibility has been hit because New Delhi was unable or unwilling to do anything concrete despite the repeated pleas from the opposition parties. India has a hard job ahead in overcoming these difficulties.

Why Nepal’s Access to China Ports Matters - September 14, 2018

In this week's column for The Diplomat, I looked at why Nepal's access to China's ports matters. The move deserves attention for its potentially wider significance.



In a surprise move last week, Nepal was granted access to Chinese land and sea ports, ending Kathmandu’s dependence on Indian ports. While the move is just one of several within the bilateral relationship, it nonetheless deserves attention for its potential wider significance.

In March 2016, Kathmandu and Beijing signed a Transit and Transport Agreement (TTA) that promised to provide Nepal access for third party trade through Chinese sea and land ports. The decision to implement the TTA was taken after the two sides signed a TTA protocol in a bilateral meeting in Kathmandu last week. Until now, Nepal had to engage in third party trade through the Indian port in Kolkata in West Bengal (Nepal has a similar access pact with Bangladesh as well).

For the full essay, click here.



The TTA protocol allows Nepal access and use of four Chinese sea ports – Tianjin, Shenzhen, Lianyungang, and Zhanjiang – and three dry ports – Lanzhou, Lhasa, and Xigatse. With the signing of the protocol, Rabi Shankar Sainju, Joint-Secretary at Nepal’s Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Supplies (MoICS) said, “Now we have access to additional ports as an alternative. They can be used in trading with the countries in east and north-east Asia.”

There are considerable infrastructure development issues to be resolved before these can be totally operational, but ending the dependency on India is seen as particularly a “joyful” moment in Kathmandu. India’s “unofficial” blockade in 2015 had a lot to do with Nepal’s open embrace of China since then. The blockade that led to serious hardships for ordinary Nepalese citizens has created large pockets of anti-Indian and correspondingly pro-China sentiments within Nepal.

Though this is a considerable setback for New Delhi, India has been attempting to play harder for Nepalese affections especially in terms of building up infrastructure for Nepal. India is currently in the process of constructing two railway lines and there are three additional lines being planned to beef up Nepal’s options. India is also refurbishing and upgrading four major custom checkpoints at Birgunj-Raxaul, Biratnagar-Jogbani, Bhairahawa-Sunauli and Nepalgunj-Rupediya in addition to expanding and renovating the road network in the Terai region of Nepal. In addition to Kolkata, India has also opened the port of Visakhapatinam to Nepal and there is a small amount of trade taking place through it. Between India and Nepal, there are reportedly 25 crossing points, two integrated checkpoints, and there are two additional checkpoints being developed now.

The latest TTP is one more iteration of the growing Nepal-China multifaceted relationship. And there are clearly strategic consequences to this growing relationship. One important impact of the Nepal-China TTA is that Nepal’s access to Chinese ports will be through six checkpoints at Rasuwa, Tatopani (Sindhupalchok), Korala (Mustang), Kimathanka (Sankhuwasabha), Yari (Humla), and Olangchung Gola (Taplejung). These and other road and railway projects between China and Nepal will allow China to potentially project power against India on a different section of the Sino-Indian boundary, and possibly even outflank Indian military forces at the border.

As a follow-up to an earlier assurance by China to support mega infrastructure projects in Nepal, Nepal’s Minister for Physical Infrastructure and Transport Ramesh Lekhak suggested to his Chinese counterpart that the connectivity projects should be speeded up since Nepal’s endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative. A projected route includes connectivity from Kerung in China all the way to Kathmandu, Pokhara, and Lumbini. Lumbini is just about 100 kilometers from the Indian border state of Uttar Pradesh, making it uncomfortably close to the Indian capital.

The expanded and deepened Nepal-China relationship also restricts India’s own strategic space in its own backyard. The growing profile and role of China in South Asia is becoming more prominent, with Beijing making unprecedented penetration in other countries in the region such as Sri Lanka and Maldives. Despite caught up in a debt-trap diplomacy with China to the point of being forced to lease the Hambantota Port to China for 99 years, Sri Lanka does not appear to have learned any lessons: Colombo has gone back to China for more funds to address its next debt repayment cycle in 2019.

China’s successes leave other major powers in a bit of a quandary. While the United States, Japan, and India are all stepping up their efforts to warn poorer states of the dangers involved in seeking Chinese infrastructure funding, their incapacity or unwillingness to provide any credible alternative means China’s is the only real game in town.

What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?, my this week's column for The Diplomat

"What Does the Modi-Xi Summit Mean for Sino-Indian Relations?," my this week's column for The Diplomat published on Thursday, a day before the informal summit between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Though the interaction between the two leaders is notable, there is reason for skepticism and managing expectations.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to travel to Wuhan in central China for an “informal summit” with the Chinese President Xi Jinping. The visit comes against the backdrop of nearly two years of friction between India and China over a whole host of issues including the Doklam standoff, India’s Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) bid, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

What will the summit between the two leaders produce? Of course, there is no set agenda and it may be a fairly free-wheeling conversation. Given the deep hostility that exists and the anti-India rhetoric that was on display last year during the Doklam crisis, it is not certain that such negative sentiments can be brushed under the rug that quickly.

For the full essay, click here.



The bilateral relationship plummeted to an all-time low in the wake of friction on multiple fronts. But in December last year, two high-level visits from China suggested the need for a fresh review of the relationship. Within a few weeks of each other, both the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and State Councilor Yang Jiechi visited India.

Since early February this year, there have been efforts from the Indian side too – the cancellation of the Dalai Lama’s events in Delhi marking the occasion of 60 years in exile of the Dalai Lama, was the first indication of the Indian outreach to China. In a note to Cabinet Secretary PK Sinha, India’s Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale said it is a “very sensitive time” in India’s bilateral relations with China and therefore, it is “not desirable” for government officials and other leaders to take part in the celebrations of the Tibetan government in exile.

Several weeks later, it was reported that the Indian government had actually informed China about this before advisory was sent out. Informing China appears to have been undertaken to earn some brownie points with Beijing. India’s overtures to China seems like a one-way process as yet, because China is yet to take any reciprocal steps.

The idea of an informal summit was first floated during the visit of the Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale to China on February 23. Modi agreed to the summit in principle when he called Xi to congratulate him on the extension of his tenure in March. Since then, there have been visits by other officials, including India’s National Security Adviser Ajit Doval and Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj, who have fine-tuned various details in preparing for Modi’s summit in Wuhan. In fact, it was Sushma Swaraj, in a joint press conference with the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who announced that Modi will visit China. Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou too travelled to India in April to finalize the summit details.

Even though Modi will be traveling to China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on June 9-10, the Indian leadership took the bold decision to make another earlier visit for the summit. The idea of an informal meeting is not to have a set agenda and engage in a free-flowing conversation between the two leaders. The conversation could include the domestic political and economic climate in both the countries, regional developments like the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and international ones such as the U.S.-China trade war. While it is impossible to predict the outcome of this meeting, the importance and consequence of the state of Sino-Indian relationship for Asian security and stability cannot be ignored.

There is disquiet in New Delhi because China has not demonstrated any reciprocal efforts to pacify India. On the contrary, China has engaged in additional efforts to boost its military forces in the Doklam area, as well as in other areas along the disputed Sino-Indian border. Construction of a new road and military posts (at least two) in Shaksgam Valley, north of Siachen Glacier, in the past few months also raises concerns. Shaksgam Valley is located in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and was ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963, although India does not acknowledge this and treats the Valley as part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

This may not yet pose itself as a direct threat to Indian armed forces deployed in Siachen Glacier, Nonetheless, the Chinese action was described by the former Indian army Northern Army Commander Lt. Gen. DS Hooda as a “provocative” step.

There is thus considerable skepticism in India about the summit. Progress on the bilateral front will be judged on whether Beijing shows some sensitivity to Indian concerns on the BRI and CPEC, on India’s NSG bid, and on terrorism. China’s rising influence and growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean are of concern to India and China has not acted to reassure India about China’s long-term intentions.

Nevertheless, China appears to believe that India has agreed to the Wuhan summit because New Delhi has recognized the follies of the so-called Indo-Pacific partnership with the United States and Japan and the ill-effects of that strategy on Sino-Indian relations. Some Chinese analysts suggest that many of the frictions in India-China relations are a result of “lack of trust” or “Western instigation.”

But so far, there is also little indication that India will bend. For instance, on the BRI, India has officially stated that “the so-called ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’ violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. “No country can accept a project that ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity,” the statement continues. “We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality, and must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

Indeed Sushma Swaraj reiterated this at the SCO Foreign Minister’s meeting and stated: “Connectivity with SCO countries is India’s priority. We want connectivity to pave the way for cooperation and trust between our societies. For this, respect for sovereignty is essential. Inclusivity, transparency and sustainability are imperative. India has cooperated extensively with the international community for enhanced connectivity.” India has once again refused to endorse the BRI.

All of this, as well as the efforts on both sides to lower expectations, suggest that not much should be expected out of the informal summit. Indeed, beyond some general and temporary stabilization of ties, it is not exactly clear what either side will get out of this meeting.