Managing the AfPak Challenge in US-India Relations - The Diplomat, 9 August 2019

In my column for The Diplomat last week, I wrote on the AfPak challenge in US-India relations and both sides need to carefully manage this issue to avoid damaging the wider relationship, especially as it has other longer term strategic challenges to confront in the broader Asian strategic context.

Indo-U.S. relations have been running into rough weather recently. Trade problems, India’s decision to buy S-400 missiles from Russia, and differences over Iran have all taken a toll. Both sides are gamely working to ensure that these don’t do lasting damage, but a new issue – disagreements over the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its consequences – now threatens to overload the agenda and potentially do serious damage, especially to their common interests in the Indo-Pacific.

It is not clear that their differences over AfPak can be entirely resolved but both sides can take efforts to limit the fallout from these disagreements before it is too late. This does require though that both New Delhi and Washington understand each other’s compulsions in AfPak and recognize that their common interests in the Indo-Pacific are more important.

For the full essay, click here.



After almost two decades of fighting to keep the Taliban out, Washington is understandably exhausted. There is little hope that that the United States can win the war and even lesser hope that it can strengthen Afghan government forces sufficiently that they can contain the Taliban without American assistance. So, the choice the United States faces is to stay on for the foreseeable future or try and cut a deal with the Taliban to withdraw with a modicum of grace.

Added to this is President Trump’s domestic compulsion. Americans are weary of the war, and have been for some time. Barack Obama promised to get the United States out of Afghanistan but was unable to do so. President Trump, who came to power complaining of the costs of the United States’ over-commitments abroad is even more motivated. With the election campaign beginning, and the election itself fifteen months away, he appears intent on succeeding where his predecessor failed.

The key problem is that it is unlikely that the United States can withdraw from Afghanistan without Pakistan’s support and cooperation. Though the Taliban in Afghanistan is a diverse and a somewhat less than unified force, it does appear clear that Pakistan has sufficient control over them to ensure that no negotiations can take place without the good offices of Islamabad. Trump has been critical of Pakistani behavior in the past, and Washington in general, is well aware of the history of Pakistani duplicity.

Moreover, the Taliban’s commitments that they will not allow Afghanistan to be used for terrorist activities against the United States and the West is a laughable proposition. Once the United States withdraws, there is little that Washington can do to ensure that a Taliban government will live up to the promises they make. Nevertheless, these commitments are a useful fiction that provides cover for Washington to blame that they have withdrawn honorably.

If the United States’ imperative is understandable, so is India’s. If the Taliban come back to power in Afghanistan, there is little doubt that Islamabad will be able to use Afghan territory to, once again, base anti-India terrorists there. With India demonstrating that it now has the political willingness to strike terror camps in Pakistan, Pakistan’s incentive for exploiting Afghan territory is even greater.

Though India’s interests in preventing a Taliban takeover is clear, its options are limited. India appears to have done little to build up any specific source of support of proxies within Afghanistan, to give India any voice in the negotiations for the U.S. withdrawal. What this means is that while the Taliban might give at least some paper guarantee to the United States about non-use of its territory for international terrorism purposes, India cannot even expect that. New Delhi would prefer that the U.S. forces stay on in Afghanistan but that is not likely. And nobody gives much heed to India’s mantras like “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned” process.

A key question is how the disagreement between the United States and India on Afghanistan and Pakistan’s role in it can be managed. Washington and President Trump personally are not likely to look at any Indian efforts to slow down or sabotage the U.S. withdrawal very kindly. Equally, New Delhi is likely to be more than a bit peeved if the United States facilitates Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, especially with Pakistan’s assistance. Thus, there is little doubt that when it comes to the AfPak, the Indian and American interests are directly contradictory.

What is worrying is the possibility that these disagreements will bleed into other areas and affect cooperation in critical areas, especially the Indo-Pacific. Though there are disagreements between India and the United States on how to balance China in the Indo-Pacific, these are relatively minor. But unhappiness over AfPak can raise issues of dependability about the other in both capitals. There are already increasing concerns in Washington about whether the United States was wise to bet on India; and in New Delhi, concerns about American dependability have never been far from the surface. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient maturity on both sides to continue cooperating on one area while they have significant differences in another.

Anti-terror Ties Bridge US-India Gap

Here's a link to a story on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to the US by Peter Brown that has quoted me. The story appeared in the Asia Times Online (November 24).

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is in the United States for a state visit as many Indians are finding US President Barack Obama's treatment of India less friendly and perhaps more unpredictable than the approach of former president George W Bush.

"We understand America's tactical compulsions. What we don't understand is what is its big strategy," a senior Indian official told the Times of India.



However, with the first anniversary of the last year's November 26 terrorist attack on Mumbai fast approaching, events over the past few days may reshuffle the deck as far as Manmohan's priorities are concerned. Manmohan, who arrived on Monday morning for a visit that will culminate in dinner at the White House on Tuesday, has accused Pakistan of not doing enough given that the Mumbai conspiracy originated there. He repeated that charge shortly after touching down in the US.

His remarks - along with the arrest in Italy last week of two alleged supporters of the plot, as well as the arrest by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) last month of two men in Chicago allegedly linked to the group blamed for the atrocity - add to the possibility that the Mumbai attack may emerge as the core mission for Manmohan's visit to the US.

US Central Intelligence Agency director Leon Panetta's short visit to India last week highlighted how volatile this situation is becoming. He went there to discuss, among other things, possible ties between the Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan and the two men recently arrested by the FBI in Chicago: David Coleman Headley, a US citizen of Pakistani origin, and Tahawwur Hussain Rana, a Canadian. Any alleged involvement of a US citizen in the Mumbai attack not only broadens the scope of the conspiracy but brings ongoing US domestic counterterrorism activities and FBI surveillance data into focus.

"We have been working hand-to-hand, shoulder-to-shoulder, hour-by-hour in cooperating and sharing information with India's government on a daily, weekly and monthly basis," said US Ambassador to India Timothy Roemer at a news conference at the US embassy in New Delhi. Voice of America reported that Roemer "declined to discuss how Washington would react to any extradition request by [India]".

Manmohan will no doubt seek assurances from the Obama administration that the US "will exert considerable pressure on Islamabad to meet its UN-mandated anti-terror obligations, and, credibly prosecute the ideologues and perpetrators directly tied to the carnage," said Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Samuels International Associates in Washington, DC.

"As the US concentrates minds in Islamabad to fight the necessary fight for Pakistan's own survival, a price ought not to be paid in New Delhi," said Gupta.

While India can count on many friends in Washington, Obama's unfortunate omission of India altogether from his recent speech in Tokyo had left many in India wondering about the current US position on India.

"While the Bush administration may have recognized India not only as a regional power but also as a potential global power and as a strong pillar in the new and evolving Asian strategic framework, this view may not hold true under the Obama administration," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in Security Studies at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi. "Despite the popular perception of the relative decline of US power, the US continues to be the sole superpower, and India believes that it is in its best interests to have a strengthened partnership with the US."

Some analysts blame India for its apparent inability or failure to craft a corresponding comprehensive US strategy of its own.

"No thinking has been ever done in India as to what it expects out of a long-term strategic relationship with the US. It is always the US which decides what it will give to India, and it is New Delhi which accepts," said Bahukutumbi Raman, director of the Institute for Topical Studies in Chennai. "What passes for analysis in India is just wishful thinking."

Since the US does not depend on India in any matter, no actual quid pro quo relationship - let alone a viable strategic partnership - was ever created. Instead, India has been assigned the role of a sub-regional power "whose aspirations of having a status on par with China are unrealistic," according to Raman.

"Nobody in India has realized that, for the first time, the US, Japan and Australia have a leadership which does not rate highly India's potential as an emerging power," said Raman, who has previously stated that Obama is following closely in the footsteps of president Jimmy Carter in terms of presenting the US as confused and soft on important global issues.

The vast majority of Americans are simply unaware of Manmohan, and the importance of his visit escapes them. As the leader of the world's largest democracy, Manmohan has an opportunity to show how India and the US share important geopolitical, economic and environmental objectives. Most of all, Indian and US interests intersect when it comes to dealing with China's rapid economic and military ascent.

"India does not wish to see a hostile relationship between the US and China with destabilizing consequences for the continent," said Rajagopalan. "India needs the US to play a major role in dealing with China and Pakistan, although it is not clear yet whether it will be a positive one."

Although US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton spent several days in India in July and left a strong impression in the process, Gupta stresses that the US needs to do far more to convince India that the US is and will remain a reliable partner. If the US fails to deal with this credibility gap effectively, the US risks "leading others in Asia to question the reliability of the US as a balancer against China. These are not trivial considerations," said Gupta.

"The US must ensure that it does not use India and South Asia-related agenda items as a salve to paper over differences in US-China political/strategic relations. US-India relations must not be a derivative of the US-China relationship but accorded bilateral exclusivity at a minimum."

This is one reason Obama's rather unexpected comments during his trip to Asia about possibly expanding China's role in South Asia created an uproar in India .

"The failure of [Obama] to understand the distrust of China in large sections of Indian civil society has landed the US in a situation in which the considerable goodwill between India and the US created during the administration of his predecessor stands in danger of being diluted by his unthinking words and actions," wrote Raman recently, adding that China has consistently tried to isolate India "by keeping alive the old distrusts and animosities and creating new ones".

The US quickly attempted to amend Obama's remarks. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Williams Burns said that "the US is interested in pursuing the best and healthiest possible partnership with China, but that does not come at the expense of other increasingly important partnerships, particularly our relationship with India."

Obama can now set a more positive tone, according to Gupta, by quickly signing off on an agreement that will allow India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel.

"Parties are close to an agreement on this front. There could be no stronger statement of continuity than continued forward movement on this signature Bush administration initiative, which was vigorously opposed by some who are now in the current administration," said Gupta.

Subrata Ghoshroy, senior associate in the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, identifies several other issues on the "nuclear agenda" that will be discussed, besides reprocessing - "which India wants and the US does not". For example, Manmohan will arrive with his administration's approval of the Nuclear Liability Bill, which will allow India to join the international convention on civilian liability in case of nuclear damage.

"Right now, it is not clear when he will introduce it to the [Indian] parliament," said Ghoshroy. "Nonetheless, it is an important step that will make it easier for US companies to build nuclear plants in India."

US companies are refusing to start construction in India until this legislation, which would immunize US companies in the event of a nuclear accident, is signed into law.

"In a way, this puts the entire onus on India and Indian companies alone and not on the US companies, their technologies or materials," said Rajagopalan. "Neither Russia nor France have demanded such a pact. If and when India signs such an agreement, it will inevitably include all the countries that are involved in the nuclear trade with India. It is not certain how India and the US will find a way out of this muddle."

According to Ghoshroy, the US also wants India to begin negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), as well as make positive statements about the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Manmohan is on record as saying that India's deterrent is credible, so no more tests are necessary anyway.

"India may continue to [attach] the CTBT to a timetable for complete disarmament," said Ghoshroy. "But the US has leverage regarding trade - especially on IT [information technology] and a nuclear deal - that could induce India to sign the CTBT."

Another key area involves a further revising of the denial regime of the US when it comes to the transfer of high-technology. In this regard, more measures on the civilian side are important, including a comprehensive commercial space launch agreement (CSLA) in line with the positive improvements made this summer. Without the CSLA, India cannot enter the lucrative commercial satellite market both for US commercial satellites or third-country satellites with US components.

"On the defense/military side, there is also a strong desire to reach an agreement on a 'Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum' so as to ensure the secrecy of bilateral [intelligence and surveillance, or so-called C4ISR] exchanges. This will enable access to strategically sensitive US weapons systems," said Gupta.

C4ISR is a term used by the US military meaning: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Although the transfer of certain sophisticated technologies from the US to India is easier today, "nothing is going to happen overnight. India is trying to move away from its dependence on Russian equipment, but cost and end-use restrictions are still major challenges in buying American," said Ghoshroy, who added that the biggest near-term purchase for India involves procurement of 126 tactical aircraft worth US$10 billion. US defense giant Lockheed Martin is a strong contender with its F-16s jet fighters.

"There is also accelerated collaboration in missile defense systems. India is seeking 'seeker' technology . It presently has only RF [radio frequency] seekers from Russia, but would like to have infrared technology for longer-range missiles," said Ghoshroy.

India is also increasing its procurement of Israeli defense technology, although the joint Israeli-US Arrow anti-missile system, for example, has not yet been added to the list. Chief of Staff General Deepak Kapoor's recent four-day visit to Israel - now India's top supplier of military hardware - was capped off by completion of the sale of a tactical air defense system to India, among other things.

Other items on the agenda for Manmohan's visit include climate change, Afghanistan, and India's relations with Iran.

Just prior to his departure to Washington, Manmohan met with Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. Manmohan told the Washington Post that because Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the development of nuclear weapons by Iran is not a viable option. In addition, according to Manmohan, the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informed Manmohan a few weeks ago that, "he was not so sure that Iran is definitely working towards a nuclear weapon." Earlier this month, India changed its mind, and declared there was no possibility that India might launch an Iranian satellite in the coming months.

"India cannot play a substantive role with Iran. Although Indian business houses like Tata and Reliance are active in Iran, India's recent votes in the IAEA have irked Iran," said Ghoshroy. "India has also pulled out of ... gas pipeline negotiations under US pressure. They continue to maintain friendly relations, but I doubt they have any real cards to play."

In East Asia, India and the US have always enjoyed good relations with Japan. The US has encountered mixed signals lately from Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and his new government. India is also detecting a shift in attitude in Tokyo, as well as a degree of uncertainty. A few days prior to Obama's arrival in Japan, Indian Defense Minister AK Antony held talks with his Japanese counterpart, Toshimi Kitazawa, in Tokyo, the first visit to Japan by an Indian defense minister since 2006.

According to Gupta, while any uncertainty surrounding the US-Japan alliance "doesn't directly feed into the US-India equation", Manmohan should be quite concerned by Hatoyama's "less than forthcoming attitude". It is expected that Hatoyama will travel to India as early as next month.

"[Previous Japanese leaders] were of a remarkably pro-Indian orientation. Shinzo Abe was extended the 'values based' alliance to include India within his notion of a 'broader Asia'. The Japan-India joint statement on defense cooperation was signed during Taro Aso's premiership," said Gupta. "By this high standard, the Hatoyama folk have been something of a let-down."

The US and India may see differently when it comes to China and Pakistan, but they have mutually beneficial outcomes - and basically share the same vision - for countries including Afghanistan, Myanmar and for the Tibet Autonomous Region. Africa is on that roster, too. As for efforts to secure India a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in particular, little progress is expected during Manmohan's visit.

"I do not expect the US will announce support for India to become a member of the UN Security Council but it should. It is long overdue," said Nicholas Burns, professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He has been a strong supporter of the need for a larger and more inclusive UNSC.

Burns contends that, above all else, the Obama administration has to demonstrate clearly "that India's rise to power is in the strategic interest of the US".

"Due to the number of short-term foreign policy crises confronting the US, such as Afghanistan/Pakistan, and the Iran and North Korea nuclear challenges, for example, the administration has not given much public emphasis to US-India relations," said Burns. "This week's state visit gives them the opportunity to do so. Obama needs to reverse the impression that he cares more about China than India. He needs to articulate a strong and positive vision for the future of US-India ties as his two predecessors did so well."

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the US state of Maine

Indo-US End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA): Advantage or Disadvantage

Here's a story Dr. Satish Misra has done on the Indo-US EUMA, where he has taken opinions from various scholars at Observer Research Foundation including mine.

The opposition to the End-Use Monitoring Agreement (EUMA), concluded between India and the United States during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit last month, has been more or less on expected lines with the opposition parties accusing the Congress-led UPA government of compromising the “sovereignty” and surrendering the vital national interests to the Americans and the ruling combine defending it on grounds of a long-felt need to “diversify” the sources of country’s defence procurement.

Much of the debate also stems from lack of availability of the full text of the EUMA in the public domain which has led to a degree of uninformed articulation by experts as well.



“The EUMA has received contrasting reactions from members of the Indian strategic community because in absence of a declared text, it is difficult to assess the net worth of this agreement,” says Senior Fellow Deba Ranjan Mohanty who has been studying the Indian defence industry over a decade.

In absence of a declared text of the EUMA, the agreement is prone to all kind of interpretations, points out Mr. Mohanty and adds that “while a section of the experts like former Indian Air Force chief Krishnaswamy have criticised or shown reservation towards the agreement, there are others like former Defence Secretary K Subrahmanyam have supported the EUMA.

The opposition to the EUMA is essentially “political”, says ORF Senior Fellow Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan. “Possibly, one can see a point in the Left parties opposition to the EUMA as these parties have always been ideologically opposed to the US and anything which India does with the US, opposition is expected from these quarters”, she points out reminding of the Left’s withdrawal of the support to the UPA government on the issue of Indo-US Nuclear deal.

“But the Bharatiya Janata Party’s opposition to the EUMA is not understandable. If it was in power, it would have concluded a similar agreement”, says Dr Rajagopalan who has been working on “US Military Strategy”.

Till now, the EUMA was applicable on case-to-case basis as and when India bought defence equipment from the US, the agreement, signed during Ms Clinton’s visit, would cover all future defence deals.

Mr. Mohanty says “the EUMA is both good and bad” and lot would depend on how this is put in practice. “On the positive side, this opens up a flow of high tech systems from the US to India. Even if the supplier has a right to sell what it wants to, there is enough scope for India to benefit from flow of technology”.

“This in turn is likely to help the Indian domestic military industrial complex which is being opened up for private participation. The EUMA may contribute to develop private sector into the role of system integrators”, asserts Mr. Mohanty.The whole issue has to be seen in the context of India’s decision to “diversify” its sources of arms procurement, says Senior Fellow Nandan Unnikrishnan.

Mr. Unnikrishnan, who is Euroasia expert at the ORF, says that if the decision has to be implemented then the US figures prominently as one of the sources of defence procurement and India cannot bypass the requirement of EUMA.“ It is a standard requirement for the US companies to be able to sell to any country. If India decided to buy the US military hardware, then it has to sign the EUMA”, says Mr. Unnikrishnan in response to a question whether it is “compulsory”.

On the negative side, the EUMA is designed to preserve the US technology supremacy. Any defence equipment, procured from the US, cannot be used against any of the US allies including Pakistan, points our Mr. Mohanty and adds that in case of a breach of the agreement, the US has the right to withdraw all products and support systems from the recipient country.

Another negative feature is the “birth to death” clause of the EUMA which not only limits the recipient’s necessity to modify any system to suit its operational requirements but also prohibits further innovation, points out Mr. Mohanty saying that it is a “highly restrictive” agreement.

Per say, it need not to be negative to India’s security so long there is no restriction attached to the usage of the equipment to defend India’s interests, says Mr. Unnikrishnan who has studied India-Russia defence relationship closely. Referring to the opposition to the EUMA, Mr. Unnikrishnan avers that this is “new element” to Indian political domain which disturbs “status-quo”. There has been an expression of “concerns” and it is for the Government to ensure that India’s interests are not “compromised”.

To a question if the EUMA compromises Indian “sovereignty”, Dr Rajagopalan says that even after the signing of the agreement, the decision to buy the US military hardware and high-end defence equipment would still vest with New Delhi. Moreover, such agreements have an element of universality. When India sells any military system or equipment to any country, “we also insist on EUMA like agreements”, says Dr Rajagopalan.

India and US build stronger ties in space

Here's a story on Indo-US space cooperation by Peter Brown that has qouted me extensively. The story appeared in (August 06, '09) the Asia Times Online.



Peter J Brown

New rules for India's space program are now in effect with respect to India's access to United States space technology and components - thanks to a Technology Safeguards Agreement (TSA) signed on July 20 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and India's Foreign Minister S M Krishna.

However, many are misreading the full scope and impact of this TSA. Yes, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is now considerably closer to launching US commercial satellites - as well as European commercial satellites with US components - but ISRO still has a long way to go.

According to a US State Department's Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) notice last month entitled, "Licensing

Satellite Components for Launch from India," this new TSA, "effectively changes US Government policy to permit the launch of civil or non-commercial satellites containing US ITAR [International Traffic In Arms]-controlled components on Indian space launch vehicles.

"For the purposes of this policy, 'civil or non-commercial satellites' does not include commercial satellites [communications or otherwise]. Commercial satellites will continue to be subject to a presumption of denial," the DDTC notice stated.

"Presumption of denial" simply means go ahead and submit a license application for export of a commercial satellite with ITAR content, but do not hold your breath because without a high priority US foreign policy interest - ie, extraordinary circumstances - this application is dead on arrival.

"The export from the US of ITAR parts and components to India for incorporation by India into an Indian space vehicle was permitted prior to execution of the TSA," said John Ordway, a partner at Berliner, Corcoran and Rowe, LLP in Washington, DC.

"If misunderstandings were to arise in the DDTC licensing process following execution of the TSA, they would probably arise over what is civil or non-commercial use of a satellite."

An attempt to clarify matters with Anthony Dearth, the DDTC's chief of the Space and Missile Technology Division, was unsuccessful.

"The TSA will ensure monitoring by the US side against any diversion or misuse of equipment or technology," said Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow in security studies at the New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation.

"Negotiations on a possible Indo-US TSA have been underway for the last few years. The US has been insisting on restrictive movement of the payload, constant overseeing and monitoring by the US, and solid firewalls separating civil and military payloads. However, the current agreement is [identical] with what the US has with other countries, [and] is essentially driven by US laws. India did not have much maneuverability in negotiating the details."

According to Rajagopalan, even with this TSA, the profitable market for the launch of US commercial satellites or even third-country commercial satellites with US components remains off limits to India until a separate Commercial Space Launch Agreement (CSLA) is signed. Negotiations continue, but serious differences are not being successfully resolved.

"US communications satellites are part of the US Munitions List [USML], and a separate certification from the US State Department will be required to enable ISRO to launch [them]. The CSLA is still insufficient for some purposes because there is another layer of clearance and certification required," said Rajagopalan.

As David Karl observed in his recent Asia Times Online commentary, "The Clinton trip underscored how the secretary has taken ownership of the India portfolio in the Barack Obama administration, filling an important void at the top levels of the US government that has existed for several years." (See Clinton's India visit a low-key success Asia Times Online, August 5, 2009.)
However, regardless of who owns the India portfolio, many US space companies want the US State Department to be replaced by the US Commerce Department, as they view the latter as more supportive when it comes to commercial satellite exports. These companies also want many existing rules revised if not eliminated entirely, including the removal of commercial satellites from the USML, a measure which is now under consideration by the US Senate after being recently approved by the US House of Representatives.

The new TSA, "represents positive progress in reversing the US's obsolete, arrogant, and counterproductive export control regime. However, much remains to be done, particularly in regard to re-evaluating the classification of space hardware in the context of an overall review of the USML," said Mike Gold, the director of Nevada-based Bigelow Aerospace's Washington DC office and chair of the US Federal Aviation Administration's Export Controls Working Group under the Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee. [1]

However, while India would benefit immensely from this regulatory change, the current legislation on Capitol Hill would still prevent any changes to the USML affecting China.

"Although I understand the politics of the situation, I question the policy of isolation that we are practicing vis-a-vis China, and believe, if nothing else, we need to have a robust discussion as to if this policy is really helping us to achieve our legitimate foreign policy goals," said Gold.

"The legislation does not provide for an ongoing review of the USML or establishing a standing entity to conduct such work. Technology is not static, and, after five years, we will find ourselves with the same problems in terms of the obsolescence of the USML that we are facing today. We must provide for an ongoing review process. Technology will not stop changing, and therefore any finite attempt to review and revise a list like the USML is destined to fail."

Regardless of what happens to the USML, the US government is being constantly pushed and pulled in various directions by different departments which tend to disagree more often than agree on which is the best approach to take in South Asia.

"There has always been internal bickering between various governmental departments - the departments of Defense, Commerce, State, Energy and the National Security Agency - along with big defense [contractors]," said Rajagopalan. "In fact, the Pentagon maintained that the State Department still had a Cold War approach as it relates to its policies to South Asia. On the other hand, the State Department often argued that any arms transfers to India would adversely impact the military balance of the region. Cooperation on space technology could potentially create similar concerns."

According to Sourabh Gupta, senior research associate at Washington, DC-based Samuels International Associates Inc, readers should not underestimate the significance of what took place on July 20.

"Clearly the exchanges between the two countries, rather than the TSA itself, is the more significant factor. The TSA is just an umbrella arrangement that simply opens the door to a host of more specific, contentious but rewarding arrangements," said Gupta. "The exchanges [in the] meantime help build a culture of trust that's value exceeds any one agreement - and can in fact be leveraged across the spectrum of bilateral relations."

"Getting beyond the technology denial regime, imposed by the West ever since [India's] nuclear test in 1974, has been a touchstone of Indian governments ever since - and not merely for enhancing technological competencies," added Gupta.

For one of Ordway's clients based in the United Kingdom, the TSA opens the door to an enticing possibility.

"It means that my UK client that builds remote-sensing satellites that contain ITAR content now can apply for a license from the US State Department to 're-export' such satellites to India for launch on ISRO launch vehicles - again, if the remote-sensing satellites are for civil or non-commercial uses," said Ordway.

"On the other hand, the TSA and DDTC's implementation of the TSA would not permit the launch on an ISRO launch vehicle of a commercial non-US remote-imaging satellite that contains ITAR content."

Besides ISRO, beneficiaries of the TSA might also include any foreign universities that build very small, so-called "pico" satellites with ITAR content, although this is a rare event indeed it would provide an alternative to Russian launch vehicles. It is possible, for example, that the TSA could speed India's deployment of a constellation of small, formation-flying earth observation satellites which would mirror what a few other countries have already placed in orbit.
Still, it is unlikely that US and European commercial satellites will be launched atop ISRO rockets until well into the next decade. Among other things, another potentially enormous political obstacle exists in the form of the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR).

Despite the fact that none of the 17 large commercial communications satellites which were launched in 2008 flew aboard a US-built rocket - France-based Arianespace accounted for almost half the payloads placed successfully in orbit last year - one cannot rule out the possibility that USTR may intercede on behalf of some US-based launch service providers. So, in addition to the tension between the State and Commerce departments over who might become the primary overseer of US satellite exports, one must also be aware that USTR could erect an unwelcome roadblock in the future, too.

Gupta wants to see more details related to liability, insurance, pricing and intrusive monitoring requirements for space launches.

"[When these details] become more widely known, and very difficult political decisions have to be taken in this regard, a more sobering understanding of what high-technology cooperation entails will likely take hold," said Gupta. "We are already seeing some of these issues rearing themselves in New Delhi by way of the recently signed End-User Monitoring Agreement [EUMA] which is small beer compared to the intrusiveness of a CSLA."

Fireworks apparently erupted in the Indian parliament after the EUMA was signed by India and the US at the same time as the TSA. The opposition walked out after asserting that the EUMA which attempts to address sensitive and potentially defense-related high technology transfers in particular was placing Indian sovereignty in jeopardy. (See, For New Delhi, a week that wasn't, Asia Times Online, July 23)

The opposition argued, among other things, that by granting US inspectors unprecedented authority via the EUMA verification process, that a door was perhaps opening for other governments to possibly pursue the same intrusive approach. Foreign Minister Krishna attempted to assure the opposition that their concerns were off target and not supported by the facts.

Ordway views the process underway as eventually placing India in the same boat as Russia and France (Arianespace), assuming that approval of the CSLA takes place.

"But that will just mean that satellites exported to India will be 'normal' and will have the same rules as satellites exported to Russia and France," said Ordway.

Rajagopalan points out that although ISRO represents the civilian side of Indian space research, the level of advancement has created a certain amount of wariness, and raised potential fears of a possible shift underway at ISRO involving its role in direct support of military space programs. And while China has not responded to the signing of the TSA - or the EUMA - per se, any strengthening or streamlining of relations between India and the US will not be taken lightly.

"Beijing will maintain a strict watch on India's advancing defense/space technological ties with the US, Israel or the European countries. As one of the Chinese internal studies brought out, China will continue to undertake various measures to maintain its current strategic leverage in terms of territory, P-5 membership [the United Nations Security Council], and [participation in] the nuclear club, [while retaining] its important diplomatic advantages through its special relationships with India's neighboring countries," said Rajagopalan.

Greater India-US cooperation in space will likely intensify the competition between India and China over the coming years. If India's space sector suddenly surges ahead as a result, this will do more than lightly annoy Beijing.

"[While] high-technology trade and interaction with the US has an inherent sensitivity and strategic component built into it, it [also] signals that Washington is keen to expand and deepen its strategic ties with India," said Gupta. "And further, to the extent that Beijing remains under de facto high-technology embargoes initiated by the West, [US space cooperation with India] signals that strategic cooperation in highly sensitive sectors continues, at minimum, to remain weighted against Chinese interests."

After all, the TSA has emerged at a time when Japan may soon be making significant adjustments to its military space policies, such as becoming more firmly attached to the East Asian US anti-missile network. The fact that a US company is picking up the pace of its launch activities using a remote launch site on an atoll in the western Pacific cannot go unnoticed either. All of this recent activity must have been assessed carefully by Beijing. Finally, the TSA and the atmosphere surrounding it may also bear directly upon the direction and scope of India-Israel joint operations in space.

"[Although] it might be a bit premature to speak definitively about it, much of recent cooperation has been in the defense and military technologies area - both in platforms and sub-systems. And much of it has been a one-way flow, ie from Jerusalem to New Delhi," said Gupta. "The TSA potentially opens the door to endowing greater depth to India's high-technology sector which, in time, could entail spillover effects in the area of cooperative Israel-India ventures in space. To the extent that TSA also binds the US-India relationship in a greater bond of trust, Washington might also take a more forthcoming view to Indo-Israeli technology-sharing in more sensitive sub-system areas. This will have beneficial implications both on the commercial and military side for India."

Rajagopalan agrees that the TSA will further strengthen and seed India-Israel initiatives, too.

"The two countries have been cooperating in the space sector and in 2008, ISRO launched an Israeli spy satellite. The TSA can establish trilateral cooperation in this arena," said Rajagopalan.

Still, Gupta points to an important domestic dimension to all of this space-related activity in India. One possible snag lurks beneath the surface.

"[The vague sense/hope in India is that] high-technology cooperation will inevitably and tacitly translate on the military side too, particularly on the missile development and space side," said Gupta, who went on to emphasize a possible misunderstanding that looms large here in terms of any ongoing cooperation.

"Washington and the Democratic [Obama] administration are likely to be ultra-careful this time after the experience of the late-1990s vis-a-vis China. There is always the danger that demands for intrusiveness [stemming from] such cooperation with India will be hard to stomach domestically in the rabble that is New Delhi politics."

Note
1. Mike Gold's comments are his own and do not reflect that of the working group.

Peter J Brown is a freelance writer from the state of Maine, USA, who specializes in the global satellite arena.

(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online)

Indo-US Relations in the Second Manmohan Singh Administration

This essay on Indo-US relations in the second Manmohan Singh Administration first appeared on the IPCS website.

With a decisive mandate for the Congress (I)-led UPA government, the general assumption is that there will be continuity in India’s relations especially with the United States. With the Congress (I) not having to depend on the Left parties for support anymore, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be able to pursue the strategic partnership with the US with greater ease. The Left parties would have exercised a stronger say particularly in matters pertaining to US, China and Nepal, and have been overly critical about US-India defence agreement of 2005, the Indo-US nuclear deal and the strengthened defence and military ties with the US. The end-user monitoring agreements on American defence items supplied to India too would have come under the Left scanner. The defeat of the Left parties has particularly elated the NRI community who believe that the new government will not only take the economic relations to a higher level but also significantly strengthen the strategic ties between the two countries.



With the Congress (I) and Manmohan Singh at the helm of affairs, there could be easy passage of further economic reforms and of FDI into India. Opening up of sectors including telecom, retail, media and insurance can now be speeded up and fiscal reform measures will also be on the table that can get the country out of the economic downturn faster.

In fact, Manmohan Singh’s decision to call the Left a bluff and conclude the Indo-US nuclear deal proved his mettle and strong leadership qualities. Although the nuclear deal will enable it to meet about 3 percent of India’s energy needs, more significantly, the deal, as the Prime Minister saw it, got India out of the nuclear apartheid of more than three decades and put India on the global map as an important and responsible player.

While continuity is foreseen, there might be a few issues that one has to factor in India’s relations with the US. These concern nuclear issues, regional security issues including Kashmir and Pakistan, China, Iran and WTO and climate change issues.

The Democrats including Obama have been staunch opponents of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Now that the deal has been completed, their opposition cannot mean very much. However, there could possibly be some difficulties at the next stage of negotiations on operationalizing the deal. It should also be borne in mind that the Obama Administration will remain committed to non-proliferation goals, including Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) that will be pushed with greater vigour. The Obama Administration is also likely to strengthen its efforts to bring in countries like India, Pakistan and Israel into the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework, though it is unclear if this is just a declaratory posture ahead of the next year’s NPT Review Conference or something more serious. India not being a member of the NPT remains a major issue for the Democrats. Obama’s renewed interest in getting CTBT ratified by the US Senate and thereafter by other countries, including India and Pakistan could become a sore point in bilateral relations. On the other hand, India’s opposition to the CTBT has weakened somewhat, if one goes by the speech that Shyam Saran gave at the Brookings Institution recently.

Obama’s AfPak strategy linking Kashmir to the security of Afghanistan is not a very palatable one for India. This is exactly what Pakistan has always sought and it could possibly be a sticking point in India-US relations. Second, there is a clear gap between the US and India on their objectives vis-à-vis Afghanistan. The US has a limited objective – ensuring that the Taliban / al Qaeda do not use the Pakistan-Afghan territory to carry out terrorism against the US. For India, it is a much more complex issue of ensuring that Afghanistan does not fall back into the hands of Taliban and become a fertile ground for terrorism and instability in the region. India also disagrees with the US on dealing with Taliban by making a differentiation between good and bad Taliban. Besides, a deal with the Afghan Taliban may not bring much positive results when the effective command and control are with the ISI in Pakistan. Lastly, the US will be making the same mistakes as it did at the peak of the Cold War when it funded a large number of tribal groups. It must be kept in mind that over a period of time, these groups outsmart their masters and get out of control.

Finally, the nature of US-China relations will also affect Indo-US relations. A softer approach towards China is not something favourably looked upon by India as it happened, for example, during the Clinton administration, where they wanted to jointly manage South Asia. On the other hand, India does not want to see them become hostile to each other and get into a conflict situation, where India may be forced to take sides. Both of these situations could prove dangerous for India. Similarly, improved Indo-US relations will likely have a negative effect on Sino-India ties. In the same way, improved US-China relations will raise concerns in New Delhi and could affect both US-India as well as Sino-India relations.